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Dear Conference Participants:
On behalf of Trinity College and the Center for Urban and Global Studies, I would like to extend
a warm welcome to you for participating in this conference at Trinity. The Center plays the
central role in promoting Trinity's new strategic initiative of integrated urban and global
teaching, research, and engagement on campus, in Hartford, and globally. By organizing this
conference and bringing a number of you to campus, the Center is reaching out to develop
exchanges and cooperation with scholars and institutions, especially those in the greater New
England that may share a broad research interest in urban and global studies. This conference
will provide an open forum for both guest and Trinity scholars to present their research and
engaged in debates that aim at critiquing and advancing the current interdisciplinary scholarly
work on cities and communities in the context of globalization and transnationalism. I look
forward to some stimulating and fruitful intellectual dialogues and interactions over the next two
days. I hope that you will find the papers assembled in these proceedings useful and beneficial to
our digestion of the presentations and discussions. We are planning to produce a working paper
series and then an edited book based on a select set of the papers presented at this conference and
will be in touch with you shortly after the conference. I also hope the invited guest scholars will
have an enjoyable time on our beautiful campus. Finally, let me thank you for gathering here to
share your ideas and contribute your insights that will enrich this collective endeavor.

Xiangming Chen
Dean and Director
Center for Urban and Global Studies
Paul E. Raether Distinguished Professor of
Sociology and International Studies
Trinity College
Hartford, Connecticut
xiangming.chen@trincoll.edu

The Center for Urban and Global Studies at Trinity College is supported through the generosity
of The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and of donors to the Trinity College Mellon Challenge for
Urban and Global Studies.

Keynote Speaker I
"Destination Culture: How Globalization Makes All Cities Look the Same"

Sharon Zukin
Broeklundian Professor of Sociology, Brooklyn College -and City University
Graduate Center
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cultural creativity can renew their distinction. When the same idea, though, is applied in many
cities of the world, it results in an all too visible homogenization.

1

For years, economists and public officials have declared that the shift from making to
designing products heralds a new global division of labor, with workers in formerly industrial
cities and nations developing "higher" skills, with appropriately higher educations and wages.
During the first few decades of this structural change- from the 1970s to the l 990s- the loss of
jobs in textile, steel, and automobile production in the most economically developed nations was
supposed to be balanced by the creation of new, high tech jobs, with financial and other services
leading the new economy: Silicon Valley would replace Detroit, and Wall Street would be
decentralized to every bank or local office that could sell stocks and bonds. (We have recently
seen what benefits that brought us.) The rapid growth of both lower- and higher-level industries
in some less developed countries, leading to an economic drain from the previously dominant
industrial regions, sowed doubt about the expected progress toward a new stage of development
for all. In cultural terms, the distinction of these early industrial regions as makers of national
wealth and pace-setters for the world diminished with the outsourcing of traditional jobs.
Products that once signified "national" and " local" accomplishment were now made in other
places. This led to a confusion of cultural identity. Is a silk scarf from the Parisian fashion
house Hermes, properly speaking, no longer "French" if it is made in China? Is a computer
"American" if the components come from China and are assembled in Mexico? Certainly the
local communities whose lifeblood flowed through the mill and the factory no longer found in
these products a source of pride. For those political and business leaders who wanted to retain
the prestige and the reputation for creativity that these products had endowed, the label "Made in
France" or ''Made in the USA" was revised to focus on the activity of conception.
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At the same time, luxury products permeated what cam·e to be known as a global
consumer culture. Cheap airline tickets in the 1960s and 1970s had made it possible for even
middle class tourists to travel to Paris and capture an authentic souvenir of that city by buying a
bottle of Dior perfume or an Hermes scarf; by the 1980s, though, the worldwide marketing of
luxury products by rapidly expanding branded stores made both the local and the national
identity of these products weaker. Shoppers could buy "Hermes" in New York or Tokyo as well
as Paris, and eventually they could buy Hermes products in different Hermes stores in a single
big city, as well as in nearby department stores. This could, indeed, be one criterion of a Hglobal
city": offering more than two Hermes stores where the luxury brand is sold.
These changes were crystallized in the 1980s by the rise of the marketing paradigm we
know as branding. Cities as well as corporations struggled to create a distinctive image or brand
that would appeal in a larger, more democratic, and more fiercely competitive marketplace. Just
as consumer goods corporations proclaimed that the barely perceptible differences between their
products were signifiers of their distinctive identity, so the cities where these goods were
designed and sold marketed themselves to the rest of the world as creative capitals. To some
degree this was true, since the disposable income generated by the symbolic economy of finance ,
media, food, and fashion produced a large market for a11 kinds of creative work. Moreover,
tourists and investors brought their patronage for creative workers in art, theater, music, and
other cultural expressions and performances, as we11 as in cultural institutions like art museums
and commercial spaces like art ga11eries and auction houses, and even the cultural display of
stores. For a11 these reasons, competition between the largest cities to be global financial capitals
spi11ed over into a branding competition to become, as former mayor Rudolph Giuliani said
about New York, the "cultural capital of the world."2
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Today, the public imagery of branding connects cities' financial activity and cultural
creativity, and tourism and economic growth. While financial elites and elected officials
changed market rules in favor of a dangerous deregulation, they also promoted facilities for
cultural consumption. The result, by the 1990s, was that the physical landscape of global cities
did not separate creativity from consumption. Moreover, the symbolic landscape of financial
trading, art auctions, fashion shows, and hipster bars promoted not just an image of individuals
vying to show off their excessive wealth but of cities engaging in a similar competition.3
Smaller cities do not want to be excluded from these global games. If they don ' t house
major capital markets and can ' t draw the action of big auction houses, they compete for a place
on the global cultural circuit by developing art fairs , film festivals , and even Cow Parades where
painted fiberglass cows, or bison, or moose-depending on a city ' s chosen symbol--are installed
on the streets. Other repetitive events promote the creativity of local cultural industries. More
than 150 cities, from New York to Rio de Janeiro, hold an annual or a semi-annual Fashion
Week, and Design Festivals for the furniture trade stretch from London to Ljubljana. Modem art
museums have replaced factories as a symbol of collective wealth and a source of pride; every
city wants a "McGuggenheim." Even the Midwestern region around Gary, Indiana, long
overwhelmed by Chicago ' s dominance and tormented in recent years by the collapse of the U.S.
steel industry, has sent an economic development committee to Bilbao to investigate how
~ "', r • ..•

another former steelmaking city could be revitalized by the Guggenheim. Keeping ahead of the
competition is expensive, though, and officials of even the biggest cities complain when they
realize that they can never do enough to maintain their city ' s lead. "We see ourselves as being in
a competitive race with other cities from around the world," Daniel Doctoroff, the former New
York City deputy mayor for economic development, recently said to a meeting of high-level
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cultural administrators and CEOs. "Many of [them] are trying to copy us, whether deliberately,
or in some cases, unintentionally .. . .They ' re stealing our cultural institutions. There's a
Guggenheim all over the world now. "

4

Certainly cultural competition is not the only way to explain the overwhelming force of
standardization in global cities and would-be global contenders. In the early 1960s, the urbanist
Jane Jacobs blamed the twentieth-century modernizers who worshipped progress and planned to
rebuild all cities with right angles and straight lines. As architects and urban planners, they
developed the intellectual tools and aesthetic styles that resulted in homogenized superblocks and
high-rise towers, creating what Jacobs called "the great blight of dullness." Alternatively, from
an economic point of vi ew , the geographer David Harvey sees the homogenization of cities
resulting from the actions of investors, who tend to withdraw capital from one area or type of
investment and shift it to another in a concerted effort to maximize profits. If developers can
make more money and have less political interference by building ranch homes in the suburbs,
they ' ll do so; but when that becomes too difficult or costly, they ' ll switch to building loftapartments downtown. Concerted development strategies are intensified by the global
investment portfolios that have grown enormously in recent years. Whether they are sovereign
funds of foreign countries or transnational real estate investment trusts, they target an
increasingly wide range of buildings and construction projects, all tending to make the centers of
cities more expensive and driving poorer residents to the periphery. 5
Like everyone else, investors, developers, and officials are also influenced by the flow of
ideas and strategies- " traveling ideas," as the urban planning researchers Malcolm Tait and Ole
Jensen, call them. These ideas may respond to specific demands in one city or another, or they
may just stir people ' s interest. When they are applied in one city after another, though , they lead
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to "McGuggenization." Often developers choose a competitive response that copies what others
are doing if that has proven to get media attention, local government's support, or higher sale
prices for the finished product. As a result, star architects like Richard Meier are hired to design
a new apartment house in a poor location, or Frank Gehry is commissioned to design a sports
stadium as a centerpiece of~ problematic big urban development. Moreover, both traveling
ideas and competitive strategies are seriously promoted by business and professional groups that
lobby for them in meetings with colleagues around the world, leading to cities in different
regions sharing the same strategy. The net result is a treadmill of competition that enforces
homogenization. Because it's difficult to come up with new ideas, competition condemns cities
to create ever more places that aim to be distinctive, but look just the same. Like the aspirational
consumption of contemporary consumers who buy high-status goods in the hope of expressing
the high status they would like to have, cities engage in aspirational production, producing more
modem art museums, arts festivals, hipster districts, and cafes- all because they want to be

different. 6
The value of these outposts of difference is nearly always calculated in financial terms.
When the artists Christo and Jeanne-Claude installed hundreds of bright orange flags in Central
Park in the middle of winter in 2005, New York City tourism officials estimated that four million
visitors came to see The Gates and bought so many souvenirs to benefit local nonprofit arts and
environmental organizations that they poured $250 miJiion into the city's economy. For this
reason, the officials and the media judged the event to be a great success--though Central Park
was already attracting more visitors than any other city park in the country. As beautiful as the
installation was, The Gates did not confirm New York's uniqueness. It was only one of Christo
and Jeanne-Claude's many well-known projects that the artists have created since the 1970s by
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wrapping huge swathes of fabric around notable sites, from Berlin's Reichstag to Sydney's Little
Bay. The Gates was a high-class variation on the Cow Parade, a temporary version of
Guggenheim Bilbao, a way to place the Christo brand for a few weeks in New York City.
Moreover, the apparent success of The Gates encouraged the New York city government to
repeat the experience of installing large-scale public art with the specially designed and built
waterfa1ls of Olafur Eliasson in summer, 2008, and several months later- in a transparent
exercise of corporate branding- the installation in Central Park once again of the Chanel Mobile
Art Container, designed by the celebrated architect Zaha Hadid, and circulating around Hong
Kong, Tokyo, New York, London, Moscow, and Paris. 7
These cultural strategies do bring several important benefits to elected officials. First,
they suggest that all cities can be winners. Second, unlike old smokestacks and docks, they 're
clean. Third, like shopping centers and Business Improvement Districts, they make people feel
safe, and they create a sense of belonging. The Gates, the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao, and
the Cow Parade, as Jean Baudrillard once wrote about the Centre Pompidou in Paris, are a part of
the "hypermarket of culture ' that keeps people enthralled, "in a state of integrated mass." As a
result, public art insta1lations, modem art museums, and festivals have become a pervasive and
an influential part of cities ' toolkit to encourage entrepreneurial innovation and creativity,
cleanse public spaces of visible signs of moral decay, and compete with other capitals of the
symbolic economy of finance , media, art, and tourism. 8
These cultural strategies aim to resolve problems of a local identity crisis. But whether
they also create traveling ideas that migrate around the world, or respond to the same structural
needs, or just inspire imitation, they homogenize cities ' distinctive look and feel. Regardless of
how spectacular or creative the desired effect, the net result is an unintended standardization.

8

Three different kinds of cultural attractions show how this amazing likeness works: the
downtown shopping and entertainment district, the modem art museum, and the cultural hub.

Times Square
During most of the 20 th century, Times Square developed a worldwide reputation as a
vigorous entertainment center- featuring everything from Broadway shows and movie theaters
to bright neon lights, billboard advertisements, and milling crowds- at all hours of the day and
night. At the beginning of the century, its cosmopolitan aura enabled New Yorkers to call it,
with some exaggeration, "the crossroads of the world."· In terms of national aspirations, Times
Square was both the geographical and metaphorical center of American popular culture. Men
and women gathered there to read the latest headlines spooling off the huge, electric Motogram
sign, and it was in Times Square that Alfred Eisenstadt took his famous photograph, published in
Life magazine, of a sailor sweeping a young woman off her feet and kissing her to celebrate the

end of World War II. Times Square continued to draw visitors, including families with children,
through the 1960s. But as a heavily traveled, camivalesque area of the city, it also drew men and
women looking for casual encounters with strangers, often involving the rough trade of sex and
drugs. Because private real estate developers showed no interest in the area, the city government
proposed several different projects, none of which attracted much attention- until the 1980s,
when corporate investors planned to build skyscraper offices that would erase the district ' s
historic roughness and neon glitter, as well as its seediness. This plan stirred so much opposition
that the project was delayed for several years, until potential financing disappeared in the stock
market's decline after 1987. 9
Much of the opposition came from the men and women who supported historic
preservation and led many of the city's cultural institutions. Spearheaded by the Municipal Art
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Society, opponents campaigned to protect the historic authenticity of Times Square by aesthetic
means: by preserving its look. They proposed a law requiring each building in the district to
wear a large illuminated sign on its fa9ade- making each building, in effect, a giant electronic
billboard. Broadway theaters, threatened with being sold by those who owned the land on which
they stood and swallowed up by new office development, inspired another new law. This law
enabled theater owners to sell "air rights," important for the opportunity they offer to build a
much taller building on the site, to ·o wners of nearby properties. The sale of air rights would
protect the concent_ration oflow-rise theater buildings on the side streets while skyscrapers rose
on the broad avenues around them, beginning on Broadway itself. At the same time, the New
York City Police Department began vigorous sweeps of the sidewalks and porno shops,
removing the pimps, hustlers, and hyperventilating, overwhelmingly male customers who made
42

nd

Street after dark so menacing, especially to women. For added force, the city government

condemned properties occupied by porno shops that refused to change their stock or close, using
the law of eminent domain to seize them "for the public good" and sell them to real estate
developers who would replace them with Jess troublesome businesses.
The combination of "aesthetic legislation," policing, and eminent domain prepared Times
Square for a change of popular culture, one that relied, not coincidenta11y, on the Disney
Company. The well-known New York architect Robert A. M. Stem linked these strategies, for
he both served on Disney's corporate board and oversaw a local planning study of how to
preserve the Broadway theater district. Stern recalls noting, when passing through Times Square
one day in the late 1980s, how many people, especially women, came to matinee performances at
the area's theaters by chartered bus from their homes in the suburbs. He then came up-so he
recalls- with the idea of building attractions that would make Times Square safe enough for
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these visitors to feel at home there. Luckily, by the early 1990s, the Disney Company was also
thinking about expanding their business by producing shows for the commercial theater that
would feature their film characters and theme park rides. Placing Disney on Broadway, then,
was an attractive prospect for both the urban planners and the corporation.
Locating Disney in T.imes Square suggested a healthy synergy between the familyoriented popular culture of Disney entertainment and the moral renewal the city government
desired. With new laws protecting space in the district for legitimate Broadway theaters, private
developers began to plan new entertainment facilities for corporate tenants who wanted to be
near the Disney beachhead. In the 1990s, when Disney still seemed an invincible corporate giant
with universal popular appeal, the company opened a Disney store on Times Square and
renovated a historic' theater, the New Amsterdam, next door, for the premiere of "Beauty and the
Beast." They were soon joined by the youth-oriented cable music network MTV and a slew of
themed restaurants, bars, and performance spaces with well-known brand names--from Madame
Tussaud's Wax Museum and Virgin Megastore to B. B. King's Blues Club and a Hello, Kitty
store.
By financial measures, the new Times Square has been a rousing success. Every year, 26
million visitors come to gawk at the bright lights, eat at the restaurants, shop at Toys 'R' Us, and,
if they can afford $100 tickets, go to the theater. The area's impact, according to the Times
Square Alliance, a local business group, equals the combined economies of Bolivia and Panama.
Entertainment is not the only type of business represented in Times Square. While the cultural
attractions bring crowds that fill the area from 42 nd to 50 th Street, day and night, Times Square is
ringed by corporate office towers for the main job-providing sectors of the city's symbolic
economy- media and finance- just the types of businesses that are most vulnerable to global
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financial downturns. The headquarters of Conde Nast, the Hearst Corporation, and the New
York Times are near Times Square, as well as the headquarters of NASDAQ, and the late,
lamented offices of Lehman Brothers and Morgan Stanley, as well as many corporate law firms .
Media and entertainment may either keep the district bright despite financial retrenchment, or
decline as they did during the Great Depression, when the commercial theaters of 42 nd Street
degenerated into burlesque houses and cheap movie theaters.
From the beginning of its renewal in the 1990s, though, Times Square has suffered from
a homogeni zed plastic entertainment culture._ Critics have complained bitterly of
" Di sneyfication"--a bland, mind-numbing sameness of corporate brand names, bad food , and
banal entertainment. Branches of transnational businesses like Madame Tussaud ' s deny the
unique location, detaching it from the city ' s history and from the area ' s pop culture roots in live
performance. Despite pulsating neon billboards and crowds that make the asphalt ripple with
expectation, Times Square has become a fast food franchise of popular entertainment. It
represents a standardized consumer culture that, despite the prominence of its live-action events,
like the dropping of a glittering ball from the top of the Times Tower on New Year's Eve, risks
being a cliche.

Guggenheim Bilbao
Beginning in the 1960s, when the French government planned to create the Pompidou
Center of Modern Art, in Paris, modem art museums have been asked to fulfill three different
roles: as a magnet of urban redevelopment, a symbol of the nation's prestige, and an energizer of
human capital in terms of creativity and innovation. The museums are nearly always located on
land that has lost its industrial uses and its economic value- often on the waterfront-and the
acquisition of this land is financed by the state. In Paris, the state planned to locate the Centre
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Pompidou on a terrain vague of low-rent, dilapidated housing, small workshops, and cheap
shops between the not-yet-gentrified Marais and the not-yet-demolished wholesale food markets
of les Hailes: the plateau Beaubourg. Through an international competition, a state-appointed
commission chose a startling industrial design that exposed pipes and other parts of the
building' s structure, painted in bright colors, was intended to represent a set of progressive
programs and institutions that would force Paris (and, by extension, France) to become a
dominant player on international modem art and music circuits. It wasn ' t only the design that
challenged French tradition. Awarding the commission to foreigners- the young British
architect Richard Rogers and the Italian Renzo Piano-created a precedent for going outside
national borders to showcase the client's innovation. Since this strategy was quickly copied by
other clients around the world, it led to architects ' rising reputations as "starchitects" as well as
the globalization of their practices and the branding of their signature styles. By the 1990s, when
local leaders in Bilbao and Hong Kong planned large cultural districts on the waterfront, their
thoughts turned to how these cultural facilities and their designers could help their city to
achieve, or retain, a presence in global financial markets.
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New cultural districts do attract media attention . An increasing number of art magazines,
travel guides, and Internet websites dedicated to cities and leisure promote new cultural scenes as
places to go. Although the public may have no idea of what art, exactly, is showcased in the new
facilities, they hear the "buzz" about them. Lower air fares , more free time, and a stronger
emphasis on individual mobility encourage cultural tourism, especially among the wealthy,
highly educated men and women who likely collect such experiences as signs of their distinction .
Young people, even from overseas, are attuned to the emergence of these cultural districts, and to
individual cultural institutions, in a way that locals are not. The big open space in front of the
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Pompidou Center has been filled with tourists and buskers, young people and break dancers,
many of them not French, from the time the museum opened. Meanwhile, the big open space in
front of the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao is generally empty except for tourists.
Un]ike the Pompidou Center, which is owned and run by the French government,
Guggenheim Bilbao is an outpost of the global chain of Guggenheim museums. Conceived as an
attention-getting symbol of the city ' s triple goal--breaking loose from declining industries,
cleaning the detritus of steel mills and shipyards from the waterfront, and carrying out a
blood]ess counter-terrorist campaign against Basque separatists, the ~useum had many local
uses . But, like the corporate leaders of the Disney Company who decided to set up shop in
Times Square, the director of the Guggenheim Museum, based in Manhattan, was already primed
for expansion. Since the mid 1980s, Thomas Krens had planned to open several branches in
other cities of the world as well as sponsor a new Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art
(MassMoCA) in North Adams, a declining industrial town in the Berkshire Mountains of New
England . The Guggenheim Museum had more art works than it had exhibition space to show
them ; many recently acquired works and installations were so large they required galleries of
their own.
Like the Times Square project, the revitalization of Bilbao' s industrial waterfront
embodied a desired synergy between the strategies of Basque business leaders and urban
planners and of Krens , a cultural entrepreneur. Like Times Square, the Pompidou Center, and
other new cultural districts around the world, Guggenheim Bilbao would be joined by new shops
and upscale apartment houses : real estate development. But unlike most other cities, Bilbao had
a broader, more ambitious strategy to modernize urban infrastructure by organizing competitions
for the design of subways, bridges, and airport terminals. The main point, though, was the same:
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to join the best of global design and local fabrication to craft a set of new urban symbols. This
represented an extraordinary break from the inwardness of local traditions toward an outward-

.
·
11
}ook mg
tounst economy.
With both the selection of art inside the galleries and the design of the museum in relation
to the wider urban context, Guggenheim Bilbao has challenged traditional Basque identity. The
architect Frank Gehry intended the curved, silver-color titanium panels of the museum ' s fac;ade
to represent the waves of the Nervion River and to suggest the toughness of the blast furnaces
that used to be nearby. But the museum ' s sinuous shape and flashy reflections oflight could just
as well suggest a cosmopolitan glamour- the glamour of the actress Marilyn Monroe, as Herbert
Muschamp, the late architecture critic of the New York Times, wrote when he visited the museum
at its opening in 1997. The building suggests an " American style of freedom ," Muschamp says.
"'That style is voluptuous, emotional, intuitive and exhibitionist. " Nothing could be farther from
either traditional Biskaian culture or attitudes in Bilbao, a city that in the past had rejected both
the minimalist steel sculptures of the American artist Richard Serra and the work of modem

. Jorge O te1za.
. 12
B asque artist
Since the shipyards and steel mills had not yet been demolished when Muschamp wrote
this, it was easier for him then than it would be for a visitor today to say that Gehry was inspired
th

by Bilbao ' s 19 -century industrial power. But Gehry transformed the city ' s industrial heritage
into an abstract form , and the museum itself replaced a factory that, by some accounts, was still
in working order. These material transformations of the built environment represent the
museum's dominant position in the city, where it both overlooks the city center and takes the
major share of the regional government's cultural fundin g. It is also important that all the
exhibitions feature work by overseas artists. This is perhaps a good thing for Bilbao, a
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historically inward looking city in a separatist province, where the local Fine Arts Museum has
an excellent collection of historical local work but lacks a strong modem art collection. Yet it
defies the goal of integrating the new cultural district with local artists. Related to this issue, the
museum receives more visits from tourists than from local residents. Ticket prices are high for
people in Bilbao, where the youth unemployment rate is 60 percent. Hotel prices are also high
for Spanish tourists. Visitors tend to come once, stay one or two nights, and leave without seeing
the rest of the city.
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Business and political leaders in Bilbao have been praised for taking their future into t~eir
hands by welcoming change and developing a cultural strategy of revitalization. But exactly the
same vision has shaped strategies in quite a few other cities. From Melbourne to Manchester,
hopes for cultural-led redevelopment have led to an endless series of waterfront cultural centers,
cultural festivals, and cultural competitions. The European Union promotes these aspirations by
funding the annual selection of a European Capital of Culture, which, like the Olympics, goads
each city to rebuild its old industrial districts with flagship cultural projects. ln a similar sort of
competition- but without the regional supports--Asian cities develop their own flagship cultural
·
14
proJects.

But the repetition of these projects raises serious questions. Does it lead to the imposition
of a single mold of creativity- one that excludes traditional artists? Does it exc1ude local
residents because they are neither producers nor consumers of art that wins the attention of
global gatekeepers, like art and lifestyle magazines, or of overseas investors? ln the nineteenth
century, industrial Bilbao was closely connected to European bankers and English factories that
invested in its steel mills and shipyards. But today's modem art museums are, in many ways,
incubators of a new globalization. They are not just sources of pleasure and learning, but
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technologies of power that force urban cultures to open up to the outside, adapt to transnational
markets, and become more cosmopolitan in a single, recognized way.

15

50 Moganshan Lu
Less monumental in size than a cultural district but equa1ly ambitious in its vision of the
future, the "creative hub" is·an effort to remake the production side of urban culture. The hub is
an intentional cluster of artists and designers in a neighborhood or a building complex.
Sometimes it is subsidized by the state, like the creative hubs sponsored by the London
Development Agency since 2004, but often it emerges as a spontaneous cluster of young artists,
musicians, and performers, like the artists' districts of SoHo (Manhattan), Williamsburg
(Brooklyn), and Hoxton (London), as well as the short-lived ''Silicon Alley" of lower Manhattan.
Many cities have the material requirements for these clusters to form: low-rent areas of formerly
industrial, or even office, buildings that are near to both financial and media firms that will buy
creative work, often on a free-lance basis, and to low-price shops, bars, and restaurants, whose
ethnic and working class cultures provide a diversity of source material and a feeling of
authenticity. From the viewpoint of young cultural workers, sharing the streets with immigrants
and workers helps to create a neo-Bohemia of creative energy. It also reproduces the edginess of
the city's traditional unexpected encounters with strangers- and Strangeness: new cultural
production thrives on the jagged edges of uneven development, in areas that have not yet been
sanitized or Disneyfied. 16
These lessons have been taken by entrepreneurial business and political leaders in the
rapidly growing economies of Asia, especially in cities like Shanghai where old industries are
moving out and relocating to lower-cost regions of China, and city and district officials want to
encourage new types of development. Though it is risky for local governments to support new
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art, which may be critical of the party"and state, they may support cultural hubs as evidence of
their city ' s, and China 's, creativity. A small number of creative hubs formed in Beijing and
Shanghai during the 1990s and early 2000s on the initiative of individual artists
In Shanghai, the artist Xue Song moved into studio space in a vacant, l 930s-era factory
complex at 50 Moganshan Lu, near the Suzhou River, owned by Shangtex, a large textile and
apparel holding company that had moved to a new development zone on the Pudong side of the
river, near the airport. Not only artists, but also business and political leaders saw the site's
potential as a cultural hub, especially in light of the success of Factory 798, a complex of artists'
studios and galleries that had opened in Beijing in 200 I and quickly spurred the development of
a hip area of ga11eries, cafes, and boutiques. Artists in Shanghai, attracted by the cheap rents and
location in the center of a rapidly growing, cosmopolitan--city, rapidly moved into the Shangtex
site; they were joined by individual cultural entrepreneurs from Europe and the United States
who opened galleries of contemporary Chinese art, displaying work that until recently had not
only been discouraged but even banned by government and party leaders. This work now
appeared to be a positive attraction for foreign tourists and investors, who were as eager to
"discover" new Chinese artists in gritty industrial surroundings in Shanghai as to find the work
of other artists in similar surroundings in SoHo or the East End. Shangtex became an eager
patron- or landlord- of new artists, for the company prides itself on its innovative union of
technology and fashion to produce new synthetic fibers for the clothing industry. Moreover, 50
Moganshan Lu enjoyed the support of local party and government officials. In 2002 , the
Municipal Economic Committee named the 21-building complex an official industrial park; two
years later, this title was changed to '"art industrial park."
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Building a creative hub at 50 Moganshan Lu suits Shanghai's ambition to become a
global city that surpasses its close competitors--Hong Kong and Beijing-as both a financial and
a cultural center, a capital of the symbolic economy. Spaces are occupied by a variety of
creative concerns: art galleries, graphic arts, architects', and design studios, and TV and film
production facilities. Not surprisingly, the hub's self-claimed branding strategy capitalizes on
aesthetic and spatial representations that originated in the United States and have migrated to
Europe and Asia: its slogan is "Suzhou creek/Soho/loft." As the hub's website states, these
connections "embody that M50 [50 Moganshan Lu] is an integration of history, culture, art,
vogue [sic], and originality." A meeting ground between the old loft buildings of Manhattan's
SoHo and the new titanium marvel of Guggenheim Bilbao, Moganshan Lu is intended to
upgrade the polluted waterfront, show a good way to re-use old buildings rather than tear them
down, and bring technology together with art. To justify the effort, the management evokes not
just the appearance, but the experience of authenticity: "The shabby factory buildings contain
certain value, because the naked steel structure as well as the old brick walls and the mottled
concrete make people feel the trueness and perfection of being existent." Urban culture can't get
more ambitious than this. 18
Moganshan Lu has proved to be popular with artists and tourists from overseas as well as
from different regions of China. Visits are recommended by foreign guidebooks and websites
dedicated to Shanghai, to the art world, and to tourism. The afternoon that I visited, a few
foreign tourists were eating lunch in the small cafe and looking around the open galleries,
although when there are special exhibitions, several hundred visitors may come by in a single
day. Some of the artists who show their work there come from Hong Kong and Taiwan; they
find the cost of living lower on the mainland, and they have access in Shanghai to an
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international market. While a portion of the art is traditional in style, much more is almost
shockingly modem and ironic, making parodies of Maoist-era artifacts and poses or suggesting
that some of the more blatant results of the booming consumer society in China are as grotesque
as the bourgeois capitalists caricatured by the German Expressionists of the early 1900s.
The danger is that 50 Moganshan Lu is not successful enough either to complement or to
counter Shanghai ' s aggressive demolition of old buildings and districts . Although the city
government aims to clean the Suzhou River and develop a pedestrian-friendly, green zone along
its banks, construction crews continue to work day and night- tearing down factories like 50
th

Moganshan Lu and destroying the old city that grew up around them during the 20 century.
Neither do creative hubs like Moganshan Lu benefit all artists. Some individual artists have
become very successful ; their work commands high prices and sells mainly to foreign tourists
and at auctions overseas. But other artists find it hard to pay even the low rents at 50 Moganshan
Lu. Since land prices are very high in the center of the city, most artists cannot afford to live
there. Some artists have moved their studios to less expensive space on the edge of the city,
preferring to use Moganshan Lu as gallery space to se11 their work.
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A Final Note
New York, Bilbao, and Shanghai have different economies and are governed by different
political institutions. Their cultures, though cosmopolitan, have different roots and forms of
expression. But these cities, like so many others around the world, have been persuaded that
culture will restore a sense of distinction that will make them desirable and competitive. The
measure of culture is difficult to determine. Benefits, if not financial , are impossible to calculate.
The question that suffuses their efforts, though, is whether the pursuit of distinction ends in
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homogenization. Globalization may tum out to be a cruel Darwinian evolution, selecting certain
elements of cities for preservation while blending others into a fusion.
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There is lawful violence wherever violence contributes to the creation of that which it
is used against, or as Marx says, wherever capture contributes to the creation of that
which it captures.
Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia ( 1987) 1

Hailing the Twelve Million
Amidst the current deadlock over immigration reform in the United States, it has become
a commonplace to hear legislators of every stripe disavow any intention to deport the estimated
twelve million undocumented persons residing in the country.2 In 2004, anticipating debates over
proposed immigration legislation, then- Homeland Security Undersecretary _Asa Hutchinson
called any demand to arrest and deport the millions "unrealistic" and acknowledged that his
agency lacked the manpower and finances to conduct an operation on such a scale, arguing that
"I don ' t think America has the will. . .I think they have too much compassion to tell our law
enforcement people to go out there and uproot ... [people who] might have been here 8 or 12
years, who got kids here that are American citizens."3 As successive legislative reforms have
since failed in the U.S. Congress, government officials have been less willing to affirm the good
will of citizens toward the undocumented population. But with the exception of a few far-right
candidates, the 2006 and 2008 election cycles brought renewed declarations that the government
would not, and could not expel the twelve million. Former Tennessee Senator Fred Thompson
told Chris Wallace of Fox News Sunday, "Look it's just not realistic that we ' re going to round up
1
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12 million people and ship them all out of the country." The electoral cycle brought with it a
tacit agreement among politicians to suspend any further efforts at addressing immigration
policy, given the volatility of the issue and the failure of both parties to achieve consensus on
policy change.
Even the rise of Democratic leadership seems to promise little movement toward
resolving the crisis. During an October 17, 2008 interview with The Associated Press,
Democratic House Speaker Nancy Pelosi looked ahead ·10 the likely Democratic sweep in the
presidential, house, and senatorial elect~ons with exuberant hopes for party economic and health
care platforms. But the Speaker spoke in far more tempered terms about the Democrat' s agenda
for reviving the stalled overhaul of immigration policy. Pelosi began with the seemingly
obligatory statement that the twelve million could not be deported: "We cannot send them all
home, and we cannot send them to jail, so we have to address it." 5 Rather than describe a
solution, however Pelosi all but conceded what had been the cornerstone of progressive policy some form of legalization - to the opposition. Achieving bipartisan agreement, she argued,
could require "sacrificing ... past priorities." 6 Unlike the Bush-appointed Hutchinson, Pelosi
could not commit to "compassionate" reform; while Hutchinson recognized undocumented
people as members of U.S. society, Pelosi could only affirm "they are part of the U.S. economy."
"Maybe there never is a path to citizenship if you came here il1ega11y," Pelosi concluded. "I
would hope that there could be, but maybe there isn ' t."

4

Fred Thompson, interview with Chris Wallace, FOX News Sunday, 11 March 2007.
Pelosi, quoted in Julie Hirschfeld Davis, "Pelosi says tax rebate unlikely before Bush leaves,"
The Associated Press (October 17, 2008), online at
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5hmzyiVIIB2w-pCeJrPL8q U3y5DKgD93 SJF A00
6
Paraphrase of remarks by Nancy Pelosi. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, "Pelosi says tax rebate unlikely
before Bush leaves"
5

3

Although Democrats have spoken out against the most radical elements of restrictionist
policies, they have largely adopted the discourse of criminalization as their own. Speaking to a
leading national Latino civil rights agency, the National Council of La Raza, Senator Barack
Obama called for comprehensive reforms, with a pathway to citizenship for the undocumented.
The presidential candidat~ continued in his attempt to reconcile the proposed legalization with
the view that unauthorized border crossing constitutes a crime, worthy of penalty: "Yes they
broke the law, and we should not excuse that. .. but we cannot - and should not- deport 12
million people. That would turn America into something we're not, something we don't want to
be." 7 Obama denounced ongoing ICE raids for terrorizing communities and dividing families,
and decried the "hateful rhetoric" framing the immigration debate. Still, the new Obama
administration appears unlikely to press forward with its immigration agenda. Over the past two
election cycles, Illinois Congressman Rahm Emanuel, the president-elect's Chief of Staff,
backed off from Party commitments to immigration reform, arguing that Democrats would not
pursue comprehensive legislation until the second term of the presidential administration. 8
Having seen reform bills fail twice in Congress, Emanuel called immigration reform the "third
rail" of U.S. politics, adding defensively, "And anyone who does not realize that isn't with the
American people."9
The Democratic retreat on immigration has occasioned little outcry amidst the euphoria
accompanying Barack Obama's election to the presidency, a victory broadly understood as the
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defeat of white primacy, if not the inauguration of "postracial" politics in the U.S. Nonetheless,
the inertia of government leadership on pressing immigration reforms represents gross
negligence toward an intolerable situation in which the status of millions remains undetermined.
The long stretch of the two-year presidential campaigns marked a period of unprecedented
aggression by immigration law enforcement, with DHS coordinating mass arrests, detention, and
deportation within a national dragnet of unparalleled scale - targeted against nonviolent persons
whose legal offenses were overwhelmingly limited to civil violations of immigration codes, and
not criminal acts.
Given the current context, it is worth scrutinizing the frequency with which politicians
declare the impossibility of deporting the 12 million. The very declaration hails the "twelve
miHion" as a discrete, separate class of nonnational subjects, subject to exceptional action by the
nation-state. The compulsory disavowal of a project of mass deportation be1ies the actual scope
of detentions and removals already underway. But far more important, the negative declaration
has an additional, less visible intent: to deny one form of violent exclusion in favor of another.
That is, the government retreat from immigration reform is itself a form of policy, one that
commits the nation-state to a peculiar govemmentality with regards to the undocumented. The
simultaneous refusal to engage a project of total expulsion, while also withholding a path to
legalization, constitutes the undocumented as a distinct order of political subject, one whose
entitlement to civil and human rights protections remains dangerously indeterminate. By refusing
to engage in mass deportations, the U.S. government evades the conversion of undocumented
residents into the aggrieved subjects of gross human rights violations. By deferring any program
of legalization, the state places the entitlements of citizenship beyond the reach of millions of
people; people whose class status and longstanding residence in the U.S. makes it un1ikely for
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most to obtain full citizenship anywhere else. Neither the bare subjects of human rights, nor
subjects who qualify for the plenitude of citizenship protections, the undocumented occupy a
position of what I would tenn minimal subjectivity . Minimal because the undocumented have
been subjected to a criminalizing discourse that renders their status abject in relation to that of
the citizen; minimal because their unrecognized status renders the undocumented vulnerable to
an almost total abridgement of their social relatedness as materialized in actual kinship ties, and
communal belonging. And, as the ultimate fate of the undocumented as a class remains
suspended within the legislature, the criminalization of unauthorized migrants has imposed a
violent process of subjectivation within the law, one which effects a type ofradical
depersonalization of the entire populace- by exposing a smaller percentage of undocumented
persons to detention and removal in exceedingly aggressive epi~odes of immigration law
enforcement.

l'

_'I

I

As evidence, l offer the case of my own city of New Haven, Connecticut. When the City
Board of Aldermen approved a municipal identification card program on June 4, 2007- an
initiative designed to ameliorate the situation of undocumented city residents by improving their
access to city services and police protections - the response from federal immigration authorities
was swift and severe. Two days later, federal law enforcement agents conducted a mass sweep
though the city ' s Latino neighborhood, arresting and detaining thirty-two people, in what
appeared to be a deliberate use of the ICE program "Operation Return to Sender" for political
ends. Publicly released email correspondence among officials at the Connecticut U.S.
Attorney 's Office and the federal Department of Homeland Security' s Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) unit point to a concerted effort to use force to dissuade city officials in New
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Haven from "proceeding with the ID cards and making New Haven 'a sanctuary city. "' 10 The
retaliatory nature of the raids demonstrates an overt use of force to sustain a policy of total denial
of civic membership to the undocumented. The show of federal power represents a systemic
disposition toward violence in defending the sovereign power of the state against any challenge
to its monopoly on recognizing citizens, including this most limited, entirely localized initiative
to confer belonging on those without legal status.
The message of the New Haven raids, as in other cities, was clear: federal authorities
would not tolerate any effort to reconstitute the criminalized population as rights-bearing,
political subjects apart from the nation-state. The raids taught both immigrant advocates and
anti-immigrant groups alike a second lesson: that in defending its sovereign authority, the state
need not take recourse to wholesale process of deportation. The limited show of force installed a
regime of govemmentality defined by fear and crisis; one that exerts force both within and
external to the state, by conjuring a social imaginary in which the vaster project of expulsion is
possible, perhaps even inevitable. As New Haven joined hundreds of other localities affected by
the unparalleled campaign of ICE raids on workplaces and immigrant neighborhoods, DHS
officials released their figures for what deporting the twelve million might entail in terms of
expenditure. The calculated costs of such an operation, an estimated 94 billion dollars, featured
prominently in Congressional hearings on ICE operations in September of 2007. 11 Given that this
figure, which did not include the price of locating the undocumented or paying court costs,
represents more than twice the entire annual budget for the Department Homeland Security ($35
billion), the question of mass deportation remained entirely a matter of speculative thinking.
10
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But while we might be thankful for the apparent distaste of federal legislators for an
operation of total expulsion, the mere act of imagining such an eventuality is symptomatic of
something larger at work. That is, the deliberation over the price of a policy universally
recognized as tantamount to social cleansing moves mass deportation from the status of the
unthinkable to the imaginable, justifiable realm of state violence. In this way, state discourse has
mobilized a legal and social imaginary tied to the exceptional violence entailed in expelling
twelve million people, so as to normalize the more embedded and systemic violence of its
current policies. By relegating mass deportation to the abstract realm of virtual politics, state
officials have created a system that need only occasionally resort to overt shows of force - as in
the Postvi1le, Iowa raids of May 12, 2008 - in order to achieve its ends. 12 The more
fundamental , and pervasive expressions of violence relating to the criminalization of migrants found in the language of governance, policing, detention, and court proceedings, remains
hegemonic, and seemingly without remedy in the political realm. Against the negative example
of mass deportation, then, another regime of socia] cJeansing has been insta1led, one which
achieves the status of more ordinary, rationalized - and therefore Jess easily contested - terror.
This regime of cJeansing operates by nuJlifying the socia] protections of embeddedness and
relatedness that migrants have achieved as co-workers, co-residents, and co-familiars in
communities across the country.

The Governmentality of Social Cleansing
12

The largest single-site workplace raid in U.S. history, during which over I 00 ICE agents
entered the AgriProcessors, Inc. plant in Postville, Iowa, detaining hundreds of employees.
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In what follows, this essay examines the expansive use of punitive force against Latino
migrants within the current immigration enforcement regime. I argue that the transfer of federal
responsibilities for immigration enforcement to local police and private security officers exceeds
the bounds of border regulation, creating a climate in which law enforcement may become the
instrument of social cleansing. I locate my analysis in Northwest Arkansas, where the rapid
growth of the Latino population led local officials to enact anti-immigrant policies in defense of
white ethnic primacy in the region. By reviewing an incident involving the brutal mistreatment
of a Mexican woman in police custody, I aim to show how state violence has obtained renewed
popular sanction during the war on terror, with grave implications for human rights and the rule
of law across the transnational migratory circuit.
To speak of Latino migration to the U.S. is simultaneously to recognize the longstanding
patterns of exclusion and repression at work within current immigration law enforcement, and to
observe the unsettling portents of a perhaps more threatening future confronting noncitizens and
racialized communities in the new century. The expansion of state powers for the surveillance,
detention, and removal of criminalized noncitizens represents a concerted assault on the
integrity, autonomy, and mobility of the Latino population as a whole during a period of
unprecedented demographic growth and change. The heightened violence of current policing
practices imperils human and civil rights across the Americas, as it escalates in relation to the
mass exodus of poor migrants from the south, and draws legitimacy from the U.S. sponsored war
on terror.
I use the concept of social cleansing to indicate the willful conversion of racialized
noncitizens into criminalized targets for selective punishment and removal. As the Department of
Homeland Security has enmeshed migrant detainees within the prison industrial complex, it has
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appropriated and expanded its apparatus of detention and bondage for a transnational regime of
immigration policing. Punitive immigration enforcement may now confer an irredeemably alien
status on the reviled unauthorized migrant - one that places noncitizen detainees beyond the
reach of legal relief or hope of reintegration into the communities where they live and labor. As
such, the expansive use of force in militarized workplace raids and neighborhood sweeps signals
a dangerous opportunity for the state to engage in social cleansing, and for the indefinite
suspension of basic democratic restraints on state power.
So too, I invoke "social cleansing" in order to connote its Latin American referent,
limpieza social, and connect these processes within the boundaries of the United States with the
greater human rights crisis accompanying mass emigration from the south. State-sanctioned
processes of selective punishment and exclusion in the United States bear growing importance to
the violent processes of social regulation that shape the Latin American migratory circuit. The
rising index of anti-immigrant violence in Central America and Mexico includes arbitrary
seizure, detention, and subjection to theft, battery, and sexual assault - at the hands of state
agents, paramilitary groups, private security, and criminal mafias. Within Latin American
polities, limpieza social connotes the selective repression of a population deemed so threatening
to the state or state interest as to require special or exceptional punishment, which aims to
neutralize its dangerous presence. The criminalized Latino noncitizen within the U.S. is al1 too
commonly a survivor of other violent processes of expulsion, whether political, social. or
economic in nature.
That said, it is important to note that no concerted program of total expulsion is at work
within the immigration law enforcement system. Rather, the selective searches and detentions,
localized neighborhood sweeps and workplace raids have mobilized a social and legal imaginary
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that admits social cleansing. (I say social, rather than ethnic, because anti-immigrant sanctions of
mass deportation are not monolithically racial in intent, but involve a more complex constellation
of nativist, class, and racial antagonisms, as well as more abstracted principles tied to the rule of
law.) The interplay between restrictionist policy, national security doctrine, and popular nativist
anxieties, has produced a powerful set of associations with immigration law enforcement as the
pre-eminent mechanism for securing national territory and population against all internal and
external dangers. In the absence of federal immigration reforms, anti-immigrant sentiment has
found expression in the threefold increase in state and local legislation linked to immigrants and
immigration during 2007 . 13 By a 2: 1 ratio, the 244 bills enacted that year sought to expand
enforcement and restrict the rights of undocumented persons. Many of these bills will ultimately
be struck down for infringing on civil rights and constitutional norms. Far from checking or
tempering the demand for total policing, however, immigration law enforcement has exploited
the social fears behind such legislation, and expressed in the media, in order to recenter and
expand the disciplinary apparatus within the executive branch of federal government.
This govemmentality of fear and negation has assiduously identified defending the rule
of law with an imaginary of social cleansing; and as artificial or far-fetched as this symbolic
order may appear in relation to actual legal processes, it is all the more tenacious in its social and
political effects. By its very virtual status, the imaginary may give license to the most extreme
forms oflegal violence within the codes oflaw enforcement. Consider Foucault's reflection on
the imaginative processes entailed in the system of legality:
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Pew Hispanic Center, "2007 Survey of Latinos: As Illegal Immigration Issue Heats Up,
Hispanics Feel a Chi11," (December 13, 2007), p. 7.
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We could even say that the law works in the imaginary, since the law imagines and can
only formulate all the things that could and must not be done by imagining them. It
imagines the negative. 14
By its very nature, then, the law of citizenship is defined by its imaginary relation to the category
of the noncitizen; national community by its imaginative expulsion of its outside. The
disciplinary authority grant_ed to immigration and policing apparatus produces a citizenry that at
times of crisis reasserts its self-preservation in decidedly negative terms. Thus, even as New
Haven legally retains the Municipal ID program, local agencies must continua11y contend with
the possibility of future repercussions, as a vocal nativist minority deploys the rhetoric of social
cleansing ("send them home in chains") in order to incite the legitimate punishment by agents of
the state, who may, in fact, send migrants "home" in chains. In this way, the threat of greater
wholesale violence has a state-building function, which expands the disciplinary power of
government agents.

Immigration Law Enforcement in the Service of Racial Governance
The racialized "illegal alien" has long been an instrumental target for punishment in the
U.S. as a figure for all that threatens national sovereignty. 15 Since 1996, the federal government
has cast immigration enforcement as a central concern of fighting terrorism, using a surge in
detention and deportation to entangle migrants further within the criminal justice system and its
militarized border defense. The reformation of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
14
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12

under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003 intended to consolidate a distinct
regime of governance and statecraft at the hemispheric level, linked to the integration of markets,
neoliberal restructuring, and military security across the region. This has had implications far
beyond immigration regulation, remaking the transnational migratory circuit into a theater for
selective armed operations of surveillance, detention, and removal on a vast scale, waged against
migrants, refugees, and noncitizen workers. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), now
the country's second-largest law enforcement agency, reported a seven-fold increase in worksite
apprehensions between 2002 and 2007, while deportations reached an all-time high of 186,600 in
2006, a figure representing a ten-percent increase from 2005. 16 The hundreds of worksite raids
conducted since 2006 represent the pub1ic face of the Office of Detention and Removal, whose
Endgame program ca11s for "removing all removable aliens" by 2012, through an expedited
removal process mandated by its Interior Enforcement Strategy. 17 ICE pursues these objectives
by implementing new technologies and infrastructure within its expanded operations, but also,
more importantly, by re-categorizing noncitizens who have violated immigration codes as
"criminal aliens," "immigration fugitives" and "absconders." The systematic recoding of
ordinary violations has led to an inordinate increase (79% in 2006) in the detention of offenders,
who are now more likely to be held for indefinite and prolonged periods, and denied access to
adequate representation, judicial review, or legal relief. 18 Even without new legislative reforms,
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Lost Children," The New Yorker March 3, 2008, pp. 59-67.
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DHS expects to triple its prison capacity in the coming year, in order to accommodate noncitizen
detainees, who have become the fastest growing sector of the incarcerated population in the U.S.
These trends have only exacerbated the failures of existing U.S. policy toward Latin
America, which has remained centered on promoting economic integration through free trade,
while militarizing nationa_l boundaries and conducting transnational police operations modeled
on earlier counterinsurgency programs. Following their precarious transition from
authoritarianism and civil war in the 1990s, Latin American countries have experienced rising
indexes of armed confli_ct and violent crime tied to state corruption, illicit trade, and paramilitary
activity. The impunity of crime and corruption has precipitated a pervasive crisis for the rule of
law in many Latin American polities. In response, the U.S. has repeatedly cast regional economic
and social concerns as matters of security, at the expense of the social investment and political
reform needed to address the root causes of outmigration. Since the 1980s, Latin American
emigration has continued its precipitous rise as a consequence of deepening social inequality and
economic instability across the region; in the past two decades, the U.S. Latino population more
than doubled in number, reaching thirty-five million in 2000. 19 Despite the current downturn in
the national economy and the increased hazards of the border crossing, new immigrants continue
to transform communities across the United States. The combined pressures of sheer human need
and the U.S. labor market render migrants willing to brave the dangers of the arduous passage
north, and expose themselves to abuse by human traffickers, maras, and immigration law
enforcement.
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Although the proportion of foreign-born persons within the U.S. has yet to reach the peak
levels of the early twentieth century, when newcomers reached fifteen percent of the population,
the relatively high concentration of Mexicans and other Latinos among new immigrants- an
estimated 47.2 percent of the foreign-born population in 2006 - has provoked popular alarm at
the growing Latino presence. According to the Pew Hispanic Center, the Latino population
stands to triple by 2050, and it will be largely responsible for the country ' s population growth in
the coming decades. 20 Despite awareness that new immigrants have fueled the expansion of the
U.S. labor market, contributing an average of 3 7 billion dollars annually to the gross domestic
product since the 1990s, punitive legal codes restrict the vast majority of the foreign born to the
permanent status of aliens ineligible for naturalization. 21 More than one half of the adult Latino
population is vulnerable to deportation - to losing a close friend , family member, or persona]
freedom to the immigration enforcement system. This untenable situation has proved a serious
liability to Latino civil rights amidst the U.S . war on terror. While the federal government has
continually raised the terrorist threat as a pretext for DHS expenditures in the area of border
policing and immigration enforcement charges of terrorism were in fact brought against only
twelve of the 814,073 persons prosecuted in immigration courts over the past three years. 22 The
total number of cases involving actual "national security charges" remains negligible within the
total immigration prosecutions· a case- by-case study by the Executive Office of Immigration
Review (EIOR) revealed that nearly a11 of these cases - 86.5 percent - stemmed from ordinary
20
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immigration violations, "such as entering the U.S. without an inspection, not having a valid
immigrant visa, or overstaying a student visa."23 Although these acts are civil, not criminal
violations, the DHS entrusts immigrant detention to a network of "four hundred federal and
contract facilities, county, and local jails" where immigrant detainees become enmeshed within
the criminal justice system. 2~
, If the purported mission of Immigration and Customs Enforcement is "to protect America
and uphold public safety by targeting the people, money, and materials that support terrorist and
criminal activities," then the discrepancy betwe~n the agency's actual enforcement activity and
its stated objectives should invite serious scrutiny. 25 ln December 2006, when the lnspector
General for Homeland Security, Richard L. Skinner, made his semi-annual report to Congress,
he produced an internal audit that showed a marked increase in arrests of department employees
for crimes including murder, rape, and corruption. 26 Cases involving the lmmigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) topped the list of severe crimes. The conduct of the militarized
raids, home invasions, and neighborhood sweeps that have netted janitors, meatpackers,
carpenters, and homecare workers for deportation - rupturing families with U.S. citizen children
- reveals an opportunistic use of the carceral system to pursue interests entirely unrelated to
national security. Absent any plan to forcibly deport the 12 million undocumented, or to legalize
their status in the U.S., lCE, deputized police officers, local officials, as wel1 as Mexican law
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enforcement, have used the perceived security crisis as a cover for the selective imposition of
terror - by active and vio]ent detention and removal - on the Latino population. It remains to be
seen whether a new Democratic administration will reverse this process by pursuing
comprehensive immigration reform.

The Case ofAdriana Torres Flores
The case of Adriaria Torres Flores, a thirty-eight year old Mexican woman living in
northwest~m Arkansas, illustrates the institutional vio]ence that characterizes the current regime
of immigration enforcement. On Thursday, March 6, 2008, the undocumented Springdale
resident was Jocked alone in a holding cell at the Washington County Courthouse, and left
without food , water, or bathroom facilities for four days.27 Senora Torres was one of severa]
people arrested at a loca] flea market on criminal charges related to the sale of pirated music and
videos. When Torres Flores declined a plea bargain and declared herself innocent of the charges,
the judge revoked bail and ordered her detained. After taking Torres Flores to the temporary cell
at the courthouse, the bailiff, Corpora] Jarrod Hankins, neglected to arrange her transfer to the
county jail and simply forgot her when he closed the building for the weekend. Although
Hankins was on duty all day that Friday, he never checked the room, nor did any other staff
report hearing the detainee's cries for assistance. The following Monday, March I 0, when the
court reopened, Senora Torres Flores was discovered lying on the floor of the nine by ten foot
cell, which contained only a metal table and benches behind its steel door and concrete walls.
According to press reports, Torres Flores endured bitter cold and thirst over the weekend, and
resorted to drinking her own urine during her ordeal. Speaking for her mother, the fourteen year27

For the facts in this case, see: Adam Nossiter, "Arkansas Woman, Left in Cell, Goes 4 Days
with No Food or Water," New York Times (March 12, 2008), available online at nytimes.com
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old Adriana Torres Diaz told the press, "When she went there to the court, she thought they
would see her. She thought they would take care of her." Her family had no knowledge of her
situation, thinking she was in the Washington County Jail. With no one to attend her, said her
daughter, "She was feeling like she was going to die."
The mother of three .U.S.-bom children, Adriana Torres Flores has lived more than half
of her life - nineteen years - in this country; but because of her undocumented status, she now
faces deportation proceedings. Although the Mexican consul Andres Chao has entered "the
highest protest of the Mexican government" over the incident, Senora Torres Flores could well
be prevented from obtaining legal residency in the U.S. Any financial award she may obtain in
legal damages wiII likely be paid to her on her return to her home state of Zacatecas, a place she
has not lived in nearly all her adult years. 28 Separation from her family will compound the trauma
she has already suffered; her son told reporters that his mother cries at night, that her nightmares
have woken him since her retum. 29
In his subsequent review of the episode, Sheriff Jim Helder found that Hankins acted
without "intentional misconduct," and placed the bailiff on a thirty-day administrative leave
without pay. Citing Hankins ' "exemplary record" in his statement to the press, Helder argued
against terminating an "employee [who] makes a mistake while trying their [sic] best to perform
their duties." 30 Despite assurances by Washington County Chief Deputy Jay Cantrell that her
mistreatment was "a very, very, horrible accident" and "not racialJy motivated," we can
nonetheless question whether her identity was incidental to the injuries she endured in custody. If
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the bai1iffhimself betrayed no personal enmity toward Ms. Torres Flores, it is nonetheless clear
that it was Torres Flores's status as an undocumented Mexican woman, not her alleged crime,
which mobilized the state's actions against her. In their treatment of noncitizens, police agents
are under no pressure to demonstrate an actual threat to public security while meting out
punishment. 31
What prevents this case from being legally recognized as an instance of torture is the
determination that the bailiff acted without intentional malice toward the detained woman. 32 To
be forgotten in such a way, however,_the detainee had to be perceived as less than fully human,
and by extension, deserving of brutal neglect. It is worth noting, too, that the incident bears
resemblance to the repertoire of extra-legal punishments deployed by US agents against other
alien detainees, captured in the war on terror. Prison guards routinely impose prolonged periods
of isolation and deprivation on alien detainees for the express purpose of humiliating,
disciplining, and procuring information from terror suspects. The corrosive logic that has
permitted the state's i1lega1 use of torture in one context - in CIA-operated offshore detention
sites and its practice of extraordinary rendition - as part of the declared war on terror is thus
mirrored in the context of routine, non-military immigration enforcement by the Department of
Homeland Security and its deputies. Mounting evidence demonstrates that hundreds of
immigrant detainees have been subjected to gross mistreatment while in DHS custody, in prison
31
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sites that are, like Guantanamo Bay, set up to deny transparency of operations, and give effective
impunity to perpetrators of abuse. 33 Torres Flores has not been declared an enemy combatant, but
the US government has treated her like one - unlawfully so -.
In fact, we could say that Washington County police should not ever have encountered
Adriana Torres Flores at aU. She was arrested and brought to court by a local law enforcement
task force that focuses on criminal enterprise activities, with the stated purpose of reducing
'"violent, egregious and unnecessary crimes' committed by illegal aliens." 34 The initiative comes
under ICE's Section 287(g) program, which enlists state and local officers to perform immigrant .
enforcement functions on behalf of federal authorities. The 1996 lllegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAJRA) added mechanisms for law enforcement partnerships
between federal, state, and local law' enforcement to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),
in order to give investigators and correctional officers working at the state or local level
[the] necessary resources and latitude to pursue investigations related to violent crimes,
human smuggling, gang/organized crime activity, sexual-related offenses, narcotics
smuggling and money laundering. 35
Since 2006, officers from four Northwest Arkansas police agencies have received training for
questioning, detaining, and processing unauthorized immigrants within their jurisdiction. 36
According to Washington County Sheriff Helder, the group is "under really strict guidelines on
[racial] profiling," which means that its focus does not include "looking for people who are here
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illegally. " 37 Stil1, officials have offered no explanation for the police action that led them to
Adriana Torres Flores; specifical1y, how prosecuting undocumented immigrants for selling lowend copies of DVDs at the Springdale Flea Market fulfills their stated mandate to pursue
"foreign-born criminals and immigration violators who pose a threat to national security or
public safety. " 38
The gap between the DHS mandate and local enforcement outcomes has not discredited
the 287(g) program, despite indications that local police across the country ha·ve abused the
broad powers granted to them for immigration enforcement. 39_Although a countywide review of
arrests failed to show any perceptible pattern of immigrant criminality in northwest Arkansas,
Rogers Mayor Steve Womack argued that the initiative showed "a high degree of success" in
meeting its objectives. 40 In this context, the treatment of Torres Flores' ordeal presents no
challenge to continuation of the security program; in fact, by apologizing for the "mistake," local
law enforcement exploited the communicative power of the incident. To many non-Latino
residents, the state's message is one of nonpartisan commitment to the rule of Jaw; to the
growing number of Latinos and immigrants, the apology is fair warning that their rights have
been, and will remain, suspended. Mayor Womack's defensive response to critics of the program
vividly demonstrates the bifurcated strategy of local government: "The general public is in
37
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overwhelming support of this local initiative. I am tired of people trying to make excuses for
illegal immigrants."41 By aligning "the general public" (by which he means law-abiding citizens)
against "people trying to make excuses," and "illegal immigrants," Womack enacts the rhetorical
separation of the white majority population from Latinos, who he can paint as people without
respect for the law.
The success of 287(g) has entailed the deliberate reclassification of civil violations of
immigration codes as felony crimes, a penalty that falls almost exclusively on the Latino
community in Arkansas. As a result, the activation of the ICE program permits the treatment of
the Latino population as a whole as a suspect group and menacing presence. Recent police
conduct in the northwestern counties reveals the emergence of an apartheid system of separate
justice. Since its inception, the 287(g) task force has conducted raids on county businesses most of them small, Latino-owned shops and restaurants - seizing and deporting hundreds of
unauthorized immigrants, and confiscating property. 42 Jim Miranda, a local activist who brought
the police campaign to the attention of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the
Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), cited the raids on the
Acambaro Restaurant chain as an example of the excessive use of force by the police in raids
that go well beyond 287(g) intended function. On December 11, 2007, federal and local agents
entered the Latino franchise's four area locations, detaining numerous people and arresting
nineteen workers for violating the Immigration and Nationality Act. Federal officials seized the
business assets and private property of the owners, Arturo and Silvia Reyes, and charged them
with human trafficking. Other detainees face penalties for identity fraud linked to the use of false
41
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social security numbers. Under current law, federal immigration charges bring jail time and
mandatory deportation, placing detainees beyond the reach of legal relief for offenses that, until
recently, were treated as simple civil violations. 43
In practice, then, the 287(g) program, which purports to root out terrorists and violent
criminals, has had an entirely different effect, permitting local governments and law enforcement
agents to appropriate the instruments of counter-terrorism to incite racial terror. By
distinguishing police actions from the abstracted threat of terrorism, state agents consolidate
popular consent - or demand - for the violent use of force against unarmed targets. L_amenting
the climate of fear that accompanied the raids and traffic dragnets in Arkansas, Jim Miranda
observed, "It feels like it is dangerous to be Hispanic."44 When Miranda presented his concerns
to Steve Womack, the chief architect of the 287(g) program, the Mayor conceded, "I see your
point. I see why you ' re concerned about civil liberties," only to add, "But there is such a thing as

collateral damage."45 Womack's admission is tel1ing. He acknowledges the violation of Latino
civil rights, but neutralizes the charge of police misconduct by construing the context as a theater
of war. His use of the euphemism for civilian casualties normalizes the indefinite suspension of
police restraints and implies the death of Latino citizenship.
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Cr6nica de una Limpieza Social
Homeland Security Program 287(g) on the ground in Northwest Arkansas
Racial animosity toward Latino migrants in northwestern Arkansas predates the 287(g)
program and the U.S. war on terror. Through the 1990s, the number of Latinos in Arkansas
nearly tripled in size, climbing from an estimated 17,000 persons in 1980 to nearly 150,000 in
2008 . Between 2000 and 2005, the state had the fastest growing Latino population in the
country; new births and migrant settlement is largely concentrated in the northwestern part of the
state, where the food processing companies Tyson Foods and Cargill operate major production
plants.46 The expansion of jobs in transport, cleaning services, construction, and meat packing,
have been a magnet for low-income migrants, 51 percent of whom lack legal status.
Although foreign-born workers have largely served as a replacement labor force , their
presence provoked concern among civic leaders in the northwest, who tended to associate the
region ' s relative affluence and quality of life with its ethnic homogeneity as a white-majority
area. 47 According to the 2000 census, 88 percent of northwestern Arkansas residents are "white,
non-Hispanic persons," while Latinos make up 8.2 percent of the population. 48 By 2001 , tensions
between local officials and Latinos culminated in an ACLU/MALDEF lawsuit against police
departments engaging in racial profiling that alleged that officers routinely subjected Latino
citizens to unnecessary drivers license checks and harassment. In June of 2006, city and county
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governments in northwest Arkansas undertook a special census, linked to government interests in
tracking population and economic growth. The results allowed political officials to make broad
claims that the undocumented posed a threat to normal governance. Seeking new measures to
"fight illegal immigration locally," Rogers Mayor Steve Womack declared his intention to
introduce legal ordinances that would classify illegal immigrants as a public nuisance, providing
the city new mechanisms for penalizing both the undocumented and those who employed or
entered into contractual agreements with them. Although Womack presented no conclusive
evidence that undocumented immigrants constituted "the clear majority" of offenders in gang
and narcotics-related incidents, he was successful in promoting policies aimed that stigmatized
the undocumented as a criminal presence. In public remarks, the mayor displayed the racial
reasoning that has long been a hallmark of anti-immigrant politics in the U.S.:
If they're living here illegally, there's a good chance -- and I don't know the percentage of
a chance -- but there's a pretty good chance that they're probably doing some other things
that are illegal. That's affecting our quality of life.49
The assertion that undocumented status implies an innate tendency toward criminality indicates
an insidious drift toward vigilantism. As the migration scholar David Manuel Hernandez has
shown, the government's presumption of guilt authorizes the curtailment of Latino and
immigrant civil rights as a preventative measure, "for the purposes of discovering after-the-fact
charges that justify long-term detention and deportation. " 50 In his anti-immigrant campaign,
Mayor Womack found a willing partner in federal authorities. Rather than pursue restrictive
ordinances, Womack obtained broader assistance for controlling the undocumented population
by mobilizing regional law enforcement behind the 287(g) program.
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While anti-immigrant hostilities are commonly associated with situations of financial
insecurity, Womack received the popular mandate to expel the undocumented population at the
culmination of at least a decade of steady economic expansion linked to the manufacturing and
service industries. His "State of the City" address for January 2007 provides a triumphal
summation of fiscal health· linked to taxes on retail sales - a pattern of revenue growth that
Arkansas government reports linked directly to the contributions of the new immigrant
workforce. 51 But for Womack, immigrants remain an irremediable problem, justifying
extraordinary measures to "send a strong measure to those who have entered the country illegally
and taken residence in our city." Reiterating his commitment to Homeland Security's 287(g)
program, the Mayor turns his attention from "the growing threat to the quality of 1ife" to "the
issues of appearance of our city." His subsequent discussion links the expulsion of the
undocumented to plans for "beautifying the gateways to our community;" his address in effect
serves as a political call for social cleansing. For Womack and his supporters, the task oflocal
governance becomes the simultaneous provision of "gateways" for deserving residents, and the
denial of entry to those deemed an offensive presence. An approving comment on the
conservative blog FreeRepublic.com that called for the expansion of the 287(g) program beyond
the northwestern counties made explicit the implied racial dimension of Womack's aesthetic
project: "I wish the little town of Hopeless, AR would wake up. It is starting to have a certain
south of the border appearance. " 52
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Echoing Mayor Womack's assertion that "Rogers will not become a sanctuary city for
il1egal immigrants," civic organizations and political groups across the state have acted to
mobilize the white English-speaking population behind a platform of resentment and ethnic
nationalism. A group ca11ed "Secure Arkansas" currently seeks approval from Arkansas
Attorney General Dustin McDaniel for a ballot initiative that would ban state services for the
undocumented. 53 The move is largely symbolic, since the state already prohibits the dispensation
of many benefits, including Medicaid, to those without legal status. But the campaign has an
important communicative effect, by directing elected officials to take aggressive stands against
undocumented immigration, and promoting a climate of intolerance in which Latinos and
immigrants will be prevented from asserting rights within their communities of residence. In this,
Arkansas is no different from other states contending with anti-immigrant sentiment. In the
absence of federal immigration reform, municipal and state governments across the U.S. have
used ballot initiatives and local ordinances to force undocumented residents to leave. 54
Indeed, the expansion of immigration enforcement has proved the means for communities
across the U.S. to reinvent a white majoritarian politics. In the face of unprecedented
demographic shifts accompanying Latino immigration, the criminalization of latinidad provides
a means for receiving communities to imagine and consolidate anew the cultural logic of white
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My city, New Haven, represents an alternate case, where local government sought to
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primacy. 55 One Arkansas resident articulated the changing cultural context for employment in the
state as a loss of ethnic entitlement:
My wife went to check out a technical job at Cargil [sic]. The guard only spoke Spanish,
after getting past him and to the HR office the Latina receptionist was speaking Spanish
with two workers. The wife then told the receptionist who she had come to meet with and
while waiting a number of other people pasted trough [passed through] and only Spanish
was spoken. While speaking with the HR lady (who happened to be American) my wife
asked if she would have to speak Spanish for the job and was told that Spanish was not a
requirement for employment. They wanted her to fill out an application and interview
right then but my wife had other appointments that day. So the HR person said that would
be OK and gave her application to take it home and fill it out and bring it back. So she
took it and went back to the car to leave, when she got to the car she looked at the
application and it was in Spanish. True story. 56
The author narrates the episode in a cinematic framework, expressing surprise at the apparent
hegemony of Spanish and Latinos in the food processing industry. His account of his wife's
misadventure serves as an almost comic platform for conveying the injury felt by many citizen
workers in the new division of labor. The discovery that the Cargill plant is now occupied
almost entirely by Latinos - whom he represents as foreigners- suggests a larger social
breakdown. Thwarted at every tum, the factory becomes impenetrable to the English-speaking
job candidate, as her failed application induces a psychic state of alienation in both its senses: the
loss of property or entitlement and the loss of self. 57 It is worth noting that even as the author
expresses bewilderment at the changes at Cargill, he does not describe the displacement of the
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citizen workforce in the form of racial grievance. Instead, by -delivering his· account as a "true
story," he gives priority to the experiential dimension of the narrative, over its political
implications. The absence of any overt demand for a return to the way things were, suggests the
possibility for reconciliation among the diverse sectors of the labor force. In this way, the
comment reveals the manufactured quality of the immigration crisis itself; that anti-immigrant
mobilizations are not inevitable, nor cyclical, responses to demographic change, but politically
produced outcomes of tactical deployments of state and popular power.
That realization should cast new light on the issue of government accountability for the
mistreatment of Adriana Torres Flores. Her subjection to conditions of extreme deprivation
while in police custody corresponds to a deliberate process of dehumanization, in which extreme
violations against individuals are tolerated as necessary excesses in the campaign to convert
Latino migrants into subjects without rights. Even as the state acknowledges her suffering, it
nonetheless confirms its necessity - as the limit case of direct violence that sanctions the
structural violence deployed to sever social ties between the unwanted migrants and the majority
population.
Immigration raids and traffic dragnets thus represent the consolidation of a regime of
racial governance in northwestern Arkansas, one with paraBels in many other parts of the United
States. Through new regimes of immigration policing, law enforcement agents do not only seize
the criminalized population, they also create the institutional right to ensnare immigrant and
Latino communities within the criminal justice system. The assertion that immigration
enforcement serves to defend the rule of law becomes less a cover for arbitrary or selective
police violence, than the wholesale reconstitution of the rule of law as an apparatus of violence one that sustains and reproduces itself by presupposing the necessity of force. The criminalized
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Latino/migrant thus constitutes the outside of the exclusionary juridical order, whose expulsion
and subjection to punishment calls it into being. 58
If today the ICE raids constitute the removal of merely hundreds or thousands, they
nonetheless make visible a dangerous removal of restraint in the use of force against the civilian
population. In this, we see the incipient process of remaking the political, penal, and juridical
apparatuses to sanction state terror, or what some have called the state of exception. 59 As state
institutions adapt to accommodate the mass surveillance, detention, and removal of nonviolent
civilian targets,. the potential installation of a repressive immigration regime looms large; this
despite the leftward tum toward more moderate and populist leadership in both the United States
and Latin America. Current transformations in immigration enforcement and criminal justice
may ultimately permit the removal not only of criminalized subjects, but entire classes of persons
deemed unworthy - by reason of poverty, ethnic or cultural difference, or ascribed social
characteristics - of accommodation within the protected spheres of national belonging and
citizenship. At present, conservative immigration policy makers have set their sights on ending
family-reunification policies, and perhaps even birthright citizenship even as they block any
form of legalization for the twelve million in future legislation.

Migrant Maternity and the Hemispheric Regime ofLimpieza Social
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This is not, of course, exclusively a matter of Latinos or Latino migrants, but extends to
various racialized and stigmatized groups targeted for special policing and removal by the U.S.
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color in the criminal justice system.
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By way of conclusion, 1 want to offer some final thoughts about why Adriana Torres
Flores' s maternity will not protect her from deportation in the current moment. ~'These are the
salt of the earth, these are wonderful people. You would want them as your neighbors," her
immigration attorney told reporters, only to concede, "But, mothers of U.S. citizens are deported
every day."60 (His complacency toward routine deportation policy echoes federal disavowals
that routine operations entail gross human rights abuses on a grand scale.) Certainly, the
deliberate separation of citizen children and undocumented mothers is a longstanding tactic of
immigration enforcement; family separation engenders social dislocation and terror within the
targeted community. The curtailment of migrant women's fertility not only hastens the "social
liquidation" of the criminalized population, it also extends the state's punitive authority into the
future by interrupting generations. 61 In this context, the simultaneous production and disavowal
of women's suffering serves as an instrument for producing the separate orders of rights for
different sectors of the national population, and for masking the coercive intent of routine
deportations as a means to hasten the seemingly voluntary departures by undesired migrants.
Because Mexican communities have historically been comprised of undocumented
migrants and non-naturalized legal residents in large numbers, they have been particularly
vulnerable to deportation and expulsion. 62 As I have shown, the war on terror has provided
elected officials with a useful cover for efforts to foresta11 the consolidation of an ethnic power
bloc with the growing demographic majority of Latinos in the U.S. ln remarks calling
unauthorized migration "a slow-rolling, slow motion terrorist attack on the United States," U.S.
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Roy Petty, quoted in Christopher Spencer, "County Deputy Suspended After Forgetting
Woman in Cell" The Morning News (March 12, 2008), available at www.nwaonline.net
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See my discussion in Migrant Imaginaries: Latino Cultural Politics in the U.S.-Mexico
Borderlands (New York: NYU Press, 2008); see also David Manuel Hernandez's discussion of
immigrant detention in the essay "Pursuant to Deportation."
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Congressman Steve King (Republican from Iowa) has repeatedly resorted to animal metaphors in
his depictions of Latino migrants as an imminent threat to national security. 63 In 2006, King took
the floor of the House to propose the construction of an electrified fence along the U .S.-Mexican
border. As he proceeded to build a miniature model for the edification of fellow Congressional
Representatives, King dismissed concerns for immigrant safety, saying, "We do this to livestock
all the time." King's remarks reflect a national immigration system that continues to demand
disposable Latino labor and treat immigrant workers as 1neligible for citizenship - mere cattle.
More important, his dehumanizing rhetqric represents a frontal assault on Latina migrants, by
devaluing and debasing their maternity.

If the Iowa Congressman found few allies willing to cut off the supply of cheap workers,
he was successful in bringing the curtailment of family unification policies and birthright
citizenship into proposals for immigration reform legislation.

64

Concluding his demonstration of

the border fence, King linked his vision of territorial closure to the control of migrant women's
bodies: ''We need to end birthright citizenship that is creating these anchor babies." The phrase
"anchor babies," which implies an inhuman, parasitical presence, links King's rhetoric to the
historical use of eugenics discourse to treat the foreign-born as a racial menace. Conjuring
fantastic rates of immigrant fertility, King revealed his abiding concern that the existing ethnic
order - with its implied white majority - could be undone within a single generation. King's
theatrical use of the miniature fence and his speculative use of statistics displayed the neofascism
latent in discourses of national security and the war on terror. Rather than call for the direct use
of force in a process of mass deportations, however, King cannily relied on the invisibility of the
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structural violence embedded in immigration enforcement, which is more easily marshaled to
force migrants to leave the U.S.:
We will not have to make that decision for them. The decision will be made. They got
here on their own. They can go back on their own. It is not a matter of trying to deport 12
million or 22 mil1ion people.65
The particular figures King cites encode a veiled message of ethnic antagonism within his
apparently objective preoccupation with defending national borders. The twelve million
corresponds to the estimated number of unauthorized migrants residing in the U.S. in 2006, who
consti_tute the sanctioned targets of immigration enforcement. But the twenty-two million refers
to the total the number of Mexicans - including citizens and legal residents - counted in the 2000
census. The Congressman ' s apparent indifference to the disparity between the two numbers
demonstrates the willful appropriation of the immigrant enforcement system for the purposes of
racial governance. Speaking as the voice of the state, King issued a clear demand for ethnic, not

criminal justice.
The capture of migrant women's bodies - both in detention and in state discourse anchors the conversion of immigration enforcement into the project of social cleansing. The
bailiff who forgot Adriana Torres Flores in her jail cell did not commit his error in isolation, but
rather, in a context in which the routine procedures of carceral detention of individuals facilitates
an extra-legal project of mass punishment. Torres Flores ' s ordeal corresponds to the rampant
gender violence occurring along the entire length of the transnational migratory circuit. Other
migrant women, like Juana Villegas De La Paz, find that their very maternity becomes the locus
of state punishment.
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The case of Juana Villegas De La Paz represents another abusive detention of a Latina
migrant under the auspices of the 287(g) program in the new South. 66 Pulled over by traffic
police for a routine traffic violation on July 3, 2008, the twelve-year resident of Nashville,
Tennessee was arrested and held in custody for six days by local police, despite being at the end
of her ninth month of pregnancy, and having responsibilities as a mother of three children, all of
them U.S. citizens. Berry Hill Police Sergeant Tim Coleman arrested her in front of her terrified
children for failing to produce a driver's license or proof of insurance. Once in custody, the
Davidson County Sherriff 's Office determined that the young woman was undocumented, and
transferred her to detention. Sra. Villegas De La Paz subsequently went into labor under police
custody and gave birth while shackled, hand and foot, to her hospital bed. Her newborn baby was
then faken from her for two days, while she was returned to jail, where she developed a breast
infection after being barred from bringing a breast pump to jail. Throughout her custody, she was
denied any contact with her husband or children. At her final hearing, the Judge refused to permit
her attorney to question the police officers about the mistreatment she and her children
experienced at her arrest. All traffic charges were finally dropped, but Sra. Villegas De La Paz
remains vulnerable to deportation. Her story captures the systemic gender violence to which

,

migrant women have been subjected with impunity. Through the incarcerated woman ' s body,
law enforcement uses force to impose an experience of profound desubjectivation on individual
women ; this violence extends their situation of minimal subjectivity as a permanent condition,
while simultaneously converting their families and communities to that depreciated, unprotected
status.
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The excessive use of force within immigration enforcement is a symptom of an emerging
form of governmentality across the Americas, one that concentrates the power of the state in its
institutions of punishment and social control, while also transferring major state functions to
profit-seeking operations. Since the 1990s, amidst the rise in emigration, the sanction for social
cleansing has taken the form of a popular demand for security, voiced not only in the United
States, but also in the various countries that make up the migratory circuit. Mexico and Central
American countries have partnered with the U.S . war on terror in the pursuit of military aid and
economic investment, and t_o shore up the legitimacy of increasingly unstable regimes. The U.S.
State Department has enlisted various states in partnerships of surveillance and law enforcement
throughout the migratory circuit. The "Merida Initiative," the 400 million dollar security-aid
package for Mexico and I 00 million dollar allocation to Central America, addresses immigration
through the same optic as terrorism and organized crime. 67 Over the next three years, the U.S.
government could commit as much as $1 .6 billion dollars to Mexico, Central America, and
Caribbean counties for counter-terrorism and security programs. Even as the final aid package
included a million dollars to support the UN High Commissioner' s Office on Human Rights in
Mexico, this sum is dwarfed in relation to the overall military assistance, which includes
resources for a registry of migrants and technical assistance for tracking and detention of
unauthorized aliens. Portions of the aid package may well be used to facilitate private security
contracts with companies like Blackwater, Halliburton, and Elbit Securities, a11 of whom have
records of human rights violations and criminal violations. The Merida Initiative revived
proposals for a so-called "Security and Prosperity Partnership" among governments in the
Americas, which would act as the military counter-part the economic integration of the region.
67

See Laura Carleson, A Primer on Plan Mexico. Americas Policy Program Special report.
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"To a certain extent, we are armoring NAFTA," Thomas Shannon, Subsecretary of Western
Hemisphere Affairs for the U.S. State Department, explained in his address to legislators.
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The coordinated militarization of both the southern and northern Mexican borders has
facilitated the conversion of the country's territory into a dragnet for migrants in transit to the
United States. The current r~gime of immigration enforcement is not only a punitive system of
detention and removal; it is likewise characterized by a tendency toward carceral territoriality, in
which the mobility and autonomy of migrants are routinely suspended in the interest of social
control. The criminalization of migrants by countries of transit and settlement entails their .
conversion into a particular class of minimal subjects - increasingly detached from the protected
spheres of community and nation.

Gestures of disavowal
Many blame federal inaction for the aggravated hostilities expressed toward migrants,
given that local and state authorities lack a coherent plan for addressing the growing
undocumented presence. But this criticism overlooks the canny logic that sustains the current
impasse over border governance and immigration. The delay provides a useful and flexible
cover for smaller operations to abridge the rights of noncitizens according to the concerns of
local communities - those faced with job shortages, expensive housing, limited healthcare, or
simply unwilling to admit newcomers. Restrictive ordinances and expanded policing directed
against migrants appear less inhumane because they do not represent a coordinated effort at
wholesale expulsion of the subordinate population. The federal government' s repeated denials
of mass deportation sanction processes of social cleansing by other means. The brutality endured
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by migrant women like Adriana Torres Flores and Juana Villegas de la Paz during routine
immigration enforcement operations seems less than criminal because they are not recognized as
political acts of torture, but of incidental costs of discipline. So too, militarized raids and
neighborhood sweeps obtain popular and legal sanction precisely because they do not amount to
the deportation of twelve million. The disavowal of a crime of that magnitude redirects our
vigilance to a case-by-case treatment of individual violations, rather than allowing us to see the
larger design at work.
As often as government officials deny the po~sibility of mass deportations, they have also
tended to repeat the common refrain that the present immigration system is "broken." From
different mouths, these words have vastly different connotations. Is it broken because poor,
hardworking migrants cannot obtain visas or work permits for legal entry and employment in the
U.S.? Or is it broken because federal authorities have allowed the undocumented population to
reach the astonishing sum of twelve million people, who reside in the U.S. without any
imaginable claim to naturalization? The incommensurability of these two positions has
continued to vex all those concerned with reform. But neither answer addresses the fundamental
question of what is truly at stake for the U.S. and for the hemisphere - that is, how to define the
rights of noncitizens within a regime that ultimately refuses to recognize their permanent
presence within the national polity. The conduct of the U.S. war on terror has cemented once
more the notion that only citizens can be the proper subjects of even basic human rights. As
legal scholar David D. Cole has argued, civil liberties and human rights are all too often defined
in terms of citizenship, so that these protections do not obtain equally for persons without access
to this protected status. In other words, the call to expand citizenship as a means to extend rights
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to the undocumented should not mean that "basic protections of liberty, of freedom from torture
and related abuse are ... deemed privileges or rights of citizenship" alone. 69

+++
It is not enough to deplore the impunity with which rights violations occur within the
current regime of immigration enforcement. Violence along the migratory circuit is not the
"collateral damage" of national security defense; rather, it manifests the concerted effort to
remove a "problem population" from its integration within civil society. 70 As an instrument of
social cleansing, immigration law enforcement can be the means to selectively repress and
contain a population deemed so offensive to the national community as to merit expulsion. As I
have shown, the transfer of federal immigration enforcement to state and local authorities creates
a propitious climate for misconduct and abuse of migrant "detainees. The increasing prominence
of private security companies into immigrant detention and deportation operations only increases
the likelihood of grave rights violations by providing powerful profit incentives for the
conversion of criminalized populations into raw material for exploitation by the punishment
industry. Migrants enter the prison system alongside other criminalized and racialized subjects,
the disfranchised native-born, whose rights remain suspended within the overlapping regimes of
carceral territoriality. In an atmosphere in which jurisdiction and responsibility are unevenly
distributed among federal, state, local, and private agents, immigrant enforcement operations
transform the state-form so that maintaining its coherence and sovereignty can only be achieved
in the unanimity of lawful violence. That is, the designation of the criminalized alien as an

,

intolerable threat crystallizes and extends the legitimacy of an increasingly fragmented state
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Cited to me by Jim Miranda, a civil rights activist in Bella Vista, Arkansas. See my discussion
below.
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·a pparatus across multiple spaces of cha11enge to its sovereign power and monopoly on force that
the rule oflaw presupposes. 71
If the U.S. government does not concern itself with what will become of Adriana Torres
Flores on her return to the country where she has never lived as a fully enfranchised adult, it
remains responsible for the social effects of her violent reinsertion into Mexican society as a
deportee. Just as the punitive regime of immigration enforcement may place law enforcement
officers beyond restraint, it may also corrode those functions within the nation-state that
underwrite the substance of citizenship. At stake is the state's capacity to sustai~ and protect its
people. In many sites, the very possibility of articulating peoplehood has been corrupted by the
social dislocation that detention and deportation engenders.
Across the span of their travels, Latino migrants have refused their designation as a
surplus population, made for punishment. Against the negative authority of immigration police,
migrants like Adriana Torres Flores have interceded to claim their entitlements to work and
move freely across borders. They voice their demands in a discourse of kinship chastened by
loss. "l,No te duelen los deportados?" [Don't you feel the pain of the deported?] demanded
Francisco Chavira in his remarks before the Primer Parlamento de Lideres Migrantes Mexicanos
[First Parliament of Migrant Mexican Leaders], the historic conference held November 18, 2007
in the chambers of the Mexican legislature.72_ __ There, Elvira Are11ano, a migrant mother whose
deportation electrified migrant communities across North America, announced her initiation of a
hunger strike to call attention to the need for binational immigration reforms. Speaking to the
gender violence that had distorted her status as a rights-bearing citizen and mother, Arrellano
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offered her wounded maternal body as the ground for a new social agency. In the halls of an
official state authority that no longer serves, migrants offer the beginnings of an alternate
language of peoplehood, rights and belonging.
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Abstract:
This paper is an excerpt of a chapter from my book manuscript entitled, Politics Below the
Asphalt: Black Women and the Search for Racial Justice in Brazilian Cities (in preparation). I
am writing Politics Below the Asphalt with the assumption that spatial exclusion is at the core of
gendered racial stratification in Brazilian cities. This has led to community-based movements
led by black women against spatially-determined racial hegemony. I focus on the political
movement of the Gamboa de Baixo coastal neighborhood against urban removal and for land
rights during recent processes of urban revitalization. "Below the asphalt" expresses the
geographic location of the neighborhood underneath the Contorno A venue along the Bay of All
Saints in the city-center of Salvador. I assert that Gamboa de Baixo is both visible and invisible,
in "plain view" and "out of view," a critical socio-spatial relationship that troubles the
naturalized categories of the "periphery" and the "center." These sociospatial categories have
political meanings for the black women activists who lead the social movement there. From this
perspective, we can begin to understand why black women are the invisible landowners and the
oftentimes overlooked defenders of black, women, and poor people's rights to the city in Bahia,
in Brazil, and throughout the African diaspora.
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OMURO
eu bato contra o muro
duro
esfolo minhas miios no muro
tento de longe o salto e pulo
dou nas paredes do muro
duro
niio desisto de fon;a-lo
hei de encontrar um furo
por onde ultrapassa-lo
THE WALL
I beat against the wall
hard
I scrape my hands on the wall
I try to jump over it from far away
I bang against the wall
hard
I don't give up trying to force it
I must find a way
that I can get through it
(Oliveira Silveira 1982, my translation)
Marginalization of the Black community accompanied the abolition of slavery, while miserable
living conditions made the Black man a "declassified" citizen (Abdias do Nascimento 1989
[I 979]).

"O muro" (the wall), a 1982 poem by Afro-Brazilian poet Oliveira Silveira, embodies
various meanings for the black majority of Brazil who often confront innumerous social and
economic barriers to their survival and advancement. The muro may refer to the thick glass
ceiling in the job market, the university entrance exams, the police barricades, the gated
communities, or even the man with the metal detector at the bank. The wall is a metaphor for
understanding the gendered racial and class inequality that govern Brazilian cities. Finding a hole
in the muro, or even attempting to climb over it, becomes a life-long struggle for black people,
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and even more so, for poor black women. Moreover, breaking down the muro is potentially
dangerous and is likely to lead to injury or even death.
In this essay, I focus on the actual wall that separates Gamboa de Baixo, a black coastal
community located in the center of Brazil ' s northeastern city of Salvador, from Morada dos
Cardeais (House of the Cardinals), a 37-story luxury apartment complex built in 2005 by the
world-renowned Brazilian construction firm Odebrecht. Concrete walls, l argue, come to signify
racial boundaries, legitimate and illegitimate ownership, and segregation for the purpose of land
eviction, resulting in the "production of included and excluded bodies" (Razack 2002: l 0).
Conflicts surrounding the building ' s construction and current challenges to maintaining positive
nei ghbor relations provide a glaring example of the social, physical, and economic segregation
between rich and poor, and black and white residential communities in Brazilian cities.
These conflicts must be understood within the context of current policy debates in Bahia
surrounding the Direct Plan for Urban Development (Plano Diretor de Desenvolvimento Urbano,
or PDDU), the plan for future urban development that many social movement activists argue
privileges coastal and vertical construction (high-rises) for white middle- and upper-class
Bahians. Whereas since the slavery period, blacks have composed the majority of the coastal
population, critics of the PDDU argue that the "or/a sera para quem pode (the coast will be for
who can)" (A Tarde 3/15/07, my emphasis). In Bahia, the euphemism "quern pode (who can)"
means those who can afford to pay for it. "Who can" are rich and white and those "who cannot"
are poor and black.2 Restructuring the city of Salvador threatens to expel poor black coastal
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Black women represent the largest segment of unemployed workers and those living in poor
urban living conditions (Morais, Cruz, and Oliveira 2005), and they earn 40% of the average
salary of white men, while black men earn 46%, and white women, 79% (Santos 200 I: 7).
2
As one newspaper article noted, 61 % of household incomes of residents in closed
condominiums are greater than 20 minimum salaries (20 x 300 reais; 1U$ = 1. 7 reais) while 42%
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communities from coveted lands along the Bay of All Saints as well as encourages selfsegregation among Bahia's white elite behind physical walls surrounding luxury condominiums

(A Tarde 3/15/08).
Walls, whether physical or symbolic, I argue, push women and blacks to the margins in
the urban landscape and ~reate disposable subjects. Walls are the first visible signs of the
disposal of black coastal neighborhoods during urban redevelopment processes. In Salvador, the
marginalization of black communities operates simultaneously with urban removal, which
involves arbit:r:ary demolition, forced expulsion, and displacement. The act of policing is central
to constructing, maintaining, and disposing of black marginalized landscapes and the people who
occupy them. As Katherine McKittrick and Clyde Woods (2007, 3) state, "black and poor
subjects are disposable precisely because they cannot easily move or escape." Black marginal
subjects, then, are "declassified citizens," to use the words of Abdias do Nascimento (1989), who
do not belong in the city center and have no legal rights to the coastal lands.
From the vantage points of black women who live in Gamboa de Baixo and lead the
ongoing neighborhood movement against land expulsion and for land and housing rights, I show
that community relations during urban renewal and land redistribution throughout the city are
more fraught with racial tension and violence than apparent. This essay represents one aspect of
my broader research on how black women's resistance in Latin America and throughout the
black diaspora emerges from tlie margins, echoing Ruth Wilson Gilmore's claim that, "a
geographical imperative lies at the heart of every struggle for social justice" ( quoted in Tyner
2007: 219) and bell hooks' ( 1991, 449) assertion that, "this space of radical openness is a margin

ofresidents in neighborhoods like Nordeste de Ainaralina are classified as poor (A Tarde
3/15/07). Activists in Gamboa de Baixo argue that the poverty index in their neighborhood
exceeds 50%.
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- a profound edge. Locating oneself there is difficult but necessary. It is not a 'safe' place. One is
always at risk. One needs a community ofresistance." I consider Gamboa de Baixo to be one
such community of resistance and claiming urban space and land rights constitutes a key political
issue of black feminist struggles in Brazil.

A City of Walls: Fortress Neighborhood
For the government and the big businessmen, poor people and blacks cannot nor should stay in
the center of the city, much less along the coast. You may not notice, but we live in a very
coveted paradise (paraiso cobi<;ado), that is worth a lot to us and attracts the fat eyes of big
businessmen, that want to earn rivers of money from our homes at the cost of our misery and
suffering (Gamboa de Baixo community meetingflyer, 1997, my translation).
Physical barriers such as walls, gates, fences, and bars on windows are not unusual in
urban communities, nor are they unique to Brazilian urban design (Caldeira 2000; Davis 1992).
Walls demarcate and protect private and public ownership of property. Two main wall structures
define Gamboa de Baixo' s geography on the urban coast and have been the focus of modem
urban restructuring in Salvador. On the western shores of Gamboa de Baixo lies the Sao Paulo da
Gamboa Fort (built in 1722 and named a Brazilian heritage site in 1937). Historically, Salvador
was known as a "fortress city," constructed in the mouth of the Bay of All Saints to function as a
military and commercial port linked to other Portuguese transatlantic routes (Castro 2002, 210).
It marked the expansion of the Portuguese empire and the intensification of the transatlantic
slave trade. Salvador was and is the capital of Portuguese America. The municipal government's
recent proposal to restore the Sao Paulo da Gamboa Fort is an effort to recuperate this colonial
heritage (minus the memory of the terror and genocide of slavery and conquest) and to develop
the coastal lands for maritime tourism. The restoration of historic monuments such as forts
throughout Salvador, particularly in the center of the city and along the coastline, became the
object of urban renewal during the mid-1990s (Perry 2005). In most cases, the revitalization of
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these monuments has led to the forced removal of their black and poor residents on the land on
or surrounding them. As Radhika Mohanram (1999, 150) says in The Black Body: Women

Colonialism and Space, the predicament faced by marginalized communities during these
historical revitalization processes exemplifies the ways in which "the colonizer is authorized to
remake colonial spaces in the image of the mother country and to occlude extant, local history in
the re-narrating and remaking of places." Consequently, the state's remaking of the history of the
Sao Paulo da Gamboa Fort rendered invisible the history of the black families who have
traditionally occupied the area as w~ll as threatened the neighborhood's permanence on the land.
However, the Gamboa de Baixo community has resisted this displacement of local residents,
some living inside the ruins of the fort, during and after the restoration process.

Below the Asphalt
The construction of Contorno A venue by the technocratic and military government in the
1960s has also shaped the neighborhood's identity within the city and solidified socio-spatial
hierarchies. The avenue segregated the Gamboa neighborhood; it created a literal wall between
Gamboa de Baixo and the upper-class neighborhoods of Gamboa de Cima (Upper Gamboa),
Banco dos Ingleses (English Bank), Campo Grande, and Vitoria where the Odebrecht building is
located. Gamboa de Baixo became a neighborhood "below the asphalt" avenue, and the
description tags the neighborhood as a separate urban underworld marked by immoral and illegal
activities and obscured from the public view by the modem Contorno Avenue. Official
descriptions of Gamboa de Baixo portray these poor neighborhoods as disorganized spaces
where black people reproduce poverty and immorality, as the following newspaper article
reveals, representing the Gamboa de Baixo population that lived unde~eath the newly
constructed Contorno A venue in 1969:
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Dirty and shady men populate the place, a community formed by thieves, prostitutes, and
the feeble-minded. The families who reside on the streets down at the bottom [near the
ocean] complain about that sub-world [near the street]. One of the last victims of the
marginais (criminals) was attacked in plain daylight. It was the case of an elderly
woman, of approximately 70 years-old, injured by a crook. Before a man approaches, the
women initiate a series of love invitations, almost dragging the victims by force to the
malocas (huts/shacks) (A Tarde I0/4/69).
In addition to exposing some of the internal class tensions, the journalist described the
homes in Gamboa de Baixo as unfinished, unsafe, and unhygienic. In particular, the article
depicted the women of the neighborhood as active participants in grabbing unsuspecting victims
w~o they took into their supposed submundo (urban underworld) underneath the street. Many
Bahians I have talked with have claimed not to know where Gamboa de Baixo is located while
simultaneously claiming to know that the neighborhood is violent, drug-ridden, and full of
prostitutes, or a place where marginais (criminals), both male and female, of the worst kind live.
Thus, in the public imagination, Gamboa de Baixo is both visible and invisible, in plain view and
out of view, a socio-spatial divide created by the avenue that serves as a wall above the
predominantly black neighborhood.
Until the 1990s, and as a result of the political struggle of a black, women-led grassroots
movement, the neighborhood "below the asphalt" was forgotten, abandoned by city officials, and
lacking in basic services such as potable water, electricity, and sewer systems, which had been
become standard elements of urban development throughout the city. When the municipal
government proposed to forcibly remove the local black population to create a recreation park
around the Sao Paulo Fort, the neighborhood suddenly became hypervisible, both spatially and
politically. Neighborhood mobilization against relocation threatened the modernist design
aspirations of urban architects and engineers who discussed the development potential of the
coastal lands without the participation of local residents. State agencies used the
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underdevelopment and supposed marginality of the area as justifications for a mass moral, social,
and physical "clean-up" and "renewal," a strategy used to remove poor black residents from the
Historic Center and Agua Suja neighborhoods previously (Dunn 1994; Espinheira 1989; Filho
1999; Pinheiro). Like these displaced urban populations, many Gamboa de Baixo residents share
a collective memory of living on the coast and in the city-center since the colonial period.

The Fortresses Within
As black women in Gamboa de Baixo have fought to stake their claim to the land below
the asphalt and on the land around the historic fort, another wall has emerged as a popular feature
of neighborhood housing design. In recent years, the number of homes in the Gamboa de Baixo
neighborhood with enclosed verandas and front door grades (metal bars) or with walls around
their perimeters has increased significantly. For some local residents, the walls and the grades
protect them from both internal and external terror, specifically from the drug traffickers and the
police who many residents believe contribute to the increase in violent crime and a generalized
I

culture of fear.
One longtime resident, Simone, who is currently completing construction on a large twostory house, decided to build concrete walls around the perimeter of her property. I joked with
Simone during a recent tour of her future home, "Are you building a mansion or a fort?"
We both laughed and blurted out simultaneously, "A Forte da Simone (Simone's Fort)!"
"You wait until I put broken glass on top of it," she said still laughing, "not even the rats
will want to climb over that wall!'?°
However, Simone was less worried about the rats; her concerns about the possibility of
theft, the use of her backyard as an escape route for police fugitives, and gunfire, were very real.
The need for the wall as a barrier bec_a me even more crucial when during this past January's
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police raid, the police fired directly into the unfinished concrete walls of the home's interior.
"Imagine if the house had been finished and we had been living inside?" Simone said.
I could not imagine. I touched the hole where one bullet had lodged into the wall. "It
looks like you'll need a concrete roof too."
Rubbing her thumb against her index and middle finger, a local expression to signal that
she will need money for that, she nodded, "certainly." For Simone, the wall is a matter of life or
death for her and for many of her neighbors·.
Urban theorists hav~ given little attention to precisely how poor people perceive fear and
how they are also building "fortresses" and other mechanisms of security around themselves.
Fortresses are no longer limited to the colonial past, modernist urban designs, nor to elite
residential communities. The assumed safety of a small, everybody-knows-your-name seaside
community has disappeared. The focus on walls and grades within the Gamboa de Baixo
neighborhood illustrates the fear that poor black people experience, but also shows that in this
instance, residents demonstrate their preference to stay put and not translate that fear into what
development agents have argued is the "inevitable removal" of its residents from that area of the
city. Gamboa de Baixo residents, albeit with limited resources, continue to build homes and the
security mechanisms necessary to protect them as a way to remain on the urban land where they
have claimed property rights. In other words, they build the walls and the grades as a way to
contain themselves as a practice of self-inclusion on the coastal lands rather than exclusion from
it; they do not envision living anywhere else.

The Odebrecht Wall: Spatial Entitlement, Exclusion and Containment

[T}he territoriality ofpower is key to understanding racism (Gilmore 2002, 22).
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Residents' views of the walls of the Sao Paulo da Gamboa Fort, Contorno A venue, and
the wa11s of Gamboa de Baixo offer insights into how residents view the wa11 that now divides
Morada dos Cardeias and the Gamboa de Baixo communities. For anthropologist Teresa
Caldeira (2000), Brazilian cities such as Sao Paulo have become "cities of walls" where
"residents from all social groups argue that they build walls and change their habits to protect
themselves from crime" (297). In residential high-rises, the basic elements are "security,
facilities, services, and location" (257). Caldeira also argues that, "fortified enclaves confer
status. The construction of status symbols is a process that elaborates social differences and
creates means for the assertion of social distance and inequality" (258). These "fortified
enclaves" exemplify the modem ideal of city living. Urban theorist Mike Davis (1990, 225-226)
similarly describes Los Angeles as a "fortress city," where magnified perceptions of the threat of
violence from the so-ca11ed "criminal underclass" (young black men and poor Latino families)
dominate the white.middle-class imagination. This fear mobilizes middle-class communities to
isolate themselves and build residential "fortresses" with security systems aimed at keeping out
the criminal poor. This fear has less to do with the crime rates than with status, for as Davis
argues, poor people in cities worry just as much about violent crime as do rich people (224).
Furthermore, in cities such as Salvador, black women like Simone in Gamboa de Baixo, who in
their majority head their households and lead social networks in their communities, are the main
decision makers about housing design, which increasingly includes physical forms of protection.
A low wall constructed by the Archdiocese of Bahia, the previous landowners, existed on
the eastern perimeter of Gamboa de Baixo before Odebrecht bought the property. Odebrecht
extended the height and width of the wall before the construction of Morada dos Cardeais even
began in 2003. Gamboa de Baixo residents, who subsequently lost significant access to space in
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their backyards, met the wall immediately with suspicion. The previous wall of the cardinals did
not extend to the oceanfront, and the new Odebrecht wall made growing vegetables and fruits on
the land impossible, and one Gamboa home was demolished during the process of building the
wall. The extension of the wall from Contorno Avenue to the beach was just the beginning of the
numerous problems that surfaced as a result of Odebrecht' s acquisition of the coastal lands for
construction of the luxury apartment community.
As Odebrecht completed construction of Morada dos Cardeais in 2005, the international
religious community paused to mourn the death a~d commemorate the life of the revered
"people's pope," John Paul JI, whose death contributed to the further historical significance of
the land and the former house of the cardinals that had housed some of Brazil's most important
cardinals for almost a century. The pope had also visited the home in 1980 and 1991. When
urban architect Diogenes Rebouc;as designed Contorno Avenue, he opted not to demolish the
historic mansion and built a viaduct underneath it. The house still remains on the land, and the
historical site was restored as part of the new apartment complex. Ironically, Gamboa de Baixo
activists negotiated with the Catholic Church for several years for ownership of the part of the
land their community occupies. The archdiocese never transferred collective ownership to the
community, and instead sold the former cardinals' house and the land that included an area
where Gamboa residents continue to live. This transaction between the Catholic Church and
Odebrecht occurred without the knowledge of the community, exemplifying years of strained
relationships between the community and the Archdiocese of Salvador.
Ana Cristina, a Gamboa de Baixo activist critical of the Church's historical land
usurpation, affirmed that with the construction of the new waII, Odebrecht physically reinforced
what existed symbolically. Though the previous wall hardly posed a barrier to residents, and the
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cardinals had no security mechanisms that regulated them, the previous wall also served as a
marker of spatial and social separation between the elite house of white cardinals and the poor
and black Gamboa de Baixo fishing community. As an Odebrecht representative confirmed
(personal communication 2004) during meetings with Gamboa de Baixo activists, "Priests don't
sell anything for cheap." This statement supports community activists' claims that the land sale
to the corporation contradicted popular and global discussions of the Church's defense of
marginalized black and indigenous groups in Brazil. In this sense, a wall is a wall is a wall, and
Ana Cristina asserts that although they previously moved freely about the coastal lands, as their
black and indigenous ancestors had done prior the Church's occupation, without land titles, they
now have little claims to it. The wall remains a constant reminder of this lack of collective
entitlement, a crucial exclusion from property rights that James Holston (2008, 113) argues has
"fatal consequences for Brazilian citizenship."

.

The women of the Gamboa de Baixo neighborhood association used media reactions to
the luxury development project to force Odebrecht to make important decisions regarding land
distribution. Local jouma1ist Mary Weinstein (A Tarde 8/4/04) published a controversial article
entitled, "Realidade Concreta da Gamboa (Concrete Reality of Gamboa)," highlighting the
problems surrounding the construction on Contorno Avenue and projecting the problems the
Odebrecht building would pose for Gamboa de Baixo residents, such as land usurpation and the
privatization of the local beach. Weinstein's critiques reflected ongoing debates about the
government's urban development practices as outlined in the current Direct Urban Development
Plan, which in addition to privileging the city's minority white elite also compromised the
environmental stability of the land. She also questioned whether the coastal lands could
permanently support a 3 7-story concrete structure and whether Odebrecht could build the pier
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without much destruction to the vegetation, the bay's ecosystem, and the land on which Gamboa
de Baixo residents lived.
During these debates, Odebrecht never publicly suggested that they had planned to
displace the Gamboa de Baixo population from the land, but representatives admitted that as a
result of the political organization of the neighborhood, they had to change some of their original
construction plans, which had included the destruction of several more Gamboa de Baixo homes.
However, the erasure of Gamboa de Baixo in the marketing information that Odebrecht
distributed to potential wealthy buyers piqued the interest of neighbor~ood activists. In an
enlarged photograph of the future building that spanned four pages in the booklet, Odebrecht
deleted some of the area where Gamboa lies and replaced most of the neighborhood with an
image of-a flush green landscape that includes the Sao Paulo da Gamboa Fort and the restored
homes of the Solar do Unhao neighborhood. As one resident stated, "the design plans show all of
this full of trees. When the buyers come to live here they will see that it is not so green" ( quoted
in Weinstein 2004). The Gamboa de Baixo neighborhood is also typica11y visibly absent from the
"revitalized" landscape in state urban development brochures. For Gamboa de Baixo residents,
the marketing materials represented a state-supported ideal for the land, a place for the white
elite to live and play without black and poor neighbors, which reflects broader urban
development efforts to "cleanse" the area of this "marginal" population. This exemplifies the
contradictions of urban redevelopment evident in a statement made by state agents during
negotiations with Gamboa de Baixo residents in the mid- l 990s: "Gamboa is the face of Bahia,"
but "it is not an area for black and poor people (pretos e pobres) to live" (personal
communication 2007).

13

For Gamboa de Baixo activists engaged in a decade of struggle against forced removal,
and for land rights and participatory urbanization, Morada dos Cardeias meant the heightened
threat of displacement of traditional black fishing colonies from the coast. "Gamboa de Baixo is
on very delicate line [in terms of public space]," one activist affirmed in a meeting with
Odebrecht representatives. Another added, "We have to be alert. Alert to everything,
because .... they [the State] have the revitalization of the Commercial District; they have the
revitalization of the Historic Center. Gamboa is in a dangerous zone. And just because it's
Odebrecht doesn't mean we are not going to think about these things ... We know what has been
the history of residential removal in the violent form that we have had to deal with it" (personal
communication 2004). The Gamboa de Baixo community is effectively under siege from all
sides. Both state and private urban developers envision a lush green landscape below Contorno
A venue, the restoration of a fort accessible from the Bay of All Saints, and the consumption of
coastal luxury. In fact, concrete walls (and not black people) have now become part of the
"ideal" natural coastal landscape.

Spatial Entitlement and Surveillance
In the apartments of Morada dos Cardeiais reside some of Bahia and Brazil's wealthiest,
boasting its most famous resident, Axe music singer lvete Sangalo, who lives in the penthouse.
This elite group of residents cannot only afford to live there, but they can also afford to purchase
the goods necessary, such as yachts, to take full advantage of the available amenities, such as the
modem pier accessible by cable car. Protection by sophisticated security systems installed on the
property represents a necessary aspect of the luxurious lifestyle. In addition to working inside the
building, armed security guards work on the pier 24 hours a day to regulate the approximation of
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Gamboa de Baixo residents. However, local residents have resisted any attempt by Odebrecht to
privatize the waters around the pier.
These security guards discourage any type of physical contact with the piers by using
buoys to demarcate their territories within the public waters. As Angela, a professional diver who
is a board member of the neighborhood and fishermen and fisherwomen' s associations,
recounted, "they think that we are pirates, that we will jump out of the water to rob them, and
then row our boats back home" (personal communication 2003). Angela motions the act of
frantically rowing as she tells me of the frequency of violent encounters between these security
guards and Gamboa de Baixo fishermen and women, which expresses what she considers to be
the "ridiculous," yet systemic criminal assumptions about black men and women. Angela also
tells me the story of how a yacht almost killed her and another female diver when boaters
ignored them in the water. As many residents have affirmed, they feel increasingly displaced
from the previously unregulated land and waters of the bay by the white elite, who act as if they
are the only ones entitled to it. These sentiments of entitlement are widespread enough for these
luxury condominiums to invest significant resources into keeping Gamboa de Baixo's black
residents out of public waters. Teresa Caldeira (2000, 4) writes, "privatization, enclosures,
policing of boundaries, and distancing devices create a public space fragmented and articulated
in terms of rigid separations and high-tech security: a space in which inequality is an organizing
value." As the experiences of Gamboa de Baixo residents with privatized policing show,
gendered, racial, and class inequality govern "fortified enclaves" in Bahia (Caldeira 2000)- and,
it might be argued, in other cities such as Miami and Los Angeles. Of course, no state security
mechanisms are in place to regulate these kinds of illegal private security practices.

"Niio sou marginal (I am not a criminal]": Gendered Spatial Injustice
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With the introduction of infrastructural services and mechanical transports, there is no longer
the necessity of the constant presence ofpoor people and blacks, now that it only interferes with
the idealization of the "white " city and its European appearance (Eloisa Petti Pinheiro 2002,
260, my translation).
The Bahian elite 's preoccupation with security in this coastal region is the direct result of
public stigma of violence attached to Gamboa de Baixo, and poor black neighborhoods in
general. As activist Ana Cristina states, "everyone 'below Contorno Avenue' is considered
criminal" (personal communication 2004). The media is the primary contributor to this negative
view of the neighborhood when they report crimes committed along Contorno Avenue. If a
crime occurred in a neighborhood above Contorno Avenue, they report that it took place in
Gamboa de Baixo and that Gamboa de Baixo residents committed it. For example, a murdered
man was found more than a kilometer from Gamboa de Baixo in 2004, but the newspaper
reported he was a victim of criminal activities in the neighborhood. The man was neither a
resident of Gamboa de Baixo nor was his death related to anyone in the neighborhood. As one
resident claimed at the time, "a man dies in Campo Grande, what does that have to do with
Gamboa? Why do we have to pay the price for crime in the entire city." As a newspaper reporter
recently affirmed, "all black people continue being perceived as potential bandits or drug dealers
without justification or explanation" (A Tarde 6/9/08).
Gamboa de Baixo residents believe that the construction of Odebrecht ' s wall and the
installation of security apparatuses demonstrate the broader public ' s disparaging sentiments
about their community and the people who live there. As some residents have stated, part of the
ongoing political struggle is to prove that "somos gente tambem (we are people too)" (quoted in
Weinstein 2004), and that in Gamboa de Baixo, there are people who work and raise healthy
families in an environment they have enjoyed for generations prior to the white elite ' s urban
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redevelopment interests. In fact, poor blacks have always occupied coastal lands, when those
areas of the city were considered undesirable places for the elite to build their homes. As another
resident affirmed, "every one has to live her life. If they are baroes (barons or rich boys) and just
defend their rights and want everything to themselves, that's not going to work. They have to
think about others too" (quoted in Weinstein 2004). Gamboa residents, it appears, do not plan to
leave the ]and, and are demanding that their neighbors share the land, the beach, and the waters
of the Bay of All Saints. The "barons," as Gamboa de Baixo residents refer to the wealthy
residents of the high-rises, may want everything for themselves, including the paraiso cobi<;ado
( coveted paradise) of the coast, but as Gamboa de Baixo community leaders and local residents
reassure them, "that's not going to work."
Residents' demands to share the "coveted" coastal landscape have meant that, despite the
private security and walls, the wealthy white residents of Morada dos Cardeias must also grapple
1i

spatially with daily state military policing in their neighborhood. In fact, some Gamboa de Baixo
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residents believe this increased policing is directly related to residential class and racial shifts in
I\

the coastal landscape (Weinstein 2004; personal communication 2008). The public police serve
to protect not Gamboa de Baixo residents, but the elite who live around them. Some local
residents wonder whether these white elites have not come to expect public police reinforcement
in the area in addition to the private security they can afford.
Many Gamboa de Baixo residents now view violence, specifically police violence, as a
spectacle for residents of Morada dos Cardeias, who look down from the 3 7 stories onto the
residents who are living the systemic violence. In essence, both communities experience policing
differently: in Morada dos Cardeais, the wall and private police protect their residents, while in
Gamboa de Baixo, "fortress homes" like those of Simone cannot isolate them from the violence
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of state military police forces. Thus, the wall alone does not account for the spatial difference
between the communities; the actual height of the Odebrecht building becomes an inherent
geographic difference in how the two communities view each other. In everyday life, especia11y
during moments when ordinary policing in Gamboa de Baixo become extraordinary events,
Morada dos Cardeias residents have a unique view from above. Thus, the act of witnessing
violence is shaped by marked spatial inequalities in the landscape. From below, Gamboa de
Baixo residents can never access the everyday lives of those who Jive above them in the high-rise
apartments (unless they work as domestic workers or doormen, but no Gamboa de Baixo resident
works in Morada dos Cardeais) nor can they experience the privilege of spatial protection.
Gamboa de Baixo residents cannot climb over the wall, whether real or imagined.
This spatial difference in protection became evident during the December 2007 violent
police raid and the first violent police raid of 2008 in January. Police operations in Salvador's
black and poor communities increase before carnival festivities in the city. Known as "operac;ao
pente fino," or "operation fine-tooth comb," the police comb these black and poor neighborhoods

for so-called criminals whom they perceive to pose a threat to the lives of tourists who flood the
city. These actions are not unlike those of New York City's "zero tolerance against crime"
policies under the Giuliani administration or those in Mexico City or in Rio de Janeiro
neighborhoods before 2007's Pan-American games, which led to the massacre in the Complexo
do Alemao (Smith forthcoming). Denise Ferreira da Silva (2007), Joao H. Costa Vargas (2005),
M. Jacqui Alexander (2005), Joy James (2000), Ruth Wilson Gilmore (2007), among many
others, have written on the globalization of aggressive policing and the dehumanizing impact on
African descendant populations. In Brazil, as police raids on black communities led to increased
incarceration rates, black movement and human rights activists increasingly criticized state
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proposals to keep poor blacks in flotation prison tanks in the middle of the Bay of All Saints until
after carnival in February.
In this context, these December and January police actions are examples of the everyday
police force in Gamboa de Baixo, but as in the case of the "floating prisons," they also represent
extraordinary moments in urban policing. On December 28, 2008, local residents witnessed the
unprecedented use of helicopters flying low around the perimeter of Gamboa de Baixo with
officers rappelling out of helicopters and onto the local beach, which some residents claimed,
"appeared like a scene out of a war zone" (personal communication 2008). It was the first time
that elite SW AT teams, equipped with firearms and machinery were sent to, as residents
imagined, "demolish and to eliminate (kill)" (personal communication 2008). In this type of
urban war, the police "shoot first, ask later" (personal communication 2008). Morada dos
Cardeias residents watched the "war" from the safe confines of their balconies.
The January 4 police raid was another such scene from the "war zone." Speculations
about the entire operation dominated conversations within the neighborhood for days afterwards.
Bullets penetrated the roof of one elderly resident's house, who later recounted to neighbors and
the news media that, "the police arrived here firing gunshots. I had to hide underneath the bed."
Her dog had hid with her. From the wal1s of Contorno Avenue to the walls of the fort, the
neighborhood, all agreed, had been "terrorized."
For Gamboa de Baixo residents, the increased presence of luxury apartment communities
on the coastal lands of Salvador directly leads to the increased public policing of the area. Black
feminist theorist Patricia Hill Collins ( 1998, 51) points out that blacks' heightened "visibility can
bring increased surveillance." Classed racist-sexist ideologies mark them as '"not quite'
legitimate" citizens whose lives are expendable (McKittrick 2006, 62). Black Brazilian
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sociologist and feminist militant of the black movement Vilma Reis (2008) wrote a few days
after the January operation in Gamboa de Baixo that, "in Salvador, second largest black city on
the planet, where to be black is still synonymous with dangerous, undesirable, out of place, and
fundamentally, descartavel (disposable)," violence against poor black people has become
routine, and for some, an expected element of urban governance (see also Maravalho 2008).
Black neighborhoods such as Gamboa de Baixo are portrayed as fora de controle (out of control)
morally, socially, politically, and spatia11y. Many residents feel they are being unfairly
criminalized, such as Nice1ia, a 28-year-old black woman, who often says, "noo sou marginal,"
to insist that she is not a criminal. As another resident, Camilo, explains how his experiences
with police abuse and the general criminalization of Gamboa de Baixo connect with the police's
racialization of local residents:
It has to do with the fact that I am black, that I live in a neighborhood like here that has
its highs and lows, negatives and positives. Here has a good side and a bad side ... The
negative side is the drugs, and they think in their point of view that everyone that lives
here have some involvement with drugs, something that is not true. Because they are
many pai de familia (family men) hard-working, like they have everywhere, even in the
big mansions of rich neighborhoods (personal interview 2003).
Contrary to public perceptions that the police are doing their job of cleansing the area of
criminals as a necessary part of the process to socially improve the urban landscape, local
residents understand that they are undeserving of such inhumane forms of violent treatment; the
entire neighborhood is being marginalized, criminalized, and destroyed simultaneously.

The Racial Logic of Spatial Exclusion
This perspective bridges the theoretical gap between analyses of the violence of unequal
urban development and the violence of urban policing. By emphasizing the overlap between the
two processes, I encourage readers to think about the emergent need for black social movements
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in Brazil and elsewhere to combat the image of "collective pathology" (Gilmore 2002) while
struggling to gain access to vital urban resources such as housing, land, and basic sanitation.
Gentrification, urban redevelopment, urban revitalization, urban renewal, whatever the term we
use to describe these modem urbanization processes, reveal that for black communities, urban
clean-up campaigns can be radically exclusionary and dangerously violent (Davila 2004;
Pinheiro 1999). In Brazil, the naked truth of urban renewal exposes the contradictions of
modernity: the national desire to align Brazilian cities with other global cities such as Paris, New
York, and Frankfurt, and the growing black urban population who must fight against state and
private developers to belong as landowners and citizens in a robust new and developed city
(Pinheiro 1999). The black struggle for citizenship constitutes an urgent demand for racial
inclusion in development, expanding discourses and practices to take urban grassroots antiracism strategies seriously.
One concern of my ongoing ethnographic research has been to examine how the
modernizing project in Salvador is a racial project3 posing damaging effects for poor black
neighborhoods caught in between their own desire for improved living conditions through
inclusive socio-economic development and urbanization and the bulldozing private and public
enterprises that seek to forcibly remove them. I assert that urbanization practices illustrate the
racial and gender consciousness of the State and the ways in this form of race-based knowledge
determines socio-spatial ideologies and concrete actions. This recognition exemplifies what Joao
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Michael Omi and Howard Winant ( 1995) define racial formation as "the socio-historical
process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed" (55).
Linking this process to hegemonic processes, Omi and Winant argue that a racial project is "an
interpretation, representation, or explanation or racial dynamics, and an effort to reorganize and
redistribute resources along particular racial lines" (56). Racial projects connect discursive
dimensions of racial formation with the ways in which race organizes social structure and
everyday experiences ( 56).
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Costa Vargas (2004) terms the "hyperconsciousness/negation of race dialectic," which defines
social relations in Brazil. Vargas claims that, on the one hand, most Brazilians negate the
importance of race in structuring institutions, shaping social relations, and determining the
distribution of resources and power. On the other hand, Brazilians are "acutely aware of racial
differences and utilize those to (often tacitly) justify, think about, and enforce behavior and
social inequalities" (6). This hyperconsciousness/negation dialectic is useful in understanding
how Bahians are simultaneously hyperconsciousness of the racial aspects of urbanization
policies while also negating the salience of race in the new socio-spatial order. However, the
black communities that are most negatively affected by the forced displacement from the
"better" parts of the city understand that gentrification shapes racial, class, and gender
landscapes of the city. As a Gamboa de Baixo neighborhood association activists wrote in a press
release more than a decade ago, and which still has political saliency as the Direct Urban
Development Plan advances and more buildings like Odebrecht are constructed around them,
"the dissemination of this culture of exclusion ... principally towards the black and poor
population, distances it farther and farther from the so-cal1ed privileged areas of the city" (1996).
For Gamboa de Baixo, the new building further threatens not only the neighborhood's
permanence, but also the livelihoods and collective safety of its majority black residents. Morada
dos Cardeais is a private development project that Gamboa de Baixo activists consider to be part
of ongoing state-sponsored efforts to revitalize the coastal lands along the Bay of All Saints for
tourism and luxury real estate. Such development further reproduces gendered racial and class
hierarchies, heightens private and public security in the region, and contributes to the
criminalization of the Gamboa de Baixo neighborhood. Salvador's "racial state's aggressively
punitive stance" (Gilmore 2002: 21) on combating urban crime has meant the fact that the state
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police apparatus "formalizes inequality" (21) and deepens racist justifications to demolish this
poor neighborhood and relocate its black residents to the distant periphery of the city. The
context of daily acts of violence as well as systemic police operations signifies the "policy effect
of producing" (21) entire neighborhoods as marginal and criminal. Policing black neighborhoods
such as this one represents not only a politics of spatial containment, but also a politics of
absolute spatial exclusion in the simultaneous State actions of demolition and police abuse. By
examining policy-driven misconceptions of Gamboa de Baixo and its residents as irrevocably
violent, unhygienic, and morally bankrupt, we are better able to understand how enduring public
gendered racist images of both black women and men shape a politics of disposability and
demolition during urban renewal processes. In this dominant view, Gamboa de Baixo, as a
whole, is not just dangerous, but also it does not belong there on the coastal lands; in essence, it
threatens urban progress.

Conclusion
I have been locked by the lawless.
Handcuffed by the haters.
Gagged by the greedy.
And, if I know anything at all,
it ' s that a wall is just a wall and nothing more at all.
It can be broken down
(from "Affirmation" by Assa ta Shakur 1987, I).
On February 29 2008, I received news from Salvador about the disastrous floods of the
night before. Muddy water had invaded the home of neighborhood activist Adriano, and another
activist Ana Cristina had been trapped in an overcrowded bus on her way home from the
university. When she arrived in Gamboa de Baixo at around 2 a.m. , wet and exhausted, she was
summoned to the eastern side of the neighborhood that shares the wall with Morada dos
Cardeias. A landslide at the apartment complex had tom down a portion of the concrete wall.
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When a young woman had heard the wall collapsing onto her house, she jumped on top of her
children to protect them. While her children escaped unharmed, she was hospitalized with severe
head injuries. Gamboa de Baixo activists contacted Odebrecht representatives, who immediately
took responsibility for the cleanup and reconstruction. This kind of dialogue between both
communities results from the past few years of struggle, during which Gamboa de Baixo
residents have demanded respect as residents who preceded the luxury apartment building on the
land. Since the beginning of construction, they have insisted that attention be paid to the
environmental safety of the landscape, as journalist Mary Weinstein (2004) also wrote in her
article criticizing the project. As many have argued about the failed levees in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, events such as landslides are not just "natural disasters" (Hartman and
Squires 2006), The South End Press Collective (2007), but rather as some Gamboa de Baixo
residents have rightfully expressed, are man-made. Landslides and the collapsing of concrete
walls are the consequences of environmental shifts during mass vertical construction on the
coastal lands in Salvador. In this instance, the wall between Gamboa de Baixo and Morada dos
Cardeais failed both communities miserably.
Gamboa de Baixo continues to remain intact and to fight for land rights and improved
infrastructure, but residents face the constant threat of land expulsion and relocation to
Salvador's distant periphery. We must rethink the process of gentrification, to include private
development, as relying on strategies of criminalization and victimization of poor black
neighborhoods. The everyday experiences of black women activists, whose definition of
violence as interconnected processes of state dominance, teaches us that violence internalized in
black communities cannot be understood as separate from the violence of c1ass-based spatialized
racism, such as the construction of wa11s around luxury apartment communities. Race
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overdetennines urban redevelopment projects and the private-and public police's relationship
with the Gamboa de Baixo neighborhood and the enactment of "spatialized justice," which
Sherene Razack (2002) defines as the "values that deem certain bodies and subjects in spaces as
deserving of full personhood" ( 126).
My exploration of walls and urban policing as Gamboa de Baixo residents experience
them raises awareness of how black communities come to signify "spaces of violence,"
undeserving of citizenship rights such as land entitlement and public security. Police terrorism in
poor, black, urb_a n neighborhoods is routine, using the most sophisticated techniques of urban
warfare that recalls SWAT teams in Watts or against the Mexican-American farm workers
movements, or in the demolition of the Black Panthers. Black communities of resistance, led by
black women in defense of collective rights to the city, reflect and respond to the everyday fonns
of spatial violence that shape their ability to organize their community and resist that violence.
Resistance is encoded in the act of breaking down real and symbolic walls and recasting the
margins as oppositional spaces. As black feminist bell hooks (1984) writes, "The struggle may
not even begin with the colonizer; it may begin within one ' s segregated, colonized community
and family. So I want to note that I am not trying to romantically re-inscribe the notion of that
space of marginality where the oppressed live apart from their oppressor as 'pure'. I want to say
that these margins have been both sites of repression and sites ofresistance" (I 5 I). As racial
marginality is reproduced in terms of displacement and spatial removals, David Goldberg (1993)
concludes that resistance will come from the margins. He writes of the case of South African
apartheid, "One emergent alternative is the assumption of 'given ' peripheral places as sites of
affirmative resistance- in much the way that 'black ', say, has been assumed affirmatively as a
designation of resistance. It is in the final analysis ·only on and from these sites, the social
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margins, that the battles of resistance will be waged, the fights for full recognition of freedoms,
interests, c1aims and power, for the autonomy of registered voices, and the insistence upon fully
incorporated social institutions, resources, spaces" (205).
As Gamboa de Baixo's black, women-led neighborhood organization demands
spatialized justice when they shout in street protests, "a nossa resistencia vai ficar aqui (our
resistance is going to stay right here)" (personal communication 2000, my emphasis), their
grassroots struggle for land rights undermines "hegemonic spatial practices" (McKittrick and
Woods 2007: 7) of urban land expulsion and segregation. This form of organi~ed urban
resistance reaffirms the need to examine how black communities mobilize around spatial politics
as an important anti-racism strategy to positively transform black neighborhoods in Salvador, in
Brazil, and throughout the black diaspora.
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Abstract:
In the context of the reshaping of urban space, the restructuring of the economy, and a new
influx of rural-to-urban migrants, this paper examines the views of men and women taxi cab
drivers in the southwestern Chinese city of Kunming towards what they consider to be dangerous
people and places - people they wi11 not let ride in their cabs and places where they will not
drive. While the taxi cab drivers are those who were initially marginalized in the reform era -mostly laid-off factory workers or displaced farmers -- the drivers now view as dangerous those
people who are even more marginalized - the unemployed, the landless, the poverty-stricken,
and certain minority groups who are considered too poor or too troublesome. The cab drivers
label as dangerous those places that are liminal ones, where marginalized people enter the city
(train and bus stations), where new forms of consumption occur (Walmart), or at the city limits,
at the boundaries between urban and rural space. This paper suggests that in the new material
and social landscape of the city, marked by new forms of physical mobility and social
distinction, the taxi cab drivers seek to distance themselves both from what they might have been
and what they cannot be.
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Abstract:
Much of the literature on globalization concentrates on the broader economic, social, and
political dimensions of contemporary global changes and neglects the ways in which these
changes reshape the everyday lives of women in different parts of the world, except to highlight
the increased participation of women in the labor force and the feminization of poverty among
other dimensions of women's economic oppression. Community-based social change efforts
seem all too limited when placed up against the structures of inequality that shape the wider
political and economic environment. Analysis of women's community activism in the context of
globalization makes salient the contradictions of transnational feminist organizing for localitybased women's movements and feminist organizing more broadly. Many of the lessons we have
learned through more nationally bound feminist politics will continue to serve us as we expand
the horizons of feminist organizing. These lessons include how to negotiate the dilemmas of
organizing across class, race-ethnicity, sexualities, space, and religious and political
perspectives; how to sustain feminist activist engagement over time; how to build and mobilize
effective coalitions; how to create democratic structures at all levels of organization; and how to
negotiate the contradictions of funding, representation, and social movement framing--some of
which I will illustrate in my presentation.
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Women's Commµnity-Based Activism and Globalization
Paper prepared by Nancy A. Naples for presentation at the Conference,
"Rethinking Cities and Communities:
Urban Transition Before and During the Era of Globalization,"
Sponsored by the Center for Urban and Global Studies,
Trinity College, Hartford, Connecticut, November 14-15, 2008.

Introduction
In July 2002, 600 unarmed ljaw women in Nigeria took over a large Chevron-Texaco oil
terminal. Seven hundred workers including Americans, Britons and Canadians were held
hostage. The !jaw women activists threatened to strip naked, a practice that is used in their
culture to shame the offender. As a spokeswoman for the group declared: "Our weapon is our
nakedness" (Dahbany-Miraglia, 2000). The women ranged in age from 30 to 90. They
"demanded jobs for their sons, electricity for their homes and economic development in [the]
Niger delta" (p. 83). Drawing on their cultural practices and with a commitment to peaceful
negotiations, the ljaw women were successful in chal1enging this multi-national corporation, at
least in this location.
Much of the literature on globalization concentrates on the broader economic, social, and
political dimensions of contemporary global changes and neglects the ways in which these
changes reshape the everyday lives of women in different parts of the world, except to highlight
the increased participation of women in the labor force and the feminization of poverty among
other dimensions of women's economic oppression. However, as the opening story illustrates,
women ' s community-based activism offers a particularly instructive example of how local

struggles are contoured by and can contribute to transnational movements for economic and
social justice.
Analysis of women's community activism in the context of globalization also makes
salient the contradictions of transnational feminist organizing for locality-based women's
movements and feminist organizing more broadly. Mexican activist-scholar Sylvia Marcos
(2005) points out that many activists who are focusing their activism on international efforts
through the UN conferences and other international events, are losing their constituencies and
"are no longer rooted anywhere" (146; see also Jaquette 1995; Desai 2005). How can activists
involved in transnational organizing sustain ties to local constituencies? How can the local
remain in view within transnational movements, and how can local campaigns be conducted in
such a way that the extra-local relations of ruling are rendered visible?
In addressing these questions I draw on intersectional feminist praxis. lntersectional
feminist praxis foregrounds the ways in which activism or experience shapes knowledge, an
insight that is often lost when theoretical approaches are institutionalized in the academy. This ·
approach to intersectionality also reflects the feminist praxis that gave rise to the concept and
honors the fact that theory develops in a dialogic fashion from practice. Intersectional analyses
require crossing many different kinds of borders including those drawn between academic
disciplines between academic feminism and feminist activism, and between local and
transnational politics. From the point of view of intersectional feminist praxis it is necessary to
create stronger links between local organizing and transnational po1itics, and, in tum, to translate
the political strategies and organizing frames developed on the transnational political stage to
benefit local social and economic justice movements.
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Translation work
In my research on grassroots activism, I have found women activists to be especially
skillful in building bridges across different issues, diverse communities, and varied political
perspectives in their struggles to secure the health and safety of their families and communities
(Naples 1998a). Law professor Boaventura de Sousa Santos is among the many scholars who
are trying to understand the factors that contribute to the development of globalization from
below. He uses the image of "translation work" as a way to "clarify what unites and separates the
different movements and practices so as to ascertain the possibilities and limits of articulation
and aggregation among them" (Santos 2004: 182). Santos points out that, "Because there is no
single universal social practice or collective subject to confer meaning and direction to history,
the work of translation becomes crucial in defining, in each concrete and historical moment or
context, which constellations of nonhegemonic practices carry more counterhegemonic
potential" (184).
I understand translation work to have at least two components: first, modeling democratic
practice in everyday organizing - in other words, seeking opportunities to organize with others
as equals and, second, identifying ways to link the issues and analysis generated from one
campaign or social movement to another in order to strengthen praxis. The first component
evokes the I 960s organizing efforts shaped around the notion of "participatory democracy."
Francesca Poletta (2004) describes the process of participatory democracy as "an endless
meeting" but emphasizes the "solidary, innovatory, and developmental benefits" (2, emphasis in
original) of consensus building efforts in social movement organizing (also see Breines 1989). A
version of participatory democracy made its way into the 1964 War on Poverty legislation as an
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emphasis on the "maximum feasible participation ofresidents in poor neighborhoods." The US
state's support for community activism and community decision making was short lived, but
local residents (a disproportionate number of whom were women of color) seized this small
window of opportunity to improve the services and quality of life in their neighborhoods (Naples
1998a).
While state-sponsored maximum feasible participation was a failed experiment, we now
have models of participatory democracy that offer other strategies for broadening citizen input
into decisions that affect daily life. For example, the development of gender budgets is a strategy
that has been exported from a national context to the transnational stage. Gender budgets were
introduced by Australian feminists who had successfully organized women policy agencies
within the Australian federal government during the 1970s and through the 1995 when
conservative John Howard was elected Prime Minister (Eisenstein 1996; Sawer 1990). Gender
budgets were incorporated into the Beijing Platform for Action that was developed during the
Fourth World Conference for Women in 1995 and taken up by activists in many other countries.
It is important to examine the implementation of gender budgeting in the local context to

determine its effectiveness and identify the limits and possibilities for enhancing gender equity
through government expenditures. Economists Rhonda Sharp and Ray Broomhill (2002) caution
that "the closure of available spaces for contestation within the [Australian] state may necessitate
a more broadly based economic strategy by feminists" (43). They ca11 for increased community
awareness and involvement, as captured by the community-based Canadian alternative federal
budget approach.
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Democratic and deliberative processes require an understanding of difference and
relations of ruling to ensure the widest participation and inclusion possible. I am reminded here
of philosopher Iris Young's (2002) important work on deliberative democracy and her insightful
analysis of both external and internal exclusions that limit the participation of ethnic and racial
minorities, people with disabilities, working-class residents and those who do not share the
dominant language (see also Fung 2004). As many other activist scholars note, the rural poor,
indigenous people, and women are underrepresented in many transnational social justice
movements (see, e.g. , Brooks 2007).
Translation work also includes attending to how different organizing frames and political
strategies travel from one context to another. For example, Suchland (2007) analyzed the border
crossing potential of policies against sexual harassment and common "feminist tropes for
politicizing domestic violence in the United States, such as 'the personal is political" in Eurasia.
She found that "since they are anchored in specific experiences and critiques of the
public/private divide which are not appropriate for or translatable to the Russian context," they
''do not [serve to] politicize violence against women" in postsocialist Russia (12).
1

What strategies are most effective given the difficulty in translating organizing frames

and activist strategies across different political, economic and cultural contexts? Postcolonial
feminist scholar Chandra Mohanty (1997) argues from a materialist feminist perspective that,
"shared material interests and identity" would lead to "common ways of reading the world" (5)
and can form the basis for "political solidarity." Transnational labor organizing offers one
example

of both

the

cha1lenge

and

possibilities

of linking

local

orgamzmg

and

international/transnational campaigns for social justice thro~gh the frame of "shared material
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interests and identity" (6). Sociologists Suzanne Franzway and Mary Margaret Fonow (2008)
argue that activists can link their efforts with transnational activism without leaving home by
"join[ing] international campaigns for labor rights, boycott[ing] products made in sweatshops,
seek[ing] legal redress from discrimination by intergovernmental bodies such as the European
Trade Union Commission and the International Labour Organization" among other strategies

(538).
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Optimism about the significance of local activism in the context of global economic
globalization is reflected in Jennifer Bickman Mendez's (2002) analysis of the Central American
Network of Women in Solidarity with Maquila Workers. Women workers in the Network
document their working conditions and gather detailed information about how fast they work,
what they produce, for which transnational corporations, and their relationships with supervisors
and others in managerial positions. This information is used for local unionizing efforts and is
communicated through other NGOs in the Network to enable groups in the North to undertake
public consciousness-raising about the problems faced by women maquila workers. Network
members have also experienced a deepening in their gender consciousness that led them to create
other autonomous women's groups and cha11enge male-dominated social movement
organizations in their region. As a consequence, women have gained greater visibility in local
politics and increased legitimacy as political actors.
The extent to which local organizing efforts are linked to transnational movements for
social justice are necessarily shaped by access to financial and other resources. For example, due
to lack of access to legal and economic resources, ''women ' s organizations [in Middle Eastern
and North African countries] are not as we11 integrated into transnational feminist networks as
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are women's organizations in other developing regions" (Moghadam 2000, 80). As a
consequence, their voices and perspectives are less well represented in the international
conferences which are important sites for transnational organizing.
Negotiating limits of transnational activism

Many feminist scholars question the effectiveness of transnational organizing for
community-based struggles, especially UN-based advocacy as many is~ues such as the right to
sexual agency have been sidelined (Cabezas 2005). Critics of the UN structure point out the
problem with inadequate funding for the implementation of UN programs designed to improve
women's lives in different parts of the worked. Despite the limitations of the UN structure,
women's groups have used UN conferences to build a transnational women's movement and
bring their local concerns to the international political stage (see, e.g., Seidman 2000). For
example, Eve Sandberg (1998) argues that UN World Conferences on Women (Mexico, 1975;
Nairobi, 1985; Beijing, 1995) served as a catalyst for Zambian women's domestic organizing as
well as legitimated their activism, and provided resources and strategies for successful
mobilization; although she also points out that these benefits accrue to elite women more than to
less privileged Zambian women. Furthermore, the establishment of programs like the United
Nations Development Fund For Women (UNIFEM), and the adoption of the Convention to
Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDA W) by the UN demonstrates the
power of women's international organizing (Wing 2002). Mary Meyer and Elisabeth Prugl
( 1999) note that "the significance of international documents is not that governments will
automatically implement them but that national and local groups can use them to hold their
governments accountable" ( 13 ).
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Feminist scholars also note that a focus on preparing for UN conferences often has the
effect of diverting attention from the issues of most direct concern to local activists (see, e.g.,
Alvarez 1999). In their discussion of the Alliance for Arab Women (AA W), Nawal Ammar and
Leila Lababidy (1999), mother and daughter who are founding members of AA W, acknowledge
the significance of the UN conferences for Egyptian women ' s domestic organizing but also point
out that,
Since the UN Third Conference on Women in Nairobi in 1985, some nongovernmental
organizat1ons concerned with women ' s issues in Egypt have changed their focus from
welfare work to development of empowerment skills. Reasons for such changes are
numerous, but most salient has been the priority of international funding sources. ( 15)
In addition, local conditions or events may prevent community activists from
participation in transnational organizing efforts as Melagos Pefia (2007) points out in her
discussion of how some women ' s groups along the U.S. Mexico border were unable to
participate in the Bejing conference due to their decision to organize locally and protest the
murders of border women in the Juarez desert. While some of these activists had the opportunity
to attend the conference, the situation in their local community forced them to "'put their energies
into highlighting the violence against women and more generally showing the border to be an
economically and politically exploited community" (4; see also Staudt 2008).
Localizing transnational human rights discourse
Whether they participate in transnational conferences or not, feminist activists around the
world are using internationally produced documents like the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDA W) and the Bejing Plan for Action to hold their
8

governments accountable (see, for example, Hawkesworth 2006; Naples & Desai 2002).
Activists have used these documents and the international discourse on women's rights to
mcrease women's activism on behalf of their constitutional rights and their political
representation and social citizenship. Susanna Wing (2002) notes that women's groups who were
trying to bring home the Beijing platform in Mali found that the best way to do so was acting on
concrete initiatives relating to political participation without referring to Beijing as it was seen as_
an elite conference which did not address the realities of women in Mali. Women=s groups
localized the message of Beijing by articulating it in local terms that emphasized democracy and
the role of women in nation-building.
Efforts to localize international human rights discourse are generating new visions of how
to create a local environment to support and extend human rights. For example, welfare rights
activists in Maine have used human rights discourse to argue against cuts in welfare and for
college to count as work when assessing recipients welfare-to-work responsibilities (Polakow et
al. 2004). Historically, human rights claims making on behalf of economic rights has had less
success than claims based on political repression and violence (Neubeck 2006). However, there
is evidence that this approach is having some success in some localized efforts in the U.S. as this
case illustrates.
In a case study of women's activism in Hong Kong, anthropologist Sally Engel Merry
(2006) examines how local women's groups translated the [rural women's] grievances into a
rights language that the legislature and political leaders could hear. Activists taught rural women
how to frame their inheritance problems in the language of rights. By using a human rights
frame and direct action "a small group of poor and mostly illiterate women in Hong Kong
9

challenged the Chinese customary law that forbade female inheritance of family ]and, a system
that had long maintained the continuity of the patri]ineage" (192). Merry concludes that the rural
women: "were not initially critical of the patrilineal system, only of their relatives ' failure to
provide for them. They began to think of the family inheritance system as unfair to a11 women.
Over time, the women decided that the inheritance ]aw needed to change and came to see
themselves as victims of gender discrimination .... Violations of duty by male relatives became
violations of rights they held as women and, to a much lesser extent, rights they held as human
beings." (201)
Here again we are reminded of the vital role that translators play in ]inking diverse social
and cultural worlds for the purposes of collective action. In this case, the translators helped the
indigenous women " tell their stories differently" and as a result, "the ways they thought about
those stories also began to shift" (20 I). Clearly, this case is not without contradictions in that the
nonindigenous activists could be viewed as imposing an externally derived framework on the
indigenous women's organizing efforts. The contradictions of organizing across the many
different borders remain evident in efforts to translate an expansive vision of human rights into
everyday practices but, in my view, the importance of the translation efforts far outweigh the
pitfalls.
Linking local and global struggles for social justice
As concerns about the limits of feminist organizing through the UN mount, many
feminist scholars are looking to the World Social Forums (WSFs) and the national and regional
'

social forums for a corrective to the elitist and English-dominant UN organizing strategy (see,
e.g. , Desai 2005 ; Wilson et al. 2005). Women's influence on the transnational political stage is
10

evident in their leadership and broad-based participation in the WSF and other world conferences
on the environment, human rights, population, and social development (Peters & Wolper 1995).

2

Two feminist groups serve on the governing council of the World Social Forum (Wilson
et al. 2005). The first group is Development Alternatives for a New Era (DAWN), the network
of Southern feminist activists originally started in 1984 to promote alternatives to development
that would center women's lives and sustainability, (see, for example, Sen & Grown 1987). The
second feminist organization that has played a key role in organizing the World Social Forum is
the World March of Women (http://www.worldmarchofwomen.org/index html/en). Pascale
Dufour and Isabelle Giraud (2007) describe how "The World March of Women emerged from
the relative success of a kind of collective action used in 1995 by Quebec women when they ..
organized a March Against Poverty" ( 1157). Organizers discussed the possibility "of building a
worldwide network of women that would enable them to make collective representations to
international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which
were perceived as being responsible for many of the decisions that directly affected women's
daily life" (ibid, 1158). The goals of the group changed over time with less emphasis placed on
appealing to the UN and more focus on circulating their position worldwide.
This change in goal has been enhanced by participation in the World Social Forum. As
Dufour and Giraud (2007) discuss, the dilemmas of organizing that is focused on the UN
especia1ly as neo-conservative and religious right governments have proven very successful in
circumscribing women's reproductive rights. Dufour and Giraud effectively argue that the nested
organizing developed by WMW "provides a model of grassroots transnationalization that
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distinguishes it in important ways from the more elitist transnational feminist networks that
gravitate within the UN orbit" (1169; see also Conway 2008).
Networking among NGOs and other movement groups across the globe has been
hastened by the advent of the internet. The Internet has proven a significant resource for the
development of the links between academic and activist organizations and between communitybased and transnational feminist organizing (see, e.g. , Mcllwaine & Datta 2003 ; Ferree &
Pudrovska 2006; Friedman et al. 2006). Over the last decade, we have witnessed the power of
cyber-activism in fighting the globalization of capitalism, raising awareness about the genocide
in Rwanda and the U.S. war against Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as promoting domestic
legislative lobbying and fundraising for diverse political causes. As Lind (2005) observes,
"Through e-mail networks, an International Women ' s Day (March 8) March in Quito can be
coordinated with marches in Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico, and India. An idea is not formed merely
from the local context but from communication across national borders, around the world" (17).
However, while the Internet and other technologies offer important resources for
transnational politics, it remains a privileged tool that few people can afford and few grassroots
organizations can access. It is also important to point out that how activists use this technology
varies across class, culture, and region, as Kole (2001) demonstrates in her analysis of
WomenAction in Africa which was established to facilitate the participation ofNGOs in
evaluating the implementation of the Platform for Action developed. during the United Nations
Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995. Kole found that women ' s groups in Afrlca use
the Internet in a manner that differs from the way women in the western world access and use the
World Wide Web. Furthermore, diverse groups of African women use the Internet in ways that
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differ from each other (also see Phillips 2003). More importantly, many activists in different
parts of the world, especially those located in rural communities, do not have access to the
Internet and are therefore disadvantaged in their ability to participate in transnational movements
that have become increasingly dependent on cyberactivism.

Linking local struggles for basic needs
So how do we create the grounds for collective action or solidarity in the context of
rampant "asymmetries and inequalities" (Grewal and Kaplan 2000: n.p.)? Some coalitionstrategies that I find most promising for crossing many different kinds of borders include the
work of the Iowa-based Women, Food, and Agriculture Network (WFAN), a group founded by
women family farmers in Iowa who tie their organizing efforts to the international "food
sovereignty" movement. They view food sovereignty as a basic human right and see it tied
directly to sustainable agriculture and environmental health and safety, thus bringing together the
interests of small farmers, consumers, and environmentalists.
Along with other activist groups like The Institute for Food and Development Policy/
Food First which is also interested in food sovereignty and building local agri-food systems,3
WF AN is focusing attention on the problem of water privatization and are challenging the
neolibera] view that water is a commodity (Adams 2004). Privatization of water raises a number
of immediate concerns: the added cost of purchasing water is one concern; but less visible is how
this contributes to the neglect of our public water supply and the deterioration of the
infrastructure that supports it. As citizens are refashioned into consumers (and of course, this
process has a long history), the claims-making strategies are also restructured so that claims are
based on our ability to purchase services rather than as entitlements due to us as citizens. The
13

shift from citizen to consumer further marginalizes those who cannot afford to purchase the
essentials. Water is now added to the list of basic needs, alongside housing and health care, that
are outside the reach of a growing number of US residents.
Organizing against the privatization of water a]so has profound implications for people in
other parts of the world. As AlterNet reporter Tara Logan (2007) points out that "In Africa, an
estimated 5 mi11ion people die each year for Jack of safe drinking water." Yet, multinationals
target many countries in Africa "to tum over their public water systems in exchange for promises
of debt relief." N eolibera] economic restructuring also "drives the construction of dams, which
have displaced an estimated 80 million people worldwide. In India alone, over 4,000 dams have
submerged 37 500 square kilometers of land and forced 42 million people from their homes"
(paras 20, 22). Logan points out that control over our basic needs brings to the fore
"fundamental questions of democracy itself: Who will make the decisions that affect our future,
and who will be excluded? ... And if citizens no longer control their most basic resource, their
water, do they rea1ly control anything at all?" (Snitow, Kaufman & Fox 2007, quoted in Logan
2007: para 49). I am not suggesting that only by organizing for basic needs can we ]ink loca] and
global movements for social and economic justice and find common ground. However, I am
recommending that we consider all local issues in the context of transnational struggles for social
and economic justice. And vice versa. As anthropologist Akhil Gupta ( 1998) cautions, we need
to resist replicating "the implicit spatial hierarchy constructed in distinguishing 'the local from
the global"; as he also points out, "'the global' too originates from some location" (24, emphasis
original).

Localizing transnational politics
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Localizing transnational politics includes efforts to create and implement democratic
practices in all organizing contexts. As Chris Chase-Dunn and Ellen Reese (2007) also
emphasize in their study of the World Social Forum, the process of "creating democratic
mechanisms of accountability through which WSF participants can engage in global collective
action and move towards greater political unity remains an important political task" (para 26; see
also Shiva 1997). However, it is necessary to address this challenge at all levels of organizing on
behalf of social and economic justice. In fact, the problem of access and representation remains,
even with attention given to creating deliberative and democratic structures of governance.
Development Alternatives for a New Era (DAWN) co-organized Feminist Dialogues
during the 2004 World Social Forum "to address the critical issues facing transnational feminist
movements including creating more democratic and equitable organizational strategies,
organizing across differences between feminists in different parts of the world, and bring[ing]
feminist analyses and practices into the global justice movement" (DAWN 2004). Organizers of
the Feminist Dialogues posed a series of questions that have been key to progressive organizing
and coalition-building including "what strategies challenge rigid boundaries of the 'local' vs. the
'global and thus promote new forms of movement building and alternatives."
In one of the concept papers generated for the January 2004 meeting, they note that: "The
local and the global are often posited in opposition to each other, as different arenas of political
struggle or referring to unequal power dynamics." They ask: "What strategies challenge rigid
boundaries of the "local vs. the global" and thus promote new forms of movement building and
alternatives?" In order to effectively challenge this distinction and to build toward a more
inclusive and effective transnational feminist movement, they pose a number of other questions
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including: "how are we filling in the gaps m local and global orgamzmg m terms of
representation (who speaks for whom, [and] how local issues are distorted/ misrepresented ...
by international, regional and national networks)?" ; "how are we addressing issues of power,
accountability and transparency, and structural inequities both within the North and the South
and across the North-South, in relation to deciding agendas, division of work, resource-sharing
and access?" and "as feminists who are also part of broader social movements, to what extent are
our political agendas redistributive (claims on state and capital for resources) and to what extent
are they transformative (efforts to take power and transform oppressive structures)?" These
questions, and many more, need to be addressed by all activists who participate in the
transnational feminist movement.
The Feminist Dialogues were designed to provide spaces for translation across borders
with women from diverse backgrounds and in different political forums (Desai 2005). While
there were problems associated with the implementation of the Feminist Dialogues in 2004 and
subsequent World Social Forums, it offered an important opportunity to build bridges across
different movements and deepen feminist analyses. 4 They demonstrate, in my view, that the
strength of intersectional feminist praxis lies in its ability to remain critical of exclusionary
practices in movement politics and organizations, to work simultaneously against capitalist
globalization and against patriarchal forms of oppression, and to offer new alternatives to the
dominant forms of globalization.
Conclusion

Social justice activists have much to gain by adopting a feminist analysis of globalization,
neoliberalism, gender, and sexuality. One powerful illustration is offered by Okinawan women
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activists who are organizing against the US military presence in their country. Their feminist
analysis of globalization, militarization, and gender serves as a powerful reminder that any effort
to resist the oppressive effects of economic globalization must include creating a vision for, in
their words, '" an alternative security framework,' one that seek[ s] the transfonnation of our
society that is permeated with weapons and violation, into a community built on mutual trust and
partnership" (Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence 1998, quoted in Fukumura &
Matsuoka 2002:255). Feminist analysis can be used to uncover these beliefs and other taken-forgranted constructions of femininity and masculinity that naturalize and promote militarization
(Enloe 2004; Moghadam 2005). In this way, feminists can help develop a more effective
approach to security that takes into account strategies to protect women, their families and
communities, and the environment (see also Tursten 1999; Enloe 2007; La Duke 2004; Cockburn
2007).
Activist networks established in and through local struggles for social and economic
justice provide one of the primary means by which activists sustain and promote progressive
analyses and alternative political strategies. However, many local struggles will proceed without
international attention or transnational support. Most women activists in both urban and rural
locales are, by necessity, engaged in campaigns for basic survival, and do not have the resources
or energy to take their struggles to the transnational political stage. However, there is much to
learn about the limits and possibilities of transnational movements for social and economic
justice from women organizing in local communities in different parts of the world. Feminists
and other progressive activists are well-positioned to listen to and heed these lessons as they
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work to map the links between local community organizing, national political action, and
transnational struggles for social and economic justice.
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Legal scholar Jennifer Gordon argues for a model of "transnational labor citizenship" that

would offer freedom of movement for workers and their families and enhance solidarity and
social justice; however, she recognizes the problems associated with the citizenship framework,
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especially as her proposal would not address the limits of access to social welfare for workers
and their family in different national contexts.
2

For example, feminists were successful in their efforts to incorporate a gender perspective into

the 2004 World Social Forum '·s plenaries and workshops. However, as Wilson et al. (2005) note,
WSFs "have no direct leverage over international institutions, nor a feminist organization, nor is
it intrinsically sympathetic to feminist priorities" (61 ).
3

Food First was co-founded by Frances Moore Lappe and Joseph Co11ins in the mid- l 970s.

Their organizing efforts contributed to the development of Pesticide Action Network and other
important environmental justice groups. In 1987 former staff members of Food First. Kevin
Danaher and Medea Benjamin, left Food First to establish the organi zation Global Exchange.
http ://www.foodfirst.org/en/ about/historv (accessed 31 August 2008, 11 :l lPM).
4

The World Social Forum and other transnational social justice movements has generated a

series of local and regional efforts that provide the opportunity for translation work and for
linking local concerns to transnational organizing efforts.
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* * *
In 1937, William Lawson, a California administrator for the Work Progress
Administration , pubJicly expressed attitudes that seldom surfaced in San Francisco a half a
century earlier. In a speech delivered at the dedication of a monument honoring Sun Yat-Sen,
the founder of the Chinese Republic, Lawson proclaimed:
We, of San Francisco, enjoy the closest association with our own admirable
Chinese population. Kindly, generous, honorable, steadfast in friendship they
have earned our every great respect. The Chinese stock in San Francisco is
pioneer stock. The Chinese here are largely native born. Their grandfathers and
great grandfathers were brave, adventurous souls. They cut their bridges behind
them, crossed the wide pacific and made their way and their peace in a strange
civilization among people whose language they did not speak and whose ways
seemed the ways of barbarians to those whose whole background lay in the
culture of the Orient. They met the West and today their descendants are our
friends and our esteemed fellow citizens. The Chinese are admirable business
men. Their stores, with their wares so strange to the people of our country are a
great attraction in our city. We prize them very highly. 1
1
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I like to imagine Dennis Kearny and all the proponents of Chinese exclusion rolling in
their graves as Lawson uttered these words of praise. Indeed, the speech failed to acknowledge
how many white Americans disparaged Chinese immigration and mobilized to curtail it. The
speech also concealed the fact that Chinese San Franciscans stil1 experienced immigration
restriction laws and still encountered difficulties in attaining decent jobs and homes. Despite
these past a~d present realities, Lawson's words established that residents of Chinese descent
should be valued for their contributions to the city and should be treated as fellow San
Franciscans.
Although it suggests something about cultural pluralism as an ideal that would gain
credence in the 1930s, the statue's dedication may say more about the ties that bind China to
Chinatown and the degree to which the world outside of our national borders shaped attitudes
and events on the local level. The proper context for understanding the Sun Yat-Sen monument
is the Second Sino-Japanese War and perhaps how the local business leaders who commissioned
the statue used a transnational connection to alter how white Americans saw the Chinese in their
midst.
In this paper, I briefly examine this and similar intersections of global politics and
Chinatown politics around the middle of the twentieth century, which is an era that historians
often characterize as an important turning point in race relations. I should add that I am not of
pioneer stock in this general mode of inquiry. Although we used different words to describe it,
transnationalism has been a prominent theme in Asian American history for almost two decades.
Several factors associated with US-China relations shaped the particular political
institutions and values within San Francisco's Chinese community. For instance, American
policies directed toward Chinese immigrants slowed the overall process of political socialization.

2

Exclusion from immigration and naturalization left Chinese Americans marginalized in
mainstream politics. Denied citizenship, the immigrant generation could not fully participate in
urban politics and could not rely on government authorities to address their needs. Moreover,
Chinese Americans customarily eschewed personal involvement in the political world outside of
Chinatown because many of the immigrants had circumvented the racist exclusion laws to enter
the country illegally. Rather than draw attention to themselves, Chinese Americans allowed the
Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association, a federation of regional association leaders that
was more commonly known as the Chinese Six Companies, to speak for them in all interactions
with external political entities. Chinese immigrants continued to participate in ethnic
organizations including surname and regional associations, both of which offered essential
services in a comfortable Chinese language environment. These mutual aid organizations
maintained rooming houses for temporary lodging, connected their members with employment
agents, and assisted with burial services. 2
At first, regional association presidents, and by extension the leaders of the Chinese Six
Companies, were all gentry-scholars who had passed civil service examinations in China and
subsequently migrated to take their posts in America. This system of appointments, which was
in place until the 1920s, resulted in the preservation of Chinese political traditions and in close
relationships between Chinatown's political leaders and Chinese foreign diplomats such as the
Chinese consul general in San Francisco. Later on, the Chinese Six ~ompanies would become
dominated by local merchants, which ultimately led to the organization's class orientation. 3
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The political dominance of the immigrant generation and their organizations'
transnational connections reinforced the attention paid to developments in China. Chinese
Americans followed overseas events with great interest, especially since the immigrants still had
family members in China. This explains why Chinatown's residents responded to a natural
disaster in the lower Yangtze River area by raising relief funds. They also enthusiastically
embraced the nationalist movement and saw in it a way to benefit their families in China and to
improve their status in America. All the while, Chinese language newspapers, several of which
were organs of politi~al parties in China, kept everyone China-focused. According to James
Low, "If you were Chinese-American you certainly felt the fate of China was important. In fact
we followed Washington politics very 1ittle!"4
Over time, the Chinese Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT), established a strong
presence in Chinese American communities. In the 191 Os, members of the Chinese political
party played a leading role in mobihzing communities to boycott Japanese goods and services
and participated in the formation of the China Mail Steamship Company as an alternative to
using Japanese ships. Later on, the party tried to use vernacular dramas and Chinese language
school lessons to promote its nationalistic doctrines. These activities were meant to arouse
Chinese nationalism and to generate party support among overseas Chinese communities. The
KMT's reliance on these communities was substantial; as late as 1929, over twenty-five percent
of the party's members were overseas Chinese. By the end of the next decade, the party had
successfully recruited Chinatown leaders to join its ranks and permitted them to rise to high
positions within the American branches of the party. The overlapping leadership of the Chinese
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Six Companies, the Chinese War Relief Association, and the KMT party in America helped
establish the KMT as a dominant political force. 5
Although the Chinese Six Companies was the leading political institutions in the period
before the war, organizations that focused on issues of American citizenship were a part of
Chinatown's political world. The Chinese American Citizens Alliance emerged to teach the
growing American-born generation about their rights and responsibilities as American citizens.

It stressed loyalty to the United States and argued that pledging allegiance to China endangered
American citizenship and the reputation of those trying to establish their homes in America. The
Chinese American Citizens Alliance simultaneously served as a mutual benefit association,
providing financial assistance and life insurance to its members. By the end of 1925, the San
Francisco lodge of the Chinese American Citizens A11iance had around two thousand members.
The alliance had its own building on Stockton Street in Chinatown and published its own
newspaper, the Chinese Times. 6
The Chinese American Citizens Alliance engaged in American-style political activities.
Working together with the Chinese Six Companies, it sent lobbyists to the nation's capitol in
1915 to battle a discriminatory bill that was being considered. During election season, it posted
public statements with each candidate's position, assigned representatives to field questions
concerning the election, and established classes to teach eligible voters how to register and vote.
Alliance members argued that mobilizing voters would bring permai:ient improvement to the
status of Chinese Americans. "The Zhonghua Huigan [Chinese Six Companies] can only
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provide some temporary remedies," one author wrote, "but cannot take out the firewood from
under the cauldron and stop the water from boiling." 7
Despite the emphasis on voting as the only way to improve their condition, many Chinese
American citizens revealed indifference toward American politics. Lim Lee stated that only fifty
percent of the seven thousand ·eligible Chinese American voters chose to register and criticized
apathetic citizens for allowing the immigrant generation to control the outcome of local
campaigns. "It is justly our fault that politicians cooperated with alien demagogues to run our
politics for us," he wrote. The high levels of ap~thy stemmed from feelings of alienation and the
general belief that minority political participation was meaningless. One American-born Chinese
described his right to vote as "an empty gesture" and believed that he would remain forever a
second-class citizen in his native land. 8
The conflict between China and Japan provides a perfect example of how global politics
shaped developments on the local level. On September 24, 1931 , less than a week after Japanese
troops began occupying Mukden, a city in Manchuria, the Chinese Six Companies and other
Chinatown groups formed the Anti-Japanese Chinese Salvation Society. One of the society' s
objectives was to organize a boycott of Japanese products. Ethnic competition also came to be
viewed through the lens of war. At the end of the decade, Chinese newspapers warned its
readers that Japanese Americans were occupying commercial real estate along Grant A venue,
one of Chinatown ' s main thoroughfares. They described the phenomenon as an invasion of
Chinese territory and drew comparisons with what was happening abroad. In this period of
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bolstered ethnic identification, the common problems facing Asian Americans never became the
most important issues to be addressed. 9
The overseas conflict became a part of daily life in 1930s Chinatown. Pardee Lowe
characterized the interest in the war as "passionate, almost fanatical" and gave the fo1lowing
description of the community at that time:
Banners straddle streets announcing theatrical benefits and war drives. Sound
trucks blare forth the latest news in Cantonese. Little moppets shine shoes and
sell magazines for war relief. Extras of the community's five language
newspapers are available at every corner fruit-vendor's stand. In the book stores
are _h uge lithographs bearing the idealized countenances of Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek and his Wellesley-educated wife and countless books on the SinoJapanese undeclared war. In every show-window hang huge posters in English
urging American friends to refrain from patronizing Japanese stores while in
Chinatown or urging a genera] boycott of Japanese goods.
Lorena How remembered running down to the Japanese-owned stores on Grant A venue to drive
away white customers. The young girl would ye11 in English, "Don't buy, lady, Japanese store!"
until broom-wielding Japanese ladies chased her away. How's commitment to the boycotting
Japanese goods was so strong that she even returned a do11 that had been given to her simply
because it had been made in Japan. Meanwhile, the Chinese YWCA urged all women to stop
wearing silk stockings. "If every American girl would refuse to wear silk stockings, Japan's
invasion of China would stop overnight," one message read. "Every girl who delays joining the
movement is unwittingly helping to postpone the ending of Japanese aggression." 10
A particularly dramatic demonstration occurred on December 16, 1938, when Chinese
San Franciscans and sympathetic whites protested the loading of scrap iron onto a ship bound for
9
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Japan. Organized by the Chinese Workers Mutual Aid Association, the protest began with over
five hundred demonstrators, three-fifths of whom were white, picketing the S.S. Spyros on Pier
45. The mass demonstration lasted four days, and the number of protesters grew to an estimated
five thousand people. Those manning the picket line included longshoremen who had walked
off the job in protest and Chinese American men and women of all ages, classes, and political
affiliations. Chinatown restaurants and grocery stores showed their support by giving free food
and drinks to the protesters. Even though the scrap iron made its way onto the ships after· the
demonstration had been called off, the mass protest made the public mor~ aware of America's
role in the Sino-Japanese War and led to renewed calls for an embargo on all materials to
Japan. 11
During the 1930s, being identified with China actually improved how white Americans
saw Chinese San Franciscans. Positive images of the Chinese, especially those found in Pearl
Buck's The Good Earth and Henry Luce's magazines, laid the groundwork for this change in
white racial attitudes. Instead of being peculiar and inferior, the Chinese became farmers
struggling to keep their land in the face of natural disaster and social calamity. Articles in Time,

Fortune, and Life added to the makeover with favorable descriptions of social and political
reformation in China and an unwavering praise for China's leaders. They made Chiang Kai-shek
into a savior, the one who would Americanize China by bringing Christian salvation, political
democracy, and economic modernization. Time even named Chiang Kai-shek and Soong
Mei ling (Madame Chiang Kai-shek) their man and wife of the year in 1937. These
representations in American culture translated into white sympathy for China after the outbreak
of the Sino-Japanese made the Chinese people the victims of Japanese military aggression. At
11
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the end of the decade, seventy-four percent of Americans expressed support for China in the
Sino-Japanese War while only two percent expressed pro-Japan sentiment. The United States
government also became more involved in the war by offering Chiang lend-lease aid in
November of 1940. 12
In San Francisco, Chinese Americans engaged in their own activities to subvert the
negative images of Chinatown. Participation in the 1939 Golden Gate International Exposition
provided the opportunity to introduce to the white public a modern yet ethnically distinct
Chinese immigrant community. Th~ fair's Chinese village, which was designed by a committee
composed of American-born Chinese and foreign-born Chinese merchants, allowed the
approximately one million visitors to see the handiwork of Chinese artisans, to enter a Chinese
temple, and to enjoy a Chinese garden. Exotic architecture such as the towering pagoda made
Chinese culture appear magnificent. The attraction also had "The Good Earth Settlement," a
constructed farming village which brought to life the world described in Buck's widely-read
novel. 13
America's formal entry into the Second World War two years later enabled Chinese San
Franciscans to use America's wartime alliance with China to improve their image and their
position in America. White Americans continually saw Chinese Americans as China's overseas
representatives. For example, Kenneth Bechtel, the president of Marinship, praised Chinese
American industriousness and patriotism in a letter sent to Chiang Kai-shek. He wrote:
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We have learned that these Chinese-Americans are among the finest workmen.
They are skillful, reliable- and inspired by a double allegiance. They know that
every blow they strike in building these ships is a blow of freedom for the land of
their fathers as well as for the land of their homes.
Jade Snow Wong, meanwhile, captured how those in Chinatown made new lives for themselves
in the shipyards. She noted the mixture of foreign-born and native-born Chinese Americans at
Marinship, commenting that "some are university graduates, some are older Chinese who were
perhaps printers or cooks, some are women who were sheltered housewives." Whether they
were in unskilled or skilled positions, Wong argued, these Chinese American workers
contributed to the shipyard ' s success. She told readers of the company newsletter:
The paper picker-uppers who keep the yard neat, the cook who prepares
wholesome food, the burner who cuts with precision and patience, the draftsman
who draws with care and accuracy, the timekeeper who records working hours,
the boilermaker helper who fills the buckets with essential shifters ' hardware, the
girl who makes travel reservations- these Chinese at Marinship are each in his or
her own way working out their answer to Japanese aggression: by producing
ships which will mean their home land ' s Jiberation. 14
Local discussions concerning the repeal of Chinese immigration restriction further
confirm the significance of the US-China wartime a11iance. Dan Mah, a Chinese American
delegate from the Miscellaneous Employees Union, submitted a pro-repeal resolution to the San
Francisco Labor Council, which is affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. " We have
to make a factual demonstration of our sincerity," Mah declared, "not just give hp-service to
China." Vice President Dan Haggerty and Secretary John O ' Conne11, however, opposed the
resolution and even revived the argument that Chinese immigration was a threat to wages. "A
Chinaman is a Chinaman wherever he is," O ' Connell asserted. Mah ' s resolution ultimately
failed in a seventy-eight to fifty-four vote. 15
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The San Francisco Labor Council's position on the repeal differed from the one made by
the Congress of Industrial Organizations. In April 26, 1943, the California CIO Council sent a
statement backing the repeal drive to Madame Chiang Kai-shek and to Chinese diplomats in
America. "Unity of the people of all the United Nations is vitally necessary to the winning of the
present war against fascism," the CIO ' s statement read. "That unity must be not mere a matter
of high-sounding statements but a real bond of sympathy between the peoples of the great
democratic nations now engaged in struggle against the bandit nations of the Axis." 16
When the San Francisco Board of Supervisors was COJ?Sidering a resolution to endorse
pending repeal proposals, most of those who made oral presentations at the meeting expressed
support for the repeal measure by stressing the current and future US-China relationship. Three
Chinese San Franciscans made their case for repeal by citing Chinese American contributions to
the war effort. One speaker, who had spent thirty-eight years in China as a representative of the
United States Chamber of Commerce, argued that improving ties with China would bring
economic benefits. He said that San Francisco was the key city for export to China before
speculating that relations with the Asian nation would increase productivity and trade to such a
large degree that San Francisco would outshine present day New York. After hearing the
different opinions and delaying their decision until a city attorney confirmed that the revised
policy would only benefit immigrants from China, the supervisors unanimously voted in favor of
the pro-repeal resolution. 17
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The influence of political developments abroad on local politics persisted in the postwar
era, especially when the conflict between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party resumed.
A few left-leaning organizations, including the Chinese Workers' Mutual Aid Association and
the Chinese American Democratic Youth League, were vocal critics of both Chiang Kai-shek
and the KMT, and they pledged their support for the revolutionary forces fighting for China's
liberation. Chinatown's traditional political leadership, however, still maintained strong ties with
the KMT. The Chinese Six Companies continually stressed the legitimacy of Chiang's rule and
sought to undermine Communist support in the community. These ideological and political
differences brought China's political struggle to Chinatown.
The best example of this occurred right after the proclamation of the People's Republic of
China in 1949. A joint committee of the Chinese Workers' Mutual Aid Association, the Chinese
American Democratic Youth League, and a small group of liberal Chinatown businessmen
decided to sponsor a celebration in the Chinese American Citizens Alliance hall. In addition to
scheduled speeches, a choral group from the left-wing California Labor School was to perform
as well. About eight hundred people, a few of them black and white members of the
International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, filled the large auditorium on the
night of the celebration. They listened to the speeches, applauding every time the PRC victory
was mentioned. Everything was progressing as planned until a shout from the door interrupted
the festivities. One witness recalled seeing two lines of men running through the aisles to the
speakers' platform, tearing down the PRC flag, knocking over the vases of flowers, before
throwing a blue dye at audience members. An account published in the People's World, the
local Communist Party newspaper, reported that forty hoodlums, described as "mostly young
men, some teen-agers, but led and directed by older mobsters," smashed chairs, threw eggs, and
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destroyed a movie projector. "The blackjack wielding thugs," as the paper called them, also
slugged several spectators, causing head lacerations on two Chinese Americans. One white
supporter received a broken rib while trying to protect a poster. 18
On the following night, Chinatown held its Double Ten celebration commemorating the
overthrow of the Manchu dynasty. Community leaders fashioned the event to bolster the
legitimacy of the KMT. The Chinese Six Companies made the fo11owing statement: "The
Chinese in America protest the Communist regime, re-pledge their loyalty to democratic China
and reaffirm their faith in the principles of Dr. Sun, the George Washington of China." _Other
speakers denounced the new government, calling them the "Communist puppets of Peking," and
solicited support and sympathy for Chiang's KMT forces. During the event, tong members stood
guard on the streets, most likely guarding against a retaliatory response for what had occurred on
the previous evening. A couple of Chinese Americans were even beaten up after being mistaken
for leftists. In addition, a leaflet printed in Chinese began circulating during the parade. It
denounced several Chinese Americans as "Communist bandits" and called for their
extermination. The leaflet' s authors offered a five thousand dollar reward for the death of
anyone on the list. Those named, primarily newspaper editors and group leaders who either
expressed sympathy toward the PRC or were merely critical of the Chiang regime, immediately
went into hiding. This KMT-sponsored terrorism was only one of several efforts to silence the
dissident voices of Chinatown leftists. 19
Contrary to the claims of the traditional leadership, Chinese Americans did not
unanimously support Chiang. Criticism of Chiang had been part of Chinatown's political culture
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in the period immediately following the Second World War. At a rally held in Portsmouth
Square in 1945, Paul Leong, a member of the Miscellaneous Employees Union, was one of the
speakers who asked those in attendance to call for the withdrawal of American troops from
China. He told the interracial crowd that American imperialism will leave China undeveloped,
"drain off its wealth and impoverish its people." Sam Young, president of the Chinese Workers'
Mutual Aid Association, made a similar demand in a telegram sent to the chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. He claimed to represent "several thousand American Chinese"
who wanted the United States to not only withdraw its troops from China but also "to desist from
abetting one side against another by the equipment or the transportation of Chinese troops from
one area to another. " 20
Anti-Chiang sentiment also existed outside of the laboring classes. Gilbert Woo, editor
of the Chinese Pacific Weekly, estimated that in 1949 over eighty percent of the people in
Chinatown believed that China's government under Chiang needed to be changed. Criticism of
Chiang and the Kuomintang "wasn't based on communism," Woo declared. "We just criticized
the way we would criticize the president or the White House." Meanwhile, to the surprise of one
writer from the Chinese Press, some local importers believed that China under Communist rule
would be good for business. "They think that a Red victory would bring peace, a stable currency
and better trading conditions," the paper said. Harry Chew of the Far East Importing Company
made the same observation when a Chronicle reporter asked him about how Chinatown was
responding to the civil war abroad. "I'm inclined to think most importers are very optimistic
about the Communist setup," Chew conjectured before adding that trade ultimately would
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depend on the status of relations.between the United States and China. "If the American
Government says 'no soap, no ships to China' then we're out of business," he said. 2 1
Tso Tang, the secretary of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, summed up the general
attitude of many Chinatown merchants. "With us, we are less concerned with political matters.
It's matter oflife and death, food and a living. We have to face reality, not theories. We are
concerned with the economic life." His organization criticized KMT corruption and even passed
a resolution ca11ing for the extradition to China of T. V. Soong and K. H. Kung, two former
prime ministers and KMT financiers. Some Chinatown residents believed the resolution was the
merchants' attempt to ease future agreements with the Chinese Communists. 22
After China and America became adversaries in the Korean War, the dominant
organizations in Chinatown further emphasized the community's support for the war against
communism. Members of the Cathay Post of the American Legion passed a resolution affirming
their loyalty to America and condemning communism at home and abroad. Similarly, the
president of the Chinese American Citizens A11iance public1y declared: "If there is war between
the Communist countries and the U.S., Chinese-Americans wi11 fight against the enemy of the
U.S., regardless of what nationality he is." The Chinese Six Companies also wired President
Truman and the UN Security Council to protest the possible seating of the Communist
delegation. 23
The Chinese Press, meanwhile, stressed the assimilation and the loyalty of Chinese
Americans. In February of 1950, it reprinted the words of a white columnist who had recently
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been in the city. "San Francisco's Chinatown just isn't very Chinese anymore- much less
Chinese Communist," he wrote. The author conveyed the signs of acculturation that he observed
during his visit: "They sit in soft drink parlors and listen to the Cal-Washington game ... The
Irish Mission district chose a Chinese-American girl for centennial queen .... Chinese families
now live all over town, including Nob Hill." The author came to the conclusion that "Instead of
being un-American, they are helping us learn the true meaning of Americanism." The
Thanksgiving issue from the same year emphasized assimilation with a photograph of a threeyear-old Chinese American boy sporting a cowboy outfit. The caption said that the boy was
"symbolically turning his back on old Chinatown," and told readers the following:
As the world is even now facing a choice between opposing ideas and China itself
seemingly is lost to the forces of totalitarianism, Chinese-Americans have an
unparalleled opportunity to preserve the best of their ancestral values while
continuing to be a living testimony to their American way of life. 24
By affirming their anti-communism and their loyalty to America, the community leaders
hoped to protect Chinese Americans. The Chinese embassy had already received complaints that
Chinese Americans were being "subjected to uncivil remarks and ... [mistreated] in other ways
and that some of their shops . . . [had] been stoned." The Chinese Pacific Weekly noted similar
incidents and recommended that Chinese Americans "maintain closer contacts with Caucasian
groups and rely on the friendly support of liberal elements and opinion" in order to ''offset those
with anti-Chinese racial prejudice [from] taking advantage of the situation." Some Chinese
Americans were afraid that they might be forced to endure a mass internment, especia11y since
the McCarran Internal Security Act authorized the arrest and detainment of suspected spies and
saboteurs. To al1ay such fears , Governor Earl Warren made a surprise visit to the Chinese
American_Citizens Alliance headquarters to assure everyone that he would give whatever aid he
24
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could when ca1led upon. "The situation is grave," he said, ''and it may affect the Chinese in
America, but Americans of Chinese origin are all American citizens." Because Warren had been
a staunch advocate for Japanese American internment in the Second World War, his statement
directed toward these nonwhite citizens indicated that at least in this case America would not
automatically associate Asian ancestry with loyalty to an Asian nation. 25
Chinatown's KMT-dominated political leadership tried to convince the American public
that the Chinese people, not only those in the United States but also those in China, did not
consider PRC government officials to be their legitimate leaders. The president of the Chinese
Six Companies said that the "Red delegates speak only for Moscow- they do not speak for
China. The fact that China was conquered by force does not mean the people of China have
become Communists." A leader in the Cathay Post of the American Legion told San Francisco

Exam;ner readers that "the best means by which America can avoid total war lies in the adoption
of a program of all-out aid to Chiang Kai-shek, coupled with adequate supervision and an
abundance of technical aid." Chinatown leaders thus portrayed the KMT not only as the faction
most closely aligned with America ' s foreign policy objectives but also the real Chinese
government in exile. Chinese San Franciscans personaJly conveyed their anti-communist
political views to President Truman as well. A delegation of prominent Chinese San Franciscans
met with Truman to pledge the community's support for America's anti-communist war, calling
it a "program to restore the liberties to all freedom-loving peoples." Lim Lee, the commander of
the Cathay Post and the delegation's spokesman, asked Truman to include Nationalist China as a
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signatory to the San Francisco Peace treaty and to give substantial economic and military aid to
Chiang's forces. 26
In January of 1951, anti-communism in Chinatown became formally and publicly
institutionalized when the Chinese Six Companies created what it called an Anti-Communist
League. According to Gilbert Woo, this league was affiliated with the anti-communist league in
Taiwan, and was therefore transnational rather than homegrown. One of the organization's
objectives was to help Americans "differentiate between friend and enemy among the Chinese."
To_ realize this goal, the group furnished the names of suspected leftists and leftist sympathizers
to the FBI and the INS. The state agencies took those names and began harassing and in some
cases even deporting Chinatown leftists. State repression, therefore, helped silence the
dissenting voices coming from the left and further bolstered the dominance of the KMT.
Reportedly representing all but two or three Chinatown organizations, the Anti-Communist
League also asked President Truman to inform the public that the Chinese in America "are not in
sympathy of, or affiliated with, the actions or policies of the Communists in China. ,m

This brief examination of how the US-China relationship and Chinese mainland politics
shaped political activities in Chinatown would not be complete if I did return to the statue of Sun
Yat-Sen. In the early months of 1951, around the same time the Anti-Communist League is
formed, the Cathay Post of the American Legion and the Chinatown post of the Veterans of
Foreign Wars spearheaded another effort to emphasize the loyalty of Chinese Americans. They
endorsed the creation of a memorial honoring Chinese Americans who died in World War I and
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World War II. Within one week, they raised ten thousand dollars to finance the project. When
finally completed, the monument stood in St. Mary ' s Square, directly across from the statue of
Sun Yat-Sen. Its bronze plaque listed the names of the Chinese American war dead. According
to Charles Leong, the memorial, "with its resulting flood of favorable public response and
recognition of the Chinese-American sacrifices, stiJled the emotional anger against us." 28
For Lim Lee, the gradual nullification of America ' s anti-Chinese legislation and the
Communist victory in China ended the debate over whether Chinese Americans had a better
future in China than in America. "Prior to the Peking government," Lee wrote in the Chinese

Press, "we must admit there were cases of dual loyalty in China and to the United States .. . .
Today our future is in this country; our loyalty is to the United States." "Our grandfathers and
father still had a free China to return to when the going was rough," Lee continued, " . .. but we
have no free China to which to retreat. Our future is in this country .... This is the Promised
Land! " 29
Lee ' s declaration ofloya]ty to America is undoubtedly genuine, but questions concerning
identity and politics within Chinatown were Jess settled than he claimed. When I ponder his
declaration in light of today, I marvel at how neither he nor anyone else in 1950 could predict the
normalization of US-China relations, our current abilities to communicate, travel , and transact so
easily across borders, and the overall world that would emerge fifty years later.
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"Where Black-White Mixed Couples Live?"

Abstract:
Cities are becoming increasingly diverse while paradoxically remain deeply divided along racial
lines. Residential segregation recedes in some places and between some groups and surges in
other contexts. This study mobilizes the mixed-race household to better understand these
evolving residential location patterns. Specifically, this research becomes interested in
configurations of diversity associated with different characterizations of neighborhoods and
different types of mixed-race households. Because we know little about where mixed-race
households "fit" in these restive racialized terrains, this paper maps households and
neigh_borhoods in several large US metropolitan areas to "see," and thus re-think, the
relationships between mixed-race households' residential locations and surrounding indicators of
racialized urban spaces. In addition, we model the residential patterns of households headed by
white-black, white-Latino, white-Asian, and black-Latino partners using several measures of
neighborhood racial diversity. The results reveal that, first and foremost, households headed by
white-black partners are more drawn to neighborhood diversity, no matter how we measure it,
than households headed by other mixed-race couples. Amongst single-race households,
neighborhood diversity seems to appeal the most to black and Asian households and least for
white households. Pratt (1998: 27) argues that "borders in space and place are tied up with social
boundaries ... but that there are multiple grids of difference and complex and varied links
between place and identity formation ". Our findings trouble understandings of space scripted as
monoracial and social processes theorized based on unidimensional racial hierarchies.
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Richard Wright holds the Orvil E. Dryfoos Chair in Public Affairs and is a Professor of
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His work on immigration tackles issues of labor and housing market ·access, nativism, the
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their children . With Mark Ellis, he is writing a book - Patterns on the Land - on nativism and
immigrant geographies in the United States.
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Abstract:
Thi study analyze where hou ehold headed by black-white mixed-race couples live. Using
confidential 2000 Cen u data, v\ e report on the geographical unevenness of racial di,·ersity in
twelve metropolitan areas at the neighborhood scale then go onto present evidence on how
black-white mix d-ra e hou ehold na, igate the prevailing landscape of single-race groups.
The argument build on the previous research that finds that racially mixed households live in
places not clearly cripted as the terrain of one racial group or another. We thus are especially
intere ted in onfigurations of neighborhood diversity and analyze the geographies of blackwhite household by comparing the patterns we observe for them with hou eholds headed by
ame-race white and ame-race black couples. We u e both maps and a regre ion model to
study where black-white couple live. We find that neighborhood diversity matters for
households headed by black-white partners, but it matters in complicated and contingent way .
For example, it matter for all types of households analyzed-but has the most influence on the
re idential patterns of households headed by same-race black partners. While adding to the
literature on ra ial mixing and neighborhood diversity, the investigation is simultaneously a
call for mor re arch that conne t interracial intimacie within the hou ehold to places
beyond. Key Word: black-white mixed-race partnerships, neighborhood diversity, residential
segregation.

To what extent are the borders between communities of descent to be maintained and
why? The question is an old one ef species-wide relevance, more demanding of critical
study than ever at the start ef the twenty-first century as more nations are diversified by
migration, and as the inhibition ef the 1950s recede farther into the past. The history of
this question in the United States invites special scrutiny because this country is one of the
most conspicuously multi-descent nations in the industrialized North Atlantic West
(Hollz"nger 2003 1363).

Introduction
The in rea in mixed-race partner hip over the last 40 years stems from the scrapping of
formal laws preventing uch relation hips and the gradual erosion of social taboos directed
against interracial intimacies. Between R construction and the 1960s, courts frequently
di tingui hed b tw n political equality and ocial equality, with most al1owing to various
degrees the form r and many limiting the latter. Thus the civil rights associated \\ ith the
fre dom to marry whom you de ired and to live where you wanted were only reluctantly
conferred to all m mber of US o iety (Fryer 2007). They were among the last granted
because they both involved intimate interactions--one within the home, the other within the
confine of the lo al ommunity. Thi paper connect the racial configuration of hou eholds to
the racial mak up of n ighborhoods. More specifica1ly, many US citie remain segregated by
race, o where do bla k-white hou eholds live in such places? Are they found in white or
Afri an Am rican neighborhood or p rhap more provocatively, are they found on the edges
(literal and otherwi ) of uch neighborhoods?

Anti-miscegenation statutes were directed in the first instance against blacks to preserve an
imagined white racial purity. Blacks are the only group to have been (and continue to be-Hol1inger 2005) subjected to the one-drop rule; and "whites form the only group for which
purity is believed to be the admission ticket" (Dalmage 2000 7). Although limitations on blackwhite sex and partnership find expression in early colonial statutes, the wording of Virginia'
1924 anti-miscegenation decree exemplifies this proscription: a white was a person with "no
trace whatsoever of blood other than Caucasian." Black-white racial borders and social
intimacies have been central to the formal regulation of interracial marriage as well as more
subtle forms of racial oppression that stereotype individuals and groups as different and unable
to live easily side by side. Blacks thus also bore the brunt of restrictive housing covenants and
mortgage-lending discrimination. The legacies of these forms of institutional racism continue
to shape the lives of African Americans and whites, just as the social norms that veto blackwhite interracial intimacies continue to frame patterns of racial mixing. Childs asks that "while
... the racial landscape is changing, there is no denial of the lingering opposition to black-white
relationships. Is America moving to a color-blind society or are we still blinded by the blackwhite divide" (2002 140)?
Kevin Mumford ( 1997) sketches both the genealogies and the geographies of black-white
sexual relations in early twentieth century Chicago and New York in his book, lnterzones. We
are attracted to bot~ the title and to one of his central tenets--that although there is no
ine\'itability in the historical record, black-white sexuality is special because it carries a unique
burden from the American past, and that it is hard, if not impossible, to escape that history.
Our paper also revolves around black-white sexual relations in space. We contextualize these
distinct racial positionings, however, differently than Mumford. We ask: how do black-white
partnerships play out in residential space?
Our paper explores the contextual forms contemporary white racial domination takes in urban
neighborhood spaces, especially in terms of black-white mixing in households and
neighborhoods. We analyze the patterns of black-white partnerships across neighborhoods
using restricted access data from Census 2000 for a sample oflarge US metropolitan areas. We
seek to add to the literature on black-white racial mixing by literally mapping where blackwhite couples live. Our depictions of the concentrations of households headed by black-white
couples (BW s) are set against the backdrop a spectrum of neighborhood racial concentration
and diversity. This allows us to literally see some places of rupture in black-white binaries and
reveals a complex cartography of households headed by black-white racially mixed partners in
an urban context.
We then deepen this descriptive analysis of neighborhood patterns by regressing counts of
households headed by black-white partners on a set variables designed to capture census-tract
characteristics, contextualized by a parallel analysis of the neighborhoods where households
headed by same-race white and same-race blacks partners reside. Our findings emphasize the
role of neighborhood diversity in shaping the residential patterns of households headed by
nonwhites while at the same time showing that neighborhood percentage black continues to
powerful1y affect the residential geographies of households headed by same- and mixed-race
couples.
Background
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At one time or another, forty-three states enacted anti-miscegenation statutes
(lo ingday.org/map.htm) and as late a 1959 twenty-nine states still boasted laws that
prevented the marriage of blacks with whites. Even in the ab ence of formal regulation after
1967 social prohibition restricted interracial romance and partnership. The legacies of Jim
Crow thus abound. Whites are the group least likely to marry or partner with members of
another group. Bla ks are next least likely (Qian and Lichter 2007). At the neighborhood
scale, levels of black-white residential segregation remain very high and have declined only
modestly after 19 0. Even in places where the incomes of blacks approached those of whites,
neighborhood egregation did not decline. The emergence of more multiethnic metropolises
ha had no impact eith r (Logan et al 2004). Black-white social relations remain at the core of
the United State ' xperience with racial oppres ion .
We recognize thing have changed for the better. Since Loving, rates of mixed-race partnering
have risen. In 1970, th ensus recorded 310,000 mixed marriages (less than I percent of all
marriage ), ri ing to 650,000 in 19 0, and doubling again by 1990. The 2000 census
documented 2.7 mi1lion mixed-race marriage , or almost 5 percent of all marriage . If,,., e were
to con ider Latino a a racialized minority and add co-habiting couples to the tallies, the rate
of mixed-ra e partnering would be ev n higher.
In the 1950s, realtor , landlord , and neighbor acti ely worked to deny the opportunity for
black-white couples to live in a white neighborhood (e.g., Romano 2003 132). Even now,
however, neighbor may not be o neighborly when confronted with people on the block in a
mixed-ra e relation hip. Randall Kennedy's analysis ofracialized personal ads (e.g., those
specifying "SAF" or " WPM") featured one retired New York City police officer who specified
"white" for the woman he ought; defending his actions, he aid that dating a bla k woman
would have "up et hi 'Archie Bunker' neighbors ... I was looking to make life easier" (Kennedy
2001 31-2).
Despite the bunk r mentalities, a iz able proportion of white people now declare interracial
marriage a progr ive; they ymbolize anti-racist behavior, racial literacy, or ven an ideal of
a "color blind o iety." Many African Americans seem to view these same arrangements,
especially if it' a white woman and black man, as the opposite of progress, as "marrying up"
and/ or "marrying out"; put differently, a kinder ,vay of aying '"selling out" (Kennedy 2008).
Thu , a white parent or partner i not con idered black by most in black communities because
he or he ha no an tral claim to blackness. That person can walk away anytime. African
Ameri an may even view the entire multiracial family with u picion, even, at an extreme,
disdain. Th y pay no h e<l to "the rule of race and thu become race traitors and wishy-washy
cros overs (Dalmage 2000 6). Conver ly, many white see the white partner or parent in such
a on text, p ially if h is a whit woman, as no longer v. hite.
Neverthele , ra ially mixed couples today do "face less hostility from family and friends and
many have tolerant ommunities wher they can live" (Romano 2003 294 ). What might those
tolerant communiti look like? In what may be the most comprehensive ethnography of the
mixed-race family in n ighborhood ontext, Heather Dalmage ob erves that bla k-white
familie in bla k neighborhood face what she cal1s "borderi m" (unique forms of racism and
o ial an tion exp rienced by tho e who cross racial lines). She also asserts that in white
neighborhood bord rism plays out primarily institutionally (except classroom and
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playgrounds). In contrast~ "[i]n racially mixed neighborhoods, multiracial family member
find places where they do not have to contend with intense, daily, border patrolling" (Dalmage
2000 78-9).

Racially diverse neighborhoods, of course, may be few and far between. US metropolitan areas
exhibit "deep inclinations toward segregation;" the relatively affiuent try to maximize social
homogeneity, predictability, and, safety from crime (Atkinson 2006). Planners, politicians, and
private developers combine to group the middle-class into exclusionary residential and
commercial spaces. Some scholars note an alternative direction in urban planning and
development that resists this trend toward segregation by encouraging the creation of mixed
housing and sustainable communities with a more diverse social base (e.g., Brown and Chung
2008), but such policies that "preach the value of integration and mix" inevitably collide with
"deeply embedded social requirements that are antagonistic to social integration between
different social strata and identities" (Atkinson, 2006: 8.'31 ).
Such places also may not work in ways that our simple hypothesis (diverse households are
drawn to diverse places) suggests. Diversity brings with it both positive and negative effects.
Robert Putnam (2007) finds, for example, that ethnic/racial homogeneity in a community i
positively related to trust civic engagement, happiness and quality of life. Along the same lines,
a recent Seattle study Guest et al. (2008) found that ethnic heterogeneity is among th
strongest community characteristics that negatively predict the degree to which whites view
neighbor relations as harmonious. It's not clear from the study how other racialized group
view diverse neighborhoods. Hunt et al. (2007) offer an alternative view by studying black
women's responses to place diversity. Using census blocks as the spatial unit of analysis, they
found an inverse relationship between neighborhood percent black and perceived
discrimination (i.e., higher percent black was associated with lower levels of discrimination).
They concluded that diverse contexts produced lower levels of discrimination, and mostly black
contexts evidence the lowest levels of discrimination for black women.
A recent essay used descriptive statistics to summarize some broad patterns for households
headed by mixed-race partners (Holloway et al. 2005). Using 1990 data, they found mixed-race
households were more likely to reside in more diverse neighborhoods than white same-race
households. Generally, non-white same-race households tended to reside in more diverse
neighborhoods than mixed-race households. Black-white pairings were an exception - they
lived in more diverse neighborhoods than both white and black same-race households. This
finding may reflect 1) the concentration of blacks in non-diverse highly segregated
neighborhoods and 2) perhaps the effort of black-white households to remove themselves from
negative experiences they may encounter in predominantly white and black neighborhood
(Dalmage 2000).
Although previous research on mixed-race partnering offers a handful of guide1ines for
investigating interracial residential location we can also draw on several subsections of the
segregation literature for initial insight. First, assimilation theory, associated with originally
urban ecology but now has broad currency in mixed-race studies (e.g., Moran 2001; Qian and
Lichter 2007), contends that residential integration marks a minority group's cultural and
structural assimilation into the dominant host group. This perspective also asserts that mixed
marriage is the ultimate indicator of cultural assimilation for a minority group, resulting, at an
extreme, in the loss of minority identity. Applied to the residential patterns of household
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headed by mixed-race partners, this approach thus predicts no substantial difference between
single-race and interracial households. Dalmage's ethnography and Hol1oway et al.'s (2005)
tudy sugge t otherwise. The re idential geographies of such households reflect and affect
more complex fa tors of identity than recognized by a imple assimilation frame~ ork.
The re idential location choices of mixed couples reflect and affect the forces that produce
urban space. Thu a econd current debate in the segregation literature is the degree to which
observable re idential concentrations characterize choices of the minority group (e.g., Clark
1991, 2007) or con traint imposed by a variety of institutional and gO\ ernment agents (e.g.,
Yinger 1995). Within the group of cholars who argue that egregation does not issue
primarily from the preferences of egregated groups, trong difference of opinion exist over
whether racial ore onomic force create segregation that patterns metropolitan areas by racial
and ethnic ategorie . The e debates offer point of purchase on the problem of understanding
the re idential geography of mixed-race households. We expect that their residential location
wil1 refle t a combination of choices and constraints. On the choice side, mixed-race couples,
much as everybody l e, view neighborhoods as site for creating and enacting their identities.
A such, neighborhood choice refl ct a multidimensional complex of factors that includes
racial and ethni identity, but also cla s, family status, age, and education. Racial and ethnic
identity, ho, ever, i not just a matter of personal hoice but al o of ocial context - of how
other view you - and en uing racialized group identitie are likely sources of constraint on
mixed ?ouple ' neighborhood geographies.
We u pect these con traints operate in two ways. Fir t, households headed by mixed blackwhite couple likely confront di rimination in their earch for housing. Existing theory is
inadequate to predi t the nature, extent, or impact of uch discrimination, although this is likely
to depend on the mix of group (for example, it seems rea onable to expect that Asian-, bite
couple experience l
di crimination than black-white ouples ). Second, we expect that the
larger, more culturally dominant, of the two group from which a member of a mixed
hou ehold comes from will respond Jes favorably to haring its residential space with the
couple than the mal1 r group, especially when the larger group is white. To some extent
mixed-race oupl
ha11enge well-established lines of group difference and have to negotiate
the terrain (both literal and metaphori al) of cultural acceptance and resistance in a11
communitie repre ented in the household. We susp ct they will tend to find greater
ace ptance in mix d neighborhood . Twine ( 1999) reports the sophisticated racial residential
preference of\\ hite British mothers of mixed-ra e African-decent children attempting to raise
their children with a black racial con ciousness. They "perceive predominantly white
re idential communitie a un uitable for their children . . . because as "non-white" children
they were likely to be targeted for racial abuse. They expr ssed a preference for living in
multiethnic and multiracial communitie because their hildren would not be hyper-visible" (p.
737).

Fo11owing Spickard ( 19 9), we argue that in the U.S. context, black-white mixed-race
household ustain identity connections with both of the groups represented. We thus expect
that the re idential geography of black-white mixed-rac households will not be with lots of
other imilar hou hold . In other words, we do not think that being in a mixed partnership
will alone con titute a viable o ial category with a discrete geographic expression. Instead,
the re idential distribution of black-white hou eholds, while distinct from those of the major
ingle-race group , wi11 till refl t these distributions (albeit with a tendency to gravitate a,vay
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from the neighborhoods dominated by the largest groups). Specifically, while some households
headed by black-white mixed-race couples (BWs) could be drawn to predominantly black or
white neighborhoods, we suspect racially diverse locales offer the biggest draw. We spend
some time in the remainder of this paper thinking through how to depict that "neighborhood
diversity".
Data
We answer these questions relying on publicly available data as well as confidential long-form
data from the 2000 US census.The micro-data provide information on the racial composition of
households in census tracts, opening up the chance to analyze neighborhood-scale
concentrations of households headed by black-white partners against the backdrop of
neighborhood racial composition. We examine neighborhood patterns ofBWs in twelve large
metropolitan areas: Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, New York,
Philadelphia, San Diego, San Francisco, Washington DC - considered both separately
cartographically and together in a regression model. 1 These metropolitan areas represent a
variety of regions and range widely in their racial compositions and rates of mixing (Holloway
et al. 2005). These twelve metropolitan areas yield a total sample of about 18,000 household
headed by black-white partnered and married couples.
The 2000 census of course was the first census that allowed respondents to claim a multiracial
identity by checking a11 the race categories that applied. The majority of multiracials claimed
to be white and another race; overall, 2.4 percent of the population "checked more than one
box", adding new dimensionality to studies of racial mixing. We considered several ways of
constructing "households headed by mixed-race black-white partners". Specifically we
embarked on two parallel paths. First, we considered households headed by a black-white
multiracial person and a black (or white) partner. We found no significant differences between
the results of that exercise and the second option, which was to reclassify all multiracials as the
minority race. In this essay, therefore, we report the results of the simpler set of an·alyses.
Vve choose to study only households headed by mixed-race heterosexual couples knowing that
1) such households represent a declining proportion of households, 2) new household
formations are varied and increasingly so, ands) the race history of households. By that we
mean that we know that Moran (2001) and others have persuasively argued that US society has
concei\'ed of the normative family is based on many of those trappings that also come with
white privilege: i.e. two parent nuclear families, which de-emphasizes the importance of
extended family and emphasizes the nuclear family, whereas African American culture typically
has a stronger focus on the extended family. Our analysis makes no claims about the structure
of the household headed by mixed-race partners. Our interest in households headed by
heterosexual couples, while reinforcing some other normative perspectives on the family, stem
from the overarching research concern with the racialization of children born to and living with
racially mixed couples (e.g., Holloway et a1. 2008a) of which this essay is a part.
Analysis

1

Specifica11y, we used the urbanized tracts of these metropo1itan places.
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Our two part analysis beings with a mapping exercise. To save space, we do not provide a map
of all twelve metropolitan area in the analysis. Rather, we show the neighborhood
geographies ofBW for Lo Angeles (Figurel), Atlanta (Figure 2), Detroit (Figure S), and New
York (Figure 4). The other maps are available from the authors or (soon) at
http/ /www.mixedcitie .org/.
Several recent re ear h papers have attempted to capture the growing racial diversity of US
metropolitan areas (e.g., Fasenfest et al. 2006; Friedman 2008). We add to those efforts with a
new method (Ho]]oway et al. 2008b) that allows us to visualize diversity's multiple dimensions.
Each map compri es two layer . The ba e layer depicts racial concentration and diversity
aero s the urbaniz d spa of ea h metropolitan area by augmenting the standard index of
caled entropy2 to categorize the extent and type ofracial diversity in a neighborhood. Eis the
caled entropy indexed by j n ighborhoods. Scaled entropy ranges from 0-1; it reaches its
maximum value when all ix racialized groups are equa11y present in a neighborhood, and it is
sensitive to ery mall hares (and ab ent groups). After experimentation, we arrived at the
following organization:
• Low Diver ity: Ej<0 ..37 (typi ally, one group w/ > 80 percent)
• Moderate Div r ity: 0.74>Ej>0.S7
• High Diversity: Ej > 0.74 (and no group> 45 percent)
The e categorie of entropy capture the level of diversity in neighborhoods, but at low and
moderate level of diver ity they do not convey which racial group is dominant. Accordingly,
we further di, ide "low diversity" (darker shading) and "moderate diversity" (lighter shading)
tracts by the racial group with the largest hare. In so doing, we begin to enunciate a new
cartographic di cour e that de cribes neighborhoods as "low diversity, white-dominant; or
"moderately diver e, A ian dominant"; and so on. We use yellow for predominantly white
neighborhood , pink for
ian locale , green for black census tracts, and blue for Latino
re idential quarter . Brown area represent "high diversity" neighborhoods.
These urban racial land ap s captured in Figure 1-4 al o contain information on the
oncentration of BW s, uperimposed on the patterns ofrelative diversity. We deploy the
familiar location quotient to m a ure these concentrations.

( 1)

2

The standard entropy diversity measure for a tract is:

~(k. k.J

E i =s* ~ k= l

1

ti

*ln-1
ti

where k indexes the racial groups. The maximum value of E1 is obtained when tract j's population is evenly
divided between the k racial groups. The number of racial groups limits the magnitude of the maximum value, so
we include a scaling constants so that E1 ranges between a minimum of Oand a maximum of 1. For our
computations, we calculated E1 based on individuals in 5 racial groups created from the 2000 Census (white black
Jndian, Asian , "Other Race", plus Latino/as.
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LQj is the location quotient for black-white-headed households in census tract j; Pij is the count
of such households in tract j; Pj total population of tract j; Pim is the count of all BW s in
metropolitan region m; Pm is the total population of metropolitan area m. This ratio equals one
when the proportion of households headed by black-white partners in a neighborhood is the
same as the proportion in the metropolitan region. Census tract concentrations of BW s are
identified using light and dark hatches. The dark green hatched spaces reference superconcentrations of such households--neighborhoods identified with location quotients > S.O;
light green hatchings reference tracts with location quotients that range between 2.0>2.99,
which we refer to as simply "concentrations".
I

Space limits full descriptions of Figs 1-4. Indeed, we devote the entirety of a related study to
the base layer itself (Holloway et al. 2008b). Figures 1-4 illustrate that the neighborhood
geographies of BW s are not simple. There is no obvious spatial association of tract with blackwhite partner concentrations with high diversity neighborhoods. In Detroit and Atlanta we
find very little association between highly diverse neighborhoods and super-concentrations of
BW s. For example, three percent ( 11/375) of Atlanta's census tracts are super-concentrations
of WBs and there is no overlap of these tracts with high diversity census tracts. Similarly in
New York, the likelihood of finding BW superconcentrations in highly diverse tracts is far
lower than in, say, moderately diverse neighborhoods. The hypothesis that diverse households
gravitate toward racially diverse places is not borne out by this sample of place_,.
So where are they found? BW superconcentrations are most likely to occur in moderately
diverse white neighborhoods. To be precise, across this sample of metropolitan areas, we can
identify 1329 total tracts that are superconcentrations; of these, 566 ( 42 percent) coincide with
moderately diverse white-dominated tracts. Atlanta is a significant exception; only one tract i
both a BW superconcentration and moderately diverse, white dominated.
One reason for these patterns is explained by some simple counts. Atlanta and Detroit are
home to very few highly diverse neighborhoods (nine out of over 1400 total census tract
between the two places). Accordingly, BW superconcentrations, when they occur, must
coincide with other neighborhood configurations in these places. In Atlanta, BW s occur
noticeably in black-dominated neighborhoods. In Detroit, 26 percent of BW
superconcentrations occur in ]ow-diversity, black-dominated tracks and another 35 percent in
moderately diverse black-dominated tracts. By way of contrast, in metropolitan Washington
DC, (not shown) almost 70 percent of tracts with high concentrations of black-white couples
are found in moderately diverse white-dominated neighborhoods. This is not the case in Lo
Angeles and New York, of course; by our reckoning, these metropolitan areas have 56 and 166
highly diverse neighborhoods respectively. But even in New York and Los Angeles, BW s are
more likely to concentrate in other types of neighborhoods-that is, moderately diverse, whitedominant locales.
Houston (not shovm) presents the most even distribution of superconcentrations across our
classification of neighborhoods. More generally, there is no discernable east coast/west coast
set of systematic differences. Nor is there a large metro/ smaller metro divide in terms of the
distribution of concentrations of BW s cross metropolitan neighborhood space. Accordingly,
for the second phase of the analysis, we pool the metropolitan data to develop a systemic
perspective on the neighborhoods patterns of households headed by black-white partners.
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We model the neighborhood distribution of BWs by regressing counts of households headed by
black-white couples against the racial characteristics of a tract 3 and relevant household socioconomic and demographic characteri tic . Becau e tract counts of black-white households are
often mall or zero, we chose to estimate a negati e binomial model to avoid the problem of
tandard error inflation (Long and Freese 2006).
Specifically, wee timated the parameters of three models. The models describe average tract
characteristics of the places where BW s reside and compare them to households headed by
same race white and blacks. The dependent variables, then, are the simple counts of BW s and
their WW and BB counterparts by tract. Our independent neighborhood variables had a
couple of control : patial lag variable to account for patial autocorrelation and tract
population to a ount for size. We captured the socio-economic status of the neighborhood
u ing three variabl s: median household income, percent lacking a high school diploma, and
percent homeownership. Tract diver ity was measured along several axes. We included
percent foreign born. In terms ofrace, we designed three variables: percent black (Hunt et al.
2007 op. cit.), caled entropy, percent of the tract that claimed a race other than black or white.
We al o added a variable that accounted for the presence/ absence ofother BW s: that is, the
tract percent of hou eholds not headed by a black-partnership. Metropolitan areas entered as
dummy variable . All the continuous variable were centered to ease parameter estimate
int rpretation.
Table l summarizes the results of the regression modeling. Bold numbers are statistically
ignificant parameter e timates (p >.05); the models a a whole are statistically significant. The
negative binomial regre sion coefficient for dummy variables (metropolitan areas) compare
each MSA to DC (the omitted variable), holding the other variables constant in the model. To
a e interpretation, cholar oft n exponentiate the parameter estimates. Accordingly, the two
e tra column for a h group are (a) the factor change in the count of the group with a 1-unit
hange in X, hown only for the categorical dummy variable , and (b) the factor change in the
ount of the group with a one tandard de, iation change in X -- shown only for the
continuou ly mea ured independent variables. We thu read the metropolitan dummies in the
following way. Tak Detroit, for example; .302 is thee timated negative binomial regres ion
oefficient comparing the tract count of BW in Detroit to that of DC, all else being equal.
From the model, we can tate that Detroit has an e ti mated count per tract of BW s that is
ignificantly gr at r by 1.35 tim than that of DC.
The continuou variable are the negative binomial regres ion estimate for a one-unit increase
in a predictor variable, holding the other variables constant. For example, if tract percent black
were to increa e by one point, the difference in the log of expected counts of BBs in a tract
, ould be expected to increase by .036. What does this really mean? Exponentiating the
predictor variable provide the odd ratio for a one tandard deviation change in the covariate.
Thu when eb5rd X = 2. 5 (e.g., for tract percent black for BB), we can say that there will be a
185% increase in the count (number) of bla k-black head d households with a one standard
deviation increa e in tract percent black.
This means of mod l interpretation find the reader looking for the largest and smallest ebSrux
values. A key finding i that these exponentiated value largely coincide with predictor
3

And its urroundin g tract s to a

ount for spatial autocorrelation
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variables that capture neighborhood racial diversity. The results reveal that the entropy of
neighborhood racial composition -- net of other racial composition variables - is a powerful
variable explaining the neighborhood geographies of households headed by both same- and
mixed-race couples. It matters for white couples as we11 as black; in fact, it matters more for
households headed by same-race black partners than it does for households headed by blackwhite mixed-race couples.
Entropy offers one view of place diversity. In our model, tract percent black, however, te1ls a
very different story. While, e 65td X for households headed by single-race white partners for tract
percent black is 0.319 ( and a statistically significant negative parameter). Our model thus
predicts that there is a 68 percent decrease in the count of households headed by same-race
white couples ,vith a one standard deviation increase in percentage black in a neighborhood.
By the same token, the model also indicates that there will be a 1 85 percent increase in the
count of households headed by same-race black couples across this metropolitan system with a
one standard deviation increase in percentage black in a neighborhood. Households headed by
mixed black-,1vhite partners falls exactly between these two extremes: there wi1l be an 8 percent
decrease in the count of these households if the percentage black in the neighborhood rises by
one standard deviation.
Looking at Table 1 a bit more closely, neighborhood diversity measured in the strong entropy
effect for households headed by white-black couples exists with relatively weaker effects for
neighborhood percent black and percent non-black/non-white in the neighborhood. Thi
contrasts with the strong entropy effects for households headed by same-race black couple
that occur with even stronger effects for neighborhood percent black and a positive effect for
neighborhood percent not white/not black.
One other obserYation about all three models is worth noting. All but two of the continuou
predictor variables are statistically significant. The median household income of tract and the
percent of households not headed by a black-white couple are insignificant in the model of the
tract counts of black-white couples. Neighborhood median household income is significant and
positive in both the referent models; the percent of households not headed by a black-white
couple is negative and significant. In other words, whereas the median income of households in
a neighborhood has a positive and significant effect on the counts of white and black same-race
couples, the median household income of neighborhood has no effect on the patterns of blackwhite mixed-race couples. In addition, the neighborhood presence of households headed by
black-white mixed-race couples has a significant and negative effect on the residential patterns
of white and black same-race couples, it has no effect on the on the neighborhood geographie
of black-white mixed-race couples.
Conclusions
Kay Anderson ( 1998 206), in commenting on prevailing trends in race research, identified the
presumption of "an ordered (racialized) reality whose su~ject positionings [remained] ... fixed
and undifferentiated", , 1vhich obscured the "multiplicity and mobility" of subject positioningv.
To complicate the "neat stories of unilateral hegemony" (Anderson 1998 210), and thereby
avoid a tendency· to downplay difference, attention shifted to identifying the politics of
difference. Her goal ,~·as to move attention to racialized sites of difference. That specifi
research project concerned itself with Redfern (a district in the Sydney metropolitan area) and
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sought to destabilize fixed racial structures by highlighting moments and places that crosscut
the racial divide. In it own way, this essay has some similar goals. We seek to re-imagine
metropolitan place simultaneously as places of segregation and mixing. We do this in two
way , fir t by literally vi ualizing urban spaces as constellations of neighborhoods that can be
characterized a di\ erse or not depending on their racial make up. We then ask which if these
places might be mo t conducive for black-white racially mixed households?
Thi analysis homes in on households headed by black-white mixed-race couples. Maps of the
geographie of then ighborhood concentrations of black-white couples produce a complex
cartography. Metropolitan area vary one to the next; our mapping techniques render Detroit
as largely black and white and so the neighborhood patterns of black-'v\ hite couples necessarily
differ from other pla e that ha\' a different history and a different racialized landscape. Vv e
al o under tand that the generalization we make about space need further problematizing.
For example, when \\' di cu s highly diverse spaces, we refer only to diversity along the lines
ofra e. Furthermore, by talking about, say, moderately diverse white spaces or low diversity
black neighborhood , w generalize across entire populations. Other markers of identity (e.g.,
clas ) get erased but \ en the category "race" can " ary". For example, in the Detroit of the
1920s, white-black . gregation \'aried considerably depending on 'v\ hich "white" group served
a the referent (Darden 1983).
The model of n ighborhood ount of households pooled across a metropolitan system confirm
the importance of n ighborhood ra ial diversity as an explanatory force. Previous, descriptive,
re earch that u ed J 990 Cen us data (Holloway et al. 2005) strongly suggested that
neighborhood div r ity, al o captured by scaled entropy, was part of the story of neighborhoodcal geographie of mix d-race household location. The basic patterns in that study tand up
to a more rigorou tati tical analy i where 'v\ e begin to control for other neighborhood
characteri tics. eighborhood diver ity is important in explaining the counts of all three type
of households studi cl, not just those headed by black-white couples.
In other words, our model tell u that households headed by black-white couples are "in the
middle" in terms of the "pull" of diversity that Dalmage and others have discussed. They are
al o "in the middle" in t rms of the effect of the proportion black in a neighborhood relative to
am -race black and ame-race \Yhite couples. In other word , they are in less diverse spaces
than partnered bla k and do not appear to be drawn to African American neighborhoods like
black couple , nor repelled from it like white couples.
In a recent paper, Brown and Chung (2008) state that: "One might even argue that focusing on
neighborhood het rog neity or homogeneity isolates racial/ ethnic preference, raises it to a
higher than appropriate level of importance, or i simply the wrong question to ask (added
emphasis)." If th y mean by thi that conceiving of heterogeneity (di\ ersity) and homogeneity
( egregation) as oppo it and binary provide but a crude analytical frame, we wholeheartedly
agree. We join And r on and other and assert that to ee how race works in urban space we
mu t move away from uch an epi temological position. Our study shows that neighborhood
ra ial diversity, variou ly onceived, remains a powerful frame for understanding urban form in
thi far-from po t-racial world.
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Figure 1: Los Angeles
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Figure 3: Detroit
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Table

1:

Negative Binomial Regression Results
WW
b

Atlanta
Chicago
Dallas
Detroit
Houston
Los Angeles
Miami
New York
Philadelphia
San Diego
San Francisco
Spatial Lag
Tract Population
Med HH Income
% No HS Degree
% Own Home
Tract Entropy
% Black

0.034
-0.009
0.075
0.017
0.086
-0.080
-0.200
-0.041
0.012
-0.129
-0.124
0.004
0.000
0.001
-0.001
0.010
0.022

4M.NotWNotS
«MtHHsNotBW
% Foreign Born
Constant

3.432

e"b

e"bStdX

1.034
0.991
1.078
1.018
1.089
0.923
0.818
0.960
1.013
0.879
0 .884
1.164
1.494
1.016
0.978
1.301
1.545
0.319

b

-0.269
0 .018
-0.087
0.302
-0.217
0.039
-0.201
- 0.025
0.207
O.Ql9
-0.028
0.382
0.000
0.000
-0.007
-0.001
0.030
·0.003

0.420
0.971

-0.013

1.043

-0.009
-0.627

WB
e"b

0.765
1.018
0.917
1.352
0.805
1.040
0.818
0.975
1.229
1.019
0.972

e"bStdX

b

-0.212
-0.179
0.127
0.019
-0.046
-0.314
-0.465
-0 .007
0.344
-0.340
-0.504
0.030
0.000
0.005
0.010

BB
e"b

e"bStdX

0.809
0.836
1.135
1.020
0.955
0.731
0.628
0.993
1.410
0.712
0.604
1.409
1.576
1.134
1.184
1.149
2.092
2.849

1.036
0~958

-0.003

0.815
1.231
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Abstract:
In the United States, departments of "Spanish" have generally been viewed as places concerned
primarily with the acquisition of language. However, this perception not only flies in the face of
lived reality, but also the rich historical archive of the discipline. In my analysis, I wil1
demonstrate that Hispanism's roots in the fundamentally interdisciplinary field of philology
make it a very natural site for the analysis of complex urban and transnational phenomena and
this, despite the numerous institutional barriers (many of them erected by Hispanists and their
disciplinary descendents themselves!) that have arisen in the modern academy over the past
century.
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Were a stranger to wander on to campus possessed by a burning need to speak with
someone possessing expertise ·in urban and transnational phenomena, my guess is that he or she
would probably not go first to the academic enterprise known colloquially, if largely
anachronically, as "the Department of Languages". For most observers, especially US-born ones,
the reasoning behind this immediate non-choice would be self-evident. Everyone knows that
such places revolve around a concern for grammar and syntax, or to put it more accurately,
dispensing to students the dry, albeit necessary, prerequisites for the successful study abroad
expenence. If there is one thing that is likely to define the seeker of urban and transnational
knowledge, the reasoning follows, it is a hankering for complexity, or to put it in slightly
different way, a desire to calibrate the dazzling interplay of social, spatial, political and economic
factors which give life to the city, and the migratory processes that so often feed its growth and
development. And we all know the ability to competently analyze multiple variables of the social
reality in this way is, above all, the province of the social scientist. Right?
Well on a lot of levels this is certainly true. When it comes to gathering and analyzing
great masses of statistical data sociologists, political scientists, economists, social psychologists
and economic historians (just to name a few) are generally much more expert than the
aforementioned inhabitants of the so-called Language Department. Even when the practitioners
of these social science disciplines do not rely on pure statistical modeling, the perception is that
their methodological rigor far outstrips any thing that the humanities, with their "fuzzy"
discursive tendencies can offer. In short, the question again asserts itself, why trade in

impressionist meanderings--from a language specialist no less--when you can gain rigorously
structured snapshots of the urban and transnational reality through "solid", time-tested
methodologies?
To address the question we need to delve into the problem of representation. It is one
thing to suggest, as I have done above, the superior rigor of the social sciences in this particular
context. It is quite another to demonstrate it under the full glare of epistemological analysis. Put
another way, if there is anything that has emerged with some degree of clarity from the decidedly
mixed legacy of post-modem criticism, it an understanding that no notion of aesthetic and/o~
intellectual quality is ever quite as free-standing or self-evident as it at first might appear to be.
Rather, these things are fundamentally contingent upon the institutional and political realities
that generate and sustain them, creations which, in tum, spring from the structuring mechanisms,
or if you prefer, ideologies, which have managed to achieve a dominant role within the society.
Since the Enlightenment, and more intensely stil1 from the late nineteenth century
onward, western thinkers have increasingly sought to explain the world, and by extension, urban
and transnational realities, through an empirical lens. Hence, the great emphasis in these areas on
data collection and/or heuristic modeling. In general, these approaches have greatly improved
our grasp of social and behavioral phenomena. Indeed, I consider myself a card-carrying
proponent of such ordered information gathering, living in more or less full consonance with the
spirit of this approach in most, if not al1 , aspects of my life.
That said, I am also fully aware that these methodologies are, at their core,
representational schemas, that can and must, in the final analysis, be seen as externally imposed
frames that can only approximate the reality of the object or social phenomenon under study.
This, in tum, means acknowledging the space or gap between the critical frame and the
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phenomenon it purports to explicate. There is also the related question of what might be termed
the "aperture" of given methodology's critical lens. As the great Spanish phenomenologist Jose
Ortega y Gasset once said with his characteristic aphoristic flair. "Every act of seeing is also an
act of unseeing".

And so it is with the "gaze" of even most well-designed social science

investigation. The point here is not to invalidate the utility of such disciplinary frames, but rather
to underscore that no matter how comprehensive they may appear to be from a "person-in-thediscipline" point of view, there is always a considerable parcel of unexamined reality to be found
"under", or if you prefer, "beside" the epistemological space they occupy, parcels of reality that
may, in fact, be apt for explication (themselves necessarily partial) by other means.
If, as I have suggested, the suppleness and/or comprehensiveness of social science
methodologies have perhaps been overstated owing to their evidently "filial" relationship with
the systematizing and ostensibly objective logic of post-enlightenment modernity, the opposite
can be said of the set of scholarly approaches associated with the humanities in general, and socalled language studies in particular. This is especially the case in US.
As anyone who has gained near native competency in a foreign tongue in adulthood
knows, doing so is an immensely complex, and fundamentally transdisciplinary process. To gain
true communicative precision in a second language, one must become intimately acquainted with
a vast new set of referents from across a very broad range of cultural fields, something that can
only be accomplished through sustained and wide-ranging reading and first-hand observation.
Those who have not undergone this process have an unfortunate, if somewhat understandable,
tendency to want to reduce it to that of memorizing linguistic codes. It does not help that there is
an entire quick-sell industry in the US that, for its own pecuniary reasons, seeks to portray
linguistic performance and language acquisition in these purely mechanistic terms. This
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simplistic portrayal of things also occurs m other nations. However, in most of them, the
unavoidable need to "pass through" the process of becoming truly functional in a second
language en route to the Ph.D. (indeed, usually well before it) strongly militates against the
adoption this reductionist concepts of language such as these among the educated elites of the
society.
Unfortunately, this not always the case here. In the United· States, it is still possible to
gain both a Ph.D and tenure while remaining functionally monolingual. Because the personal
linguistic experience of a considerable number of American born and trained Ph.D.s often does
not transcend the level of memorizing conjugations, there is a not insignificant tendency among
them to impute to their colleagues in the so-called "Language Department" a core concern with
analogous types of rote learning. To give a concrete example, not long ago I was asked by a
colleague what I was doing in my mid-level Spanish culture course. I responded that we were
currently talking about the how the ideas of Proudhon, Taine and Herder, among others, had
contributed to the development of Catalan nationalism in the period between 1874 and 1906. I
added that students usually prepare 35 pages of reading in Spanish and come to the seminar-size
class ready to discuss it in that language. He told me flatly that he found this hard to believe.
When I asked him why, he said without irony that he had taken Spanish in co11ege and grad
school had not come c1ose to doing anything nearly that ambitious.
Though my colleague's confidence in his ability to gauge t~e real intellectual weight of
goings on in some one else's discipline may be extraordinary (Can you imagine my expressing
doubt about his being able to teach advanced math based on my own desultory advancement in
the subject?), I suspect that his belief in the relatively unsophisticated nature of academic work
going on in the so-ca11ed "language" field is not. This perception, which l must admit is not
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without evidence to sustain it in some quarters, has its roots, as I have suggested above, in the
progressive detachment of language study from the ambitious and broady-based intellectual
project that originally earned it a prominent place within the academy. In the time that remains, I
will revisit the roots of that movement- philology--in late I 9th and early 20 th century Europe.
Then, I will analyze how and why many of the original impulses of this intellectual enterprise
came to be obscured or transformed over time. I will conclude by looking at how a contemporary
body of theory (and practice) derived principally from Translation Studies, that is to say, an area
of scholarship with an evident kinship to old-fashioned phi]o]ogy, is proving to be an extremely
effective tool for mapping the dynamics of transnational, and in an ever increasing degree, urban,
phenomena.
The rise of comparative phi]o]ogy is inextricably Jinked to the desire among European
political and social elites to consolidate the bases of nation-state fol1owing the invigorating, but
a]so highly unruly and decentralizing, evocations of national memory unleashed by Romantic
revolutions of the late I 8th and early 19 th centuries. It was pioneered by Prussian elites who
believed that having scholars establish and circulate affirming narrative of trans-temporal unity
among all German speaking peoples would greatly strengthen the case for a political unification
among the dispersed polities their then still small kingdom sought to ]ead. It was not long,
however, before the elites of existing nation states realized that this practice of institutionalizing
the national memory could also be put to repressive, as opposed to constructivist, ends. Before
Romanticism, few ]iterate people in Catalonia, Bohemia or the Ukraine, to mention some of the
more conspicuous non-state nationalities on the continent, thought much about using the
languages spoken by the great mass of the local population as suitable vehicles for "literate"
communication. T°heir increasing openness toward doing so, alarmed officials in Madrid. Vienna
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and Moscow. They responded by using philology to "prove" the allegedly continuous hegemony
over time of the official language of state over the so-ca11ed dialects of the provinces. By the
th

beginning of the 20 century, this discipline, which has been described as, "The science which
studies written texts with an aim toward reconstructing the culture which produced and sustained
them", lay at the epicenter of university life in most European countries.
As the foregoing description makes clear, philology was nothing if not inte11ectually
ambitious and profoundly interdisciplinary. In Spain, which is the national philological tradition
with which I a most familiar, the scope of cultural expertise demonstrated by the great
practitioners of the disciphne in the period between 1880 and 1936, people such as Menendez
Pelayo, Mila i Fontanals Eduard Toda, Menendez Pidal and Americo Castro, is nothing short of
astounding. They were, in many senses, avant la lettre practitioners of cultural studies.~
In time, however, this dynamic and wide-ranging approach to examining the past, and
implicitly, the present-day parameters of the national cultural system, began to ossify. Once these
scholars located and fixed what they believed to be the core canon of "exemplary" texts, their
concerns turned, inevitably, from searching to stabilization, that is, to insuring that the narrative
of the past contained within these now "emblematic" artifacts them become "institutionalized"
among a wider segment of the society. This fundamentally changed the positionality of the
philologist. If, in the first wave of philological studies the text had been viewed as the point of
entry into a complex social reality, it was now increasingly see.I? as an end unto itself. Not
surprisingly, this fetishi zation of the canonical text and its ever-growing body of secondary
literature steadily became common practice younger scholars hoping to gain a permanent place
within the university. Indeed, it could be argued that this willingness among philologists to
propagate increasingly static (and often implicitly exceptionalist and moralistic) conceptions of
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the national past was one of the factors which increased support for public universities in Spain
and other European countries in the first part of the 20 th century.
It was precisely this second-wave iteration of philology that gave rise to many if not most
departments of Modem Languages in the US. The diasporas of the Spanish Civil War, the
Second World War 11 and finally the Cold War, brought thousands of highly qualified
philologists to our shores. In their home environments the engagement of these people with what
we now call "language acquisition" had been virtually non-existent. Similarly, their new US
student~ had almost no familiarity with the set of philological/literary concerns--rooted, as I have
argued, in a deep concern with the health of the national community- that had guided their
research agendas on the Old Continent. However, given that the exiles needed to eat and
university administrators needed to show they were preparing young Americans for the role of
managing a burgeoning empire, there evolved a sort of entente cordiale between the two parties.
The foreign-born philologists agreed to do what the US university system wanted them to do:
provide the rudiments of their native languages to American students. In return, they got enough
funding to set up Ph.D programs that would insure the continuity of philological projects they
had first developed in their land of birth.
It has from the beginning been a marriage of convenience rife with unstated tensions. The
foreign-born philologists soon realized that, owing to the geographic and cultural isolation of the
US and the very low level of multilingualism among the country's cultural elites, relatively few
of their American students were able to grasp the benefit of immersing themselves in the arcane
rules of a foreign language, never mind their native ' s culture ' s canonical literature and its
attendant body of critical commentary. Perceiving that this part of their work was a pedagogical
and intellectual road to nowhere, the foreign-born philologists started to farm it out to whomever

7

they could, graduate students or worse yet, any fellow native speaker who appeared to have a gift
for explanation and/or communication. This "intellectually disembodied" approach to teaching
and learning language had the effect of moving philology--or perhaps more accurately,
institutional activities managed by, or carried in the name of, philologists--still further from the
set of vibrant and ambitious intellectual imperatives which had given birth to the movement in
Europe. It also confirmed the aversion, mentioned above, that many Americans had to seeing
language learning as a vital part of intellectual life.
I think is safe to say that this model--in which establishing and operating a homewardlooking offshore branch of the Spanish, Russian, French or German philological establishment
generally took precedence over providing intellectually substantial cultural and linguistic training
for - has, rightly or wrongly, marked the perception of what goes on in Language departments
in this country. Indeed, the foregoing description may err on the side of being overly generous
given that most people here, including many of our professional colleagues, do not even know
about our work as literary and cultural critics in other national spaces. Rather, they generaliy
assume that our research agendas, that is, if they believe we have them, revolve around some
aspect or another of explaining grammar or linguistics when, in fact, most of us have very little,
if any, training for, or practice in, such pursuits.
Thankfully, the evolution of philology outlined above, one in which it evolved from
intrepid interdisciplinarity to a form of ur-text record-keeping and then on to a very shadow
existence in the American academy, is only part of the story.
In the late teens, twenties and early thirties, when, as I suggested earlier, philologists in
many parts of Western Europe were completing the transformation from Indiana Jones-style
buccaneers to sinecured scholasticists of the national memory, a group of intrepid young scholars
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in Russia were seeking to bring philology to what they saw as the next level of sophistication.
Working in a time and place where the universalist ethos of communism still had not been fully
debunked, they were relatively liberated of the implied need to shore up the social cohesion of
the nation state. This supra-national spirit allowed them to be wildly ambitious. Indeed, these
Russian Formalists as they came to be called, sought nothing more and nothing less than to
analyze literature, or as they preferred to call it, poetics, in descriptivist and/or functionalist
terms, -in a way not unlike that employed by the ·biologist or chemist in their lines of work. The
core logic of the project was simple: it held that repeated and detailed observation of texts would
eventually lay bare the universal operating principles of literary expression. In order to do this,
however, they had to first define the field of literature. Was it any and all types of written texts?
What made it special? As hardheaded empiricists they could not embrace definitions derived
from literature ' s ability to evoke special feelings or emotions in readers . Similarly, authorial
intent

or self-definition was not given much weight. They eventually settled on a definition

that stressed literary language's
Having delimited

estrangement or defamiliarization from everyday speech.

the field of literature in this way, they set about examining its constituent

elements, plot devices and schemes of generic organization in much detail.
No one disputes that much was learned through this approach. However, it is also clear
that much was lost or overlooked. Let ' s put it this way. It is one thing to dissect a frog in 9th
grade biology class. It is quite another to see him grow from jelly-like eggs to leaping adult in
the shallow pond near one ' s house.

Literary texts have an unbreakable, if highly elastic,

relationship with the social contexts from which they spring.

Indeed, the very notion of

"estrangement" depends on the existence, however putative, of a normative social matrix .
Moreover, our reception of literature changes greatly over time. · For example, many of the

9

"great" essays of Unamuno and Ortega, which are unquestioned elements on graduate reading
lists in 20 th century Spanish literature, were written in newspaper or magazine articles. While
clearly not literary in 1915, they are certainly considered literary now.
The Russian Formalists and

scholars allied with

their project in Prague were not

unaware of the problems generated by this tendency to marginalize both the contextual and the
diachronic elements of literary study. Indeed, in the mid-20s a number of them (Tynjanov,
Ejxenbaum," or Jakobson and particularly Bogatyrev) began to develop what came to be called
Dynamic Functionalism in response. However, these developments occurred relatively late in
the lifespan of the Forma1ist project, at a time when the oppressive forces of Stalinism were
closing in on the young relatively freethinking cluster of intellectuals. When Western scholars
began to discover Formalism some years later they tended, for reasons that are still not clear, to
overlook this key theoretical development which, in many ways, anticipated the notion of the
cultural field articulated by the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu and others many years later.
In the early 1970s when, as noted, western iterations of formalism tended toward largely
synchronic and intra-textual analyses of literature, a group of scholars in Belgium and Israel,
whose ostensible concern was translation began to revive and refine the postulates of Dynamic
Functionalism.
Zohar.

The most important and ambitious member of this group was ltamar Even-

In his Polysystems Theory,

Even-Zohar

does away with any and all a priori

distinctions of what constitutes literature, preferring instead to generate a model for describing
the traffic of texts and textual models between what he refers to as cultural repertoires, that is,
clusters of interrelated cultural

signs, symbols and narratives which, though we

are often

unaware of them on the conscious level, have a great deal to do with shaping our perceptions
of social reality. He presumes that the activity both within and between such repertoires is
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constant and that there is a ongoing struggle among cultural actors to place their socio-semiotic
goods as close as possible to the center of this "system of systems". In order to understand and
describe these struggles, the scholar must necessarily delve into the full range of social,
institutional and historical realities that make them possible.
At first blush, this ·approach might appear to be so ambitious as to be unworkable.
However, the fear of being caught forever twiddling one's thumbs in an ill-lit comer of the
jungle of cultural production is mitigated, according to Even-Zohar, my two key factors. The
first is the fact that culture-planning, that is to say, the_creation and strategic deployment of
socio-semiotic goods, has, in every society and/or social project since the ancient Sumerians,
been the province of a surprisingly small and, if you look hard enough, readily identifiable cadre
~

of people. The second is that of parameters of a one cultural repertoire are often best understood
by observing the volume and nature of the things they import and export from other such
deployments of socio-semiotic goods. In other words, we can learn a great deal about the overall
nature of cultural systems, and by extension, the core beliefs and tropes which organize and
animate the daily lives of the people that live in close contact with them, by carefully tracing
how the socio-semiotic elites generate and/or borrow the "positively charged" cultural goods
which engender what Even-Zohar refers to as "proneness" within the general population.
I believe anexample from my own research might help illustrate how this approach can
bear considerable fruit.

Some years ago l was doing work aimed at tracing the creation and

maintenance of the Galician (that's Spain's Galicia) discourse of national identity. Like any
diligent student, l read most if not all the classic historical accounts of this process. As I was
living in that northwestern region of Spain at the time, I also interviewed as many knowledgeable
scholars as I could about the process. As one might expect, there was a fairly strong tendency in
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both instances to portray the nationalist movement as flowing, in one way or another, from the
inexorable need of a long oppressed people to claim their legitimate piece of political and
cultural autonomy. However, when I began to study the archival evidence from the so-called
foundational period of the nationalist movement, I found something very different. There was
very little, if anything, spontaneous about the discursive development of Galician

nationalism.

Rather, it had been developed almost out of whole cloth by no more than a handful of young,
economically advantaged men. And indeed within this group, there was a clear leader, Vicente
Risco, who was quite ~xceptional in the Galician context for his active engagement with literary
and cultural circles in other parts of the Iberian Peninsula as well as the rest of Europe. As it
happens, my work on Galicia was part of a larger project which also included the analysis of
nationalist discourses in Catalonia, Castile and Portugal. In addition, I had, in an earlier phase of
my life had just happened to have a quite active interest in the shape of both Polish and Irish
nationalism. Armed with this comparative knowledge and Even-Zohar's concept of cultural
interference, which posits that elites in a peripheral cultural system will almost always seek to
borrow cultural goods they lack from repertoires in other places, I was able to demonstrate with
clear textual evidence that Risco had developed his theory of Galician nationalism--the semiotic
commonplaces of which are still in the very center zone of public discourse in the region-largely from ideas and tropes imported from Portugal, Catalonia, Ireland, and paradoxically,
Castile, the very nation whose influence the Galician nationalists sought to cast off. Perhaps
more importantly, comparative case histories have demonstrated that among nationalist activists,
Risco ' s penchant for borrowing was far from more normative than one might ever suspect.
In more recent years, l have found this approach, rooted in the close empirical
observation of intra-systemic "cultural commerce", to ·be extremely helpful in decoding the
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semiotic legacies, and from there, the core social and political concerns, of a number of diasporic
and/or transnational communities.

In the minds of most, Cuba would appear to have little if

anything to do with Catalan nationalism. Yet, when we carefully observe the traffic of cultural
goods between Havana and Barcelona in the period between 1910 and 1931, it becomes evident
that the production of Cuban-based intellectuals was absolutely indispensable to the creation of
the left-leaning brand of nationalism which became hegemonic in Catalonia during the Spanish
Republic, and which served as the ideological standard for Catalan underground activists
throughout the Franco period.

A similar attention to the a) formation of subalteTI? or insurgent

cultural repertoires and b) their patterns of cultural interference with more readily identifiable
(generally owing to their political power) projects. of national culture, has yielded findings that
long overlooked historians and social scientists working within paradigms that are considerably
less attuned to the dynamic heterogeneity of cultural systems. I will not bore you with all the
details except to say that the modem Uruguayan educational system and the contemporary
Argentine publishing industry, just to name two examples, would be very, very different today
without the contributions of Catalan immigrants and exiles.
More recently still, I have found that this practice of mapping the core elements of, and
play between, socio-semiotic repertoires, lends itself quite nicely to the explication of urban
realities. As some of you might know, my colleagues and have, during the last five years,
developed a course called Hispanic Hartford designed to bring to new students into closer and
more informed contact with the social reality of Connecticut' s capital city. In my version of the
course, we begin by looking at a map of the discrete physical spaces which, when taken together,
constitute the territorial reality of the municipality. We then discuss the necessarily metaphorical
nature of these cartographic renderings. Once we have brooked the problem of representation in
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this way, we then begin to consider other ways of conceptualizing urban space, for example, in
terms the overlapping set of cultural and linguistic repertoires which generate its social fabric. I
other words, we begin to look at Hartford as a Polysystem within which the repertoire of "the
Hispanic" plays a fundamental role. But no sooner do we establish the centrality of the Hispanic
construct, then we begin to explore its own inherent dynamism and heterogeneity. How? By
having students study, first in academic readings and then through ethnographic interviewing, the
points of contact between its own constituent repertoires. For example, to what extent is the
repertoire of the Hispanic shaped by the preponderant demographic position of Puerto Ricans?
To what extent, if any, have other groups such as the Colombians, Peruvians, Mexicans and
others imported tropes of this dominant repertoire into their own reality? What are the limits of
the concept of the Hispanic within the city? For example, to what extent does physical and
linguistic proximity force or entreat Brazilians and Portuguese to begin defining themselves in
terms of the city's dominant Hispanic paradigm?

To what extent can we speak of those

possessing legal status and those that do not as constituting two separate cultural realities? If this
is the case, what is the nature of the cultural interference between them? And so on ...
I must confess that I have always been confounded and amazed by the American media
system's common practice of sending monolingual correspondents to cover the news in other
countries. Imagine for a moment the quality of news and insight that would go back to say, Iran
or Russia if their correspondent in Washington could not read or fluently speak English? It
would be nothing short of absurd. And yet this regularly occurs with American reporters. It is
often said that this is all right because so many people in other places speak English. The other
justification often heard is that "translators" are always available should the need arise. As for
the first argument, this is sometimes true, though not nearly as true as many people here believe.
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But even if one does find in English interlocutor while seeking to report upon another cultural
reality, can one trust his or her point of view as being broadly representative of the cultural
and/or political reality one seeks to explain? The fact is that in many countries those that speak
English fluently often come from a very circumscribed and insulated social class. Is it really
wise to rely on the testimony of these usually prosperous and highly educated elites to construct
a vision of the national reality of the folks back home?

As for the second argument, I should

begin by saying that I deliberately used the wrong word a few sentences back to refer to the
people who orally render information from one language to another. Though

most reporters

commonly refer to these people as their "translators", the correct term for them is, of course,
"interpreters".

One can only wonder at if the reason for this persistent misusage might have

something to do with how the correct term lays bare the highly subjective nature of the activity.
It says that the words of the second person are literally an "interpretation" of the words of the
first rather than anything approaching a word for word, concept by concept, transposition of
meaning. Indeed, anyone who has performed as an interpreter, or listened in on such activities
from a bilingual perspective, knows just how much can get lost in the mix. And that's without
taking into account the personal, cultural or political reasons the interpreter might have for
skewing his or her rendering in one semantic direction or another. In short, to believe that one
can do truly accurate and rigorous reporting while communicating through anything but th_e most
highly skilled interpreter (a very rare species!) is, in my view, to engage in wishful thinking.
Obviously, scholars are different than reporters. But if one accepts the foregoing critique
of the way our media system tends to gather information overseas, it does raise some interesting
questions about studying and understanding urban life here at home. Much, though certainly not
al1, of what comes to be classified as data in the realm of the social sciences is derived, either
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directly or indirectly, from the utterances and textual em1ss1ons of the social cohort being
analyzed. This being the case, to what extent must we begin to consider the English-only scholar
working in a place like Hartford, where somewhere between a third and a half the population are
native Spanish-speakers, to be

laboring

under a significant professional handicap?

example, can one really acquire quality information working through interpreters?

For

And if

interpreters are not available, to what extent does acquiring information from people speaking to
an informant in a language that they do not control natively affect the reliability of outcomes?
Can a sense of this city ' s political and social fabric be garnered wi~hout actively reading its
abundant and opinionated Spanish language press as well as its powerful Spanish-language
radio outlets?
I believe these are important questions, ones that must be actively debated as we go about
the task of trying to better understand this city and many others like it.
In the meantime, I'll simply remind you that here at Trinity, and on the faculties of many
other colleges and universities around the nation, there are colleagues for these concerns are a
nonissue. They have for years been swimming quite effortlessly through in this "non-English"
but, yes, oh so American, sea of urban information. While it is true that some of them have, for
either lack of interest or lack of intellectual ambition, accepted the narrowly delimited role of
"verb conjugator in chief' often thrust upon them by the American academy, many others,
passionately aware of philology ' s omnivorous heritage, the centrality of linguistic expression to
most all social and human pursuits, and their own ability to apply the sensibilities gained
through the practice of close textual analysis to the broader challenge of semiotic analysis,
have begun to assume their place within the constellation of professionals seeking to explicate
the complexities of urban life. We see how quite clearly how we can fit in. Do you?
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Thank you very much.
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Abstract

This paper interprets images of Baghdad's physical, political, and cultural centrality in
geographical works from the third/ninth to the fifth/eleventh centuries as celebrations of
connectivity. The city's centrality allowed spatial and temporal links to be forged from
region to region and from Muslim to Muslim in the Islamic world. This connectivity in
turn functioned similarly to an isnadin ljadTth studies, authenticating and legitimating
the acts of creation associated with Baghdad, such as the (Abbasid Revolution and the
founding of a new capital city. Thus, written representations of Baghdad were useful
and compelling to Muslims in this period because they evoked a sense of connectivity to
the Islamic Umma past and present, a sense of connectivity that legitimized creativity
and authority in the Islamic world more broadly.
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AI-Shafi'T said to me: "Oh Yunus , have you been to Baghdad?" I said : "No." He said : 'Then you
have not seen the world ." 1

It is well-known that Baghdad was described as the center of the world by
medieval Muslims. 2 However, the topos of centrality was actually quite common in

1

al-Khatib al-BaghdadT, Ta 'rikh Baghdad, 14 vols. (Cairo, 1931) [hereafter referred to as TB] , I: 4

(variants I: 44-45).
2

See in particular Michael Cooperson , "Baghdad in Rhetoric and Narrative," Muqarnas 13 (1996) : 99-

11 3.
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descriptions of cities in the Islamic world . What exactly did it mean for a city to be
central? The Arabic phrase often used to describe Baghdad's centrality, surrat al-dunya
(navel/omphalos of the world), was slightly different from the phrase used to describe
the centrality of other prominent cities in the Islamic geographical imagination, such as
Jerusalem and Mecca: surrat a/-ar9'(navel/omphalos of the earth). 3 One possible
explanation for this difference is that the latter phrase implies more of a cosmological
claim - the omphalos of the earth is that which literally ties, or tied, the earth to its
progenitor, God, and thus forms the center of creation. The omphalos of the world, a/dunya, on the other hand, has the sense of physical, political, economic, and cultural

centrality: centrality, in other words, in the worldly world, the world of latitude and
longitude, of monarchs, merchants, and scholars. At a more general level, paying
attention to the words and meanings attached to localities by different people at different
times and places yields rich insight into the cultural history of the early Islamic world .
Written representations of localities, in particular cities and regions, were powerful
vehicles through which medieval Muslims expressed loyalty. The fact that Baghdad's
centrality was produced and reproduced in prose works in Arabic dedicated in whole or
large part to the representation of localities, what I have called elsewhere a "discourse
of place," suggests that it was useful or compelling in some way to do so. 4 Why was
this sense of Baghdad's centrality so important that its literary production and
reproduction occupied generations of scholars? I argue that rehearsing claims to the
city's centrality evoked a sense of connectivity to the Islamic Umma past and present, a
sense of connectivity that was useful and compelling in legitimizing creativity and
authority in the Islamic world more broadly.

Centrality and Connectivity in Early Arabic Geography

3

For an example of the use of the phrase surrat al-dunya in conjunction with Baghdad and al-'lraq , see

TB I: 23. However, al-Ya'q0bT calls al-' lraq surrat al-ar9and wasa/ a/-dunya-, see his Kitab al-Buldan in
the Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum, 8 vols ., ed. M. J. de Goeje (Leiden , 1967) [hereafter referred
to as BGA] , VII : 233.
4

See my "Place and Belonging in Medieval Syria, 6th /12 th -8th /14 th Centuries", PhD Thesis, Harvard

University , 2005.
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The most concrete way in which Baghdad was seen as central was its physical
location. The earliest Arabic geographical works lavish considerable attention on the
idea of physical centrality at two scales: 1. at the scale of the inhabited world broadly,
and 2. at the scale of individual regions within the inhabited world. Thus, just as the
world as a whole had a center, so too did each of the constituent parts into which the
world could be divided. The way the world was conceived and divided differed from
geographer to geographer, but the majority of them were concerned with identifying
centers. 5 The earliest surviving Arabic geographical works adopt Ptolemy's theory of
seven "climes" (iq/Tm, pl. aqaffm) running parallel to the equator, six above and one
below,. beyond which the assumption was that human life was impossible. As the
coordinates of the climes were calculated on the basis of the longest day, the central
clime, the fourth, it was believed, enjoyed the benefits of temperate climate, seasonal
variation, and generally salubrious conditions. Other early geographical works use a
method inherited from pre-Islamic Persia to divide the inhabited world into circular
regions (kishwat} arrayed around a central circle, known as Transhahr, the ancient name
for the area dominated by Persian imperial culture that stretched from the Euphrates
River in the west to the Oxus River in the east, but which was modified in the third/ninthcentury Arabic tradition to correspond to the considerably less extensive, though equally
politically and culturally central, Mesopotamian region known as al-clraq. 6 Later
geographical works tend to follow this model of using political and cultural criteria for
subdividing the world, albeit without the circular schema and with an emphasis on the
Islamic world in particular rather than the inhabited world in general. In these
geographies, centrality in political and cultural terms meant Islamic centrality, and thus
the central region was usually the Arabian Peninsula, home to Mecca and Medina,

5

For discussions of the early Arabic geographical tradition, see Andre Miquel , La geographie humaine du

monde musulmanjusqu'au milieu du 11e siecle, vol. 1 (Paris , 1967); J . F. P. Hopkins, "Geographical and
Navigational Literature," in Religion, Learning and Science in the 'Abbasid Period, ed. M. J. L. Young, J .
D. Latham, and R. 8. Serjeant (Cambridge, 1990), 301-327; S. Maqbul Ahmad, "Qjugb_rafiya ," E/2; and J .
B. Harley and David Woodward, eds., History of Cartography, vol. II, pt. 1 (Chicago, 1992).
6

See Peter Christensen , The Decline of !ranshahr(Copenhagen, 1993).
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signaled by the author's placement of his discussion of that region first in terms of the
organization _of the work as a whole.
One of the earliest independent works of geography, written by a Persian
bureaucrat for the (Abbasid regime named lbn Khurradadhbih and finalized in 272/885,
focuses on measuring distances along well-traveled routes between localities within the
kishwarsystem, earning its description as a "road-book." In his Kitab al-Mamalik wa-1Masa/ik (Book of Routes and Realms) lbn Khurradadhbih divides the world into four
regions arrayed at compass points around the central region of the Sawad, which he
describes as what "the kings of Persia called di/ iranshahr, which is to say 'the heart of
al-clraq' (jl_,.sJI ~ 1.51 ~ l y l J.> ~ I..J"'~I ~_!µO ~LS')," an area comprising most of
what is the southern 2/3 of present-day lraq.7 Centrality in lbn Khurradadhbih's system
is represented physically by his selection of a single site of origin from which itineraries
emanate in four different directions. For the majority of the work, this site of origin is
Baghdad. Thus, itineraries to the east (al-Mashriq) start at Baghdad and continue
through al-Nahrawan in the direction of Khurasan, eventually arriving at China.
Itineraries to the west (al-Maghrib) start at Baghdad and continue through al-Anbar in
the direction of Syria and Egypt, eventually arriving at Andalusia. Alternate routes to the
west originate in Baghdad but track north through Baradan and then split off, one
branch heading toward al-Raqqa and the other toward Mosul. To get to the northern
region (al-JarbT), lbn Khurradadhbih starts his itinerary in Baghdad along the Khurasan
route, but theri branches northward toward Azerbaijan and Armenia. Finally, to the
south (al-Tayman), the route starts at Baghdad, heads toward al-K0fa, and arrives
finally at Mecca. lbn Khurradadhbih traces alternate itineraries toward various
destinations in each of the four directions, and occasionally other towns serve as points
of origin, such as al-Ba!?ra in the section on the sea route to the ·east and Mecca in the
section on the districts of the Arabian Peninsula. However, Baghdad dominates the
"road-book" as the central hub from (and to) which all roads lead.
Of course, it was not the roads themselves that made such a compelling case for
centrality - although the fact of them showed that the ruling (Abbasid dynasty was

7

lbn Khurradadhbih , Kitab al-Masalik wa-1-Mamalik, BGA, VI: 5.
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strong, prosperous, and organized enough to construct and maintain such a road
system - but the movement of people and goods that took place along them. This is
where centrality and connectivity are linked. As a regional director of the postal and
intelligence services (;+::JI j

~~I

~Lo) for the <Abbasid Caliph, to whom the work is

dedicated, lbn Khurradadhbih knew as well as anyone the intimate association between
imperial power and the connectivity that allows a regime to monitor, tax, and send
armies to all of the territories to which it lays claim. 8 Almost rivaling the <Abbasid
imperial present in the Kitab is the Persian imperial past. As mentioned above, he
indicates that his choice of the Sawad as the central region in his system of dividing the
world derived from the ancien_t Persian practice of dubbing the area "di/ franshahr, which
is to say the heart of al-<lraq." He also supplies the Persian titles of the governors and
other administrators of his regions and sub-regions, some of which had been retained
for practical reasons into the Islamic era, and he records tax revenues as well,
sometimes dating from the time of the Persian Empire and sometimes accruing to the
contemporary <Abbasid treasury. However, in the area of imperial intelligence and
communications, he is firmly in the present; he furnishes information about the <Abbasid
postal relay system for several regions, especially for the regions that he describes in
the most detail and with which, it is safe to assume, he was the most familiar, such as
the Sawad, the Jabal, and Khurasan. Only in supplying this information does he betray
the fact that the headquarters of the <Abbasid Caliph and the military elite at the time of
the work's composition were actually located in Samarra, rather than Baghdad, as

8

We learn that from lbn al-Nadfm that he held this post in the region of al-Jabal (literally, "the mountain ,"

an area northeast of the Sawad transversing the Zagros Mountains in a swath from ShahrazOr in the
north to al-Ahwaz in the south and stretching as far east as the cities of al-Rayy and l!?fahan), but
nowhere is it specified for which 'Abbasid caliph he was so employed or to which caliph the Kitab alMasalik wa-1-Mamalik is dedicated. lbn al-Nadfm does remark that lbn Khurradadhbih was a boon

companion of the Caliph al-Mu'tamid (r. 256/870-279/892), and since the Kitab reached its final form
during his reign it seems likely that the work was intended for him . See lbn al-Nadfm, The Fihrist, ed. and
trans. Bayard Dodge (New York , 1970), 326.
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Baghdad represents at best an alternate point of origin for the relays (and occasionally
gets bypassed completely, as in the route from Samarra north to Mosul). 9
In addition to these lines of imperial communication and remuneration, past and
present, the movement of merchants and pilgrims along the itineraries receives its
share of attention from lbn Khurradadhbih. He devotes separate sections at the end of
his work to the trade routes of Jewish and Russian merchants, and peppered
throughout the text are references to much-frequented destinations for the pious - or

°

curious - traveler. 1 Furthermore, the section on the Arabian Peninsula reflects his
concern with the multiple routes taken by pilgrims on the annual ljajjto Mecca, and it is
in this section that Baghdad is displaced by Mecca as a center to which (and from
which) all roads lead. 11 This awareness of the traffic along his itineraries is where
physical centrality in lbn Khurradadhbih's work translates into the connectivity that
assigns political, economic, and cultural centrality to, for the most part, Baghdad, but
also to other centers, such as Mecca and Samarra.
Other geographers endow Baghdad with a sense of physical centrality, if not at
the scale of the world as a whole than at least at the scale of the region. By the middle
of the fourth/tenth century, a school of geographical thought had emerged that
introduced a new system for dividing the world and representing those divisions
graphically. Often termed the "Balkhi school" after an early fourth/tenth-century scholar
whose work has not survived, the geographers who embraced this system tended to
focus primarily, if not exclusively, on the regions of the world inhabited by Muslims and
to portray those regions via maps as well as text. The maps themselves can be seen
as studies in connectivity. As Emilie Savage-Smith has argued, the fact that these
maps do not conform to today's standards of cartographic accuracy does not mean they

9

See, for examples , BGA VI : 41 , 59, 116-117.

10

For the sections on merchants, see BGA VI : 153-155; for examples of material on curiosities and

mazarat(destinations for pious visitation) , see BGA VI : 64-65, 79. For further discussion of the role

played by such information in the work as a whole, see James E. Montgomery, "Serendipity, Resistance,
and Multivalency: lbn Khurradadh_
bih and his Kitab a/-Masalik wa-1-Mamalik," in On Fiction and Adab in
Medieval Arabic Literature, ed. Philip F. Kennedy (Wiesbaden , 2005), 177-232.
11

BGAVI: 125-150.
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were not perceived as useful and compelling enough to be the focus of the works in
which they were featured, rather than, as is sometimes implied, amateurish
supplements. 12 Savage-Smith suggests that we should look at these maps as "an aid to
memory and a means of imposing order on new and complex material and

not as a

visual model of physical reality." 13 As aids to memory, the maps acted as guides to
possible itineraries in each region, not unlike the way that maps of subways and bus
routes do today, and thus oriented travelers "at a glance" from one town to the next,
whereas more detailed information might be provided by locals or more experienced
fellow travelers. The three most famous geographers of this school, al-l~takhrT (d. ca.
350/961 ), lbn tfawqal (d. ca. 367/977), and al-MuqadqasT (d. ca. 390/1000), all provided
such maps of the regions into which they divided the world, which were conceived along
the lines of perceived political and cultural, as well as physical, frontiers in the midfourth/tenth century and thus reflected the fragmentation of (Abbasid power into
,. successor states in this period . Although all three begin their works with the Arabian
Peninsula, as the religious and cosmological center of Islamic civilization, in their
chapters on the region of al-clraq they provide maps in which Baghdad occupies a
central position and which highlight the many routes that connect the people and goods
moving along those routes to that center. 14 [Iraq map from lbn tfawqal as illustration]
One of the realities of Baghdad's location that fused physical centrality with
connectivity was the Tigris River and the canal system linking the city to the Euphrates
River as well as to various tributaries. This network of waterways dominates lbn
tf awqal's map, forming the vital connection between the localities represented on the
map. 15 To look at this map, it seems one would never need to get out of a boat to visit

12

Emilie Savage-Smith , "Memory and Maps ," in Culture and Memory in Medieval Islam: Essays in Honor

of Wilferd Madelung, ed. Farhad Daftary (London , 2003), 109-127.
13

Ibid., 109.

14

For further discussion of this trend in geography, see Miquel , La geographie du monde musulman, I:

267-330; Gerald R. Tibbetts, "The BalkhT School of Geographers," in The History of Cartography, ed .
Harley and Woodward, II (pt. 1): 108-129.
15

lbn ~awqal, Kitab $Drat al-Ar9, BGA, II : 232; for a French key to the map, see lbn Hawqal , La

configuration de la terre, 2 vols. , trans . J . H. Kramers and G. Wiet (Paris , 2001 ), I: 230-231.
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every town in al-'lraq. Putting this impression into prose - and into a broader
geographical context - an early geographer of a more literary style, lbn al-FaqTh, wrote
of this river network in his work Kitab al-Buldan composed around the turn of the
fourth/tenth century: "From these two rivers come the treasures of most of the east,
west, north, and south (y~I .9 Jl.cu:WI .9 y_.>SZ.]I .9 '-9~1 Jtsi 0lp v.~I

~w 04-9)."16

If

this was true, then those living along the waterways of greater Baghdad had access to
all of those treasures, in theory if not also in socio-economic reality. Another early
geographer who composed his own Kitab a/-Buldan perhaps a decade or two earlier, alYa'qObT, used the story of the city's foundation (to which we shall return below) to
emphasize the centrality and resulting connectivity made possible by the rivers. When
the 'Abbasid Caliph al-Man~Or (r. 136/754 - 158/775) arrived at a small fishing village
known by the name "Baghdad" on the western bank of the Tigris River, he recalled a
prophecy that he would found a new imperial city for his dynasty:
j o~lj .la..wlj 0-fJ o.b,.> J) J~ lo J) W..JI ac~ ~~ 0ly:Jlj ~~
~

o.b,.> 0ly:Jlj ©..> (r.! 0_>:'--?-9
~
~
lo dl.>S :J ~_ij ~ :J v9Y ~l.9 dJ~ ~ lo :J (y.~I :J a.o~I .9 0Lo.c :J 0'-'Jl.9 .9 jl~~I :J ~~I
j ,oWJlj ci9)lj~J~.) v° J~ loj o.b,.> J> ~ I J> ~ lo..o ~).9 U~J)lj ~UJ~.>j J.o_9.A)I
J~ ;J u~I ;J J+:::JI jwl cu°u, ;J Jfa. !J ~ ~ 0ly:JI J> ~ I J> ~ lo..o yyi.o.JI ;J ya.a :J J~I
,.)..wl_p
C

vD

'-A

.,-.0.JI

•

..S,

•

C

An 'island' between the Tigris and the Euphrates, with the Tigris to the east of it and the
Euphrates to the west of it, will be the emporium (mashra'a, mashru'a) of the world. All of what
comes on the Tigris from Wasit al-Ba~ra, al-Ubulla, al-Ahwaz, Fars, Oman, al-Yamama, alBa~rayn , and what abuts to that, will be transported upstream to it and will moor at it. Likewise,
what comes in the way of what is carried by ships on the Tigris from al-Maw~il, Diyar Rabfa,
Azerbaijan, and Armenia and on the Euphrates from the Diyar Muc;Jar, al-Raqqa, al-Sham, alThugh0r, Egypt, and the Maghrib will be transported downstream to it and alight at it. And [to it
will be] a road (madraja) for the people of the Jabal, l~fahan, and the districts of Khurasan. 17

16

The section of the Kitab al-Bu/dan that deals with Baghdad has survived in a single manuscript (known

as the Mashhad MS) of a later abridgment of the work as a whole. For a published version of the
sections on Baghdad from the Mashhad MS, see lbn al-Faqi'h, Baghdad, Madina! al-Salam, ed. $ali~
A~mad al-'AIT (Baghdad, 1977), 82.
17

al-Ya'q0bT, Kdab al-Buldan, BGA, VII: 237-238. Compare with versions in al-TabarT's Ta'rikh al-Rusu/

wa-1-Mu/iJk, ed. M. J. de Goeje et al., 3 ser., 16 vols. (Leiden, 1964), I (ser. 3): 271-276; idem, The History
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This passage implies that it was the destiny of Baghdad to be at the crossroads of the
world, particularly of the economic world. In another passage he makes explicit this
economic centrality: "Merchandise is imported to [Baghdad] from al-Hind, al-Sind,
China, and Tibet, from [the countries of] the Turks, the Daylam, the Khazar, the
Abyssinians, and the rest of the countries, to the point that there are in Baghdad more
of these goods than there ~re in their countries of origin ( .9 .l.i.u.JI .9 ~I 0" ~I ~ ~l..9
·:-q · lilll
· 1"'(t!
-- u
• -<_:.:-:> u• lilll
-.::..q ..70 F--1.~1 ..7o ~Yo'··'Io
~Io
· - ... q
..)1--J u
. 01J b:i
. (JD
~ ~
. y ·t..w ..7o ~.I o
..7J~
..7
.
..7 ~
~

01).~.:JI u.>.? ~I 01~1

at:;

u9 l..o..o)." 18

This kind of centrality was defined by

connectivity, and in these litanies of cities and regions of the Islamic world lay
Baghdad's power to connect people and goods from the Maghrib to Khurasan to Oman.

Centrality and Connectivity in Al-Khatib al-Baghdacfi's Tarikh Baghdad
It was not just geographers who were concerned with representing Baghdad's
physical centrality iri tandem with its power to connect far flung regions of the Islamic
world politically, economically, and culturally. By the second century after the coming of
Islam, groups of religious scholars, known as <u/ama: had coalesced around the goal of
preserving the collective memory of the Sunna, or the exemplary life of the Prophet
Mu~ammad. To do this, they collected what was known as l:{adT!h, or individual reports
of the actions or sayings of the Prophet on the authority of eye- (or ear-) witnesses and
transmitted orally over the generations. Only by preserving the l:{adTth and learning
from their example could they help their fellow Muslims live righteous and virtuous lives,
particularly in the many practical areas on which the Qur'an was silent. Central to this
task was assessing the authenticity of each l:fadith, or "tradition," which depended in
large part on the trustworthiness of the chain of transmitters ( isnadj who had passed the
report along over the generations. Thus, the scholarly field of isnad analysis was born,
and the composition of biographical dictionaries designed to help scholars assess the
individuals past and present who were engaged in the transmission of l:fadTth
proliferated. While the earliest of these dictionaries were organized along generational
of al-_Tabari: 'Abbasid Authority Affirmed, ed. and trans. Jame Dammen McAuliffe, vol. XXVIII (Albany,

1995), 237-245.
18

BGA VII: 234.
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lines, soon dictionaries devoted to ljadith transmitters from specific cities and regions
started emerging. One of the most significant early examples of such a city-based
biographical dictionary was the eleventh-century Ta'rikh Baghdad by the renowned
Baghdad-born ljadTth scholar al-Khatib al-Baghdacfi (d. 463/1071 ).
At the beginning of the Ta'rikh Baghdad, al-Khatib al-Baghdadi inserts an
introductory paean to the city itself, before embarking on biographical entries for all the
ljadTth transmitters who could be associated with it. Not surprisingly, he uses the
ljadTth itself as his main source of evidence for the city's virtues. Surprisingly, however,

he includes in this litany of virtues a sampling of ljadTth that slander the city and people
of Baghdad. Why would he make his work a platform for such negative views of his
hometown and its residents? Certainly, it was not because he agreed with them.
Rather, he quotes an earlier authority in his field: "Which ljadith scholar has not
recorded a thousand traditions on the authority of liars? ( yliS"

u.c

~ ~ ~.>.:> y>l..o

0i J

~ ~.l> uJi)" 19 There is no shame in recording weak or forged ljadTth, he explains, as

long as they are accompanied by an analysis of their weakness or the evidence of their
forgery. In fact, it is implied that the most important contribution of a ljadith scholar is
not in his/her transmission of sound traditions but in his/her elucidation of the faults of
weak traditions and their isnads. Such a demonstration of this most important
contribution on his own part sets the stage for the most important praise he lavishes on
the people of Baghdad and the reason for his composition of the biographical dictionary
in the first place: that Baghdadis are the most zealous and skilled collectors of ljadTth in
the world. 20
But what made this skillful zeal so important was not just their vigilance in
revealing faulty isnads or their ardor for collecting sheer numbers of traditions, an
enterprise that might keep them miles from their homes for long periods of time seeking
out ljadTth from the oldest possible transmitters (and thus those from whom they might
experience the words or actions of the Prophet through the fewest possible
intermediaries), but the fact that in so doing they were busy forging links back in time to

19

TBI : 43.

20

Ibid.
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the era of the Prophet. This is the way in which the act of l:fadith collection and
preservation functioned temporally just as rivers and roads did spatially to enhance
connectivity within the Umma. And in each case, Baghdad was perceived as the
center. When al-Khatib al-Baghdadi followed up his chapter on slander with a chapter
of l:fadith in multiple variants with full chains of transmission praising the virtues and
merits (al-manaqib wa-1-fa(fa'i~ of his native city, we can imagine the isnac/3, this time
sound ones, radiating out from Baghdad connecting all the links in the chain stretching
back to the original authority who had sat in the presence of the Prophet. Similarly,
when al-Khatib al-BaghdadT followed up his introductory paean to Baghdad with
volumes of biographical entries assessing the contribution to l:fadith studies of
generations of scholars who lived or died in Baghdad, we can similarly imagine the city
as a hub for muJ:,addithtJn, the isnac/3 they preserved emanating from Baghdad like the
spokes of a wheel, connecting multitudes of Muslims concerned with keeping the words
and actions of the Prophet alive in the Umma.
To be sure, the introduction to the TarTkh Baghdad also includes what were, by
that time, the standard images of Baghdad's spatial centrality, and these function to
reinforce the overall representation of Baghdad's temporal centrality, the place linking
past to present, and Muslim to Muslim, by means of the l:fadTth. Al-Khatib al-Baghdacfi
devotes a short section to a kind of hybrid system of dividing the world, appropriating
the circular regions of the old Persian kishwarsystem but using the Ptolemaic
nomenclature of seven climes as labels, with the fourth as the central one, the surrat aldunya, and with Baghdad as its epicenter. 21 But this physical centrality translates

immediately into a kind of cultural and biological connectivity, as al-Kha\Tb al-Baghdacfi
observes that its temperate conditions (another holdover from the Ptolemaic system)
produce a melting pot, in which the worst qualities of peoples of other regions evaporate
and the best qualities are distilled:
yl.w !J ~ I .)1_9-w 0D !J ,iWLA..all !J p!J.)I o_µ 0-0 l~lw !J ,,o.tol.u.o.i 0..u.ol !J ctl@j ,.)~i 01~1

dJjj !J

!J ~~ 0-0 !J ~ I j@i o..olo:; 0-0 !J ,0lwlp !J J~I j@i dio. 0D !J .~_,JI &k 0-0 !J ,0b~I
~Jlh.9\11 JA)i &.a.>. 0-Wb.o uDJ\110D ~11.iw j@i J) ~ l ! J ,o.JS di) 0-0 I ~ .~

v"'b.i

···J~\11 u-w~ !J y.l\11 !J ~~ ~ I !J ci..JaA.11

21

JJ I ~ dl.iS' o.ilb.JI ~ l~~I W- !J

JSlw

•J~I !J yjSJI 0-0

Ibid., 23.
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Because of [Baghdad's centrality] , the complexions of its people are even [hued] and their bodies
are statuesque. They are safe from the ruddiness of the Byzantines and Slavs, from the
blackness of the Ethopians and the rest of the peoples of sub-Saharan Africa, from the
coarseness of the Turks, from the rudeness of the peoples of the Jibal and Khurasan , from the
vileness of the Chinese and from those who resemble them and have similar countenances. For
[the people of Baghdad) are safe from all of that, and, [in fact] the good qualities of all the peoples
of the terrestrial zones are joined in the people of this part of the earth by the grace of God, and
just as they are proportionate in countenance, so they are graceful in character and in the grasp
of scholarship, etiquette, and the best customs .. .22

One can almost imagine that the intermarriages enabled by the many routes and rivers
leading to Baghdad produced mixed genetic codes connecting all corners of the
inhabited world and yielding a microcosm of the best and the brightest of the Islamic
Umma.

As if to reinforce this kind of centrality, al-Khatib al-Baghdadi concludes his
introducto~ paean to the city of Baghdad with an extended historical topography that
draws from earlier sources, including the aforementioned geographies of al-Ya'q0bT and
lbn al-FaqTh, to emphasize the capaciousness of the city, its ability to accumulate,
accommodate, and appropriate the many peoples of the Umma. One of the ways in
which he does this is to emphasize the early settlement of the city, the land grants
awarded to members of tne military and the ruling elite, and the continuing waves of
immigration to and concomitant suburbanization of Baghdad. Al-Khatib al-Baghdadi's
topography reproduces a clear emphasis in al-Ya'q0bT's and lbn al-FaqTh's earlier
works, which is the enumeration of the land grants or fiefs (aq/a), estates or suburbs
(arbar;I), and palaces (QU$UIJ in and around the city in the first decades after its founding

in 145/762. The enumeration of these parcels of land doubles as an enumeration of
names associated with the 'Abbasid bureaucracy, military, an9 ruling house itself, as in
this list of estates from the west bank of the Tigris:
UJbJI '-) V. ~ ...AJ !) .y~I 0! ! ) ~ i..AJ !) ·Y..9:'.i ,_) J+9 J ~ I ",-AJLS' ·~
V. clLJI J+C LP-!J !)
a
.:..q
·
a ~ I • ..n'I ..·
·
a
... .. a
Lli.o
~
., L : • · l.olc • ,.,n')I I . .n. a .>1-;;,'I X>i
.J .._y.Jy,u uA/J.;, . ..
V. .ft.""'J I.AJ.;, -.._y.J-!,.y ..>!
~ V. u
V. ~ ..>! ~ J . J ~

-J ~ l ~ i ~ > "
The Estate of 'Abd al-Malik b. ~umayd, the secretary of al-Man~Or before Abu AyyOb.

22

Ibid.
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The Estate of 'Amr b. al-Muhallab.
The Estate of tfumayd b. AbT-I-tfarith, a general.
The Estate of Ibrahim b. 'Uthman b. Nuhayk near the Quraysh Cemetery.
The Estate of Zuhayr b. al-Musayyab.
The Suburb, and the Square, of the Persians, which al-Man~ur granted to them as fiefs.23

Frequently al-Khatib al-BaghdadT interrupts enumerations like this one with a ljadith,
accompanied by a full chain of transmission, giving more detail about the history of the
land grants and the origins of their names, as in the following (omitting the isnad):

J.9-0 ,o.>l.::JI ~ oJ+9 ~l5" .9 ,o).> ~ I v . _>All.lo 0.9-0LoJI ~i.9 ... Jl9
.dJlo v. oj.o> Jjl;..o c4i~~I u9 .9 <W~~I t.fo.J pl JI)~ yJ-> ~ .9 ~ J ~ I

E_Ua.9i u-'-~0 !11.9 :Jl9 J ~ I

AI-Ma'mOn granted Tahir b. al-tfusayn his palace as a fief. Before him it belonged to 'Ubayd alKhadim , a client of al-Man~Or. AI-Bagb_ay,n, fiefs granted by al-Man~Or to these people extending
from Darb Sawar to the end of Raba9 al-Burjulan,yah, where the dwellings of tfamzah b. Malik
are located.24

Even the streets themselves bear such names, as in al-Ya'qObi's description of
Man~Or's original walled "Round City" on the west bank of the Tigris: "From archway to
archway [of the Round City] are passageways and streets known by [the names of]
officers or clients of the Caliph, or [even of] the inhabitants of each street ( 01..9UaJI LY-':'! !J
;:;

~

t,#,1

""',

JS' ..:.,l.S:..AA.li ..9 ~I~ !J

v,1J

•

.sa

,~

,

- ~

••

•

•

o.>I~ ~fo y:JJiJI .9 ~ I 0l9UaJI Jl)."25 In these topographical

representations of Baghdad, place names bear witness to the political and social
connectivity buttressing the 'Abbasid regime in the first half century of its power.
Descriptions of the rapid expansion of the city in this period further underscore
this connectivity. One of the ways in which Baghdad's capaciousness is emphasized in
the sources is through statistics about the features of its infrastructure and the great
number of services it was able to provide, signifying its ability to absorb and, in so

23

When quoting from the topographical chapters of the Ta'rikh Baghdad, I will use Jacob Lassner's

English translation . Lassner, ed. and trans., The Topography of Baghdad in the Early Middle Ages
(Detroit, 1970), 67-68; TB I: 85. See also, lbn al-FaqTh , Baghdad, 45, 48-49.
24

Lassner, 68; TB I: 85. See also, lbn al-FaqTh , Baghdad, 47; and BGA VII : 249. For derivations of some

of these names, see Guy Le Strange, Baghdad During the Abbasid Caliphate (Oxford , 1900), 108.
25

BGA VII : 240.
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doing, to connect vast numbers of people. The geographers lbn al-Faqih and al-Yacq0bT
both quote statistics on the number of streets, mosques, and public baths in the city,
numbers that were clearly exaggerated, but the effect of which was probably intended to
be superlative rather than descriptive, to make Baghdad into a mythical version of itself,
a symbol of magnitude and aggregation .26 To take as a case in point the baths, al-Ya(
qObT records 15,000 public baths in Baghdad at the turn of the fourth/tenth century,
while his contemporary lbn al-Faqih quotes an obscure author known as Yazdajird alKisrawT who counters a rumored 200,000 baths with, in his estimation, the more realistic
figure of 60,000. 27 He then submits this figure to various calculations involving the
number of attendants at each bath and the number of households served to arrive at the
wildly implausible figure of 96,000,000 for the total population of the city. Later al-Khatib
al-Baghdadi, in the characteristic method of a fjadT!h scholar, records several reports
from different sources about the number of public baths in the city ranging from 3,000 to
27,000. 28 Whatever the truth of the matter, and it is good to keep in mind that accuracy
may never have been the intended goal, the repetition of such statistics, alongside
calculations about the number of canals and streets, the volume of foodstuffs
consumed, and the taxes levied in the city paints a picture of a massive, densely

26

On lbn al-FaqTh 's KHab al-Buldan, and in particular his treatment of Baghdad, as a kind of "mythic

geography," see Anas B. Khalidov , "Myth and Reality in the K Akhbar al-Buldan by lbn al-FaqTh ," in

Myths, Historical Archetypes and Symbolic Figures in Arabic Literature, ed. Angelika Neuwirth , Birgit
Embal6, Sebastian Gunther, and Maher Jarrar (Beirut, 1999), 481-489.
27

BGA VII: 250, 254; lbn al-FaqTh , Baghdad, 90-91. Yazdajird's calculations are also quoted by Hilal al-

$abi' (d. 448/1056); see his Rusum Dar al-Khilafa, ed. MTkha'TI 'Awwad (Baghdad, 1964), 18-20. The
exact identity of Yazdajird al-FarisT is a matter of some debate, as there are no extant manuscripts of his
work, but he is reported to have lived around the turn of the fourth/tenth century and to have composed at
least one book in praise of the city of Baghdad, from which lbn al-FaqTh and Hilal al-$abi' drew. Others
who mention or quote from Yazdajird's work on the subject of Baghdad include lbn al-Nac:ITm (d. ca .
380/990) , al-Tan0khT (d. 384/994) , Yaq0t (d. 626/1229) , and MajjT KhaITfa (d. 1659). For more on his
identity, see the editor's introduction to lbn al-FaqTh, Baghdad, Lassner, 38-39; and Otar Tskitishvili ,
"Yazd~ard b. Bahandadh al-KisrawT and Some Questions of the Inner Structure of Mac:ITnat al-Man~0r,"

Studia lslamica 69 (1989) : 167-175.
28

Lassner, 107-108; TBI : 117-119.
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populated urban space that embodied, even necessitated, connectivity. According to
lbn al-FaqTh, Baghdad was a place where refugees were effortlessly absorbed; Shiites
rubbed shoulders with Sunnis; Mu'tazilites shared the streets with Kharijites. 29 Al-Ya'
qObT writes: "All kinds of people, both city-folk and country-folk, reside in [Baghdad) .
People move to it from all countries, near and far, and all people from the provinces
prefer it over their homelands ( ~

u.o

jii:ul 3 J~I !J Jl..a.o~I j.wl !) u'-'WI '-91..i.AOI

u.o

~

,o+Uo!JI ~ jl.9\11 J@I ~ Lw)I !J ~1..JI !J ~WI 01-l4Jl)." 30 Al-Khatib al-BaghdadT opines
simply that one of the main things that distinguishes Baghdad from all other cities is its
capacity to accommodate a large population (c,.;~

o.>.e

u" ~

Lo). 31 This

capaciousness, and the diversity and connectivity it made possible, suggests that the
source of the city's centrality was not only its physical location but also its ability to
function as a microcosm of the .Umma at large.

From Connectivity to Creativity
While it may seem obvious that Baghdadi natives would praise their city's
centrality out of pride or that 'Abbasid loyalists might do so in the hopes of patronage, I
argue that there was another dimension to these representations of Baghdad as a
center that connected Muslims past and present, near and far. The images of Baghdad
that emerged in the works discussed above from the third/ninth to the fifth/eleventh
centuries were compelling and useful in justifying authority and creativity at a more
abstract level. In an interpretive essay on "traditionalism" in Islam, William Graham
writes:
One particular element of this Islamic traditionalism is pervasive, even indispensable: a 'sense of
connectedness ,' or to coin an Arabic neologism for this , Hti$afiyah - the need or desire for
personal connection (itt1"$a~ across the generations with the time and the personages of Islamic

29

lbn al-Faq"ih , Baghdad, 80, 93 .

30

BGA VI : 233-234.

31

TB I: 119.
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origins - something that has been a persistent value in Muslim thought and institutions over the
centuries. 32

For Graham, the evidence for the importance of this "sense of connectedness" to
Islamic traditionalism lies primarily in what he calls "the isnad paradigm," which
connects Muslim to Muslim over the generations stretching back to the time of the
Prophet in the process of l:fadith preservation. 33 The effect of such a paradigm that
relies on connections to the past when adapted to a cultural context broader than that of
l:fadith studies, is not, he argues, to stifle creativity and discourage innovation, but in

fact to make creativity and innovation possible. Connectivity, evoked by a chain of
transmission or the image of a river or road network, can be a powerful tool because it
links the Islamic Umma to a common project, whether that be the circulation of l:fadith,
the support (or overthrow) of a political regime, or the building of a new capital city. In
the case of Baghdad, the foundation story, which accompanied many of the
aforementioned representations of its centrality and connectivity, acts in relation to
those representations in the same way, I suggest, as the matn, or text of the Hadith,
does to its isnad For l:fadith scholars of al-Khatib al-BaghdadT's generation, the
strength of the isnaddetermined, almost completely, the strength, and thus the veracity,
of the matn. A project as audacious and ambitious as the building of a new imperial
capital city required a really strong isnad or, in Graham's words, a "sense of
connectedness" to transform it into a communal project, a project that linked Muslim to
Muslim, and thus to legitimize it culturally, if not also politically.
Almost all of the works discussed above stress the originality, the unprecedented
nature, of the founding of Baghdad by al-Man~Or in 145/762. AI-YacqObfs account
describes the site chosen by al-Man~Or as "ignored by my predecessors (

JS ~ ~ I

u-"°Jji; 0-0 )" and the "Round City" that he planned and had built on the site as "the only

round city known in all the quarters of the earth ( OJ.9.l.o

32

~ -.lo

~.l.11 Jl.la.91 &.o.>

JJ '-9_.>Sii ~

William A. Graham, "Traditionalism in Islam: An Essay in Interpretation," Journal of Interdisciplinary

History23, 3 (1993), 501 .
33

Ibid.
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l.a>y.C}." 34 Al-Khatib al-Baghdadi quotes the famous third/ninth-century litterateur al-

Ja~i? evoking the originality and intentionality of this "Round City," planned and
executed under the detail-oriented eye of its founder: "It is as though it is poured into a
mold and cast (l.cl_,..91 ~.r9i

Lo.;lr, yJl.9 ~

c.+io

lAilS}"35 lbn al-Faqih portrays the Caliph

al-Man~Or as an ambitious and resolute leader and his city-founding project as a risky,
but ultimately hugely successful, venture:
~~I l.iw J ~ 0i 0iJ o~I 01.iWI o.l.A>b .9 o~I Jiiuu\11 .9 ~ I o.iw ~ .9 ~»I o.iw .9 ,o_;.:;JI I ~
a ,dl.o.JI '--'"o
· -la~.. o..i..oi
· 0f'
· a.cl.o.>. ,0 Ll.&.11 '-91..Si '--r.'a ..7a , u_n~,_
;·; U· L..,.,1.-:>
.. ..7a O..U.>..o
..7
.
U::J,J..7
..
~
--..r ..7a Iii, ~ ..7a \Iy.D
..

~r··

.dl.oJ~ L>'-'WI

Jpi ~i u.9y 0~Uo (r.D?-1~

Because of his resolve and this experience and after this ambition and extensive travels , having
seen faraway countries, he judged that he would choose this site for a city, a lodging place, and
an abode - all of this while Khurasan was in turmoil , in the far reaches of Syria a group of
Umayyads were trying to take power, and in Mecca and Medina some others saw themselves as
the most legitimate candidates for sovereignty.36

The passage goes on to praise al-Man~Or's foresight and boldness, despite the
aforementioned obstacles, to choose such a strategic location for his city, the centrality
of which made possible further conquests on the frontiers of the empire by his
successors.
Competition from other claimants to the caliphate was not the only challenge to
al-Man~Or's plan described by the sources. There was also the matter of the preIslamic, or the lack of Islamic, associations with the site of his future city. The story of
the prophecy that confirmed al-Man~Or's choice is well-known, as its source, in most
accounts a Christian monk, and its structure resemble similar prophecies related in
biographies of the Prophet Mu~ammad. 37 This "foundation myth," to use Simon

34

BGA VII: 238. This, of course, was not true , as circular cities were an architectural convention in the

territories of the Persian Empire, and this fact was probably widely-known during the time of al-Man~Or,
but the assertion of originality is what matters here. See Charles Wendell , "Ba~dad : Imago Mundi, and
Other Foundation-Lore," International Journal of Middle East Studies 2 (1971 ): 99-128.
35

Lassner, 56; TB I: 77. This is also quoted earlier in lbn al-Faqih , Baghdad, 64.

36

lbn al-FaqTh , Baghdad, 88.

37

For a discussion of these parallels , and the structure of Islamic foundation myths more broadly, see

Simon O'Meara , Space and Muslim Urban Life: At the Limits of the Labyrinth of Fez (London , 2007) , 58-
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O'Meara's term, endowed a site without any clear Islamic or Biblical antecedents and in
dangerous proximity to the heart of the pre-Islamic Persian Empire with Islamic
legitimacy; this is what O'Meara refers to as "the reversal of a prior state, or the
ascendancy of Islam and salvific urban space."38 Another act of reversal chronicled in
the sources was the renaming of the site from Baghdad, a name of obscure derivation
that was apparently used to refer to the small fishing village on the western bank of the
Tigris where al-Man~0r staked his claim, to Madina! al-Salam, or "City of Peace." The
exact derivation of Baghdad is a matter of some debate in the sources, though most of
them include an ancient Persian etymology in which Bagh meant "gift" or, worse, "idol"
and Dad or Dadh meant "God," making "Baghdad" the equivalent of "idol of God." Thus,
it is often noted that some Muslims, especially strict <ulama: preferred the name
Madina! al-Salam, though in daily (and literary) practice it is clear that the name

Baghdad prevailed. 39 Moreover, al-Khatib al-BaghdadT reveals considerable
controversy about the ownership and taxation of all the land of the Sawad at the-time of
the Islamic conquest, which made the legality of al-Man~0r's acquisition, either by
appropriation or purchase, of the site for his city a matter of some debate. It seems that
the legal status of the land - in particular, its category of taxation - had to be changed
(or ignored) in order to make licit al-Man~0r's foundation. 40 These acts of reversal might
also be thought of as acts of creation, and they were neither unchallenged nor
unproblematic. This is why Baghdad's connectivity was so important, the isnadthat

67; see also, Wendell, "Bag_!:!dad." For the most accounts of the foundation of Baghdad, see al-TabarT,

Ta'rikh, I (ser. 3): 271-278 ; idem, Historyofal-Tabari, XXVIII : 237-247. Each of the sources discussed
above also gives an account of this foundation story: lbn al-FaqTh, Baghdad, 30-35; BGA VII: 237-238; TB
I: 66-67.
38

O'Meara , Space and Muslim Urban Life, 60.

39

lbn al-FaqTh, Baghdad, 27-28; TB I: 58-62. A similar, and similarly ambivalently executed , "act of

reversal" in the sources was the partial demolition of the Palace of Chosroes (!wan Kisra) at the former
Sasanian royal city of Ctesiphon (al-Mada'in) that lay 35 kilometers southeast of Baghdad. See al-TabarT,

TaYikh, I (ser. 3): 320-321 ; idem , History of al-Tabari: AI-Man$0r and al-Mahdi, ed. and trans. Hugh
Kennedy, vol. XXIX (Albany, 1990), 4-5 ; and lbn al-FaqTh, Baghdad, 36-37.
40

TB I: 4-22.
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are defaming the Prophets; and those who defame the Prophets are defaming the Lord of the
Prophets. 44

This, then , was Baghdad's isnad from Baghdad to Iraq to the (Abbasid Caliphs to the
Prophets to God. All Muslims were Baghdadis, wherever they lived, and Baghdad was
the world, literally in microcosm on its streets and figuratively in terms of the reach of its
political and cultural authority. Without Baghdad, the lands were like limbs severed from
a body, and without reverence for it, the people were like those who reject God. 45 And it
seems that Muslims outside of Baghdad, even in the rival city of Damascus, agreed;
evidence from a manuscript of the Ta7ikh Baghdad indicates that one of the
introductory chapters on the virtues of Baghdad was delivered as a lecture in 504/11101111 at the Great Mosque of Damascus. 46
Like a conventional isnad, Baghdad's isnadwas meant to be repeated, as it
served to make alive and present the connectivity underpinning its authority. Thus,
images of the city's centrality and connectivity during the first century or, even more
specifically, during the first decades of its existence were emphasized in later works.
The topographical information furnished by al-YacqObT dates, by his own admission,
from the era of al-Man~Or and his successor al-MahdT (r. 158/775-169/785). 47 In a
careful study of al-KhatTb al-BaghdadT's sources, Jacob Lassner finds that they date
overwhelmingly from the third/ninth century, portraying the city as it had been over a
century before the author's birth. 48 This emphasis on the first century of Baghdad's
existence instead of a focus on more up-to-date information can be interpreted as
evidence for a generalized nostalgia about the city as a symbol of past glory, of a
golden age of Islamic unity that had, by the turn of the fourth/tenth century, if not

44

Ibid., 74.

45

This passage comes at the end of a diatribe against those who "magnify Egypt and profess preference

for it over Baghdad (jlytJI .>I~~ ~.lA.o ~ l~l9 j ci..ol> ya.a

0L.w I ~ )" (lbn al-Faqm , Baghdad,

67) ,

which may help explain its defensive tone .
46

TB I: 44-45 (note 1).

47

BGA VII : 254.

48

Lassner, 41 .
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substantially earlier, certainly passed. 49 An example of this nostalgic, even elegiac,
tone can be found in al-Khatib al-Baghdacfi's own words:
0.>.9J¥ .~ly,..JI 4-.a.> ,~ly,..JI o~I.> ·81..a.cJI o).9 W.lll ->I .~)I ,o4i v9 ~i .9 i>Jl.o.c c.;lS lo _;s-i .9
J+9 c.;lS ~I ~l !l@;lhl ~ I .9 .~I.JAC y?f) . ~ I ~ j Jc ~~ .9 .~I ~ v.i:> ,o:; .E.Jlw..oJI
-J4.lll ykJ Wb.o .9 ,)..a.o)II ~ ~4.D ,Jl9)II ~ v9 J19li.JI .9 J~~l v" ~ lo Jc l;ya_sJ ~L...JI
.9 !lii9.9

It reached its highest point in buildings and population during the reign of ar-RashTd , since there
reigned quiet and the utmost prosperity in the world . Then came the civil war and continuous
tribulations. The city decayed and the population departed. However even with the general
decline, Baghdad in the period before our own time was different from all other cities and urban
centers.50

While this may have been nostal~ic, I suggest that it was also useful. Repeating
images of the city's centrality, even if it had since vanished, acted in the present as an
isnad, connecting the Umma to its past. Nostalgia stems from perceptions of loss, but I

argue that this was also the stuff of living memory, that repeating images of Baghdad's
centrality and connectivity worked talisman-like to produce and reproduce creativity and
authority in the present. To return to the idea of a "discourse of place" introduced at the
beginning of this paper, third/ninth- and fourth/tenth-century Muslims found representing
the cities and regions of their world useful and compelling enough to bequeath to later
generations a corpus of works occupied primarily with such representations. In the
case of Baghdad, the images of centrality and connectivity discussed here legitimated
certain acts of creation - the founding of a new capital city, the establishment of a new
ruling dynasty - the repercussions of which would remain relevant for centuries. For
later generations of Muslims, both in and outside of Baghdad, keeping the memory alive
in prose and poetry can be seen as both an expression of the loss of the past and a
commitment to connectivity in the present, even and especially in the face of such
decisive rupture as the destruction of the city by the Mongols in 656/1258.

49

See Cooperson , "Baghdad in Rhetoric and Narrative." For a fifth/eleventh-century example of nostalgia

for an even more recent past in Baghdad, see George Makdisi, "The Topography of Eleventh-Century
Bagdad: Materials and Notes (1-11), " Arabica 6, 2-3 (1959), 178-197, 281-309.
so Lassner, 109; TB I: 119.
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Abstract:
Like much of interior New England, from the 1630s to the 1830s Hartford was an isolated
community populated almost entirely by descendents of a wave of English Puritan immigrants
who had arrived in the Great Migration of the 1630s. This strong and parochial local subculture
was drastically and rather sudd_enly diluted by immigration stimulated by the industrialization of
the region. By 1860, one third of the city's population was composed of immigrants and their
children, 73 percent of whom were Irish Catholics. Tensions over a large range of cultural,
religious, and economic issues characterized relations between settled Yankees and Irish
immigrants in the 1850s. Nativism was strong in the region, but so was a pattern of aggressive
Irish self-assertion in the streets of the city and in the location of new Catholic churches in
largely Protestant neighborhoods. Beginning in 1852, a series of Irish parades on St. Patrick's
Day forcefully asserted the presence of Irish people and of Catholic faith in a Yankee stronghold.
Despite Yankee criticism and resistance, the parades grew with the Irish population. In the
1850s, the route focused on immigrant streets on the city's East Side, with a foray into Yankee
territory in mid-parade for Mass at the newly constructed St. Patrick's Church on Church Street.
The character of the parade shifted dramatically during the Civil War years, when nervous
Yankee city officials invited the marchers to use the State Capitol as the site for a celebratory
luncheon at the conclusion of the march. The parade route expanded during the 1860s to
encompass the entire downtown and many Protestant neighborhoods- from a two hour to a six
hour event. Coverage of the parade in the city's newspapers illustrates both the resolute Irish
assertion of civic presence and the Yankee retreat from confrontation with the Irish.

Bio:
Andrew Walsh is Associate Director of the Leonard E. Greenberg Center for the Study of
Religion in Public Life at Trinity, where he is managing editor of the magazine Religion and the
News and co-editor of the Center's new book series, The Future ofReligion in America. He holds
degrees from Trinity College, Yale Divinity School and Harvard University, where he earned a
Ph.D. in the History of American Civilization. In June 2008, One Nation Divisible: How
Regional Religious Differences Shape American Politics, which he wrote along with Mark Silk,
was published by Rowman and Littlefield. At Trinity he has been active in the Hartford Studies
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At Home in Hartford: Catholic Assertions and
Protestant Responses in Mid-19 th Century Hartford

By Andrew Walsh

2

"The ground on which St. Joseph's convent and chapel have been erected was
purchased by Bishop Macfarland of James Goodwin, Esq. in July 1872, for the
sum of $70,000. Up to that time the site had been known as the old Morgan
homestead.
Its purchase for Catholic purposes caused some talk among the neighbors.
The words exchanged were less friendly than those of Ossian in his address to the
Sun, and have been forgotten. 1"

In 1872, the Rev. Joseph Reid inscribed these oblique, but heavily freighted comments on
the first page of the baptismal register of the newly-organized St. Joseph Roman Catholic
Cathedral. For Reid and many other Catholics, the purchase of the Morgan homestead was a
delicious moment. The property, owned by Hartford's largest landowner, stood in a prominent
spot on Farmington Avenue in Asylum Hill, a peripheral city neighborhood then developing
rapidly as an elite suburb happily removed from the clatter and congestion that had taken over
the old heart of the city, a mile to the east. For many of the prosperous Yankees then building
houses on its shady streets, Asylum Hill ' s.chief charm was that it recalled the reassuring
atmosphere of bygone days, of an earlier Hartford that was quiet, homogeneous, and largely free
of the strains caused by a generation of industrialization, urban growth, and the immigration of a
swelling flood of strangers.

1

The allusion is to James MacPherson ' s celebrated literary fraud , The Poems of Ossian.
As far as I can tell, Reid refers to a long declamation at the end of the poem "Carthon," which
presents a sort of reverse Celtic Oedipus story in which a heroic Briton is slain in single combat
by his unwitting father. The Celtic hero, Fingal, orders his bards to compose an ode to the fallen
Carthon. "Exalt then, 0 sun, in the strength of thy youth! age is dark and unlovely; it is like the
glimmering light of the moon; when it shines through broken clouds, and the mist is on the
hi11s." James MacPherson, The Poems of Ossian (New York: Thomas Y. Crowe]] & Co., 1877)
233-34.
2

3
Reid and his co-religionists were not simply celebrating a good real estate deal, they
basked in the chagrin of their Protestant neighbors. Francis McFarland, Catholic bishop of
Hartford, bought the Morgan property partly because he wanted to build his new cathedral in the
best part of town. 2 But he also wanted to make a dramatic political and social statement:
Whether the Yankees liked it or not, they now had to deal with the rising strength of Catholics,
and particularly Irish Catholic immigrants. Forty years after a small group of impoverished Irish
ditch-diggers had scrapped together enough mon~y to buy an abandoned Episcopal church on the
city's East Side, Hartford's Catholics- overwhelming Irish immigrants and their children- had
become a force to be reckoned with.
To ensure that he could make his grand gesture, McFarland took care to buy the property
on Farmington Avenue secretly. He commissioned the city's sole Catholic lawyer, Thomas
McManus, to find a Protestant intermediary who could negotiate with James Goodwin without
arousing suspicion. McManus arranged for George Affleck, an Asylum Hill nurseryman to make
the purchase and resell the property to him for conveyance to the Catholic church.3 McFarland
made his first priority for the site the construction of a motherhouse for the Sisters of Mercy,
which included a large chapel that served both the sisters and the small congregation that could
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be gathered for the cathedral parish. For decades, most of the cathedral's parishioners lived in
other neighborhoods of the city. When the cathedral established a parish school, it was located
on Broad Street in the Frog Hollow neighborhood, almost a mile away. 4 An episcopal residence
followed on Farmington Avenue, and then, in 1879, a "basement church" opened, enclosed by
the foundations for an immense brownstone Gothic cathedral designed by the prolific Brooklyn
architect Patrick. Keeley.
Reid, McFarland, and others gloried in the day and relished their subterfuge, but, in fact,
the day of real Catholic power had not yet arrived in Hartford. It took the Catholic bishops,
priests and people of Hartford almost 20 more years to construct the brownstone cathedral that
would loom over Protestant Asylum Hill.

* * * * *
Like many New England cities, Hartford experienced remarkable demographic
transformation over the course of the 19th century. An initial wave ~f migrants from rural
Connecticut and northern New England had posed a significant initial chaJlenge in the early
decades of the century. While that migration left the city larger, more commercial, and with
more diversity among its Protestant residents, the city's elite felt comfortable about local society
through the mid- l 830s. "Where, two centuries ago, naught was to be seen but a 'waste, howling
wilderness, we know behold flourishing towns, the busy mart, with all the accompaniments of a
free, enlightened and Christian population," the Rev. Joel Hawes remarked in a bicentennial
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address commissioned by the city govemment. 5 Hawes didn't perceive Catholics as a threat to
the city and its inherited culture. Indeed, he didn't even mention them. The largest social
problem discussed in detail in the oration was Sabbath breaking. But 1835 was about the last
moment when a Yankee could presume a homogeneous audience in Hartford. Indeed, although
the Catholic population numbered fewer than 200, some of the city ' s Protestants were already
sounding the alarm.
The Rev. Horace Bushnell arrived in Hartford in 1835 to take up t~e pastorate of North
Church. His first published sermon, based more on things he had experienced in New York than
on any major change yet evident in Hartford, sounded the first of a long series of warnings.
Romanism has set in with a new enterprise upon our liberties .... Popery, we have
supposed, was such an extravagance as could not be inflicted upon the American people;
we have been confident of Protestantism. But we hear of such advances ... that we can
close our eyes no longer ... . Catholic emigrants are pouring into this country,
in a manner altogether unexampled. 6
In the same sermon, Bushnell raised the specter of Catholic political power as a threat to Yankee
democracy, "Have not the priests a power over their people that is nearly absolute? Can they not
lead them after whatever candidate they please?" It was not necessary to have large numbers of
actual Catholics on the ground to trigger local expressions of hostility. The reservoir of inherited
anti-Catholic sentiment was immense, and native-stock Hartford Protestants produced a stream
of anti-Catholic and anti-Irish invective even before a large immigrant presence developed. In
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1836, for example, one of the seminal anti-Catholic texts of the antebellum period issued from
Hartford. Theodore Dwight, editor of the Hartford Courant, distributed and probably wrote The

Awful Disclosures of Maria Monk, with its lurid picture of convent life in Montreal.
Tensions accelerated as actual immigrants began to arrive in significant numbers. In
Hartford, this took place during the later 1840s. The Irish population of the region had begun
growing in the late 1820s, and the state's first Catholic parish was organized in Hartford in 1829,
with about 75 members. But in the mid 1840s, the Irish population began to surge: a parish
census recorded more than 400 immigrants in 1844, and the 1850 U.S. Census showed an Irishborn population of more than 2,000 in a population of 13,555. The number of Irish-born in
Hartford then tripled over the course of the 1850s, reaching 6,432 in 1860.
So, rather suddenly, by 1850, Irish immigration was a salient feature of the city's life.
Immigrants clustered in a congested area of Hartford's East Side, between Main Street and the
Connecticut River, close to Holy Trinity Church on Talcott Street. In the East Side, some stores
and a large number of saloons and boarding houses already served the Irish population. To the
native stock, immigrants, who lived in extremely overcrowded housing, seemed to fill the streets
at all hours of the day and late into the night.
Even though large-scale Irish migration was commonplace in American cities in the
Northeast during these years, the dominance and persistence oflrish migration to Hartford
seemed remarkable to natives. And in the middle years of the nineteenth century, at least in the
view of the articulate Yankee elite, the words immigrant, Irish, and Catholic were substantially
interchangeable. 7 Many of Hartford Yankees experienced the late nineteenth century as a wholly
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unwanted and unexpected disruption of a familiar and homogeneous society. Nevertheless, the
city's native-stock Protestants clung tenaciously to social and political control. Up until the
1890s, they kept decisive political control of the city just beyond the grasp of the city's
Democrats, who were mostly "immigrants" (although the party's leadership was still mostly
composed of native-born Protestants). But the -control exercised by the Yankees was neither
monolithic nor total , and, over the course of the decades, two large, self-conscious, and wellorganized groups conducted an incessant discourse over Hartford's transition from a
homogeneous, Protestant town into a pluralistic urban industrial city.
The 1850s were an especially contentious decade in the city. Reacting to the surge of
immigration, Connecticut became a major center of nativism-one measure of its rise was the
destruction of Hartford ' s Holy Trinity Church in a suspicious arson in 1853. Egged on by
Protestant leaders, nativists frequently mobilized the power of the state to harass Catholics. For
example, after extended litigation, in 1_855, Connecticut courts upheld a Protestant husband's
trespass complaint against Waterbury's first Catholic pastor, who had been called to administer
the last rites to the man's Catholic wife.
Hartford itself was already a major antebellum center of "benevolent reform," guided by
figures like Horace Bushnell. The city ' s well-organized Protestant leadership hoped that
Protestantism could remain the undiminished source of social cohesion and values. A cluster of
missionary and benevolent organizations they developed between the 1830s and the 1850s
sought to redirect and "improve" the new urban poor, both native-born migrants and nonProtestant immigrants. These organizations were animated by the optimism of revivalism and by

Irish born (6,432 in a population of 29, 150) was already exceeded by the number of children
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post-millennial confidence in the perfectibility of society. In 1850, for example, four young men
founded the Congregational City Mission Society hoping to alleviate "the Temporal necessities
of the destitute, strengthen the religious interests of the poor, gather children into Sabbath
Schools and provide free religious services each Sabbath. 8
For more than a quarter century, the society was led by David Hawley, a former farmer
who set the tone for the society's work. Hawley roamed the city's laboring district, distributing
religious tracts, clothing and food. Resolutely evangelical in mood, technique, and purpose, he
hated drinking. When the city's poorest neighborhoods took on a strong immigrant and Catholic
character, Hawley did not shift his methods or presumptions. His unswerving, if rarely realized,
goal was to convert the Catholic poor to evangelical Protestantism, to cultivate in them new
Protestant identities, and to encourage conformity to Protestant and middle class mores and
values.
Hartford's antebellum Protestant reformers allowed no compromise with Catholic
interests or Catholic identity. Their approach was resolutely confrontational. Supporters of the
city's very active common school movement of the 1850s insisted on Protestant texts for the
schools and the tone of Sunday school, temperance, and charitable workers was relentlessly
convers10nary.
Despite their energetic activity and commitment to benevolent reform, few of the city's
mid-century Protestant leaders were ever able to overcome their sense of the radical otherness of
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the new immigrants. Barbara Cross, Horace Bushnell's biographer, notes that during the 1840s
and 1850s Bushnell ultimately "rationalized the prevailing contempt for religious or racial
aliens" in Hartford. "Blurring distinctions among them, he treated them with all practical neglect
and theoretic derogation. 9" As time passed, like many of his parishioners at North Church,
Bushnell responded to mass migration by personal withdrawal, by refusing to acknowledge the
changes happening before his eyes. Many of his peers reacted by moving away from the city
center. "Our range of life is so walled up by the respectability of our associations, that what is on
the other side of the wa11 is very much a world unknown," he admitted in a sermon published in
1858. 10

Containing Catholics:
The elite Protestant policy of trying to keep Catholics out of sight and out of mind did
give immigrants a certain room to maneuver and develop their own institutions, most notably the
institutional infrastructure of the Catholic church. Irish Catholic immigrants did not, in fact, care
much about what Yankees thought about them. Catholics asserted themselves repeatedly and
aggressively, but until the Civil War years they could find a few signs that they might eventually
find an equal footing in Hartford.
The Hartford Courant, in particular, showed an almost endless shower of scorn on the
Irish. Before the early 1850s, the newspaper served as the chief voic~ of Connecticut Whigs.
Then it became the leading Know Nothing newspaper, and it closed the decade as the voice of
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the new Republican Party. Throughout the period, the Courant poured out a relentless stream of
complaints about the Irish: about their drinking, political corruption, extreme poverty
disorderliness, stupidity, family size, and laziness. The Irish neighborhood emerging on the East
Side was routinely referred to as Pigville. Long lists of "Paddys" and "bogtrotters" arrested for
public drunkenness were published regularly.
In the decades before the Civil War, only one major Yankee institution, the Democratic
Party, showed much openness to Catholic immigrants. Even then, its chief aim was finding votes
to end the party ' s perennial minority status, not to embrace the goal of Catholic equality.
So, in the years between the 1830s and roughly 1860, Catholic immigrants to Hartford
experienced local versions of most of the classic problems and controversies that characterized
the first great wave oflrish Catholic immigration to the United States: daunting poverty,
illiteracy, social isolation and discrimination, disenfranchisement, and inability to control critical
communal issues such as the education of the young. Three major episodes of inter-group
conflict in the city are laid out below.
I) In the 1830s, tensions arising out of competition for jobs and religious differences led to
frequent conflict between African-Americans and Irish immigrants in the East Side. In July of
1834, there was what amounted to a three-day race riot in the area around Talcott Street, with
unrest apparently triggered by verbal exchanges that took place after a mass at Holy Trinity
Church. 11
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2) As the city ' s Irish immigrant population rose rapidly in the late 1840s and 1850s, serious
tensions developed in local politics, especia11y as immigrants were naturalized and began to
participate actively in city elections, overwhelmingly as Democrats. Anti-immigrant sentiment
crystallized in a strong nativist movement in Connecticut. The secretive American or KnowNothing Party organized in the state in 1853 under the title, the State Council of Connecticut. Its
constitution stated that the party ' s object was "to resist the insidious policy of the Church of
Rome, and a11 other foreign influences against the institutions of our country, by placing in all
offices in the gift of the people, whether by election or appointment, none but native-born
Protestant citizens.
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One factor that pushed nativist Protestants to support the new party was the common~
perception that the Democratic Party was acting increasingly vigorously on behalf of
immigrants. Before 1850, immigrant participation in city politics was discouraged by the fact
that Hartford ' s aldermen and city councilors were all elected at large. But in that year, under
Democratic majorities in the General Assembly, Hartford 's state-chartered form of government
was altered to mandate elections through a new system of wards. In the city elections of 1851 ,
the Sixth Ward, located on the East Side, moved permanently into the Democratic column. In
1852, it elected the city ' s first Catholic councilor, James Mulligan, a foundry worker. In 1853
and 1854 Irish voters on the East Side played a key role in electing Democratic mayors.
As a reaction to developments of this sort, in 1855, the Know-Nothing candidate for
governor, William A. Minor, won election, along with a working majority in the General
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Assembly. Immediately, Minor denounced immigrants as unfit for citizenship and sought to
impose a 21-year residency requirement for naturalization. He then moved briskly to disband six
state militia companies composed of Irish Catholic immigrants. In I 856, the General Assembly
also passed legislation that required all church property to be held by local congregations, a ,
practice that struck directly at Catholic doctrine and customary practice. To add insult to injury,
the act explicitly exempted Episcopal, Methodist, Shaker and Jewish groups from the restriction.
An amendm~nt to the state Constitution passed restricting suffrage to men able to read the state
Constitution and laws, as did an act forbidding the state courts to naturalize aliens.
3) During the I 850s, the city's Protestant leadership also moved to criticize informal
practices that had led to de facto public funding for parochial education at the common school
level. Horace Bushnell and educational reformer Henry Barnard pushed for a reorganization of
the city's public1y-funded schools to eliminate Catholic control of some of the city's schools.
(Between the 1830s and 1868, Hartford improvised a system in which minority groups received
some funding, largely salaries for teachers, for schools conducted in or by churches. This
practice began when African-Americans asked to remove their children from the common
schools and asked to receive public support for teacher's salaries. Segregated schools were then
formed at the Colored Congregational Church on Talcott Street and the African Methodist
Episcopal Church on Pearl Street. Catholics took advantage of this precedent to demand and
obtain similar support for schools at Holy Trinity Church on Talcott Street, and, eventua1ly, at
St. Patrick's Church on Church Street, and St. Peter's Church on the South Green. The two key
factors that permitted this blurring of the boundaries between church and state were the
decentralized system of public education that prevailed and the overlap between city-funded
12

common schools and Protestant-dominated Sunday Schools. Until the end of the 19th century,
each of the Town of Hartford's common school districts had its own elected school board that
hired and fired teachers. (Hartford had wholly separate Town and City governments until 1897 .)
Education fell under the purview of the town selectmen. 13 A district board could be and often
was set up to meet the needs of a particular population group dominant in a neighborhood.
Full-scale political conflict broke out in 1865 and 1866, as Protestant reformers pushed
for a tighter system of school administration that would be less friendly to Catholics. The major
confrontation took place in St. Peter's parish, which had been organized in 1859 to serve
Catholics living south of the Park River, which then bisected downtown Hartford. Bishop
Francis McFarland staked out an impressive and controversial location for the new church,
directly on the city's South Green, the central public space in an emerging, elite Protestant
neighborhood. The parish school, initially located in a disused Masonic ha11, opened a school
with 200 pupils in 1860. The school's staff included a principal, John Gaffney, and three lay
Catholic women. All received salaries from the local district committee.
For several years, the district committee continued to employ an a11-Catholic teaching
staff at St. Peter's. But by the mid-1863, the composition of the district board had changed and
half of the teaching staff was composed of Protestant women. They began to insist on using the
King James Version of the Bible in classroom lessons and devotions, rather than the Catholic
Douay Version. (It was taken for granted by both Catholics and Protestants that the school's
curriculum should include religious lessons and devotions).
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In 1865, Father John Lynch, pastor of St. Peter's, denounced the King James Version as a
"secular book," and pressed the district committee to forbid its use at St. Peter's, or, failing that,
to transfer the Protestant teachers. When the district committee failed to act, Lynch mobilized
Catholic voters to eject the district committee at that fall's town election. That prompted a
Protestant counter-mobilization, and, before leaving office, district committee signed contracts
with several Protestant teachers, most notably Emily Parsons, who began her lessons each day
with lengthy prayers and readings from the Protestant version of the Bible.
Lynch and Parsons went head to head in the classroom, and in the public prints, but
Lynch was unable to oust the resolute Parsons. He decided, instead, to remove all her pupils, and
so Parsons conducted her lessons in solitude until the spring of 1866. At that point, the city's
priests announced the removal of publicly-funded teachers from both of the city's parochial
schools. The city's parishes then sought to locate religious sisters who could take over Catholic
school instruction. The feud rumbled on into the late 1860s, eventually leading the Hartford

Times to denounce "the insane bigotry of a few hotheads in the South School District. 14 "

The Parades:

Parading by immigrants in Hartford emerged in this climate of inter-group tension.
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The literature on St. Patrick ' s Day parades is now fairly large, with articles and longer
monographs on 19 th century parading in New York, Worcester, Lowell, and Toronto. These
include Marie Fitzgerald's SUNY dissertation, "St. Patrick ' Day Parade:· The Conflict of Irish
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secondary literature suggests that parading had important political significance in nineteenth
century America. "In the classic parades of the mid-nineteenth century, constituent groups in the
polity actually presented themselves, rather than abstract symbols for public view. The parade
re-presented the urban population, forming a detailed, descriptive portrait of the urban social
structure," Mary Ryan argued in her 1989 essay, "The American Parade." At a time when
parades were important civic events, Ryan and others argue, the St. Patrick's Day Parade shifted
t~e focus from proclamation of civic unity to assertion of sub-group identity and rights. "The
Irish, in a particularly obstinate way, forced Anglo-Saxon Protestants to acknowledge them as
members of American culture, as well as citizens. They actively demonstrated that an ethnic
parade, not a melting pot, would be the most fitting symbol of a multi-ethnic society. 16"
Hartford's first St. Patrick's Day parade took place in 1852, a relative latecomer by the
standards of New York, or even Worcester, where the first parade took place in 1845. 17 It was

Parades in Nineteenth-Century Toronto: A Study of Immigrant Adjustment and Elite Control,"
Social History (Canada) 1992 25( 49): 57-73; Sallie Marston 's "Public Rituals and Community
Power: St. Patrick's Day Parades in Lowell, Massachusetts, 1841-187 4, ") Political Geography
Quarterly (Great Britain) 1989 8(3): 255-269; Timothy Meagher's, "Why Should We Care For a
Little Trouble or a Walk Through the Mud": St. Patrick's and Columbus Day Parades in
Worcester, Massachusetts, 1845-1915," New England Quarterly 1985 58(1 ): 5-26. Kenneth
Moss, "St Patrick's Day Celebrations and the Formation oflrish-American Identity, 1845-1875:
Journal of Social History, 1995 29(1 ): 125-148. Most of these treatments rely too heavily, as
does this paper, on newspaper accounts. Meagher's paper on Worcester is based on a remarkably
full set of primary sources.
16
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sponsored by the 160 members of the St. Patrick's Society. Based at St. Patrick's Church and led
by its formidable pastor, the Rev. John Brady, the cultural and benevolent organization was an
ardent public advocate of both immigrant rights and temperance. The Hartford Times reported
that, "the St. Patrick's Society of this city came out in large numbers to day in honor of the
birthday of the Patron Saint oflreland. They were accompanied by the Washington Brass Band,
and a large and appropriate banner was carried in the procession. Two or three hundred members
of the Society marched in the procession, and a very large numper, male and female, followed
upon the walks. They made quite a lively appearance and their numbers showed that the Society
is in a prosperous condition. 18 "
Events and connections stressing Catholicism punctuated the day, which began at 6 a.m.
with a band serenading Father Brady at his house on Ta1cott Street in the heart of Pigvillle. The
parade itself began an hour or so later, with a procession from State House Square to St.
Patrick's Church, where the members of St. Patrick's Society entered the church in a body to
attend Mass. (Hartford is the only city on record where the paraders marched into church,
attended the Mass, and then reformed afterwards to continue. In other cities, masses preceded the
parades, which were often routed to pass by important churches.)
The parade then "marched through the principal streets." As was often the case in this
period, Hartford journalists were interested in the performance of the bands that accompanied
public processions. The Times' 1852 coverage ended by observing that "a great many persons
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from out of the city joined in carrying out the celebration. Stack's Band performed their part to
admiration and drew forth many compliments on their beautiful new uniforms."
The 1853 celebration expanded to fill the entire day. It kicked off with another 6 a.m.
serenade for Fr. Brady. In a paragraph, the Times reported that "The Catholics of this city have
celebrated (the day) in admirable style by a long and well-arranged procession with three Bands
of Music, by addresses, &c, and they will .have a grand entertainment this evening at the
American Hotel. St. John's (Sick and Burial Society) and St. Patrick's societies were out with
their emblems." Coverage in the Times expanded dramatically over the course of the 1850s,
eventually including lists of the order of march by the groups participating in the procession and
details of the program at St. Patrick's. The newspaper also launched a strenuous defense of the
parade and its participants, a defense more against the stereotypical Yankee complaints about the
occasion than a rebuttal of particular charges oflrish disorder, secrecy, and debauchery.
The parade was creditable to the different societies, and everything was conducted
in the most quiet and respectable manner. The long line of stalwart men, with
their happy faces, dressed in their best and clothed with their national colored
regalia, presented a pleasant appearance, as they marched through the streets
to the popular air of' Old Ireland.' Their neat and orderly appearance surprised
many of our citizens, for they have looked upon the celebration of this day by
the 'Sons of Erin' has being nothing more or less than a bacchanalian bout. ...
The members of these societies are not associated together for any secret purposes,
but for their own mutual benefit and improvement. They are entirely of a
benevolent and charitable character and are composed of some of our best
and most industrious adopted citizens. Their object of association is as
much for mutual improvement as for the assistance of each other in times
of sickness and need.
The Courant 's coverage in 1853 was much less enthusiastic, failing to mention the
parade at all and radiating the sense that the celebration was an unwarranted day off from work.
"Yesterday being St. Patrick's Day, it was generally observed by the Irish population of this city;
and from the large numbers in the streets, we should judge that with them it was a general
17

18
holiday. So far as we could learn, everything passed off pleasantly."
Coverage of the 1854 celebration was also full in the Times and perfunctory in the
Courant. For the first time, an all-Irish militia unit, the Emmet Guards, marched in the parade.

The unit was commanded by Edward McManus, a member of one of the Irish community's "first
families," and a key organizer of communal activities. "The Guards made a fine appearance on
this their first parade in our public streets, and showed by their marching and drill that they were
under good officers and instruction," the Times reported.
The newspaper's account also suggests, for the first time, what the parade sounded like.
Two bands participated, playing a brief program over and over, one calculated to stress both
Irish identity and Irish commitment to the United States. "The national tunes of Yankee Doodle
and Hail Columbia were played alternately with "Saint Patrick's Day in the Morning" and "Erin
Go Brah."
As usual, the mass at St. Patrick's received attention. "The Church was crowded with
people and presented a fine appearance. The address was an eloquent and able effort."
Throughout the 1850s, the Catholic identity of the celebration was stressed above all other
elements. The symbolic emphasis was heightened in the middle of the decade when St. Patrick's
church began to confirm the children of the parish as part of the complex of events. There was no
discussion in the city newspapers about why Brady and the parish chose to initiate this practice,
but it is mentioned repeatedly by the Times in subsequent years.
The tensest years in Hartford were the late 1850s, and the tone of coverage varied
strikingly in the two dailies. The Courant, in particular, remained terse. Upon occasion,
however, the Courant 's stiff upper lip did quiver. By 1859, the Courant had completed its
lengthy transition from serving as the mouthpiece of the Whig, then Know-Nothing, and finally
L
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Republican parties. Its main domestic preoccupation was also shifting from the problems of
immigration toward the problem of slavery. Nonetheless, in that year its single paragraph on the
parade concluded with a startling sneer. "'St. Patrick's day in the morning' was yesterday
celebrated in this city by the members of "St. John's Society and Burial Society" who marched
through the principal streets, headed by the Hartford Coronet Band. Mass was held at St.
Patrick's Cathedral, and a large number of persons were confirmed. It was well for the
procession that Commerce Street was not laid down in the line of march, as it would have been
apt to have thrown cold water on the procession. 19"
By 1860, the St. Patrick's Day celebration was a mature event, the benevolent societies
organized around St. Patrick's Church were familiar to newspaper readers, as were the men who
served as marshals and public spokesmen. The parade attracted 800 to 1,000 marchers annually
and many times that number "attended upon it." Even the Courant was struggling to take things
philosophically. "While the English have their feast of St. George; the Scotch their St. Andrew;
the Dutch their St. Nicholas; and the puritans their Forefather's Day, it is all right and proper that
men who have an hereditary right to venerate St. Patrick should perpetuate his memory and stand
by the traditions of their ancestors. Here's a health to St. Patrick!" The Courant 's editor even
publicly thanked the benevolent societies that organized the parade and dinners for inviting him
to participate (which he respectfully declined).
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Hartford Courant, March 18, 1859. Commerce Street lay just east of the Connecticut
River and was one of the main streets in the city's new riverside factory district.
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Hartford Courant, March 17, 1860. The era of mudslinging was not entirely in the
past, however. In the same column as the annual St. Patrick's Day paragraph, was an outraged
report condemning a dispatch in the previous day's Times as "a wilful and deliberate lie." In a
reversal of stereotypes, the Times had reported that a group of Republicans had returned by train
from a rally in Waterbury and marched through the midnight streets. "Their drunken and noisy
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The events of the early 1860s, both local and national, also produced a shift in climate
toward a somewhat warmer embrace of Irish Catholic immigrants. In 1861, the Democrats
reclaimed control of the city government for the first time in a decade. More importantly, the
Civil War created an ongoing emergency that generated a deep undercurrent of Yankee anxiety
about the role of immigrants, who now, with their children, made up perhaps as much as onethird of the city's population.
In 1862, the first celebration of St. Patrick's Day after full wartime mobilization, there
were dramatic changes. For most of the preceding decade, the parade had stepped off at State
House Square and wound around downtown before returning to the square. That route remained
much the same, but in 1862, when the parade returned to the State House the marchers processed
inside, where a meal for 500 was served. Surrounded by a host of Catholic priests, Governor
Thomas Seymour and Mayor Ronald Flowers were, for the first time, in attendance. Both
responded at length to the day's toasts. The Times reported 15 toasts, beginning with "The Day
we celebrate," passing on through toasts in honor of George Washington, the Governor, the
memory of Andrew Jackson, and concluding with "the Press."
Fr. John Cahill in his toast in honor of Bishop O'Reil1y,
''congratulated the St. John Sick and Burial Society on the honor they had in
entertaining his Excellency Thomas H. Seymour, the Governor of the State,
his honor the Mayor, and other distinguished guests. It proved clearly to his mind
that the Irish men of Hartford were good citizens and upright men. Gov. Seymour
returned the compliment by embracing Irish nationalism. He toasted "IRELAND:
her back turned to Britain, her face to the West; may the day soon come when
she sha11 break the rod of the oppressor and, redeemed from thralldom, 'take

behavior on the streets at their return this morning at 2 or 3 o'clock, was such as would disgrace
a party of rowdies, and the watchmen were almost compelled to arrest a dozen or so of them and
put them in the watch house."
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her stand among the Nations of the Earth. 2 1"
By 1863, the parade itself had swelled to triumphal proportions. Until then, those
participating had marched through the East Side and to St. Patrick' s Church, then wound back
through the downtown. The construction of the immense new St. Peter' s Church on South Main
Street created new possibilities for public display. So the announced parade route for 1863 was
expanded accordingly. Mass, now at the new St. Peter' s Church, remained the central focus -of
the procession, but the parade route wound through virtually every part of the city. For the first
time, the line of march included the middle class and elite Yankee neighborhoods springing up to
the south and southwest of the old downtown. 22 The 1862 parade lasted about two hours. The
1863 version was scheduled for six hours of marching before returning to the Old State House
for what amounted to a Democratic Party rally, replete with a long address from Mayor William
Hammersly and toasts running the gamut from "the United States, the home of our choice, and
the land or our adoption" to Pope Pius IX . Even the Courant reported on Father Peter Kelly's
long speech in praise of Pope Pius without comment. Kelly said he thought the health of Pope
Pius the IX was a toast that every man as well as every priest could and should respond to
heartily. The Courant also noted that the parade was routed to pass the offices of the city ' s major
21

Hartford Times, March 18, 1860.
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Hartford Times, March 16, 1863. According to an advertisement taken by parade
organizers, the line of march for 1863 subsequent years was: Around the north side of the State
House to Main Street. Down Main Street to St. Peter's Church, where the Societies will attend
Divine service; after which the Societies will reform in front of the church and march around the
South Green, up Main to High, down High to Ford, down Ford to Trinity, down Trinity to
Washington, down Washington to Park, down Park to Main Street, up Main to Arch Street, down
Arch to Front Street, up Front to Morgan, up Morgan to Main, up Main to Trumbull, down
Trumbull to Pearl, up Pearl to Main, up Main to State, down State to Front, up Front to Temple,
up Temple to City Hall, there to partake of dinner."
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newspapers. "In front of the Courant 's office, the line of march was stopped for a few moments,
and three cheers given for the paper."
The parades of the Civil War years marked the highpoint of that form of very pointed,
politically freighted, public assertion by masses of Irish Catholics in Hartford. St. Patrick ' s Day
parades continued into the 1870s but growth stopped. By the late 1870s, both Catholic officials
and official representatives of the Irish nationalist movement were actively discouraging the
parade. The Ancient Order of Hibernians, the mainstay of the parade in New York, Worcester,
and other places, came late to Hartford (I 879), probably because of the strength of the parishbased benevolent and temperance societies that dominated organized Irish social life in Hartford.
In 1881 , the Connecticut Catholic, a new Hartford-based weekly, rem!lrked that St.
Patrick's Day ''was celebrated in a quiet manner. High Mass was celebrated in the three Catholic
churches at 9 o' clock, and in each a sermon on the life and works of St. Patrick was delivered.
The congregations were large, as becometh the religious fervor of the race. There was no parade
or outdoor celebration. 23 "
"~
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The Connecticut Catholic rehearsed the case against parades several times during the
1880s, and the parade was not revived in Hartford. The standard arguments of the period were
that money spent on parades should be used to support the Irish poor, especially in the Land
League movement. But there was also a sense public demonstration was no longer necessary. "It
now seems most proper for us," it editorialized in 1886, "to assemble in our respective parish
churches and there honor our noble exemplar by appropriate prayers and invocations. In the
evening, we can assemble in public halls or society chambers and give expression to our
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Connecticut Catholic, March 19, 1881.
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sentiments in song, music, recitation, and speeches. 24 "

If the St. Patrick's Day Parade seemed to be losing its utility in the 1880s, Irish Catholics
in Hartford certainly did not abandon the parade as a form of celebration or self-assertion.
Parades remained an important part of the repertoire of collective behavior. And in Hartford, the
emphasis on Catholic identity seems stronger than in other places that have been studied. There
was, for example, an immense parade to honor the rededication of St. Patrick's Church on
November 26, 1876. Processions from other neighborhoods converged on the church, which was
rebuilt after a devastating fire. There were also significant parades at each step of the process of
constructing the new St. Joseph ' s Cathedral.
The cathedral's cornerstone wa~ laid on April 29, 1877, an occasion for the gathering of
Catho1ic hierarchs from across the nation and clergy, religious and lay people from around the
state. "Trains from all parts of the state brought societies and throngs of people who lined the
sidewalks from Asylum Street to Sigourney Street," the Times reported. "The procession formed
at the depot and included 15 societies and nearly 2,000 men. It was the largest gathering of
Catholics that ever assembled within the limits of Hartford, a number estimated at 15,000. After
the arrival of the procession, the clergy proceeded from the Pro-Cathedral (St. Peter's) to the
porch of the Cathedral." That winding clerical procession covered almost two miles of city
streets.
Another, far less formal , parade took place to honor the completion of the project. In
November of 1891 , Bishop Lawrence McMahon, who had raised $500,000 to build the 2,200-
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Connecticut Catholic March 13, 1886.
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seat cathedral, returned to Hartford from a lengthy trip to Europe. McMahon was met at the train
station by a crowd of people who marched him to the new cathedral, which had been completed
in his absence. A torchlight parade covered the IO blocks from the station to an illuminated
cathedral. Newspaper accounts put the crowd along that relatively short parade route at I 0,000
and reported that 4,000 crowded into the cathedral, along with McMahon, who was not
t

expecting the event that greeted him.
The cathedral's consecration on May 8, 1892 brought an even larger parade, fed by trains
converging on the city from every section of the state. There were also less formal, smaller scale
events that indicate the continuing perceived utility of parading. There were, for example, a
number of parades conducted to welcome parish priests back to the city after extended leaves. In
a city full of Irish immigrants and their children, stories of Irish-born priests returning home,
often after decades away, to pay a final visit to their mothers, had enormous emotional
resonance. In August of 1892, the long-serving pastor of St. Peter' s Church returned to Hartford.
He was greeted at the station by hundreds of parishioners and the Colt ' s Band. That event
became a parade when the group placed the priest in a carriage and escorted him on a winding
course through the downtown streets to St. Peter's on the South Green.

The Politics of Placement
Parades, however, were not the only public ways to assert a rising Catholic public
presence. From, an early point, Catholic leaders followed an aggressive strategy for siting and
building new churches. The secret purchase of the site of St. Joseph ' s Cathedral was not an
anomaly, and neither was the conscious decision to locate the church in an elite Protestant
neighborhood. It was the culmination of a pattern that developed in the middle decades of the
24
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nineteenth century, certainly in Connecticut, but probably in many other cities, too. 25
Catholic leaders didn't follow this practice from the very beginning. When the Bishop of
Boston purchased Holy Trinity Church in 1829, the structure was moved off Main Street and
into the very small Catholic community then taking root on the East Side. But when that church
was outgrown in the late 1840s, its pastor, the Rev. John Brady bought land half a mile east of
the Talcott Street site to build a new and imposing brownstone parish church. The church,
renamed in honor of St. Patrick, opened in 1851 at the comer of Church and Ann streets, in a
neighborhood of large single-family houses owned by prosperous Protestants.
In 1860, Bishop Francis McFarland, who later chose the Asylum Hill site for St. Joseph ' s
Cathedral, bought a site for the city's second Catholic parish church on the South Green. St.
Peter's Church, too, was located blocks away from any large Catholic residential district, but
dead center in a developing Protestant mansion district.
In other words, as middle and upper cJass Protestants abandoned the city's oldest
residential districts to immigrants, the Catholic Church chased them out into the new suburban
districts, where it erected enormous new churches. By the 1880s, St. Patrick ' s, St. Peter's and St.
Joseph ' s each reported weekend congregations of more than 4,000. These attendance figures
dwarfed the memberships of the city ' s elite Protestant churches, usua1ly by a several multiples.
Attendance at St. Peter' s alone surpassed regular attendance at all ten of the Protestant
congregations that shared its Main Street address. And Catholics knew that the Protestant were
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The land for St. Mary's Church on Hillhouse Avenue in New Haven and St. Michael's
Church in Springfield, Massachusetts were both purchased through similar stratagems at about
the same time. Both were also located in elite Protestant neighborhoods.
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aware of their strength.
Hartford's Catholics, from the bishop down to the unskilled laborers marching in the
street, pressed and pressed. After the Civil War, Catholics noted with pleasure the climate of
increasing opportunity, but felt no sense that the city's Protestants were inviting them to
participate as equals in the city's religious, public, or economic life. "Except where Catholics are
strong in numbers and consequently powerful in influence, it is ordinarily regarded as
presumptuous in them to aspire to civic prominence," an editorial in the Hartford weekly, The

Connecticut Catholic, observed after the 1892 elections (which brought in a Democratic
governor with an electoral margin of 1,100 votes). "It would matter little what their capacity may
be, or what their public service may have been; their ambitions are met with the condescending
assurance that success is doubtful for them because of their Catholic affiliation. 26 "
One of the reasons for this skepticism was the continuing reluctance of Yankee voters to
authorize a change in the city's electoral districts. The 1850 plan with six wards persisted until
1897, an approach that guaranteed immigrants in the Sixth Ward representation on the Board of
Alderman and City Council, but not very much. The wards were drawn as geographical entities,
and did not provide proportional representation. As a result of the crush of immigration, by the
late 1880s almost 40 percent of the city's population lived in Ward Six, but was entitled to only
one sixth of the aldermen and councilors. The reforms of 1897 created ten, more equitably
drawn, wards. The balance of political power began to shift, leading to the election of the city's
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The Connecticut Catholic, 16 April 1892, pg. 4. In rejecting Republican rule, the
editor wrote on November 12 of that year, "Connecticut has been true to herself in giving us
such a grant and glorious Democratic victory. She has placed herself where she really belongs,
outside the pale of the doubtful states, in the list of sane Democratic communities."
26

27

first Irish mayor in 1902 and a second in 1910. (However, true Democratic and Catholic
hegemony over the city' s politics did not arrive until 1935.)
As Hartford ' s Catholics approached the gates of political dominance in the 1890s, their
leaders began to practice the rhetoric of American civil religion. In 1894, when the Rev. Michael
Tierney was chosen to replace Lawrence McMahon as Bishop of Hartford, he selected George
Washington ' s Birthday as the date for his consecration. Another large parade ensued. After it
that, during the consecration ceremony, Tierney seized the occasion to preach on the civic role
and promise of American Catholics, arguing, in particular, that the Irish were just as loyal and
authentic Americans as were the Yankees. He urged that the city Irish-Americans, as a sign of
their political maturity, give up the tradition of raucous and assertive parades on St. Patrick's
Day in favor of "banquets and other intellectual exercises. 27 "
Nevertheless, there were lingering reservations about the potential damage that
assimilation could do to the city ' s emerging Catholic subculture. In the 1890s, the city ' s Catholic
leaders stil1 expressed grave concern about the potential al1ure of the liberties of the Protestant
world. Clergy and Catholic journalists stil1 policed the perimeters vigorously. ln the middle of
singing the praises of the new St. Joseph 's Cathedral, for example, the editor of the Connecticut

Catholic paused in 1892 to wish that if "those Catholics who make a practice of resorting to the
religious meetings of Protestant denominations when some itinerant.' evange1ist' is announced to
speak or sing would attend their own church, they would have less reason to be ashamed of
themselves. Dul1 indeed must be the musical tastes of those who prefer the ditties of these
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Connecticut Catholic, February 30 1894.
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meetings to the beautiful chants of the mass and vesper services. 28 "
Well into the twentieth century, Hartford's Catholic political and religious leaders
continued to sing this sort of tune. They wanted immigrant and Catholic political power and
social prominence, and so they pressed hard. But they also wished to preserve strong boundaries
for their subcultures and preferred, in the last analysis, to maintain an enclave.
One other factor may·be worth noting. Despite the high volume of rhetoric and even of
nativist actio_n against Catholic immigrants, even in the 1850s, Irish Catholic immigrants never
faced the sorts of implacable resistance faced by, for example, African-Americans. And even in
the tensest days of conflict, there remained points of human contact that blunted conflict. One
was humor. In 1858, just as things were looking up for opponents of nativism in Hartford, the

Hartford Times resumed the extensive coverage it had given to St. Patrick ' s Day in the early
1850s. It carried this report of the dinner of St. John ' s Sick and Burial Society that closed the
celebration of St. Patrick ' s Day.
The Chairman called upon the father of St. John Society, our old and respectable
fellow citizen, James McManus. Mr. McManus gave a history of the society.
When he came here there were only 17 attendants upon the church to which
he belonged. He alluded to the time when Henry E. Ellsworth, Esq. built Central
Row comer, then the best building in the city. There were then a very few Irish
laborers in the city, and one of them was carrying a hod, when a gentlemen
stepped up and inquired ' who is building this block? ' 'Ellsworth, Delany & Company,'
was the reply. Mr. Ellsworth heard of this reply and asked the hod carrier who Ellsworth,
Delany and Co. were. "Why," said he, "you are Mr. Ellsworth, I am Mr. Delany, and the
Company are a11 over the building at work . It takes all of us to build this block, you
furnish the money, I carry the hod, and others plan and do the work. It would never be
built if you, Mr. E1lsworth, had to carry the hod, nor, in fact, if you depended on me to
furnish the money. Mr. E was much amused and acknowledged the mutual relations of

28

Ibid., 19 March 1892, pg. 8.
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laborer and capitalist, and the dependence of one upon the other.
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Hartford Times, March 18, 1858. McManus, a laborer, arrived in Hartford in 1828.
His sons James and Edward both achieved careers as professionals that were exceptional for
their cohort of second generation Irish Catholics, one as a lawyer and the other as a dentist. Both
were extremely prominent lay Catholics. But at this moment, both young men were already
leaders of the Catholic community. Edward as an officer in the Emmet Guard and perennial
grand marshal of the St. Patrick's Day parade and James was a Civil War hero and the Catholic
church ' s chieflocal legal advisor until his death in 1912.
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We also have to work sort of the dark side, if you will. We're going to
spend time in the shadows in the intelligence world. A lot of what needs to
be done here will have to be done quietly, without any discussions, using
sources and methods that are available to our intelligence agencies if
we 're going to be successful. That's the world these folks operate in.
-- Vice-President Dick Cheney, September 16,
2001

A growing body of contemporary art in America comments on
post-September 11 conditions, specifically the changed realities in the nation's political and
social psyche. Okwui Enwezor, in his incisive catalog statement for the Seville Biennial 2006,
had identified three themes of the exhibition he was directing, and the statement captured very
well the principal concerns which underlie the art
that is a response to the "war on terror": one, "the construction of a gargantuan empire of secrets
in which arbitrary measures and suspension of constitutional safeguards represents the principal

tool of global governance"; second, the "weakening of the liberal model of open society by a
range of forces- from the terroristic imagination to the futile calculus of total war and the
creeping state of emergency within which both are being prosecuted"; third, "the ways in which
artistic practice seeks to mediate the distinctions between civil society, civic space, and social
reciprocity." Given these concerns, various artists have responded both by calibrating the vast
reduction of individual freedoms in relation to the growth in ideologies of control, and, equally
important, by charting new geographies of affect and intimacy, finding new languages to express
protest and also love. In ~any cases, the artists have chosen to work on, in Dick Cheney's
phrase, "the dark side" and they have borrowed techniques used by the covert agencies in the
war on terror. For this and other reasons, their work has both immediacy and appeal. But what is
also of great interest is the way in which these political artists in some measure parry the demand
of politics. Many artists whose work compels attention in this context are those who refuse to be
defined by dominant notions, whether of the left or the right, of what it means to be political.
This is what makes their art thoughtful, and, at other times, transgressive or disturbing.
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Paul Chan was born in Hong Kong in 1973 and grew up in Omaha, Nebraska. He is wellknown in the contemporary art world for his video work but he is also a font-maker. (One of the
fonts he has designed is called "Politics to Come" and every letter comes out as "blah." He has
used this font to translate, for instance, the U.S Constitution' s Bill of Rights.) In a recent work,
an untitled, seventeen-minute video, Chan has interviewed the activist lawyer Lynne Stewart,
who was disbarred from legal practice and faces a prison sentence after her conviction for
providing "material support" to Islamic terrorists. The documentary is a self-portrait of_the
lawyer as an activist, but it is an unusual portrait because the film ' s surprise, and its charm, is
that it has Stewart, a sixty-seven-year-old radical lawyer, reading poetry. An opposition is being
exploited here, between a sentence of law and a sentence that works otherwise. Hence the
appearance on the screen, at the end, of a line from the philosopher Alain Badiou: "The poem is
not a rule-bound crossing, but rather an offering, a lawless proposition."
Stewart's story of her current trial, as she told me in an interview in her former offices in
New York, begins with an undercover informant. Emad Salem, a former Egyptian army officertumed-FBI informant, had asked Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, in the latter's kitchen late one
night, whether it would be halal to bomb the United Nations building. Unknown to the Sheikh,
Salem was taping the conversation. It wasn 't halal because it would be "bad for Muslims," the
Sheikh had replied, and then told him to target the American military instead. With this evidence
in hand, when the government was about to try Sheikh Omar for conspiring to bomb New York
City landmarks, former US Attorney-General Ramsey Clark contacted Lynne Stewart and asked
if she ' d be interested in representing the Egyptian cleric. Stewart took on the case and fought for
her client, but the decks were stacked against him and he was found guilty.

Stewart believes that the Sheikh was "wrongfully accused and wrongfully convicted."
She told me that she "cared a lot" about her client, even though "his cause was not my cause."
She laughed and said that the cleric, who is blind and infirm, was always trying to get her to
convert to Islam. He would say, "Lynne, it is unthinkable to me that we'll be in paradise, and you
will be not be there." But more than the personal relationship she had developed, Stewart felt
very strongly that her client hadn't received justice. The FBI, after the bombing of the World
Trade Center in 1993 was desperate to nab anyone who could be described as a terrorist. The
informant had been paid a million dollars to deliv~r one lie after another. Stewart told me that in
court, while cross-examining the informant, she had told the man, "You lied on your
immigration status. You lied to the woman who married you." Despite what the government
witness claimed, there was no concrete evidence of Sheikh Omar being involved in any actual
plan to place a bomb. Stewart also believes that the use of anonymous jurors, as well as the
practice of isolating jurors by having them picked up at the train station by U.S. marshals and
being escorted into the court, only reinforced fear and prejudice against the Muslim defendants.
The Sheikh was found guilty on twenty-five counts and sentenced to multiple prison terms. In
addition, the government had also put other legal restrictions on Sheikh Omar; he was not
allowed to communicate with the outside world, including the media. But Stewart ran afoul of
that ruling when she read out to Reuters a statement that the Sheikh had dictated about his
opposition to a cease-fire in Egypt. The government charged and found her guilty under the 1996
Anti-Terrorism Act with four counts of aiding and abetting a terrorist organization. Instead of the
thirty years that the government wanted, the New York federal judge handed down a sentence of
twenty-eight months. The former lawyer is currently free on bail pending her appeal.
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In Chan's video, we watch Stewart recite John Ashbery, William Blake, and Eavan
Boland. The video ends with Stewart reading a poem by Bertolt Brecht, the last poem that he
wrote before his death: "And I always thought: the very simplest words / Must be enough. When
I say what things are like / Everyone's heart must be tom to shreds." Both the poet Brecht and
the artist Chan are aware that the simplest words are never enough. Nothing is ever enough. And
yet we need to speak out. That is why we hear Stewart reading more of Brecht's words. "That
you will go down if you don't stand up for yourself. / Surely you see that."
The surprise in the film is not simply that the lawyer is reading poetry, thereby coming to
Stewart's life, as she put it to me, "from an oblique angle." It is also that when the poems are
being read, the screen eliminates all image and begins to shimmer with color. Elsewhere in the
film, when we hear Stewart speaking and then also see her on the screen, the sight and the sound
do not always match. We are hearing her laugh, but in the image on the screen, she is somber,
sitting in the dappled light on the steps behind her Brooklyn home. This is as effective as having
Stewart reading poetry. When I asked Chan about it, during an interview in his Chelsea studio,
he said that with the '"misalignment' between sound and pictures what we realize is that the
nature of things isn't the nature of things." Chan further explained, "As someone who does not
do documentaries, or who is not a journalist, I cannot rely on a narrative or an argumentative
logic that would hope to persuade and influence the material aspects of the case. My material is
immaterial. It is ghostly. It is the ghostliness that tells us something not directly but indirectly,
and it's in the process of following this sign that gives us a chance at the tail-end to see things
and say things otherwise."
There is another kind of spectrality that Chan has also been attending to. In the attention
that has been paid to the Stewart case, what has often been overshadowed is the extraordinary
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injustice done to one of her co-defendants, Mohamed Yousry, a graduate student who had
assisted Stewart in the Sheikh Omar defense only as a translator. For performing his work for
Stewart, translating Sheikh Omar's Arabic words into English, Yousry was also held guilty on a11
counts of having provided "material support" to terrorists. The government asked that Yousry be
given twenty years. At the end, he was sentenced to a year and eight months in prison. While
currently out on bail, because of his pending appeal, Yousry has lost his job as a languageinstructor because his supervisors at CUNY's York Co11ege were advised not to honor his
reappointment. The FBI seized a11 his dissertation work, forty-seven boxes <:>f materials and two
hard drives, and he has had to move with his family to Connecticut. Yousry had never been
involved in any act of violence; he is not a member of any Islamic organization. In fact, he is not
even a practising Muslim; he is married to a Baptist, and has raised his daughter as a Christian.
He has publicly accused Sheikh Omar of " seeking to replace one form of authoritarianism in
Egypt with another." A quiet and human portrait of Mohamed Yousry- and a sense of the
enormous tragedy of his prosecution- emerges in a short documentary entitled "A Life Stands
Still." The film was made by Mary Billyou and Annelisse Fifi and is a part of a series that Chan
has curated under the title "Charged in the Name of Terror: Portraits by Contemporary Artists."

Trevor Paglen is a doctoral candidate in experimental geography at UC, Berkeley, and he
uses equipment and techniques employed in astrophotography to take pictures of secret military
bases, "black sites," and aircraft used in programs of "extraordinary rendition."
Paglen is interested in exploring what he calls, citing the famous passage from Conrad's
Heart of Darkness, "blank spaces on the earth." In a telephone interview with me, Paglen said
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that these are places that, under a new imperialism, "have been disappeared." Since the midl 990s, the CIA has had in place a covert policy of kidnapping suspected terrorists from any part
of the world and then detaining them in secret prisons called "black sites." One of the sites that
Paglen has photographed is the secret prison in Afghanistan known as "Salt Pit." This was the
facility that provided housing for the CIA "high-value" detainees. On his website, Paglen writes,
"To find the Salt Pit, I used a collection of commercial sate11ite imagery, a compass, testimonies
from former prisoners, and a map drawn by a former prisoner." The map Paglen mentions had
been drawn by Khaled El-Masri, a German citizen of Lebanese descent, who was kidnapped by
the CIA in January 2004 and held incommunicado for four months. El-Masri had been
kidnapped in Macedonia, detained in Afghanistan, and eventually released in Albania. The
conditions under which the Americans held El-Masri were inhuman and degra'tling. The
prisoners held at this prison describe "a darkness so thick that they could not see their own
hands; Eminem ' s "S1im Shady' album and other abrasive music and sounds were blasted twentyfour hours a day; interrogations were held under strobe lights; and prisoners were strapped to the
ceiling."
To make it worse, no public records exist of such kidnapped persons. In CIA lingo, they
are "ghost detainees." A part of Paglen 's project has involved the compiling of information and
photographs of the civilian airplanes used in the transportation of the secret prisoners. The CIA
uses a fleet of unmarked aircraft owned by networks of front companies whose boards of
directors are wholly fictitious individuals. In a gallery exhibition entitled "Missing Persons,"
Paglen has presented a collection of the signatures of these non-existent people culled from
business records, aircraft registrations, and corporate filings . When he began investigating the
individuals whose names appeared in such documents, Paglen found that " there was no home
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address, no phone number, nor any other proof that she'd existed at all." Each signature
supposedly made by any one individual looks different because each one was made by a
different person.

If the torturers do not yet exist in the public consciousness, it is perhaps necessary to
create them.
With the aid of sixty-dollar combat fatigues and stripes and military insignia that she
bought online, performance-artist Coco Fusco has recreated her own identity as a militant
sergeant. Sgt. Coco Fusco delivers lectures on the creative ways in which women can use sex as
a torture tactic on terrorist suspects, especially on Islamic prisoners. ·Her performance has been
inspired by what had been for Fusco the most disturbing aspect of the photographs from Abu
Ghraib: the presence of women among them, not as victims but as victimizers.
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In a related project, Fusco has made a video entitled "Operation Atropos" that explores
the practice of interrogation. In the summer of 2005 , Fusco and six women, whom she had
selected after circulating a call for volunteers on listservs, were filmed as they were interrogated
at a camp run by retired military interrogators. The group running the camp calls itself "Team
Delta" and its purpose is to train people in the arts of performing interrogation. Fusco paid eight
thousand dollars for the interrogation experience. Her mock-interrogators as well as her fellow
participants had agreed beforehand to be filmed during their training.
In the resulting documentary, we first watch Fusco and her colleagues traveling in a van,
driving into a wooded area, where they are to meet their interrogators. Suddenly, the van is heldup by masked men who, amidst loud shouting and violent pushing, take the women captive. The
visitors are asked to strip to their underwear and they are given the orange coveralls that we have
seen prisoners wearing in photos from Guantanamo. The men put hoods on the women and then
handcuff them for the walk to the interrogation site. The women are playing the role of visiting
members of a human rights group; the interrogators, gleefully hamming, pretend to be East
European paramilitary thugs bent on extracting the names of the visiting group's local contact.
The pretense is difficult to maintain under continuing duress. One woman, hooded and bound,
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breaks down and protests, "It's a fucking game, dude. I'm really fucking tired of doing this." But
her interrogator is having none of it. He berates her in his fake accent, "May be you must
understand that this is no game. But obviously you are too distraught to understand this. Pull
yourself together. You'11 find no compassion in me. You come across the border into my
country. I'm a patriot."
Despite the farcical element in the exchange, the extreme experience, however voluntary,
of being hooded and bound, must have revealed something new to the participants. When I
mentioned this to Fusco, when I interviewed her one evening in her Brooklyn home, she said, "I
learned how soldiers are trained, not how prisoners are treated. It is much easier to inflict pain on
a prisoner if you believe that you've experienced it yourself." The Team Delta members were
submitting their trainees to a form of torture because they believed that they'd thereby become
better interrogators. That is what their leader had meant when he had told Fusco and her
colleagues, "You won't be a good interrogator until you step into the shoes of the prisoner."
On the day I was meeting Fusco, the New York Times had printed a front-page story
about the release of secret CIA documents called the "Family Jewels." Fusco talked for a while
about the agency's role in wiretapping journalists and dissidents, and the acts that the US
government has undertaken in the past against legitimate, democratically-elected governments,
before returning to the origins of her film. When Fusco first read the reports coming from places
like Abu Ghraib and Bagram Air Base, she felt that the moral issue aside, this was also
disturbing and dramatic. It was "performance material." She had decided very early on that,
unlike much of the left response to the war, her own take on the scandal would be to focus on
what it meant to be an America. She said, "It is a mistake to overidentify with the victims of
torture. We are not the victims of torture. We are the perpetrators of torture."
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Wi11 you search me?
What?
I want you to search me.
What?

We were rushing across the platform towards the express, and got on just as the
door was closing. It was nearly empty but he remained standing, holding the
overhead bar.
Why do you want me to search you?
Because you said you would.

I can ' t search you; you're~ woman.
Oh, I didn't know that. I paused and looked down at my book, then back up at
him. Will you train me?
What?
I want you to train me.
Look, 1 have tow off here.
I repeated my request. He mumbled something, scribbled a number on the last
page of my book, and slipped out between the closing doors.

These are the opening words of a small book that, in addition to a video and a series of
photographs, resulte·d from an unusual artistic experiment code-named "Lincoln Ocean Victor
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Eddy." The artist is Jill Magid, who was born in 1973 and lives in Brooklyn. When Magid
returned home to New York City after living abroad in Amsterdam for five years she heard an
announcement on the subway intercom that she hadn't heard before. The announcement
informed subway users that the transit police could subject them to a random search. When
Magid asked an officer to search her, he refused. But she befriended him and they often met in
the underground station where the officer worked and, at other times, in his car or in a cheap
cafe. In imitation of the slim, black notebook in which the officers log their entries, the artist also
maintained a log as a record of the 117 hours and 23 minutes that she interacted with the
unnamed officer.

Adam Boy Charley David Eddy Frank
George Henry Ida John King Lincoln
Mary Nora Ocean Peter Queen Robert
Sam Thomas Union Victor William
X-ray Yellow Zebra

When I wake up and make coffee I think of him below me. I know that for me it
is a new day and for him it is the same. Three hours later he calls. I go down the
stairs, through the door, and tum the comer to his car. I open the passenger seat
and get in.
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For him I am time to be logged, a moment that comes or does not come, with a
beginning and an ending, that is gone when I leave this apartment. For me he is a
constant. He will follow this schedule for at least ten more years. He is my
stability and I am his vacillation.
The letters of the word "love" when translated into the code followed by the police read
"Lincoln Ocean Victor Eddy." Although Magid appears to be performing an idiosyncratic
anthropology of the subway·-her photographs are seldom studied compositions, and look more
like hurried_pictures snatched as evidence- her project is wholly attuned to language and its
startling possibilities. The artist deliberately interprets official or legal statements almost literally
and uses that ploy to mine an utterance for all its emotional, human, specific meaning. After
Magid's debut exhibition in New York City, one reviewer wrote that she seemed to be
"motivated by an urge to infiltrate and personalize, if not sexualize, the anonymous social and
technological systems that surround us." This reading is especially relevant to Lincoln Ocean
Victor Eddy. During an interview with me in downtown Manhattan one summer day, Magid
explained that the question she had asked herself was the following one: "If you put intimacy
into a system, what kind of intimacy do you get back?" The result is less a study of a system of
surveillance, and more of an obsessive tracking or observation of human vulnerability. Magid
told me that she had felt "totally lost" when she first heard the announcement about random
searches on the subway intercom. It is difficult to imagine that she could have felt any more
secure when she entered into what she calls "a real relationship" with the unnamed police officer.
But her response to the threatening announcement she had heard on the intercom strikes me as
being at once transgressive and touching. The seduction, the role-playing, the class differences,
not to mention the tension between the two protagonists dancing to a gendered tune- all seem
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familiar enough, but in the context of the "war on terror," when our identities and behaviors are
still being defined, the story that Magid tells us is appealing not only because it is familiar but
because it is new.

In the late 1960s, in New York City and later at UC, San Diego, where she was a student,
well-known artist Martha Ros]er produced a series of images that she had entitled "Bringing the
War Home." Designed as agit prop their goal was to mobilize support against the war in
Vietnam. Now, Rosler has done a near-identical series of collages that takes as its subject the war
in Iraq. "This war is a replay of the earlier one," Rosler told me, "So I decided to swallow my
pride and go back to a form I had abandoned thirty years ago." Outside the window of a
suburban American home, was a tropical landscape with charred corpses and tanks on the street;
a Vietnamese housewife appeared to occupy an advertisement for a vacuum cleaner, except that
visible on the other side of her clean drapes were armed American Gls standing in a bunker; two
white boys were playing in a brightly furnished room with thick shag
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carpeting, but the window drape was lifted to show an anti-war protester being arrested by two
policemen. In the new series, the protestor is missing, but the contrasts remain stark. Pfc.
Lynndie England, leash held in left hand, stands inside a sophisticated kitchen with pictures of
Abu Ghraib strewn about; an androgynous-looking model walks across a living room as if
strutting on a ramp at a fashion show while in the foreground are two bent-over figures , hands
bound behind them, hoods on their heads; a smiling young woman, her repeated figure forming a
busy arc of happiness, sprays a room-freshener in Saddam' s ruined palace.
Rosier is not the only one who has found contemporary use and relevance for her early
art. In a class at the California Institute of the Arts, during the spring semester of 2007, Nancy
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Buchanan and Sam Durant asked their students to produce art modeled on Rosler's 1983 video
"A Simple Case for Torture, or How to Sleep at Night." Rosler's film was a fiercely lucid
response to an opinion piece in Newsweek written by a philosophy professor Michael Levin
arguing for acceptance of torture if it could save lives. In his article, Levin had asked, "If you
caught the terrorist, could you sleep nights knowing that mi11ions died because you couldn't
bring yourself to apply the electrodes?" The video by Rosier is inspired by the Nietzschean
injunction to "distrust all in whom the impulse to punish is powerful." Rosier cites Levin's
hypothetical story about a terrorist group kidnapping a newborn baby from a hospital. Levin had
written that he had asked four mothers if they approved of torturing those kidnappers and all had
said yes. But such "what-if' scenarios are suspect because they so rarely conform to actual
reality, and the deeper error in Levin's thinking is repeatedly exposed by Rosier through a series
of brilliantly clarifying arguments delivered as a calm voice-over while the camera pans over a
scene of children playing with their parents in a public place:
But the state and individuals must never be confused with one another. The state
is not a person. It does not have an unconscious, a spouse, feelings, children, a
house, pride, a body, sex organs. The state feels no pleasure, no pain. It does not
experience ecstasy, love, depression, or hatred. It has neither rage nor passions.
The state is not biological but social and historical. The state is not a worried,
sleepless man. It is not a frantic mother. It is not a person or even a group of
persons. The state does not have a right to do this or that. It has no right to seek
revenge or retribution. The state has no personal rights. It has no personal
opm10ns.

16

Although they possess a deceptive simplicity, these are powerful intellectual arguments. No less
powerful is the way in which Rosier reframes the debate by pointing out in her film the dismal
record that the US has of supporting global human rights. Her criticism of vigilantism, death
squads, and kangaroo courts, in other parts of the world is linked-through rational argument,
but also through visual collage-to well-known history of US aid to violent regimes in Latin
America and elsewhere. The directness of Rosler's sentences, and their explanatory reach, give
to the film a quality of easy didacticism. This allows the film to present a strong voice in the
public sphere and also partly explains why it reverberates in today's political context.
The CalArts students produced short videos that shared some of the features one sees in
the best of Rosler' s work, a provocative combination of verbal and visual wit giving a sharp edge
to powerful political expression. Donna Golden's "A Good Night's Rest" mixes visual images
with voice fragments from radio and tv shows. The film-maker provides no editorial commentary
and lets her subjects voice their opinions while the images and descriptions of torture appear on
screen; the voices we hear belong to anyone from President Bush talking about the necessity of
torture to ordinary citizens cheerfully declaring on talk-show radio that what was happening in
Abu Ghraib was comparable to a weekend in Las Vegas, something they'd pay good money to
have done to them. "Drawing Lines" by Carlin Wing straightforwardly provides the different
meanings and usages of the word "line" present in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary.
A neutral voice-over reads through the variety of meanings while, on the screen, words and
images written on index-cards are pinned to a notice board. The structure is very simple but a
slow tension is built through the exploration of what those ordinary words mean in the context of
the current war in Iraq. The first few examples are innocent enough, suggesting simple
household uses of rope or wire. But then, we are given one meaning of line as "a telegraph, or
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telephone, wire or cable ... " and then "also, any wire or cable serving as a conductor of electric
current," and what we see on the screen is a red line-drawing of a man strapped to an electric
chair with a dark bag over his head. "A row of people or things" is accompanied by a sketch of a
U.S. soldier leading a row of handcuffed and hooded Arab men. Another meaning of "line" is "a
connected series of fieldworks, defenses, etc." and the visual on the screen is a long list of U.S.
bases all over the world. In yet another video, an untitled work by Jim McCardell, we are again
confronted by a gap between the visual and the verbal, forcing viewers to question not only what
they see but also what they_believe. McCardell processes and distorts the widely circulated
footage of U.S. soldiers using thermal imaging to shoot armed Iraqi insurgents hiding behind a
truck filled with bombs; while the footage plays and is interrupted by iridescent grid-like frames,
a female voice provides structural criticism of "geopolitical stabilization," quoting Immanuel
Wallerstein Jin.king privatization and the spread of a global economy through the creation of a
core-periphery divide. At the film's end, when the same footage is played with the original
audio, we hear the exchange of commands between the U.S. soldiers and the sound of gunfire
blasting away insurgents visible on the radar only as moving figures who have thrown their
weapons down. By now, even words like "go forward hit him" or "smoke him" and the
answering "ready to engage" and "roger" do not sound like ordinary words at all. We are
inclined to think of invisible determining forces. The visual on the screen is a like a moving dark
spiral or tunnel . We are inside the historical processes that place a man running in the night in a
field while an overwhelming power places him in the sights of a gun that he cannot even see.
And below are stills from a brief video "A Love Story" by Chie Yamamoshi. The film-maker
stands among those waiting at the busy Los Angeles airport, holding a sign, welcoming an
uncertain, if not impossible, future.
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Paul Shambroom is a Minneapolis-based photographer who was born in New Jersey in
1956. Shambroom caught the public eye for two projects, both filmed over long stretches of
time, documenting nuclear facilities and town council meetings all across America. His recent
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photographs, in what he calls the "Security Series," have been taken at training facilities financed
by the Department of Homeland Security. These images, described by one commentator as "John
Singer Sargent-meets-John Ashcroft portraits," show Hazmat suited figures in eerie landscapes
emptied of everything except a difficult-to-name dread.
When I came upon Sham broom's latest photographs, starting with an image titled
"SWAT team approaching house, 'Terror Town,' Playas, New Mexico," I noticed how the
viewer wasn't able to see a single face. That only enhanced the emptiness of the picture, despite
the brightness and the brilliant blue sky. And then, w~en I had seen the other images in the
series, a rare face or two visible only through gas masks, there was another recognition. Al]
individuality had been removed from the frame: what we were witnessing was a condition. We
were looking at a system in operation. Call it what you will, defense machine, surveillance
system, counterterrorism paradigm.
Jonathan Ra ban's novel, Surveillance, published in 2006, opens with the following
words: "After the explosion, the driver of the overturned school bus stood beside the wreckage,
his clothes in shreds." When the driver takes his hands away from his ears, he notices that they
are dripping in blood. Beyond the bus, there is fire and smoke. When a child emerges from the
blown-out window of the bus, the driver watches the rescue workers who come running over the
moonscape of smashed glass, "sexless toddlers in silver spacesuits." The kid is grinning, as if he
doesn't yet understand what has happened. The driver, we are told, is "trying to assign the name
of a painter to the scene, Goya, maybe." Then, he tips his head and jiggles his pinkie in his right
ear "to cJear the canal of stage blood."
To the grinning kid, he says, "How're you doing, kid? ... Better than school, huh?"
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The driver's name is Tad Zachary and, Raban writes, he is "one of the six professional
stars of the show titled TO POFF 27 by the Department of Homeland Security." Although most
victims are played by volunteers and homeless people, Tad and his fellow pros are paid well so
that their faces may be filmed in close-up and beamed by satellite to a bunker in Washington DC
where the exercise is being monitored.
Tad doesn't mind the work but hates working with amateurs. They always overdo it. He
is also irritated by the grinning kid, who is actually not an extra. Tad gives him a bit of advice
about method acting, "lf you 're getting paid, kiddo, if you think you 're an actor, you better, learn
to wipe that stupid grin off your face. This is a pro speaking. You 're a casualty. You 're probably
going to be dead of radiation sickness in a week. Think of your parents. Think of the funeral.
You ' re one unlucky kid .. ."
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If one looks carefully at Sham broom's pictures, it is difficult to be certain what Tad
would make of them. Each image is balanced in its composition and nearly neutral in tone; the
photographer gives no direct clue as to what he wants us to think. It's almost as if we have to
bring our own knowledge to bear on the subject. Do we know what these exercises funded by the
Homeland Security are or are not able to accomplish? In Raban's book, Tad reports that during·
the previous exercise, TOPOFF 26,
nearly every rescue worker had been contaminated, fatalities had vastly exceeded predictions,
chains of command had broken down, hospitals overwhelmed." During my first phone
conversation with~Shambroom, I learned that he too had recently read Surveillance. And his
reading was the same as Tad's. Shambroom noted that the government had put all this money in
combating terrorism, and the disaster that we got was Hurricane Katrina. He said, "It showed that
they don't have a ·c1ue." At the same time, however, he emphasizes that his photographs do not
convey a clear or fixed political opinion. Even the pictures that he had taken of nuclear weapons
and stockpile had been read in radically different ways, by folk in the military or by the pacifists
outside. Despite what he calls the "theme park" atmosphere at some of the "disaster towns" he
photographed in the latest series, Shambroom told me that he very consciously avoided
exploiting easy irony in the photographs. There is in those images something at once more
elaborate and elusive at play. Layers of artifice are present in the portraits of the rescue workers,
for instance because Shambroom has followed some of the conventions of grand portraiture of
the 18th and 19th centuries. We see the first-responders in their biohazard suits, adopting the
heroic poses of the figures in the paintings by Gainsborough and Reynolds--but with the
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historical context of those poses having already been hollowed out, what is communicated to us
retains an unsettling theatrical edge. This is not necessarily a mocking stance. It is possible to see
the rescue workers as wanting to be heroic in these photographs, and also maybe in life, and
perhaps that is what, despite the masked faces, the impenetrable uniforms, and the high-tech
paraphernalia of counterterrorism, finally makes them human.
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Having discussed scenes from Ra ban ' s novel with Sham broom, I thought it made sense
to invite Raban to respond to the images in "Security Series." This is what Raban wrote back to
me:

I hadn't seen Shambroom's photographs before, and found his site enthrallingespecially for the high ambiguity of interpretation that his pictures allow. On the
surface, they reflect the Department of Homeland Security view of things- a
world where bombs go off to devastating effect, and first responders are orderly,
in control, heroic.
I read the images from a counter point-of-view- from the assumption that
most terrorist attempts fizzle-, first responders screw up, governments panic. Odd
that I should be looking at Shambroom now, just a couple of days after the
publication of pictures from the failed bombings in London and Glasgow- the
dud car-bombs being loaded onto a transporter, the burning jeep, destined for
inside the passenger terminal, stopped by concrete bollards outside, the chief
victim a would-be martyr, now hanging on to life by a thread in the Glasgow
hospital where he worked as a doctor. ..
Of course Shambroom ' s Terror Town exists in the shadow of 9/11 - a rare
attack in which, with the exception of the crashed plane in PA, pretty much
everything went right for the terrorists .... Had they predicted the total collapse of
the twin towers? I doubt it. My suspicion is that they were as stunned by the scale
of the event as the rest of us, their grotesque success lay beyond their wildest
dreams.
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In Terror Town, the Honda and the Toyota are reduced to a few
unrecognizable fragments of scorched metal, while the superhero bomb disposal
guy with his robot stands at the ready- a lovely paradoxical image that neatly
deconstructs both images.
Living in London in the 1970s and '80s, I grew used to, and bored by, the
inconvenience of constant bomb-scares and (rarely) IRA bombs that actually went
off and killed a relatively small number of people. Terrorism was a nuisance, but
it was a part of the weather. The three thousand killed on 9/ 11 changed that, of
course, and invited us to imagine whole cities taken out by anthrax or a rogue
nuclear "device"- the Terror Town world documented by Shambroom. But I' m
stuck with my English skepticism: last week 's failed attack strikes me as more
representative of what we 're up against, and the attempt to paint radical lslamism
as the dangerous, world-altering-successor to Nazism and Stalinism seems wildly
overblown.
, l admire the cool responses of Gordon Brown and his new home secretary,
Jacqui Smith: they were proportionate in a way that neither the Bush
administration nor Tony Blair/John Reid have even been. Even had the bombs
gone off, I think Brown and Smith would have kept their heads.
In my book, which l see as a comedy of manners set in the shadow of the
War on Terror, nothing goes right: the DHS exercise gets out of hand,
surveillance catches the wrong people, "security" is a charade. The people at the
center of the story are infected with the virus of the times, but muddle along with
their lives, as people do.

25

The attacks of September 11 resulted in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, illegal detentions
and torture, extraordinary rendition, heightened security as well as new forms of surveillance,
black sites, and the scandal of a small iguana-infested Cuban is]and being turned into a prison
where the U.S. cou]d hold detainees, seeming]y forever, without trial. The surveillance state and
its agencies have given rise to new subjectivities, and images and texts that testify to this
emergence have been adopted by artists and curators as the most powerfu] new documents of our
times.
On December 4, 2006 the New York Times had a front-page report about a videotape
which showed Jose Padi1la, jai]ed in so]itary confinement for three and a half years, being taken
out of his cell in the army brig in Charleston, South Caro]ina. The report said, "That day, Mr.
Padi11a, a Brooklyn-born Muslim convert whom the Bush administration had accused of plotting
a dirty bomb attack and had detained without charges, got to go to the dentist." The videotape,
according to the Times, offered the first concrete g]impse inside the secretive military
incarceration of an American citizen whose detention without charges became a test case of
President Bush ' s powers in the fight against terror." Padilla's ]awyers had argued that as a resu1t
of torture at the hands of the mi]itary, including the extended so]itary confinement, their client
was so psychologica11y damaged that he cou]d not stand tria1. The rep9rt said, "Mr. Padilla's
lawyers say they have a difficult time persuading him that they are on his side."
Within weeks of that report in the Times, in a January 2007 article in Artforum, Graham
Bader mentioned the same video, writing about Padilla: "In the videotape documenting one short
episode of his military detention, he is shown on his way to a root canal down the hall from his
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cell, wearing blackout goggles and noise-blocking headphones, thereby prevented from
experiencing even briefly anything outside himself, outside his merest existence as bare life,
wholly at the whim of the state." Bader's argument is that the most intensely politicized
contemporary images are those that concern "the state's role in authoring the most basic
experiences oflife and death." As the Bush administration has blatantly gained control of
extravagant, far-reaching powers, including the right to illegal detention, it would follow that
image·s, like those of "the broken figure of Jose Padilla, shuffling to the dentist down the hall
from his cell," should enter critical-art discourse as new evidence to be examined and
understood.
Thus, a photo-exhibit attempts to represent the reality of Guantanamo not by showing the
conditions of the detainees in the prison (the camp rules prohibit photographs that would in any
way identify the individuals) but by assembling for .public viewing the photographs collected by
the pro bono lawyers working on behalf of the men imprisoned on the island.
Lawyers based in cities like Washington D.C. and New York, when engaged by the
families of the Guantanamo detainees, often sought photographs of their clients so that they
could be sure that the men they met on the island were the same ones that they had been hired to
help. There was another reason. Their clients were likely to be suspicious of them; after all, the
men had been lied to and abused in different ways during their interrogation. Therefore, during
the visits to the families in places like Yemen or Saudi Arabia, the lawyers took photographs of
the people who had hired them. They also photographed the pictures that the family members
shared with them, showing their clients during their former Jives, as sons, brothers, fathers.
Margot Herster, a photographer whose husband is on one of the lawyer teams working on
behalf of prisoners in Guantanamo, has collected more than two thousand such photographs. She
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has also put together an archive of reports based on the lawyers' narrativ·es about their
experiences while visiting the detainees ' families as well as their work in Guantanamo. Herster
and Carolyn Mara Borlenghi have also compiled audio-recordings of the status-review sessions
of several detainees ' cases; they obtained declassified audio recordings of Combatant Status
Review Tribunals (CSRTs) from Wilmer Hale, a law firm that had acquired them through a
Freedom of Information Act request. A selection of about a hundred photographs, along with the
audio and video materials, constitutes the current exhibit titled "Guantanamo: Pictures from
Home. Questions of Justice." It debuted at the Fotofest Gallery in Houston, was on a year-long
display at the Open Society in New York City, and then traveled to the Sesnon Gallery at U.C. ,
Santa Cruz. The video insta11ation plays on a wall-mounted 32"X37" flat panel television on a
continuous loop. The lawyers speak to the camera about their visits to the prison-camp, their
clients (one describes the suicide-attempt by his client during the lawyer's visit), and what the
experience has meant to them also as lawyers and as human beings. The audio-installation, also
on continuous loop, plays in an enclosed space with dim lighting. In one section of the tape, a
man who is identified as Muhammad speaks in Arabic and his words are translated into English.
He relates what he had earlier said to his American interrogator: "Did you say you ' ve captured
seventy percent of the members of al Qaeda? Good. That's excellent. Take my picture and my
information to them and ask them if I am al Qaeda or not al Qaeda. You will feel better and I will
feel better."
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Gift Abdu]aziz al-Swidi's attorneys purchased for his mother at his request;
trans]ation: "Don't despair, someone in the sky is taking care." Courtesy of
Collection of Through the Walls/Margot Herster ©2007.
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"Barriadas" and Suburbs: Modernity and Haussmannization in San Juan, Puerto Rico, 19361968"

Abstract:
Puerto Rico's transition from a largely agricultural and poor colony to a shining example of early
Third World modernization after World War II has been analyzed almost exclusively by
focusing on its industrialization-by-invitation program. In this paper, and the larger project from
which it stems, I argue that equa11y important was the process of suburbanization and the radical
transformation of the built environment, which has had a far more lasting impact than the laborintensive, footloose factories that briefly set up shop there in the 1950s and 1960s. The casestudy is that of San Juan, the island's capital and largest conurbation, representing today over half
of the island's popu~ation of 4 million people. I focus specifically on the work of the island's
Planning Board in the l 940s-1960s and its myriad of urban policies, especially "slum removal,"
public housing, and suburbanization that produced a particular form of uneven development and
fev~rish battles over the social production of space in the context of colonial modernization.

Bio:
Luis A. Figueroa is Associate Professor of History, and serves as the Coordinator of the Film
Studies Program at Trinity Co1lege. Figueroa's scholarly interests include slavery, postemancipation, and racial discourses and practices in the Caribbean; historical film (both fiction
and documentary); and the history of Latinos\Latinas in the USA. He is the author of the awardwinning book Sugar, Slavery and Freedom in Nineteenth-Century Puerto Rico (The University
of North Carolina Press, 2005). His new research project focuses on urbanism, suburbanization,
and colonialism in San Juan, Puerto Rico since 1930. He is also coproducing a documentary film
on Hartford in the 1960s as part of Trinity's Hartford Studies Project. Prior to joining Trinity
College Figueroa was an Assistant Professor in the Department of History and Associate
Director of the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Connecticut in Storrs
(1990-1996), as well as co-founder of its Institute for Puerto Rican and Latino Studies. He
earned his B.A. in General Studies (History and Philosophy) at the University of Puerto Rico-Rio
Piedras and his M.A. and Ph.D. in Latin American History at the University of WisconsinMadison.
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"Zone"

Abstract:
Some of the most radical changes to the globalizing world are written not in the language of law
and diplomacy but rather in the language of architecture and urbanism. Perhaps the most vivid
urban organs of architectural extrastatecraft, the technique of contemporary space-making most
hidden in plain sight, is the zone. A zone may be one of any number of variants including the
Foreign Trade Zone, Export Processing Zone, and Special Economic Zone among many others.
Each zone type provides its own cocktail of exemptions that might include tax exemptions,
foreign ownership of property, streamlined customs and deregulation oflabor or environmental
regulations. Heir to ancient pirate enclaves, the freeports of the Genoa, or the ports of Hanseatic
trade, the zone is the perfect legal habitat of the corporation. The earliest historical urges to
incorporate express a desire for freedom and exclusivity. If it is the corporation's legal duty to
banish any obstacle to profit, and the zone is the spatial adjunct of this externalizing- a
mechanism of political quarantine designed for corporate protection.

Bio:
Keller Easterling is an architect and writer from New York City. Her book, Enduring
Innocence: Global Architecture and its Political Masquerades (MJT, 2005) researches familiar
spatial products that have landed in difficult or hyperbolic political situations around the world.
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Zone
Keller Easterling
Some of the most radical changes to the globalizing
world are written not in the language of law and diplo. macy but rather in the language of architecture and
urbanism.
Indeed, the notion that there is a proper forthright
realm of political negotiation usually acts as the perfect
camouflage for this extrastatecraft that resides in the
unofficial currents of cultural and market persuasion.
Capricious, hilarious and illogical, here is the rich medi.:.
um of subterfuge, hoax and hyperbole that finally rules
the world. From this medium emerge both epidemics of
belief and prolonged stalemates. As global powers juggle
national and international sovereignties or allegiances
to citizens or shareholders, their behavior is, by necessity, discrepant. Theories of globalization that concoct
epic binary wars between these powers (e.g. national/
transnational or global/local) are nowhere near sneaky
enough. It is much more likely that the multiple realms
of influence are kept in play to lubricate the obfuscation
so important to the maintenance of power. The nation
state is not dying in the face of the increased power
of transnational forces. State and non-state forces decide together how to release, shelter and launder their
identity. Crucial then might be a working knowledge of
the logics of duplicity rather than the practices of righteousness. While architecture and urbanism are clearly
delineating some of these realms of extrastatecraft, the
profession often claims to be excluded from political
decision-making or claims to be "not at the table" when
policy is determined. Yet the good news is that the most
-influential policies are controlled by discrepant characters like butlers, "go-betweens," shills and confidence
men. And architects, as the classic facilitators of power,
have long been seated at that particular table.
Perhaps the most vivid urban organs of architectural
extrastatecraft, the technique of contemporary spacemaking most hidden in plain sight, is the zone.
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The Zone Is Ancient And New
A zone may be one of any number of variants including the Foreign Trade Zone, Export Processing Zone, Special Economic Zone,
Free Trade Zone or Free Economic Zone among many others. Each
zone type provides its own cocktail of exemptions that might include tax exemptions, foreign ownership of property, streamlined
customs and deregulation oflabor or environmental regulations.
Heir to ancient pirate enclaves, the freeports of the Genoa, or the
ports ofHanseatic trade, the zone is the perfect legal habitat of the
corporation. The earliest historical urges to incorporate express a
desire for freedom and exclusivity. If it is the corporation's legal duty
to banish any obstacle to profit, and the zone is the spatial adjunct of
this externalizing- a mechanism of political quarantine designed for
corporate protection.
In 1934, emulating freeport Jaws in Hamburg and elsewhere of
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the late 19th century, the United States established Foreign Trade
Zone status for port and warehousing areas related to trade. As the
zone merged with manufacturing, Export Processing Zones appeared
in the late 1950s and 6os. China's Special Economic Zones, allowing
for an even broader range of market activity, emerged in the 1970s.
Since then special zones of various types have grown exponentially,
from a few hundred in the 1980s to between three and four thousand
operating in 130 countries in 2006.l Moreover, special zones handle
over a third of the world's trade. Some zones accumulate a few hectares; some grow in conurbations that are hundreds of kilometers in
size. 2
The Zone Is Breeding
Breeding more promiscuously with other "parks" or enclave
formats, the zone now merges with tourist compounds, knowledge

"Export Processing Zones: Past
and Future Development," OECD
Trade Policy Working Paper No.
53, May 22, 2007 Michael Engman,
Osamu Onoder and Enrico Pinali.
http://www.oecd.org/.

2

Xiangming Chen, "The Evolution
of Free Economic zones and the
Recent Development·of Cross-National Growth Zones" International
Journal of rban and Regional Research, vol. 19, no. 4 (Cambridge:
Blackwell, 1995), 593-621.
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villages, IT campuses, museums and universities that may complement the corporate headquarters or offshore facility. . The zone has
become a new primordial civilization and a warm pool for the latest
cocktail of spatial products (e.g. offices, factories, warehouses, calling centers software production facilities etc.) that move around the
world More and more programs and spatial products thrive in legal
lacunae and political quarantine, enjoying the insulation and lubrication of zone exemptions. Indeed, the zone as corporate enclave is
· a primary aggregate unit of many new forms of the contemporary
global city, offering a "clean slate," "one-stop" entry into the economy
of a foreign country. Most banish the negotiations that are usually
associated with the contingencies of urbanism - negotiations such as
those concerning labor, human rights or environment- the zone is
now the new urban paradjgm.
Many of the new legal hybrids of zone, oscillating between visibil-
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ity and invisibility, identity and anonymity, have neither been mapped
nor analyzed for their disposition - their patency, exclusivity, aggression, resilience or violence.
The Zone Calls Itself A City
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The zone often calls itself a "city," where "city" is either a noun
describing an urban area or a modifier indicating a place where
something is to be found in abundance (e.g. A shopping center might
be called "shopping city"). HITEC City, Ebene Cybercity or King
Abdullah Economic City, among hundreds of others, take on the
title of "city" as an enthusiastic expression of the zone's evolution
beyond being merely a location for warehousing and transshipment. Many countries in South Asia, China and Africa used export
processing zones as a means of announcing their entry into a global
market as independent post-colonial contractors of outsourcing

and off-shoring. For example, with Ebene Cybercity, Mauritius has
moved beyond EPZ development to IT campus development with
help from the developers ofHITEC City in Hyderabad. Dubai has
rehearsed the "park" or zone with almost every imaginable program
beginning with Dubai Internet City in 2000 , the first IT campus
as free trade zone. Calling each new enclave "city," it has either
planned or built Dubai Health Care City, Dubai Maritime City,
Dubai SiJicon Oasis, Dubai Knowledge Village, Dubai Techno Park,
Dubai Media City, Dubai Outsourcing Zone, Dubai Humanitarian
City, Dubai Industrial City and Dubai Textile City.
The Zone Is A Double
Now major cities and national capitals are engineering their own
zone Doppelgangers - their own non-national territory within
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which to legitimize non-state transactions. World cities like Hong
Kong, Singapore and Dubai, which assume the ethos of free zone for
their entire territory, have become models for newly minted cities.
The world capital and national capital can shadow each other, alternately exhibiting a regional cultural ethos and a global ambition.
Duplicity is essential to the zone. Both state and non-state actors
use the other as proxy or camouflage to create the most advanta.:·
geous political or economic climate. Companies like CIDCO and
SKIL can now be hired, as they were in Navi Mumbai, to deliver infrastructural , legal environments like those in Shenzhen and Pudong
- city-states with not only commercial areas but a full complement
of programs. New Songdo City, an expansion of the lncheon free
trade territories near SeouJ, is a complete international city on the
Dubai or Singapore model designed by Kohn Pederson Fox. Here,
aspiring to the cosmopolitan urbanity of New York, Venice and
Sydney, the zone is fiJled with residential, cultural and educational
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programs in addition commercial programs. While the emotional
streaming videos for the smalJer "cities" of developing countries are
often accompanied by tinny fanfares and low production values, the
New Songdo City video messages are accompanied by new age tunes
or heroic strains in the John Williams style - the spectacular theme
music of the non-state capital. In Kazakhstan, in 1997, the old capital of Almaty was simply moved to the more strategic Astana, or
''.Astana-New City," a core Special Economic Zone in the city featuring all the heraldic accouterment of the new capital in the form of
projects designed by some of the most famous architects in the world.
The zone is beautiful, relaxed, smart and error-free; It has
special stupidity.
The organizational and political constitution of the zone is often
portrayed in terms of openness, relaxation and freedom The corpo-
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rate city is a cleaner and smarter and more beautiful version of urbanism. Even those corporate cities that remain largely devoted
to logistics, like Keppel Distripark in Singapore, win architectural
awards for their beauty. Cyberport in Hong Kong, developed by
Richard Li, heir to the STAR TV corporate dynasty, has developed
a city so beautiful that it appears to have jumped directly from the
computer screen.
The masquerade of openness effected by the lifting of any restrictive national loyalties or tariffs turns very easily to evasion, closure and
enclave. Zones cheat just as most maritime city-states have cheated
for centuries. Like the Mediterranean city-states of the thirteenth to
the eighteenth century, with their extended networks of aggression
and contraband, the port cities generate a constelJation of surrounding interdependencies that may take advantage of geographic proximity but may also develop in response to distant supply chain. Whatever

ancient patterns of trade and piracy reappear within the context of
deregulated shipping, the maritime city is no longer a cosmopolitan
marketplace but rather a society of hyper-control. It constantly oscillates between closure and reciprocity as an stretchy fortress of sorts
that orchestrates controlled and advantageous cheating.
The orgmen who tend the self-referential organizations of the
corporate city are proud of the fluid, robust, information-rich environments they have created. Their automated warehouses and information Landschafts slowly and obsessively sort and stack enormous
amounts of information. Yet only information that is compatible to a
common platform qualifies for inclusion. Indeed, an enormous intelligence is deployed to reset or eliminate any errant or extrinsic information. While remaining intact, the hermetic organization develops
shrewd auxiliary tactics and strategies to fortify its stupidity

s Types in 70 Countries

1983 591 Free Economic Zones of Various Types in 82 Countries
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and defend against contradiction. Regimes of power at once diversify
their sources and contacts while consolidating and closing ranks,
extending and tightening their territory. They grow while deleting information. This information paradox- wherein an enormous amount
of information is required to remain information poor- might be
termed special stupidity. It is a common tool of power.
The Zone Launders Identities
Countries just entering the marketplace may use the new zone
economy, while also rejecting its incompatibility with state rhetoric
or banishing it as a contradiction to the state's purity. The DPRK
introduced zones like Rajin Sonbong and Kaesong to act as cash
cows for the state but also remain separate and vilified as a capitalist
economy. Kim Dal Hyon (a NK economic reformer) is reported to
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have said, "Let's consider the Najin-Sonbong area as a pigsty. Build a
fence around it, put in karaoke, and capitalists will invest. We need
only to col1ect earnings from the pigs.3" Meanwhile vast zone conurbations col1ect in the Tumen River Region between the DPRK
and Russia. The Stalinist Dynasty ofDPRK understood the way the
capitalist economy works so well that they even characterized their
Mount Kumgang resort near the DMZ as a "special tourist zone."
China's SEZs are the world's model of this phenomenon. Their early
. experiment with four SEZs to quarantine the capitalist market has
exploded to produce scores of different zones of various types all
across the country. Cross-national growth zones in the South China
Sea move products between zones in different jurisdictions to take
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1995 900 Free Economic Zones of Various Types Around the World

FOREIGN TRADE·ZONE/PLANNED COMMUNITY.

Alliance, Texas, 1989

advantage of different quotas and levels of regulation. In Eastern
Europe the zone allows other European corporations to take advantage ofless expensive labor from entering EU countries. Similarly;
Alliance Texas, north of Ft. Worth, a classic corporate city as office
park and distripark, renames and redistributes many of the products produced in Mexico under NAFTA agreements so that they
can be calibrated to the desired profitability in a US context.
The Zone Is On Vacation
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The corporate city considers itself heir to the same privilege and
liquidity that petrodollars enjoy. Able to materialize and dematerial-

iJ
Muh

ize with the caprice of offshore holdjngs, the new corporate enclaves
also need to get away and relax. Operating in a frictionless realm
of exemption and merging with other urban formats, the zone also
naturaUy merges with the resort and theme park, even assuming an
ethereal aura of fantasy. Indeed if corporations are often only vessels for liberated money, they can easily be mruntained outside of the
work-week environment. While corporate headquarters in national
capitals and financial capitals portray a glamorous business-like atmosphere, the office park in developing countries has tried to project
the image of, not the hotel or club of colonial or Hilton style luxuries,
but of a kingdom with unencumbered wealth. IT campuses in India
and Malaysia like Multimedia Supercorridor sometimes refer

,,
r CAMPUS/RESORT
tllnecla Super Contdor, 19N

to themselves as IT resorts offering lush vegetation and a mixture of
small scale vernacular buildings and mirror-tiled office buildings.
Even more extreme are those corporate cities that directly
merge the corporate city with the offshore island shelter. Jeju, for
instance, is a quintessential island retreat that has housed, as have
many islands, all of those programs or iJJicit activities that do not fit
into the logics of the continent. Transforming itself from penal colony and strategic military position to a "free economic city." Citing
Dubai, Singapore and Hong Kong as models, the island "guarantees
the maximum convenience for the free flow of people, goods and
capital and for tax free business activities. 4" A place of ecological
purity, casinos, golfer's amnesty and mythomaniaca] tradition, this

IT CAMPUS/FREE
Dubai Internet City, 2000

4

http://www.jeju.go.kr/
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corporate retreat also hosts global sporting events and djplomatic
summits. On the island of Kish off the coast oflran, Kish Free Zone
similarly attracts business to the island of Kish notorious for its
relaxed reljgious standards. Here, there is not only a loosening of
headscarves and a greater opportunity for socializing between men
and women, but the standard set of exemptions to which the corporation has grown accustomed. Nearby fantasy hotels like the Dariush
Grand Hotel recreate the grandeur of Persian palaces with peristyle
. halls, gjgantic cast stone sphinxes and ornate bas reliefs depicting
ancient scenes. Function spatial recipes of commerce and business

IT CAMPUS/FREE ZONE

Ddtal lntemet City, 2000

Dene Cylten:lty, 2001

are not only vessels of organizational parameters, but also a medium
of the many puffy fairy tales of belief that accompany power.
The Zone ls A Parliament OfExtrastatecraft
Both corporations and their infrastructures often serve paramilitary functions. Yet, it is not always nations and wars, but often massively capitalized corporate conglomerates, that create international infrastructures without any military association. Foreign direct
investment is funneled not only through national treasuries but also

through corporate conglomerates. From the US rail conglomerates
that employed more people than the US military during the 19th century to the consortia that today operate satellite networks and submarine cable, private corporations function in an elite parastate capacity.
The zone is the parliament for the de facto global governance of
this corporate headquartering. Enjoying quasi-diplomatic immunities, corporations may provide to nations the support and expertise
for transportation and communication infrastructure or relationships with IMF and the World Bank.Networks of construction companies and infrastructure specialists like Bouyges, Bin Laden,

RESORT/FREE ZONE

Kish F,ee Zone, 2001, JeJu, 2002

Mitsubishi, Kawasaki or Siemens deliver technologies for high speed
rail, automated transit and skyscraper engineering. Conglomerates
such as PSA, P&O, Hutchison Port Holdings or ECT, serve as modern counterparts of British or Dutch East India company franchises,
delivering transshipment and warehousing technologies. Technology
parks around the world grow their own satellite and cable networks
with their own headquarters or embassies at the interstices of the
network, whole families of corporations stick together in the same
legal habitat recreated anywhere in the world and separated by a
plane trip or a satellite bounce. Real estate operators like Emaar
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provide the spatial environments and amenities that corporate
"families" recognize as a suitable location for their new corporate
embassy.
The oil powers of the gulf, having re-emerged most powerfully
after an historical era celebrating national sovereignty as an ultimate, more easily conflate ancient kingdoms and contemporary
corporate empire with perfunctory recognition of national power.
This power must be continually with media messages and architec-
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tural imagery. The largest conglomerates appear hat-in-hand in the
media wanting the world to get to know them and support their
work as they develop alternative energies and more resilient crops
that might alleviate poverty. They ask for loyalty - a loyalty beyond
brand recognition and closer to a form of patriotism for non-national sovereignty. Architects provide cosmopolitan identities, selective
historical traditions, signature skyscrapersKingAbduJJah Economic
City, a production of the UAE's Emaar developers on the Red Sea near
Jeddah, creates yet another corporate city as world city that now offers

cultural, educational, business and residential programs merged with a
resort. Fly-th roughs with swernng traditional music render the city as
a shimmering golden man-made island filled with skyscrapers together
with traditional Islamic palace buildings. The mixture of corporate and
ancient imagery has, in turn, become a monument to the state and its
"wise leadership."
The zone city often uses business instruments for self-governance
in lieu of the tools of a citizenry. For instance, in Dubai, a hotline is

BUSINESS/RESORT/FREE ZONE/UNIVERSITY/CITY

Kine Abdullah Economic City, the Pearl, Qatar, Alfflotlran Development, Kh811-

used to identify labor problems and other issues. Occasionally the new
corporate city also borrows the tools of participatory democracies.
Gazprom City asked the world to vote on its architectural monument
from among a group of alternatives designed by famous architects.
The Zone Prefers Non-State Violence
. The prefers to benefit from an indirect association with war.
Direct association is bad for business. The gulf widens between the
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extremes of the Dubai development model and the slums of Lagos
or Kinshasa. Yet the corporate city also has a formation within which
poverty can be strictly maintained without the chaos of informal
economies. The offshore sweatshops in Saipan or the maquiladoras
on the thickened border between the United States and Mexico
organize a form oflabor exploitation that is stable and within the law.
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The corporate city not only provides a double to the national and financial capital, it has its own double in these offshore enclaves. More
discrete and less visible, these backstage formations are not given
the "city" designation. They may be violent, but it is the violence of
Bartelby- intractably passive and oblivious to consequ-ences. In
Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, development expertise from Abu
Dhabi and Dubai is helpingAJsunut Development Company Ltd. in

building Almogran , which includes 1660 acres of skyscrapers and
residential properties. The new corporate city only underlines the
extreme discrepancies between oil weahh and the exploitation of
oil resources in the mostly non-Arab southern Sudan. Indeed, the
overt, even hyperbolic, expressions of oil money are among the
chief tools for instigating war and violence in the south.

gy Zones (HIDZ), 34 EPZ's, 15 FTZ's and 15 Border Economic Cooperatives (BEC) in China

~APITAL

The zone aspires to lawlessness, but in the legal tradition of exception, it is a mongrel form that adopts looser and more cunning
behaviors than those associated with an emergency of state. Commercial interests do not identify a single situation within which
exception is appropriate. They move between zones concocting
cocktails oflegal advantage and amnesty.Just as corporate interests
play a number of zone types for advantage they also operate be-
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tween state and non-state jurisdictions, seeking out relaxed, extrajurisdictional spaces (SEZs, FTZs, EPZs etc.) while also massaging
legislation in the various states they occupy (NAFTA).
The Zone Is An Intentional Community
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2007 Over 230 Foreign Trade Zones in the US

After many cycles of zone breeding around the world, recessive
or unlikely traits begin to appear. The zone as instrument oflabor or
environmental abuse, can, by way of its political quarantine, be filled
with entirely different intentions. Dubai Humanitarian City, as an .
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outpost of relief agencies and NGOs makes a tenant out of the chief
critics of zone politics and abuses.5 Also, since the legal climate for
each of these enclaves is designed to advantage, free speech, for instance, is permitted in Dubai Media City where the major networks
are headquartered. Universities are perhaps the newest corporations
to join in the zone habitat. Qatar Education City uses the campus/
park/zone model to provide a headquarters for the franchise of major
universities around the world. Corporate sponsorship makes of the
university a kind of incubator of intelligence and manpower for the
corporation as well as the region. KingAbduJJah Economic City will
follow suit with an education sector. Saadiyat Island, a new development in Abu Dhabi will introduc~ not onJy a Guggenheim franchise
and a branch of the Louvre, but an outpost of the Sorbonne.
Moreover, it is often the very attempt to maintain massive optimized reaJms of exemption that lands the corporate city in the crosshairs of conflict. Shenzhen has become the unlikely cauldron of real
estate survival maneuvers that borrow activist techniques associated
with participatory democracy.6 The ports and export processing
zones of the South China Sea have become the targets of international immigration and security issues that place them in the center
of the political concerns they had hoped to banish.

5

http://www.dubaiinternetcity
com; http://www.arabsat.com/
Default/About/OurHistory.aspx;
http://www.dubaiholding.com/english/index.htm1

6

The New York limes, Dece mber
18 and 19, 2006, Ax.

The Zone Tutors Impure Ethical Struggles
There may be more international law to address camps like
Guantanamo than there is to address most of the zone spaces in the
world. The zone is an independent medium of transnational polity and multiplied sovereignty. Duplicity is the prevailing logic and
organizational disposition of this space. The logics of righteousness
and the insistence on orthodox political sentiment evaporate in these
environments. Most urgent for architecture is not the consolidation
of a singular position but rather the acquisition of an expanded, agile
repertoire. While these unusual levers or toggles may not have the
pedigree of political orthodoxy, they may be part of an indirect political ricochet that is instrumentaJ in a cessation of violence, a shift in
sentiment or a turn in economic fortunes.
Some backstage knowledge of the bagatelle in exchange, the players in the game and the cards being dealt returns more information
about the dirty tools and techniques of extrastatecraft. The zone is a
discrepant territory within which to rehearse impure ethical struggles and a new species of spatio-political activism wherein curiosity
and ingenuity nourish a position wherein one is too smart to be right.
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Abstract:
The Special Economic Zones (SEZs) characterized the essence of China earlier domestic
economic reform and global integration. The SEZs constitute a sharp lens for understanding
China's economic and urban transformations over the last three decades for two important
reasons. First, the SEZs demonstrate why and how rapid economic growth and radical market
experiment could have taken place under a partially open environment during early socialist
transition as exemplified by contractual employment. Second, the SEZs left a variety of imprints
on the similar growth of other cities and special zones during later socialist transition such as
land lease. In this paper we reassess the conditions contributing to the staged development of the
SEZs, especially Shenzhen with a main focus on the extent ·to which the SEZs have been a model
and how they have offered lessons for local development and city building in China. We
conclude that as the SEZs' value as innovative first-movers diminished, they continue to provide
analytical clarity on China's overall transformation over the last 30 years.
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First-Movers, Models, and Then What?
China's Special Economic Zones and Shenzhen in 30 Years

Introduction
The Special Economic Zones (hereafter SEZs), especially Shenzhen on the border with
Hong Kong served as the.first-movers of China' s post-Mao economic development, market
reform, and international opening that began around 1980. Later the SEZs, and again Shenzhen
in particular, became a sort of model for continued urban reform an~ city building for other cities
in China. But as we approach the thirtieth anniversary of the SEZs, which have been so closely
linked with the drastic transformation of China, we face the two-fold question of: I) what have
the SEZs really been? and 2) how have they changed and with what implications and lessons
either for their own prospect and for China as a whole? This paper attempts to make some sense
of the short but prominent and eventful history of the SEZs by examining their changing roles
and impacts in the local, national, and global contexts. We will do so by primarily tracing the
trajectory of Shenzhen- the first and most prominent and illustrative of the SEZs- over the past
30 years.
The SEZs, especially Shenzhen make a rich and changing intellectual puzzle that calls for
an ongoing probe into its layered meanings and functions within their local geographic confines
and the far-flung global contexts. Touted as "the city built over night" or what Ouroussoff (2008)
labeled "instant city," Shenzhen exploded from a small agricultural and fishing outpost of about
I 00,000 people in the late 1970s to a booming industrial metropolitan region of almost I 0
million people today, the bulk of which are manufacturing and service workers from nearby
towns in Guangdong province and remote villages in interior China. Shenzhen ' s economic

growth has been averaging 28% annually since 1980, which has no equal in the world. In spite
of its small rural origin, Shenzhen today ranks first in GDP per capita and among the top three in
total industrial output and exports (certainly in per capita tenns) among all Chinese cities, which
places Shenzhen side by side with the much larger, older, and more industrialized Shanghai.
While this process and phenomenon are a striking and inviting story worthy of a deep
investigation, Shenzhen 's functional influence and symbolic meaning spread far beyond its
internal boundary with the rest of China and its external border with Hong Kong. As the first
SEZ, Shenzhen was the very first locale of China to be cordoned off to experiment with
economic reform and market activities as a sort of "testing ground" for capitalist practices. This
began as China was beginning to move away from centralized planning and isolationist policy.
It was both a bold step and a cautious strategy. Bold in the sense 'Of being a historically
unprecedented move to introduce market practice and foreign investment into China. Ironically,
caution rested with the Chinese state ' s ability to control the experiment in a confined
environment such that its negative impact would be restricted if failed . This coupling of boldness
and caution would make it possible to replicate success and reduce risks at the very outset of
China ' s refonn and opening when major success was yet to come and both the risk and stake of
failure were quite high.
!
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The 30-year anniversary of the SEZs coming up in 2009 furnishes a timely occasion to
look back at the process by which Shenzhen came into existence, evolved through development
stages, and generated significant consequences and lessons. This paper will provide a critical
gauge on the developmental path and experience of Shenzhen with the primary focus on its
shifting roles in relation to the broader dynamics of China' s economic refonn, urban
transformation, and global integration. The analysis will first focus on the distinctive advantages
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of Shenzhen as a first-mover that boosted its rapid economic and urban expansion. Then we wi11
examine the ways in which Shenzhen became a national model for a variety of institutional
refonns and city-building practices whether they seemed to be justified or workable. Finally, we
wi11 assess the "what next" for Shenzhen after it has evolved and matured to be less "special"
than its early existence. Each of the three roles may or may not correspond to a distinctive stage
of Shenzhen ' s development, but the conditions that have brought about the transition from one to
the next and the cumulative outcomes will lead to a retrospective revelation of what the SEZs are
all about. More importantly, we intend the analysis to establish that the SEZs have evolve_d
beyond isolated enclaves and become an enduring feature of China's refonn and opening for the
last three decades.

An Audacious and Accelerated Start
In 1978, China was perhaps poised to enter a new era after coming out of the "dark or
lost decade" of the Cultural Revolution that lasted from 1966-1976. Indeed, the post-Mao
leadership headed by the pragmatic-minded Deng Xiaoping who had returned to power from
being persecuted during the Cultural Revolution launched the drive of "four modernizations" in
agriculture industry, technology and defense. As a concrete move of this broad ambitious
development strategy that would launch China in a new direction, the Chinese government in
1979 passed the Joint Venture Law, which allowed overseas enterprises to establish equity joint
ventures with Chinese companies. This was a very bold early move as it would directly expose
the long shielded state-owned enterprises to the financial and managerial influences from foreign
investors. While this would immediately unleash major change from the organizational level, it
would surely elevate and multiply to an aggregate effect on larger institutional arrangements and
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geographic scales. This effect has certainly turned out to reach its maximum as evidenced by
how China has been transformed by becoming and sustaining as the most popular destination
among developing countries for foreign direct investment (FDI).
In retrospect, what was more significant than the Joint Venture Law of 1979 was the
promulgation of "The Regulation on Special Economic Zones" in 1980. A Special Economic
Zone was defined as "an area where enterprises are treated more preferentia11y than in other
areas in relation to such matters as the tax rate and the scope of operations in order to attract
foreign capita] and advanced technology for modernization." The SEZs would develop we11
prepared public utilities and a receptive investment climate. They offered preferential treatment
to foreign firms such as use of land, low rent, and tax holidays. More importantly, the SEZs
were designed to function as major exporters of manufactured goods to the global market~ The
concept and intended practices of SEZs were not entirely new back then since they were similar
to the Export Processing Zones (EPZs) that Taiwan and South Korea and other countries had
used since the 1960s to drive their export-oriented industrialization (Chen, 1994, 1995; Sit,
1988). Creating the SEZs, however, was quite audacious for China given its entrenched socialist
economy and political ideology around 1980.
The SEZs were set up to introduce some brand new economic activities that were alien to
the socialist planned economy. By offering lower taxes at 15% as opposed to 33% outside their
boundaries, the SEZs would quickly become the haven for Chinese-foreign joint ventures (JVs).
In a JV, both the Chinese and foreign companies would contribute different shares of equities as
either majority or minority partners, or even as 50-50% equals. Typically, the foreign partner' s
equity share would comprise monetary capital, technology, management expertise, and some
imported material, while the Chinese partner would provide labor, land, factory premise,

physical infrastructure (e.g., roads, utilities), and some material as its equity contribution. In
addition, the SEZs attracted the first wave of other forms of foreign investment such as
compensatory trade in which productive facilities and technology are granted on credit and
redeemed with provisions of products and services. However, it was the N s that brought in the
largest influx of foreign capital into the SEZs located in Guangdong and Fujian provinces. In
1980, the foreign currency holdings in the two provinces had risen by more than six times over
1979. By March 1981 , total foreign investment in Shenzhen amounted to US$400 million
(Nishitateno, 1983, p. 176), far exceeding any other single locality in China. From 1983 to 1985,
FDI in Shenzhen rose about 75 percent annually. By then, " more than 52 percent of the total
number of equity joint venture projects in China were located in the SEZs, accounting for 34.6
percent of the total pledged foreign investment in such projects, with the Shenzhen SEZ having
the lion's share (State Statistical Bureau, 1985).
Besides being the very first to open to FDI with financial incentives, Shenzhen 's firstmover advantages got a big early lift from bordering Hong Kong. In fact, adjacency to Hong
Kong was a deliberate location consideration to make Shenzhen a SEZ so it could capture that
first inflow of foreign capital or more precisely overseas Chinese capital from the other side of
the border. This co-location would allow local-cost production in Shenzhen due to its cheaper
land and labor, low-cost and convenient shipping of raw materials and products, easy supervision
of the production process, easy coordination with the headquarters in Hong Kong, and the export
of finished goods to international markets through Hong Kong. From 1986-1993, Hong Kong
contributed 66% of overa11 FDI in Shenzhen and 64.2% of cumulative foreign investment
(Liang, 1999, p. 119). An added location advantage lies in the close cultural and linguistic
(Cantonese speaking) ties between the two cities. While geography reinforced Shenzhen 's first-
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mover advantages, it didn't sustain them later as Shenzhen' s SEZ status became less special
while other cities and open areas away from the Shenzhen-Hong Kong border began to catch up
with the stimulus ofFDI from beyond Hong Kong. Shenzhen's slip as a first-mover occurred in
1984 when the central government opened 14 other coastal cities with economic development
zones, which in turn began to c~mpete against Shenzhen and with one another for FDI and fast
growth.
If the true first-mover advantages of a SEZ like Shenzhen lasted only a few years, the
open policy heralded by them appeared to be consolidated in 1985 when Deng Xiaoping told
China, "The open policy will not be changed; if changed, it wi11 only become more open.
1

Without the open policy, there is no hope for the four modemizations." The expansion of the
open policy targeting the coastal belt in tum strengthened the SEZs' continued importance in
China's future development. They were designed to allow China to pursue an incremental and
gradual opening to and participation in the global economy while maintaining a distinctly
Chinese approach to keeping the political system largely intact. The SEZs permitted China to
induce, digest, and then adapt western technology through the controlled channels without
exposing its entire inefficient economy to fierce competition with the much more efficient
multinational corporations. This calculated design set China's SEZs, exemplified by Shenzhen,
onto a distinctive trajectory of evolution.
The year 1992 was a landmark in Shenzhen ' s evolution. That year, Deng Xiaoping--the
architect of China's reforms and opening--revisited Shenzhen where he made short but emphatic
remarks to confirm the importance and permanence of the zones, and also sent a powerful
message to the rest of China that economic reform and open policy would definitely continue.
Following his visit, FDI rose from US$715 million in 1992 to US$1.4 billion in 1993 and by
1

Ta Kung Po (publi shed in Hong Kong) , August 4, 1985.
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1994 was at US$2.2 billion. The data for 2006 showed that FDI increased to US$52.6 billion, of
which US$32. 7 billion was utilized. Deng's visit to Shenzhen in 1992 provided the boost that
has sustained its rapid growth in both GDP and FDI over the next 15 years (see Figures 1 and 2).
Figures 1 and 2 about here

From the First-Mover to a National Model
The rise of Shenzhen (almost from nowhere) was not unexpected given its head start over
the rest of China by almost a decade. Its first-mover advantage was magnified even more by
being the sole city that not only borders Hong Kong but also enjoyed exclusive policy privileges
not granted to any other city for a number of years. Once Shenzhen got ahead with this unique
combination of first-mover advantages, the rest is history, so to speak. However, the historical
significance of Shenzhen would have been much more circumscribed if it only emerged as
"miracle city" through the powerful boost of first-mover advantages. In fact, Shenzhen was
endowed with a historical mission of being a "laboratory" for China's reform and development.
As some of the practices that were initially introduced and tested in Shenzhen and later
implemented elsewhere, Shenzhen's role as a model become more clear and consequential than
its first-mover advantages that would gradually disappear.
To illustrate Shenzhen 's role as a model for China, we identify a number of policy
transfers that originated in Shenzhen and spread to the rest of China drawing from He ( 1991 ).
First of all, Shenzhen broke new ground in utilizing foreign investment and bank loans for
constructing infrastructure projects. It adopted tendering where project design, construction, and
furnishing would all be subject to competitive bids as a way of reducing risks and improving the
efficiency of capital construction. This practice contributed to the "Shenzhen Speed" of growth
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in ways other than being the "historical first." Secondly, Shenzhen blazed the trail in introducing
contractual employment through the first set of Chinese-foreign joint ventures, leading to early
reforms of traditional lifetime employment, egalitarian wages, and insurance that were prevalent
in state-owned enterprises. Thirdly, Shenzhen started the first foreign exchange swap center in
China, allowing some degree of openness, competition, standardization, and fluctuation based on
market principles that stimulated the development of the export-oriented economy locally and
beyond. Fourthly; Shenzhen is where the first stock market of China was established ( and
Shanghai set up the second stock exchange later), signaling that stocks were not confined to the
capitalist economy and could be used to boost productivity. Finally, Shenzhen took the very first
initiative in using auctions to transfer the use or leasing right to state-owned land.
As a specific example, in April 1982 a Shenzhen-foreign joint venture--Zhuyuan Hotel-introduced "job specific and floating wage rates." Furthermore, the manner in which workers
were hired changed. Workers were beholden by contractual agreements that a11owed for recourse
to be taken by employers if it was broken and for workers to be fired based upon performance.
These policies represent ways in which an employment meritocracy has been introduced a la
capitalism style via the SEZs and their natural receptiveness to new ideas. A number of policy
experiments that originated in Shenzhen have become the norm for greater China, as in the case
of selecting construction firms for jobs. Shenzhen began the practice of making construction
firms compete with each other for securing a contract. This led the firms to compete with each
other to be the most attractive in factors of affordability and quality. Since 1982, all construction
projects in Shenzhen are required to adopt the open tender system and a set of provisional
regulations was promulgated in May 1983 .2

2

Nanfang Ribao (published in Guangzhou), June 5, 1983.

While these market mechanisms have since been adopted and made routine in much of
urban China, they were bold experiments in the early 1980s when China's very early reforms
were restricted to the rural areas through the household responsibility system based on efficiency
and flexibility in land use, production, and market exchange. The more successful experiments in
Shenzhen such as tendering in infrastructure construction, labor contract, and loosened control of
non-staple food prices were quickly adopted in the 1980s. This process could be seen as a spatial
extension of "better (not best) practices" from Shenzhen to the rest of China. Some of these
practices revealed the effective mechanisms that turned out to be a key to subsequent urban
development in other Chinese cities. For example, the transfer ofland use right through auctions
was crucial to the rapid built-up of the Pudong New Area of Shanghai in the early 1990s. As
large infrastructure projects like highways could be built through a bidding process, it became
replicable and was replicated in other Chinese cities, creating a powerful push behind the rapid
physical transformation of these cities. Contractual employment, which was tested in Shenzhen,
spread quickly and broadly to other cities and became an enduring element of China's new labor
market. ln a way, by attracting the very wave of long-distance migration from northern cities
like Beijing, Shenzhen set the tone and highlighted the path of large-scale internal migration that
turned into tidal waves of an estimated 200 million job-seekers now roaming the cities,
especially those booming coastal centers.
In looking at Shenzhen as a model , we see both the ease at which some of the early
experiments could be and were "exported" and the difficulty of replication on a larger
geographic scale or in more entrenched urban places. This duality of the Shenzhen's replicability
stems from the very nature of how Shenzhen was set up to be a model. Getting the early start
· allowed Shenzhen to reap easy growth benefits that would be more difficult to come by as other
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areas began to catch up and emulate. The spatial confinement of the experiments increased the
chance of success by minimizing the spillover of risks. Being a new city, i.e., without the deep
planning foundation and strong state control, reduced the potential conflict between market
reform and institutional backlash from rooted socialism. These special conditions aside, which
made Shenzhen special in the first place, they converged temporally to create first-mover
advantages for Shenzhen itself and its appeal as a replicable model.

If we look back at the interaction between the first-mover advantages of Shenzhen and its
modeling impact over th~ past 30 years, we have detected sequencing and an evolution. Firstmover advantages by definition came first and created favorable conditions for Shenzhen to take
off. In addition, they created a favorable environment with the cumulated resources from the
rapid growth for the market experiments, which in tum reinforced and sustained Shenzhen' s
rapid development. As some of Shenzhen's first-mover advantages became eroded due to the
withdrawal of special policies and their extension to other cities, Shenzhen continued to provide
a dear record on the balance between the success vs. failure of its experiments. Over time,
Shenzhen as a model for ]earning also became Jess useful as other cities began to adapt
Shenzhen's experience to local conditions and to figure out alternative approaches. This process
implies the inherent limits to cross-local transfer of new ideas and practices. When Shenzhen is
no longer special because other cities are becoming more like it, its appeal as a model has
diminished. While we need more evidence to substantiate this argument, our basic contention
remains that China has modeled Shenzhen to the extent that the country's reforms and opening
have followed the logic and trajectory of this SEZ.

1

That Shenzhen has lost some of its early star status also has a lot to do with the
proliferation of many other types of development zones in China. These zones carry different

administrative grades depending on their supervising institutions, ranging from "national"
development zones to "provincial" and "municipal" ones. And some cities even divide their
development zones into several categories. If this phenomenon is seen as a learned outcome of
having Shenzhen at the outset, it has become almost too much as the zones have been developed
based on same formulae of tax benefits and at the expense of gobbling up too much agricultural
land. As a result, the central government has organized several campaigns to check development
zone·s and the unqualified ones or those with poor performances were cancelled. From July 2003
to December 2006, the number of development zones were reduced from 6,866 to 1,568 and
their total area were cut from 38,600 square kilometers to 9,949 square kilometers. 3
All these development zones offer favorable polices to attract investors and businesses of
different types. And these zones are under the management of their own administrative
commissions, which are relatively independent. The unique governance method of development
zones produces a parallel system with the local authorities. In one city, rules and regulations in
taxation, industry, environment and other fields were different in and out of the development
zones and an institutional barrier is formed. The management commissions of development
zones, independent of the local government hierarchy, should focus on running the economic
affairs within the development zones. But as the zones are enlarged, sometime covering several
towns the commissions take on many jobs beyond the economic sphere like maintaining public
security and maintaining the hygienic conditions. It not only hurts the efficiency of the managers
of development zones in luring investment and serving investors, but also burdens them with the
4

jobs they were not supposed to do. Although Shenzhen avoided this kind of problems by
having enlarged the zone to be largely aligned with the municipal boundary earlier, the rapid and
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China Daily (China 's on)y English dai)y) on)ine at Chinadai)y.com.cn, Ju)y I I , 2008.
Ibid.
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widespread of the generic SEZ model has generated governance challenges in places that are less
developed than Shenzhen.

What Next for Shenzhen? Facing Predictable and New Challenges

No longer being a model for other cities and zones is the lesser problem for Shenzhen.
Instead Shenzhen may have become a "victim" of its tremendous earlier development success.
With rising land and housing prices in the zone, enterprises and factories have begun to move out
to cheaper nearby locations outside the zone, which repeats the early cross-border relocation of
factories from Hong Kong in Shenzhen. The central government's efforts to curb house-price
gains in the country's leading cities have failed to prevent increases of more than 40 per cent in
Shenzhen in 2007 alone. The average price of homes in downtown areas rose to more than
22,000 yuan (US$2,840) per

square meter, fast catching up with Hong Kong's New

Territories next door. This in tum is helping to drive up the cost of non-residential land. Among
businesses looking to cut costs by moving out is Huawei, China's largest telecommunications
company. It is building a production facility on a 500,000 square meter technology park site in
neighboring Dongguan city, 70 kilometers from Shenzhen. Huawei, which has 4,000 employees
in Shenzhen alone, was investing 4 billion yuan in the project, scheduled to be finished by the
end of 2007. Even tax breaks are failing to hold some businesses in Shenzhen. Taiwaneseinvested Guangdong Nai Li Shoes moved its factory to Dongguan. "We had tax privileges for
five years," said the owner Mr. Li. "Then we realized that Shenzhen was getting so expensive, so
we have moved our 30,000 square meter factory with 4,000 workers to Dongguan." 5
However, the Shenzhen government plays down the severity of the emerging exodus,
citing only a loss of. I% of economic activity, based on official figures. One could see this loss
5

Asia Times online at www.atimes.com, November 20. 2007.
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as a plus in that there is more land available for more high tech and service sector industries to
set up in Shenzhen. In fact, the Shenzhen government recently signed a regional cooperation
agreement with Guangdong's neighboring provinces of Hunan and Jiangxi and with Chongqing
municipality in the center of the country, to assist manufacturing enterprises to move out of the
Shenzhen SEZ. In return, the Shenzhen government would receive unspecified fees, while the
conditions of the removal aid also depend on "guanxi" or connections. Even some
businesspeople agreed that there was little Shenzhen could or should do to retain companies, and
encouraged the government to focus on the advantage of having a large concentration of talented
professionals and high-tech operations. 6
The city has set itself a higher goal: to become a high-value-added business center. This
is actually a matter of economic survival, since rising land and labor costs are forcing many lowvalue-added businesses to move to cheaper inland cities. To achieve the high-value goal, the SEZ
has encouraged the formation of research and development centers by both international and
Chinese companies; and hundreds indeed have been, or are being established. Just as Shenzhen
was once a model for other Chinese cities, Hong Kong has long been a good model for Shenzhen
to emulate. But today, the winds of fortune have turned; Hong Kong is finding that it has a lot to
learn from the city on its northern border. Hong Kong no longer finds growth easy, with high
salaries and land prices, and only the service and real estate sectors expanding. But Shenzhen has
several growth engines: a fast-expanding manufacturing sector, high technology, and now (albeit
at the beginning stage) research and development. Its room for further development is huge,
especia11y in view of its dynamic, aspiring, and youthful workforce. It is no surprise that the city
is catching up with Hong Kong (Gu, 2005).

6
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Shenzhen has certainly narrowed the income gap with Hong Kong with a large and
growing middle class. Using the criterion set by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences for the
middle class with a household income ofUS$7,246, Shenzhen boasts about five million
members of this middle class. While many of them are early or more recent migrants who have
made it, there is considerable poverty in the city, which includes a lot of those who do not have
proper household registration. In fact, Shenzhen has granted permanent resident status to only
1.75 million people out of IO million residents (Gu, 2005). Middle class Shenzhenites who view
the current political system as corrupt have been challenging election law. O~dinary citizens are
running for political office in attempts to change the system. Jiang Shen, who works in the
advertising sector, chose to run for political office. He used his cell phone to find supporters for
his candidacy antl distributed campaign cards to neighbors. He was met with opposition from
state officials who were disposed against him because of a lawsuit he had brought against a city
official (French, 2006). This type of communication is indicative of increasing enfranchisement
among those in the Shenzhen middle class. While not successful, Shen represents people
seeking political participation to redress their grievances. Shenzhen has come a long way
politica11y from a fishing village back in the late 1970s.
Shenzhen has been confronting the growing cha1lenge of accommodating and
incorporating a massive migrant population that is continuing to expand. The percentage of
temporary migrants in Shenzhen' s population rose from less than I percent in 1979 to 72 percent
in 1994 and in 2002, and then to 77 percent in 2006, when the absolute number of these migrants
reached 6.5 mi11ion (Shenzhen Statistical Bureau, 2007). These migrants are not sufficiently
enfranchised to assert fair labor demands due to their status such as housing or child care from
employers; they are primarily young, single, without children and thus have considerable
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freedom to be mobile respective to employment, and due to educational and cultural factors are a
typically manageable work force that is willing to put in long hours for low pay. The temporary
quality of these migrants in the long run depends, among other things, upon whether policymakers afford them the rights of those with proper registration. The Shenzhen public schools do
not provide education for the children of migrants. The city, however, provide basic health
coverage through a program that combines US$.50 monthly premiums from workers and 1%
contributions of monthly salary from employers. A change in Shenzhen' s policies to further
separate government from business cou~d free up more resources to bettering social conditions
for the migrants. In addition, if the resources devoted to the bureaucratic oversight of businesses
could be reduced, they would enhance social services and help alleviate local poverty (Gu,
2005).

Building the new Shenzhen by twinning with Hong Kong
In meeting the new challenges of rising cost and industrial upgrading, Shenzhen has
(re )turned to an old neighbor- Hong Kong with a new development blueprint for the period to
2020. This is the first time the booming city has taken economic integration with Hong Kong
into consideration in its long-term development plan. The draft blueprint, drawn up in late
November 2007 and sent to the State Council, China's cabinet, for approval, says Shenzhen and
Hong Kong should tum themselves into a twin-city financial, trade and shipping hub. One of the
priorities set in the blueprint is to build a common capital market, with Shenzhen financial
institutions going international through Hong Kong while more financial institutions in the
former British territory could set up branches in Shenzhen as their springboard to expand
business in the mainland. The two stock exchanges could cooperate more closely to attract dual-
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listing of enterprises home and overseas. The Shenzhen blueprint focuses on six major areas .

.

1mprovmg

co-operation on financial systems, building a Shen(zhen)-(Hong) Kong

Innovation Rim, improving cross-border transportation, and enhancing co-operation with Hong
Kong in the high-technology and high-end service industries. To build the Shen-Kong
metropolis, the Shenzhen gove~ment reiterated in its newly released draft regulation on
developing the financial industry that it was willing to become "the backyard" of Hong Kong as
the region's international financial hub. The draft regulation was aimed at boosting Shenzhen' s
financial sector into "a strategic pi11ar industry" of the city after high-technology (Chung, 2007).
As rosy a picture as the blueprint depicts, there are heavy barriers to be overcome before
the plan can be actually executed. For example, the Chinese currency is still not fully
convertible, which greatly restricts capital flbw between Shenzhen and Hong Kong. Legal
systems in the two places are also radically different, so to build a common capital market some
common legal basis must be established. Regarding the proposed merger of the Hong Kong and
Shenzhen stock exchanges, some commentators have quickly pointed out that the Hong Kong
stock exchange is a listed company, whereas the stock exchange of Shenzhen is owned by the
Chinese government. Besides, there are many technical issues to deal with, for example the
listing, settlement and regulatory regimes of the two exchanges are different; investors inside and
outside the mainland are also not allowed to trade in each other's markets (Chung, 2007).
Despite these barriers associated with the incompatibilities between Hong Kong as a
Special Administrative Region (SAR) and the Shenzhen SEZ as a sub-provincial municipality,
the call and forces for closer cooperation and integration between the two have been in place for
some time. Back in 2003, the Comprehensive Development Institute (CDI), a think tank
connected to the State Council, advised the central government to elevate Shenzhen to provincial
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status so Shenzhen could create significant economic linkages with Hong Kong from a more
compatible and powerful position. The CDI pointed to the fact that the combined GDP of Hong
Kong and Shenzhen amounts to HK$1.7 trillion (about US$207 billion), some 17 percent of
China' s GDP. Besides the coupled strength, the CDI saw the SEZ-SAR alliance as an effective
solution to the major problems of Hong Kong's economy such as high unemployment, high land
and property prices and high labor costs. A "SEZ-SAR twin-metropolis" would encompass
3,000 square kilometers, doubling Hong Kong's space; it would not only lower land and labor
costs and create more employment opportunity but would enhan~e the SAR's economic
competitiveness. The CDI also called for trade and investment to be liberalized which would
compliment unrestricted flows of labor, logistics, and information between Shenzhen and Hong
Kong (Ng, 2003).
Although the proposed cross-border twinning has not been fully realized and Shenzhen
has not achieved provincial ranking that would place it directly under the central government,
Shenzhen has been moving forward with plans to strengthen economic and physical connections
with Hong Kong. For example, Shenzhen is planning to create more global linkages through
closer ties with Hong Kong's port. As part of this ambitious project for port upgrading and
renovations, Shenzhen ' s Wenjindu Port wiil be able to handle the flows of 30,000 vehicles and
30,000 passengers a day as compared to the present 1,100 vehicles and 9,000 passengers. The
enhanced port capacities of Shenzhen, coupled with being one of China ' s primary export
platforms, has begun to erode the long dominant position of Hong Kong Port, causing it to lose a
growing volume of container cargo to Shenzhen ' s ports. This relative decline can also be
attributed to the massive expansion of Shanghai Port, which is projected to become the world's
second largest container port by 20 IO surpassing Hong Kong and behind only Singapore. All
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said, the symbiotic relationship between Shenzhen and Hong Kong dating back to the creation of
the SEZ and border opening in the early 1980s, which has since benefited both in significant
ways, is becoming both more cooperative and competitive.

Conclusion
The SEZs, primarily Shenzhen were first movers of economic reform and open policy
during the earlier stage of China's transition to a hybrid system that blends socialism and market
capitalism. While China has become progressively more open to globalization since the reforms
began in the around 1980, it was the Shenzhen SEZ that set the tone and stage for that graduate
and cumulative process to unfold and evolve over the next three decades. The SEZs were
conceived while China was predominately closed off to the world; they were economic
laboratories that had the main attention of policy makers. Shenzhen became the "experimental
ground" for FDI, joint ventures, land tendering, contractual employment, and the blurring of
urban and rural through migration and more. The extent to which these experiments were
successful provided a powerful stimulus to the zones to take off and to yield some subsequent
lessons for spreading and deepening market reform in China. When the successful experiments
became transplantable and replicable in other areas, they began to lose their special status and
render the SEZs less special over time. In an apt metaphor or not, we see Shenzhen as the first
domino that is special for the moment when it triggers the row's fall and then falls down itself.
Soon after it is no longer unique, but it retains importance for making a11 the other dominos fall.
Beyond its first-mover status and modeling role, Shenzhen has grown into a large
industrial city confronting new challenges that threaten its continued prosperity. In a sense,
Shenzhen became too successful too fast. As a still relatively new city built on labor-intensive

18

manufacturing, Shenzhen also lacks a deeper and diverse economic base that might cushion the
undesirable effects of industrial restructuring. Fortunately, it continues to have neighboring
Hong Kong to tum to for new and helpful connections, and it can now do so with relative
strength given Hong Kong ' s own economic challenges. As Shenzhen enters a new phase of its
dynamic development, we have turned back the clock by reassessing its thirty-year history that
crystallizes the fundamental elements and process of China's distinctive model of market reform,
city-building, and global integration. This short history tells us as much about the interesting
results of a bold experiment with capitalism in a confined local context as the recent past of .
China ' s overall development and where she may be headed in the near future.
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Figure 1
Shenzhen's GDP per Capita (in US Dollars), 1979-2006
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Source : Graphed from data published by Shenzhen Stati stical Bureau.

Figure 2
Amount of Foreign Capital Actually Used (in million US Dollars),
Shenzhen,1979-2006
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"What Buildings Do for a City (Middletown) in a State (CT) in a Country (USA)"

Abstract:
This paper takes a cue from sociologists who study technology in its suggestion that the
materiality of a city matters in crucial ways for the social patterns that city contains. A city's
buildings do more than serve as simple background for the social lives of its inhabitants. Instead,
the city 's buildings, because they are relatively permanent although often altered, do things for,
with, and to the people who work and live in them. In this case, I use building examples from
Middletown, Connecticut to suggest how urban buildings co-construct the industrial, Nutmegger,
and American identities of Middletown business and domestic residents.
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Coordinator at Trinity College, where she continues to work today. In '" that capacity, she is
Trinity ' s Official Representative to the Inter-Consortium for Political and Social Research
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Rachael Barlow
What Buildings Do for a City in a State in a Country
In the early morning of August 31, 2006, families living in the north end of Main Street in
Middletown, Connecticut, awoke to sirens. A fire was gutting O'Rourke's Diner, which had
operated in the city for sixty years. In recent decades, O'Rourke's had become known for the
unusual food that won it accolades from Gourmet Ma9azine and The New York Times. The diner was
also kn·own for the beneficence of its owner and head chef, Brian O'RourL.
Brian had taken over the restaurant from his uncle, who had brought the original Mountain
View to Middletown in the mid 1940s (Griffin 2006). He often opened the diner to those who
occupied the city's dilapidated north end, offering them free food, coffee, and the chance to sit
beside some of the diner's more famous patrons: Joe Lieberman and Clint Eastwood. Under
Brian's direction and for a broad cross-section of Middletown societv,
0' Rourke's had become
J
what Ray Oldenburg would call a "third place" (Oldenburg ] 999), what Bruno Latour might
describe as an "obligatory passage point" (Latour 1987, ] 32), or what Michel Foucault perhaps
would dub a "heterotopia of compensation" (Foucault 1998).
As a native of the region, I had frequently eaten at O'Rourke's with my parents. I did not
become a regular, however, until I returned to Connecticut halfway through my graduate career.
My parents and I soon established a pattern. We met at the diner every Wednesday morning for
breakfast alongside some others: the father who always came in with his young daughter, the two
crossing guards from the nearby Catholic school. In the months following the fire, some of these
Wednesday regulars continued to meet. First we met outside the diner with our own carafes of
coffee and baked goods from home. Later we met in a nearby bakery one town away and finally at
1 - Rachael Barlow

a restaurant down the street. Th people who composed this transient group had rarely spoken
befor . Only wh n w fac d displacement did we befriend one another. In Slim's Table, Mitch
Dun i r (1994) docum nts the sam post-place behavior in the men who frequented Valois'
cafeteria. When the owners dos d the cafeteria for brief renovations, Valois regulars who had
eldom shar d a word before th n conn cted in xile at a nearby Wendy's. As Duneier observes:
For th fir t tim th re was substantial contact between some of the white cliques and the
larger coll ctivity of black men, with whom they did not normally associate. It was evident
that many patrons derived a particular satisfaction from the reduction of social.distance.
Rath r than att mpting to r main among their own groups, in their "places," they s ized the
opportunity to g t to know memb rs of th larger collectivity a little better (89).
Whil we, lik them n of Slim' table, acquainted ourselves with the larger coll ctivity, Brian
wre tl d with how to r build a din r that wa uninsured. The diner's absence was a rallying point,
for many in th community. Community lead rs held charity ev nts. Ev n unsolicited donations
poured in.
With the assi tanc of a local archit ct who had offered his servic s for free, Brian
d veloped plan to creat a diner untrue to the original. Brian wanted to xpand the diner so he
could have two kitch n , one to handle th daily rush and one where he could teach cooking
cla s s. In a priYate conv r ation, Brian laugh d with me as he described how his ideas for the new
din r conflict d with those of offic rs from one of the national organization committed to
c l brating American din rs. For Brian, what made the diner "the diner" was the people, not the
phy ical stru ture, and o wheth r he remain d tru to its original design was irrelevant. I
und r tood hi point, and I bought it: .. sort of. But I still felt that if the din r had not been
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important in some material way, those who loved O'Rourke's would not have spent so many days
crying over its death.
Perhaps I should begin by placing the diner in Middletown, s larger history. Middletownan area once of a much wider territorial berth than it is today- was first home to Mattabassett
Indians, then colonial merchants, maritimers, gun manufacturers, and even the nineteenth-century
Middletown Mansfields, a briefly existing major-league baseball team that was the early stomping
ground of Hall-of-Farner Jim O'Rourke. These days, Middletown is home to cohorts of colleg
students associated with a university known to rival Trinity. The city sports a new $ 10 million
police station and an ever expanding Middlesex Hospital. A certain part of Middletown, its Main
Street, parallels the Connecticut River and Route 9, both of which lead to Old Saybrook and Long
Island Sound. In the past fifteen years, Middletown's Main Street has undergone a dramatic
conomic revival. Today it appears to be thriving; a new restaurant or business seems to open
eYery day. But fifteen years prior, many Main Street storefronts were Yacant, reflective of a city
crime rate that had been on the rise since the mid 1980s (U.S. Department of Justice 2008).
I grew up near Middletown. My own memories of Main Street, and I suspect the memories
of many other locals, are tainted by what happened at the annual Sidewalk Sale in 1989, when a
mental patient from nearby Connecticut Valley Hospital v,1alked off the hospital's campus and
stabbed a Wallingford resident, nine -year old Jessica Short. The incident rocked the community
(1990; Hamilton 1989; Hays 1989; Ravo 1990). Although violent crimes such as this were rare in
Middletown and property crime and larceny theft rates were high not only in Middletown but in
cities throughout Connecticut, that the stabbing happened on Middletown's Main Street in front of
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Woolworth's (the symbol of American Main Street life) and at the Sidewalk Sale (the symbol of

Middletown's Main Stre t Life) left an ind lible economic mark on many who lived and worked in
the city and an motional mark th hundreds who witnessed the event.
In ] 990, less than a year after th fatal stabbing, The New York Times observed that in
Middl town, "Hom l s p opl now outnumber shoppers on some parts of Main Str et." It quoted
Joseph Lombardo, a local barb rshop own r, who noted that "Middletown used to be the
greatest ... You could l av with your door unlocked, and nobody would bother you. And Main
Str

twas fill d with p ople. Now som times you could roll a tire down the sidewalk and it

wouldn't hit anyon "(Ravo ] 990, 81, 85). Lombardo's hyperbole refl cts what J rememb r: a
half-joking agr

m ent I shared with a fri nd that we would nonchalantly lean our elbows on the

lock mechanism of what v r car w happened to be riding in when we passed through
Middletown's north nd. In this way, w ,, ould protect ourselves from what our eventh-grade
minds p rceiv d to b a dang rous plac without actually offending those who might walk by. But
Lombardo' s

n

v n b fore th

of cau ality is not without fault; certainly businesses were lea Ying Main Street
tabbing. But the stabbing fu led ev n more to leave or at least the local narrative

int rpreted thi to b the case. But on business notably remained: 0 'Rourke's Diner. And
perhaps that explains th community outcry when a fir in 2006 caused the diner to, at least
mom ntarily, disapp ar.
Upon its udd n absence, a place, what Tom Gi ryn (2000) describes as "a unique spot in
th univ r e," inspir s nostalgia (pg 464). Nostalgia ha , as sociologist Fred Davis notes, a
"distinctly cons rvativ bent," since it inYolv s indi, iduals orientating themselves towards the past,
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to "small paradises lost" (Davis 1979, 29 - 34). For many, O'Rourke's, because of its uniquenes~,
was one such paradise. It was one of the few businesses that stood the test of Middletown'
particular time, one once sullied by urban blight associated with a violent event that nagged at th
community's psyche. Gieryn points out that "place is the distinction between here and there, and it
is what allows people to appreciate near and far" (Gieryn 2000, 464). Similarly, I would argue that
a place, when it disappears, reveals the distinction between then and now. O'Rourke' shad carried
Middletown residents through the worst of times (the "then") and into much better ones (the
"now") . Residents in the midst of better times were reminded of when things had been worse and
what the diner had done to make those worse times bearabL.
Davis argues that "nostalgia thrives on transition, on the subjective discontinuities that
engender our yearning for continuity" (49). In other words, nostalgia has to do with the movement
from past to future and the sense that the latter is an uncomfortable break from the former.
M elinda Milligan is a sociologist who completed her dissertation at UC Davis, where she studied
the identity consequences for the employees of a small, grungy coffee shop that moved to a new
building. Milligan describes nostalgia, when associated with physical places, as "place attachment"
(Milligan 1998; Milligan 2003a) and argues that such attachment is not something to be taken
lightly, either theoretically or practically. She argues that, "When a space changes, the organization
and interactions within it change. These are not minimal changes, but instead influence employee
experience in dramatic ways. Specifically, the experience for employees who were attached to the
old site is one ofloss and displacement, a form of organizational death" (Milligan 2003b, 125).
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What interests Milligan is how employees inside a particular organization (a coffee shop)
r acted when the organization moved to an w building. She obserws that the move interrupted a
certain "spatial continuity of xperience" (Milligan 1998, 9). Employees who participated in the
move felt that the int ractions inspired by the old and new coffe shop were incompatible and
complain d bitt rly about what had been lost (their identities) in the move. Their former physical
reality was one they mis ed; they quated having traded up to a cleaner, newer place with having
trad d down th ir id ntiti

. Th hippy, alt mative identities these employees had cultivated in

th ir old workplac did not translate well to the new. Milligan observes that "in the perception of
[th ] old employ es, th Coff e House end d at the time of the mm e" (Milligan 1998, 12).
But in th cas of O'Rourke's, the patial continuity of experience took a different form.
To b gin with, it wa mor abrupt: O'Rourke's didn't mov after months of delib ration and
preparation. It dos d down ov might, to v ryon 's urprise, and remained closed for a year and
a half as Middl tm n r

id nts slowly raised the money tor novate its charred innards. But more

importantly, O'Rourk ' story appears l s squarely focused on those, ho worked therealthough they were indeed important- and mar on its patrons. For th s patrons, what they had
lost was a pla

that had b

n a small oasis during a time of urban decay. The) certainly did not

miss th d cay of, hich O'Rourk 's reminded them. But they perhaps did miss the contrast of
O'Rourk ' again t th city of which it was a part. In bad times, it was a spot of safety. In good
times, it was pot of grunge, lacking the sophisticat d ambience associated with th city's newer
re taurant and for~ hich only thos "in the know" understood its charm.
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What I want to do in the remainder of this talk is give a more complicated account of plac
attachment to O'Rourke's by explicating how the fire and the reaction to it fits within the context
of an urban landscape. I've alluded to this in connecting the diner fire to Middletown's larger
economic and social history. Sharon Zukin (2002) suggests that, while the word landscape "calls
attention to the viewpoint of the artist, sociologist, or observer," it also "obscures as much as it
reveals" ( 346). And I would agree. When we think of an urban landscape, in this case, of a New
England Main Street and a small diner sitting at its north end, there is much that we miss.
Philosopher of science Langdon Winner calls our tendency to miss the bigger something,
when applied to technological artifacts, as "technological somnambulism." For Winner, once a
t~chnological artifact enters popular use, the people who use it forget how the assumptions and
conflicts that once permeated the design process for that artifact caused it to look and operate on
way rather than another. The artifact just works. Users assume the particular aspects of its design
were always inevitable. As an example, Winner points to the many parkways that from the 1920
to 1 970s led New York City residents out to the beaches on Long Island Sound. These parkways
were the brainchild of Robert Moses, the infamous urban planner recently profiled in an edited
volume by Hilary Ballon and Kenneth Jackson (Ballon and Jackson 2007) that is intended as a
corrective to Robert Caro's more critical take in The Power Broker (Caro 1975).
According to Winner, in the 1920s Moses was not particularly concerned that the roads h
was designing would pass under many low -lying bridges and that these bridges prohibited one of
the prime means of public transportation (buses) from passing underneath. Those most likely to
rely on public transportation (the working class) thus lacked the opportunity to have the same
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week nd beach trips njoyed by the upper class, trips those parkways made possible. But those
who traveled thes parkways throughout the mid -century did not remember them as mat rial
stabilizers of class conflict. They were just parkways, part of a naturalized urban landscap , and
they just happen d not to allow buses and th social classes that used those buses to pass through
(Winner 1986, 5; Winner 1995).
W b com I ss somnambulant about c rtain technological artifacts when they break.
Br akages provid us with the opportunity to discursively or materially "reconfigur "the artifact
(Gi r)'n 2002, 44 - 45). And I argue that thi is what happen with O'Rourke's when it caught fire.
One brok n, or in thi ca

, burned, O'Rourke's l ft Middletown residents with a material and

interpr tativ ho] n eding filling. Middletown residents did their own work to fi]] it and on their
labor I re t my own .

I hav long h ]d a su picion ... that th built nvironment not only shap s what people do,
but do s o by shaping people's cognitive capaciti s. I rely on Andy Clark, whom one might call a
cognitive philosoph r, to cultivate this suspicion. In his 1997 book entitl d Being There : Putting
Brain, Body, and World Together Again, Clark argues that p ople use their material surroundings to aid

their thinking. For xample, h explain , if you want tor memb r to buy wine for an upcoming
party you ar hosting, you might place an empty win bottle on your _front stoop so that you would
notic it then xt tim you run rrands (Clark 1997, 75). Or you might arrange the spices in your
kitch n by typ of pice, thus making it easi r to find exactly what spic s you need th next time
you cook ( Clark 1 997, 46).
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In .these cases, you create a material ensemble (a wine bottle strategically placed on a stoop
or a group of spice containers arranged in a particular order) to make your cognitive tasks
(remembering to purchase wine, locating a particular spice) easier. Clark refers to such material
ensembles as co9nitive scciffoldin9 and argues that we use such scaffolding to "solve problems by
'piggybacking' on reliable environmental properties" (Clark 1997, 45). In other words, we offload
mental tasks on the physical environment that surrounds us, and this offloading frees us to do other
things. What is striking for Clark is the circularity of such scaffolding. "We use intelligence," he
argues, "to structure our environment so that we can succeed with less intelligence" (Clark 1997,
181).
The above cases seem ~minor, but that is because I have described them as the projects of
solo individuals. But what if many individuals were involved in the construction and exploitation of
cognitive scaffolding? As an example, Clark describes how some termites build the arches that
serve as one of the basic features of their nests. Each individual termite, Clark explains, rolls
together mud balls and places these balls at random, while leaving behind in each mud ball a
chemical trace. But termites are attracted to places where such chemical traces are strongest; as the
hours pass, termites continue to place their mud balls, but now in places to which they are most
attracted. Consequently, later termites place their new mud balls where past termites previously
placed their own. Mud balls on top of mud balls: the arches are effectively built.
In the termite nests, we see a place that emerges without blueprints. To build these arches
requires coordination, although as Clark puts it, "no termite acts as a construction leader" (Clark
1997, 7 5). Instead, the termites coordinate themselves through the use of the material around
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them: their mud balls. As the termites come and go, the arches emerge, independent of any
particular termite "dir cting traffic," but dependent on the coordination of termites and the
material th y carry and place. In the termites and their mud balls, we see stigmer9y: the use of
"external structures to control, prompt, and coordinate individual actions" (Clark 1997, 186). The
con truction of termit arches r fl cts a coll ctive succ ss, built across tim , agents, and things.
Th termites succeed in building th ir nests by using "reliable environmental properties" to advance
an nd avor through time. This allows them to do more for longer with fewer cognitive costs.

It is us fol to think of O'Rourke' s Diner as simply a piece of one of the arches of the
termit nest of Middletown. Yes, th diner its If, when it was originally built, had some sort of
blueprint, and certainly when it was rebuilt it had one, too. But as part of the larger urban
land cap of Middl town, the din r was just a pi ce of an arch. Other buildings in Middletown
were simply pieces of other arch s that in isolation mean less to both the analyst and the urban
resid nt than if we consid r th m as part of some urban whole, incrementally and unevenly
con truct d through a complex coordination of people, institutions, and things.
Some of thes buildings are tied to traumatic events, like the Woolworth's by which Jessica
Short was stabb d, now ironically a ·store thats lls what its name declares, Irreplaceable Artifacts.
The e v nt d fy pr diction, b come embedded in the materiality at which they happened, and in
tum supply a community narrativ about what Middletown, was, is and what it might become. To
us Clark' t rms, th built environment of Middletown's Main Street is a kind of cognitiv
caffolding. P ople r ly on that built environment to carry some of the cognitive load they would
otherwise hav to bear inside th ir brains. O'Rourk 's, as a building sitting in r lation to _other
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buildings on Main Street, assumes the cognitive work of remembering. And for a while, when
people could not go inside and drink their coffee and eat with their friends inside diner, they had to
remember what they wished to forget.
Like many cities, Middletown has long been subject to centralized urban planning
initiatives. It received its first zoning ordinance in 1927 and its first planning commission in 1930.
The commission wrote its first general document on Middletown's urban development in 1955
(Higgins 1975) and foJlowed it a decade later with a more comprehensive plan that suggested that
without careful forethought, the city would become "nothing more than a hodge-podge of hot dog
stands and neon lights" (Higgins 1965). But the real material coordination in this city, in many
other cities across Connecticut and many other cities acrqss the country and the world takes plac
in a way never captured in the planning document that reflect more about official hopes than official
happenings. And that is what I have tried to reveal here.
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"Insecure and Secure Cities: Towards a Reclassification of World Cities in a Global Era"

Abstract:
Contrary to previous city typologies, which were based on national economic prosperity and
degrees of industrialization, this paper argues that a crucial distinguishing feature of certain
global cities is the degree to which insecurity dominates the everyday lifeworld of the city. With
evidence drawn from Latin America, the paper suggests that even though globalization produces
common patterns of economic ~nvestment and physical change in the built environment of major
cities in rich and poor countries alike, including those that pursued different paths of
industrialization, it also generates significant differences within and between cities that can serve
to distinguish them from each other. In particular, in certain world cities globalization produces
conflict over land use, urban development, economic livelihood, and global commodity trade
that enmesh cities and their citizens in a world of insecurity and violence. The root cause of these
problems are spatial, political, and economic developments of the past that led to the persistence
of informality and limited industrial employment. In an era of globalization cities that carry
forward these historical legacies face accelerated social and spatial changes produced by new
investments in upper-end real estate, the acceleration of social and income inequality, the
popularity of "gating," and recent technological innovations in surveillance and private security
that fragment the urban landscape. These processes create intra-urban social tensions and spatial
dichotomies all contributing to a declining security situation even in those global cities whose
built environmental form suggests a more universal global city status.
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Insecure and Secure Cities:
Towards a Reclassification of
World Cities in a Global Era

•

Contrary to previous city typologies, which were understood in terms of national economic
prosperity and degrees of industrialization, a crucial distinguishing feature of globalizing
cities is the degree to which large informal sectors flourish and accelerate public insecurity.

•

Changes in the built form of Mexico City illuminate the "competing globalizations" that
increasingly operate in today's cities.

• The root cause of growing insecurity is social, spatial, and economic developments of the
past and how they locate themselves in the present era of globalization.

INTRODUCTION
As anyone who has recently traveled to China, India, Brazil, or Mexico knows, the largest cities of the developing world are no longer what they used to be. Far
from the picture ofresource-poor, dilapidated, and under-built backwaters of poverty that has long dominated
the perception of the global south, cities like Shanghai,
Mumbai, Sao Paolo, and Mexico City now host gleaming skyscrapers and applications of some of the newest
urban and infrastructural technologies. Conversely,
many of the prosperous cities of the developed worldfor example, New York and London-now exhibit
accelerating social and economic polarization, giving

do they pose for international urban development plan-

them indices of inequality that have long been associ-

ners and practitioners?

ated with the developing world. Together, these patterns

To ask these questions is not merely to call atten-

suggest a convergence in land uses, built forms, and so-

tion to the physical and social transformation of cities

cial problems in cities all over the world-ranging from

in the contemporary epoch. Doing so also suggests an

upscale real estate developments and high-end global

analytical concern with understanding the best ways to

business clusters to social and economic polarization to

categorize world cities and diagnose their key develop-

culturally and globally hybrid work forces, all of which

mental challenges. This paper argues that, contrary to

operate in the context of extreme urban concentration

previous city typologies, a crucial distinguishing feature

and sprawl. Many scholars have traced these newfound

of globalizing cities is the degree to which large infor-

patterns of urban development to globalization. Glo-

mal sectors flourish and accelerate public insecurity.

balization not only brings rapid and accelerating flows

Prior to globalization, most typologies for world

of global capital in search of new forms of investment,

cities grew out of an understanding of the larger eco-

but also leads the shift from manufacturing to service

nomic context in which urban locales were situated,

and information economies. The question, however, is

understood in terms of national economic prosperity

as follows: Are we really seeing a commonality of urban

and degrees of industrialization. These notions were

patterns worldwide, particularly among the major cities

captured in the lexicon of "developing" versus "de-

of the world? Or do these visual commonalities hide,

veloped" country cities, or cities of the global "north"

or co-exist with, other less obvious differences? If the

versus "south:' The primary cities of developed coun-

latter, what are those differences, and what challenges

tries were understood to host more investments in the
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built environment, higher-end services and commerce,

differences between New York City and New Orleans,

more developed property markets, higher rates of home

Mexico City and Veracruz, or Rome and Bari, to name

ownership, and less poverty. Cities in developing coun-

but a few examples.

tries were seen as lacking in basic urban infrastructure,

In the contemporary era, however, as global capital-

frequently leading to their characterization as "over-ur-

ism brings ever more cities into its orbit, such territori-

banized;, especially in comparison to those of the de-

ally-based cultural, economic, and political regime dis-

veloped world. They were also overcrowded and poor;

tinctions have started to break down. Many cities share

informality in housing and employment was the norm,

common economic features and similarly built urban

and industrial factories dominated prime urban lands.

environments. The stark distinctions between pro-

Political context was occasionally used as a reference

ducer, consumer, investor, and exchange roles in both

point for city typology, albeit often in tandem with the

the domestic and global economy have become blurred,

aforementioned economic characteristics. Democratic

as have the distinctions between flows of capital, build-

countries, especially those in which market capitalism

ing styles and patterns of urban land use within and

flourished and the state was responsive to the produc-

between rich and poor countries around the world. The

tive classes as much as the people, were seen as hosting

question thus emerges as to what urban typologies and

different urban patterns than socialist, communist, or

categorizations can best capture these contemporary

authoritarian countries in which the "command" ef-

local, national, and global dynamics. Will new typolo-

forts of the state trumped market logic. Likewise, cities

gies undermine or co-exist with old ways of classifying

in colonial countries, where mercantile relations linked

cities, either in terms of methodological building blocks

ruler and ruled, were also seen as hosting different

or classificatory outcomes, how or why, and with what

urban forms, reflecting either an outflow or inflow of

implications for urban theory and practice?

capital and investments. In both cases, political regime

I seek to answer these questions using the case

types were associated with certain urban land use pat-

of Mexico City as a reference point. By exploring the

terns, ranging from the absence of commercially-based

recent changes in Mexico City,s form, function, and

downtowns to the emergence of massive public housing

character as a result of globalization and other recent

blocs to limited investments in non -productive urban

economic and political changes, and by comparing

infrastructure, to name but a few. While these urban

Mexico City's current patterns to those that are now

differences were sometimes attributed to national

evident in cities of Europe, the United States, East Asia,

"character:, social history, or cultural repertoires, a more

and other urban locations worldwide, I seek to arrive

likely explanation was the degree of market versus state

at a new typology for characterizing what is similar and

balance in urban policymaking, a distinction that itself

what is different among world cities in the contempo-

was correlated to the type of political regime.

rary global era. Among the methodological strategies

Within countries of the same developmental status

that are used to arrive at this alternative typology are

or political regime-type, a similar logic was used to dif-

close examinations of (i) the new political, social, and

ferentiate among locales. Cities were frequently defined

economic actors that globalization has produced, (ii)

in terms of their position in the political system (such as

the ways in which these new actors change the daily

capital versus other cities), in terms of their functional

life and built environment of the city, and (iii) how and

role in the domestic economy (such as industrial, com-

why these actors and activities are distributed across

mercial, service, or agricultural centers), or in terms of

all "global" cities. The key urban problems and con-

their cultural histories. The first set of explanations was

flicts that emerge as a result of this new constellation

used to show why Washington, D.C. differed from New

of forces and conditions are also identified as central in

York or Monterrey differed from Mexico City, while

the definition of alternative city types.

the second and third explanations could account for
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This paper argues that a key feature that distin -

guishes world cities from each other, despite the shared

and economic trends might be changing in the world's

architectural and investment profile of the urban built

global cities-either for the better or the worse. Specifi-

environment within many of them, is the degree of ac-

cally, the exercise of generating new categorizations or

celerating public insecurity and the deteriorating rule

typologies for contemporary global cities gives a short-

of law. It argues that such problems can exist even in

hand method for understanding more general urban

cities that on the visual or architectural surface seem

trends that may spread across divergent developmental

eminently "modern,, and globalized. It further daims

states or economic conditions, which in turn can serve

that the emergence of a large, globally-linked informal

as a way to examine the most pressing policy concerns

sector can exacerbate problems of pubbc insecurity by

and the most appropriate domains for development

generating new forms of conflict and_tension, which I

planning action.

will characterize as "competing globalizations:' I define
these competing globalizations as the struggle between

MEXICO CITY AS A CASE STUDY

two "economies;' or divergent networks of economic

As noted earlier, previous frames of reference for

forces that draw their economic strength from entirely

categorizing cities frequently relied on national-level

different complexes of global actors and investors, yet

characterizations of political and economic "progress:'

whose uneasy co-existence in a delimited physical space

The most challenged cities were in "late industrializ-

turns them into ruthless competitors to control land use

ing,, countries where democracy remained elusive and

and the character of downtown. The public insecurity

poverty persisted. As globalization and liberalization

that results from these conflicts produces social, spatial,

began accelerating over the last several decades, many

and economic fragmentation in ways that drive the

of these countries faced the promise of fundamental

cycle of tensions over globalization, and further distin-

change, both urban and national. Mexico is a good case

guish insecure from secure cities. This paper ends with

in point. Newfound prospects for democracy and the

an assessment of why some global cities are more prone

promise of sustained economic development that came

to urban insecurity and lawlessness than others.

with global support for liberalization (up to and indud-

Before turning to more discussion, a few words

ing the 1994 signing of the North American Free Trade

are in order about why this methodological exercise

Agreement) produced a spurt of enthusiasm among

matters. One cannot understand international devel-

investors and public officials who were eager to trans-

opment these days, and the longer-term prospects for

form that country's capital into a global city. The idea

prosperity in a given nation, without understanding

was that through investments in urban infrastructure

what is happening in key global cities, which serve as

and new urban mega-projects, the world's leading in-

the command and control functions of global capital.

vestors would feel comfortable enough to locate global

To understand global cities, in turn, requires an appre-

corporate headquarters in Mexico City, and that such

ciation of changes within each of these cities, and an

urban developments would generate sufficient capital

understanding of whether and how the attributes that

flows to spur new patterns of national investment (and

are associated with certain global cities can affect long-

vice-versa). Changes in the built form of Mexico City

term urban sustainability. Undertaking this task not only

appear to reflect these global trends.

entails an examination of whether recent changes make

Over the past 15 years, Mexico City's urban econ-

these cities better places in which to live, but also efforts

omy and downtown land uses have transformed along

to identify and reinforce (or eliminate) those conditions

the lines that global cities literature would predict.

that facilitate (or impede) long-term prosperity. To do

_These evolutions are apparent in the recent "rescue,,

so, it is important to understand the large sociological

of downtown Mexico City, accomplished through the

dynamics that underlie urban trends, precisely because

development of a new, upscale tourist, corporate, and

such knowledge gives us clues as to how and why social

residential complex. Night life, commerce, and youth
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activities are on the upswing in ways that would have

forefront of the public eye as their willingness to invest

been unthinkable a mere five years ago, and the ever

in new infrastructure (roadways, fiber optics, bridges,

more modern building projects that dot the skyline

security technologies, and so forth) has generated con-

make this city a cosmopolitan rival to other affluent,

siderable political discussion.

globally connected cities around the world. Mexico City

Nonetheless, these are not the only new actors in

also shows its new face in an area that is ten kilometers

the contemporary global city. Also on the rise in terms

from downtown, called Santa Fe. Considered a major

of social visibility and impact on land use are informal

new "cluster» development that is intended to attract

sector workers, many of whom are involved in illicit ac-

a wide array of global firms, it is filled with high -rise

tivities. Many of these people have had their economic

after high -rise that are conceived within the most ex-

livelihood disrupted-and their downtown -based ac-

otic and sophisticated architectural styles imaginable.

tivities displaced-by the new urban mega-projects.

On the surface, its buildings resemble those that dot

As a result, the overall urban ambiance is not as idyllic

the skylines of London, New York, Miami, and Tokyo,

as the iconic architectural styles and new corporate or

and the degree of concentration of residential and

residential buildings would suggest. Nor is the qual -

corporate high-rises evokes the feel of cities like Sin-

ity of life in Mexico City the same as it is in the global

gapore, Shanghai, and Hong Kong. These projects have

cities of Europe and the United States that it visually

increased the social and political profile of a new cadre

seeks to resemble. Over the last several years, prob-

of "globalizing elites;' not just corporate executives of

lems of violence, crime, and insecurity have emerged

both foreign and national origin, but also a smattering

with a vengeance in many parts of the city. They were

of hotshot architects who possess name recognition and

first most visible downtown, but they have gradually

global visibility. Governing officials in the metropolitan

migrated to more peripheral parts of the metropolitan

area, while hardly new actors, once again stand at the

area, as the perpetrators have been slowly but steadily
pushed out of downtown. Extreme public insecurity
and random violence wrack most neighborhoods. Of

the newly redeveloped areas, only Santa Fe seems to

investment in an upscale downtown property market.

have escaped the worst of the daily problems of insecu-

Such constraints have further fueled the development

rity, but this outcome prevailed only because this area

of gated "cluster» areas like Santa Fe, which exists al-

has been designed as an urban fortress, with technol-

most as "another world:,

ogy, gating, tunnels and other architectural innovations

But again, the rest of the city is not nearly so pro-

that limit the free flow of people and goods. Private

tected, so security conditions almost everywhere else

security guards roam the streets with a frequency that

are far more fragile. Most streets remain dangerous, and

has no parallel in the city's past, and in ways that can

daily excursions from home to work remain volatile,

be readily replicated in other "globalizing" parts of the

with murders and assassinations relatively unchecked,

city, especially downtown. Even with s1:1rveillance cam-

and with Mexico City police remaining fearful at times

eras and security guards, the problems of insecurity

of entering certain neighborhoods. A steady inflow

continue to accelerate.

of street vendors and other under-employed service

The massive property development projects down-

workers fills most of the city's streets beyond capacity,

town, most of which started in 2001 and 2002, have

reproducing the old-style informality and a mix of rich

stalled considerably because the security situati_o n has

and poor that is more commonly associated with past

not improved enough for most middle- and upper-

epochs and "traditional" third world cities than with a

income residents to move to the redeveloped parts of

modern, globalizing metropolis. In short, the problems

the city, and because many low-income residents insist

of insecurity exist alongside the new urban mega -proj-

on remaining downtown. With many low-income resi-

ects and infrastructure developments that global capi-

dents and small commercial firms unwilling to move

talists have spurred to catapult the city into yet another

away from this strategic central location (which con -

world -recognized global city.

tinues to serve them well in an expanding metropolis
of 20 million people), developers may have hit a glass
ceiling in terms of the revenue to be generated through

"COMPETING GLOBALIZATIONS"

clash over the desired character and built environment

What makes this state of affairs particularly intrigu-

of downtown; this conflict produces the violence and

ing, if not somewhat paradoxical, is the fact that many

insecurity that now destabilize Mexico City. It is further

of the forces that are responsible for the conditions of

worth noting that these struggles are as much about

crime, violence, and insecurity have themselves been

control over space and the nature of the city as they are

empowered through globalization, albeit through a very

about the direction, or globalization, of the economy.

different network of global flows and activities than that

Stated differently, they raise a question of whose global

which has brought the downtown and Santa Fe property

network is going to prevail in what physical space, with

development forces into the picture. Even in the face of

the main protagonists in the struggle being liberal and

the Alameda project's recent approval, one could say

illiberal forces, both tied to globalization in some way.

that continued conflict over Mexico City's downtown

To the extent that these struggles over space are linked

development owes to "competing globalizations:'

to economic livelihood and profitability, the stakes

We could identify thes·e two distinct global networks

are quite high. Because the conflict involves "illiberal"

as "liberal" and "illiberal" (rather than legal and illegal).

forces who shun the rule of law, it can be quite violent

The former are defined as "liberal" since they appear

and dangerous; urban politics does not offer any easy

"legitimate" in the eyes of economic liberalization's pro-

remedy to such battles.

ponents; they constitute a legally accountable network of

For all of these reasons, Mexico City now experiences

corporate and property investors who operate in a world

ongoing conflict between "competing globalizers:' These

of regulations, property rights, and formal contract law.

battles play themselves out in the streets of the city and on

The latter are defined as "illiberal" because they are con-

the terrain of security as much as they do in formal politi-

sidered "illegitimate" partakers of the global economy;

cal deliberation and dialogue. This conflict over the city's

they constitute networks of illicit (and often small-scale)

"global character" continues to drive violence and insecu-

investors whose global supply chain revolves around

rity, pushing this city on a downward spiral towards near

black market, undercover, clandestine, or violence-prone

anarchy-and authoritarian attempts to control it-in the

activities where the rule of law remains elusive ( that is,

institutions and practices of everyday urbanism.

those that involve the marketing and global distribution

The Alameda area is already protected by a spe-

of drugs, guns, and other forms of contraband). They as-

cial police force, high -tech surveillance cameras, and

sert their political and economic power through illicit

private security guards, even as it remains surrounded

rather than licit networks of trade and distribution, and

by dilapidated areas that play host to informal sector

they sustain their activities despite the absence of formal

activities. Further efforts of this nature will likely be

property rights over the spaces that they control and the

used to create mobility barriers between the upscale,

goods that they trade.

redeveloped parts of the Alameda and the surrounding

Complicating matters further, these "competing

area of Tepito. As a result, Mexico City could face even

globalizers" have divergent spatial aims and colliding

greater socioecon~mic and spatial polarization (both

downtown development visions. The "liberal" global -

within Tepito and between it and other key downtown

izers desire an upscale renovation of downtown with

locations). Such spatial outcomes may sustain the theo-

open spaces and pristine architectural environments for

retical propositions that are advanced in the urban glo-

other global investors, tourists, and upscale consumers.

balization literature, and suggest a certain convergence

The "illiberal" globalizers thrive in the dilapidated, in -

in land use patterns across global cities. However, they

formal, and inaccessible back alleys and streets where

also suggest an extreme form of social and spatial polar-

their clandestine activities can remain hidden from view,

ization that is mediated by violence that we would not

and where police often fear to tread. This dichotomy

expect to see in other global cities like London, Tokyo,

implies that liberal and illiberal global forces frequently

and Singapore. Complicating matters, the short -term
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implications of this pattern may undermine the long-

police the nation's political and economic "enemies;' be

term path towards convergence. Extreme polarization

they laborers, socialists and communists, street vendors,

and violence will set clear limits on further upscale

or agrarian rebels, so as to guarantee state power and

property development and circumvent any movement

economic progress-the coercive arms of the late devel-

towards global "convergence" in downtown urban land

opmental state became well ensconced in a networked

uses across the Mexico City metropolitan area, as well

world of impunity, corruption, and crime. Their power

as between Mexico City and other global cities.

and longevity sustained illegal practices in the state and
in civil society, leading to a steady erosion of the rule of

SEEKING THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW

law. Such is the institutional legacy bequeathed to many

GLOBAL URBAN DISORDER:_HISTORY,

countries of the global south, and democracy has done

ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS

little to reverse it.

How can we explain this state of affairs, featuring

Such is not to say that all cities of the late devel-

high levels of violence that permeate upscale global in-

oping world are saddled with similar legacies, or that,

vestment centers like Mexico City, and ongoing tensions

even if they were, they would all face identical problems

over domination of space between "competing globaliz-

of insecurity. Nqr is such to suggest that the police and

ers ?" One answer is that the growing problems of urban

military are the only sources of violence and contem-

violence and insecurity are traceable to the path-depen-

porary disorder. Many countries did effectively purge

dent consequences of past decisions about economic

their old police during the democratic transition, with

development, governance, state formation, and industri-

South Africa being one of the few to do so successfully.

alization. That is, where a city "comes from" -in terms of

Other late developers, like India, have been democratic

its history and with respect to the larger national devel-

for much longer, and their main cities do not confront

opment context in which it emerged-limits what type

the legacies of police and military coercion. Still others,

of contemporary global city it can become.

such as the East Asian tigers, have hosted authoritar-

In prior decades, governments in countries of the

ian regimes but have eluded much of the violence and

global south like Mexico were able to pursue industrial-

insecurity that plague their late developmental counter-

ization projects because they counted on strong and/or

parts. Thus, it is important to recognize that the eco-

authoritarian states that developed strong policing and

nomic legacies of late development are also important

military apparatuses to control labor and consolidate

in accounting for patterns and locations of problems

state power vis-a-vis agrarian interests on behalf of an

of insecurity in so many countries of the global south.

emergent industrial class of manufacturers. These lega-

There are two other key factors that are linked to prior

cies empowered the late developmental state's coercive

economic development models: the extent of informal-

apparatuses so as to undermine the judicial system and

ity and the extent of income and social polarization.

facilitate corruption and impunity within the ranks of

Both trace their roots to past patterns of political and

the police and the military (if not the state itself). Over

economic development.

time, such abuses of power led to demands for democ-

In prior decades, most late developers tread a very

ratization. Even so, regime democratization did not

rocky economic road in which formal employment in

eliminate all prior institutions and practices. Even after

industry paled in comparison to informal employment

democratic transition, many late developers still face

in small-scale commerce and other petty services, with

the political and economic future with the same old

government employment generally taking up the slack.

coercive networks intact, especially in the rank-and-file

These sectoral imbalances were all too often ignore~

segments of the police and military.

in much of the sociological work on late development,

After years of working without effective institution-

which focused primarily on the key drivers of produc-

al constraints-as part of the bargain with the elite to

tion (capital, labor, and the state) and the big-ticket
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strategies of growth (industrialization, either import-

For those of us who want to understand the impact

substitution industrialization [ISi] or export-oriented

of these large-scale political and economic transforma-

industrialization [EOI]), while ignoring the diversity of

tions within the context of urban insecurity, we need to

class identities and sectoral composition of economic

understand the spatial context of these developments.

activities that sustained late development. These

Specifically, much of the current informal employment

sectoral patterns have always been problematic, but

is physically and sectorally situated within an illicit world

globalization and liberalization on a world scale have

of violence and impunity, not just because of the sheer

exacerbated them. With the neoliberal turn bringing a

illegality of many of the goods that are traded, but also

downsized state, and with expectations of greater global

because big-money trade in drugs, guns, and other con-

competitiveness driving many countries to reduce

traband products generally necessitates its own "armed

traditional sources of manufacturing and agriculture,

forces" for protection and contract enforcement. The

these sectoral imbalances-and the attendant growth of

result is often the development of further clandestine

services and informality-have become more extreme.

connections between local police, mafias, and the infor-

Part of the problem is that the two main sources

mal sector, as well as the isolation of certain territorial

of economic growth in today's W(?rld-export-led in-

areas as locations for these activities. This illicit net-

dustrialization and the development of the high-end

work of reciprocities, and the territorial concentration

financial services that are linked to real estate develop-

of dangerous illegal activities in locations that function

ment and the information economy-exacerbate social

as independent fiefdoms, outside state control, further

and income polarity, especially in cities. In both social

drive the problems of impunity, insecurity, and violence

and spatial terms, the polarization is extreme, and these

in cities where these mafia reside. The most dangerous

patterns lie at the root of the current problems of urban

areas can be found in large cities where global supply

violence and insecurity. The issue, again, is not merely

chains find the greatest concentration of producers, con-

income inequality. Polarization also raises the question

sumers, and distributors. The purveyors of these goods

of what employment sectors remain open as the largest

often locate in old central business districts where local

source of work opportunities. With fewer available job

chambers of commerce face a declining manufacturing

prospects in industrial manufacturing and many new

base and are especially desperate to attract high-end

employment opportunities beyond the educational

corporate investors and financial services. This need

reach of those who have been laid off from factories in the

leads to a physical clash of forces and development

drive to develop a more globally competitive informa-

models-and growing problems of insecurity-that can

tion technology service sector, more citizens than ever

thwart the developmental aims of aspiring global cities

before are being thrown into the informal sector. Such

as well as those of the national investor class that seeks

employment, which barely meets subsistence needs for

to generate global capital and visibility.

those who are stuck within it, is becoming more "illicit"
as protectionist barriers drop, as fewer domestic goods

TYPOLOGIES FOR A NEW GLOBAL ERA:

for sale are produced, and as the globalization of the

SECURE AND INSECURE CITIES

illegal goods trade picks up the slack. In many cities of

Mexico City may have its own political, spatial, and

the global south, mafias involved in all forms of illegal

historical peculiarities that have made its built environ-

activities, ranging from drug and weapons trafficking

ment particularly contested, complex, and violent. Even

to the sale of knock-off designer products and CDs, are

so, it is not alone. Many other cities share these lega-

calling the shots. These forces often take on the func-

cies, and they tend to face chronic problems of violence

tionally equivalent role of mini-states by monopolizing

and insecurity. Indeed, the persistence and growth of

the means of violence and providing protection and ter-

an informal sector throughout periods of industrializa-

ritorial governance in exchange for allegiance.

tion, the spatial contiguity of various social classes, the
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vibrancy of commercial and downtown life, the poli-

on the growth of the informal sector.

tics of urbai:i clientelism, and the expanding networks

Paradoxically, moreover, these very same historical

of illegal activities that hovered in the background of

advantages have given certain countries like South Korea

the Mexico City story, are also characteristic of other

and China a leading role as suppliers in the global net-

developing-country cities that now wish to achieve

work of (manufactured) contraband consumer goods,

global preeminence: Johannesburg, Buenos Aires, Rio

many of which are found on the streets of troubled cities

de Janeiro, and Manilla, among others.

like Rio de Janeiro and Mexico City. Thus, we see a small

Still, these problems cannot be understood as af-

but leading group of "late" developers reaping the bene-

fecting all cities of the global south; nor are they en-

fits of export-led industrialization once again, but doing

tirely absent in every city of the global !)Orth, even if the

so at the cost of rising illegality and violence among its

pervasiveness of the problem may not be as extreme.

less fortunate counterparts, whose problems stem from

Put another way, not all of the cities of the south are

being on the wrong end of the same global supply chain.

becoming like those of the north, even though some cit-

The result is a "categorical" split within the so-called

ies of the north share characteristics with their southern

"global south" where the relevant analytical distinction

counterparts. The root cause of growing insecurity is

is not so much the degree of formal dem~Kracy or the

social, spatial, and economic developments of the past

extent of global integration and global investment in

and how they locate themselves in the present era of glo-

the built environment, but rather, the extent of violence,

balization. There are certain cities in the "industrialized

insecurity, illegality, and lawlessness. Stated differently,

north" that share many features of those in the global

global cities differ in the degrees of their security and

south, just as there are cities in the late-industrializing

insecurity, despite sharing many similar built environ-

world that have transcended those constraints. In the

mental features, but these differences do not map neatly

late-developing world, for example, it is striking that

into a north-south division. Rather, they are more di-

many of the cities of East Asia seem to have avoided the

rectly correlated to particular urban and national devel-

descent into violent chaos and the clash of development

opment histories, which themselves must be examined

models that plague their Latin American counterparts.

with something more than a northern and southern, or

Why is such the case?

early versus late developmental, lens.

First, burgeoning urban informality is not a serious

Let us take this logic one step further, using it as a

problem across all cities of the global south. Massive em-

basis for developing a new framework for understanding

ployment in export-led industrial sectors arrived early

similarities and differences in contemporary cities of the

on in East Asian countries, thereby allowing them to

global north. Clearly, the problems of extreme violence,

avoid the disruptive plant closings and attendant unem-

insecurity, and lawlessness that characterize so many

ployment that came in the abrupt shift from ISI to EOI

Latin American and African cities-and that are related

in most of the rest of the global south. Just as important,

to histories of informality, occupational structure, in-

these are the same late developers that remained rural

come inequality, and national industrial development

for much longer and in which high rates of urbaniza-

trajectories-are not evident in most major cities of the

tion came relatively late. For another, even as they

global north, among them Paris, Milan, Tokyo, and New

pursued export-Jed industrialization, these countries

York. Such is not to say, however, that they are absent, or

also fostered small-scale commercial and industrial

that they are not materializing as a result of globaliza-

production, and prioritized employment over capital

tion. In the United States, Europe, and elsewhere in the

intensity in commercial and industrial production, be it

advanced capitalist north, many secondary and tertiary

domestic or export-led. Thus, their economies remain

cities grew with similar patterns of industrialization, de-

a vibrant source of both employment and growth. This

mography, and urban form. Detroit is a good example in

combination of "historical advantages" set a clear cap

the United States. Little money was spent on upscale real
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estate development and downtown "modernization;'

actors and urban conditions emerge. The move from

in contrast to the capital cities in the aforementioned

manufacturing and industrialization to high-end servic-

countries. Employment centered on industrialization

es and an information- or technology-based economy,

for a domestic market, and low-level commerce and

evident in many parts of the advanced capitalist north as

services were the norm. In some instances, rural decline

well as the "south;' has brought forth new investors and

brought new migrants to cities in search of employment

actors while displacing old ones who remain wedded

opportunities, a population pressure that translated into

to the industrial economy. Combined with the fact that

an inflated small-scale commercial and service sector,

many nation-states are pursuing a more neoliberal so-

especially when their arrival coincided with a decline in

cial policy, these economic and public policy shifts have

the manufacturing sector. Many locales of southern Italy

placed constraints on full employment. The balance

and certain Eastern European countries could also serve

of industry and services is also shifting dramatically,

as good examples. To be sure, in most of the cities of the

driving investors to turn to real estate developments

global north, even small ones, strong welfare state pro-

and other high-end urban projects even as it displaces

grams and commitment to employment prevented these

factory workers who now seek new sources of work.

conditions from devolving into the social polarization

While longstanding residents might not be pushed

and intense informality that laid the basis for subsequent

into low-end services or informality as a result of these

patterns of violence in certain cities of the global south.

larger macroeconomic shifts, new immigrants, who

However, the current era of globalization may be chang-

flow into these cities as a result of more fluid national

ing that reality.

borders and a globalizing labor force, gravitate to these

Given the political and economic restructuring of

low-skill areas of employment, where limited education

national economies in response to globalization, new

and language deficiencies are not large barriers to entry.
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Further social and economic polarization may follow if

order to private hands. If security and, by extension, the

they bring cultural traditions or long_standing customs

"rule of law;' are available only to those who have the

of trading and informality, and if they are residentially

financial means to afford them, and if the whims of pri-

isolated from the mainstream or socially excluded in

vate individuals determine security actions and urban

ways that limit their physical, social, or cultural inter-

conditions, then the larger social contract that sustains

action with long-standing residents. In such environ-

the public guarantees of equitable legal treatment for all

ments, crime often flourishes.

is in danger of rupture. Without a viable, publicly sanc-

Thus, alongside major global investors in real estate

tioned, socially inclusive, and well -legitimized rule of

and iconic architecture who are seeking to jumpstart the

law for the city, "mere" problems of violence can readily

urban economies of the post-industri~l era, one might

transform into widespread urban chaos and insecurity,

also see new foreign immigrants who are employed in

especially if the socially, spatially, economically exclud-

services (formal and informal) and linked to trade in

ed newcomers turn to their own "rules" for governing

consumer goods, both legal and illegal, all of whom are

urban life and livelihood.

operating in a context of increased crime. These patterns
these new and old sets of forces clash socially, struggle

WHAT CAN BE DONE?
The problems that are described above are enor-

for dominion over urban space, or find themselves on

mous, tracing their roots to macroeconomic shifts that

the opposite ends of urban privilege (in terms of income,

are associated with globalizing economies, as well as

access to basic needs provisions, and so forth), we may

their impact on urban social, economic, and spatial

begin to see a version of the same problems that brought

--structures. They cannot be easily reversed. However,

insecurity and violence in Mexico City and other his-

planners, architects, and sociologists must be prepared

torically similar urban locales of the global south.

to think about how to envision a city that would not

are starting to emerge in cities of the global north. When

Again, it is important not to over-emphasize the

fall prey to these problems. Stated differently, they

extent of similarity between the contemporary cities of

must think about how to make or keep cities secure,

the global south and north, in part because legal frame -

but without resorting only to "privatized" efforts to

works of urban action are so much more established in

guarantee security. That is, they must be committed

the latter than in the former, while it is an insufficient

to developing truly public spaces that are open to all

or deteriorating rule of law that has fueled the rise of

classes and cultures; they must be able to transcend

insecurity and violence in cities of the late developing

the temptation to use gating or other techniques of

world like Mexico City. However, there are many urban

spatial isolation to protect individuals; they must think

locales in the democratic and affluent "north" where

about new ways to structure built form so as to em-

corruption, mafias, bribery, and other illicit practices

phasize social and economic integration rather than

also impact urban decision -making, suggesting that the

fragmentation ; and they must struggle for urban and

distinction between law-abiding and lawless cities is

national-level social policies that guarantee sectorally

better understood on a continuum.

balanced urban employment patterns and alternative

Moreover, the overall sense of growing urban fear,

land uses, all in order to prevent the social and spatial

and concerns about violence that have started to plague

polarization of urban life and the compartmentaliza-

many cities of the global north in the last decade or so,

tion of physical spaces and economic activities into

have pushed residents to hire private security guards,

high and low-end activities, that compete with, rather

develop gated communities, and use new technologies

than complement, each other. It is only by undertak-

to protect themselves. These trends start to eat away at

ing this massive cross-sectoral effort to engage citizens

the institutional edifice of a rule of law because they

and the state at a variety of levels, that social peace and

shift responsibility for vigilance and maintaining public

urban harmony can be achieved. Im
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Abstract:
The phenomenon of globalization has sparked interest in the changing place of cities in the world
system. A new urban sociology contends that the rising and declining fortunes of cities are
driven by their positions in networks of international trade and investment. This new global
approach also suggests that globalization generates a new geography of centrality and
marginality: a new urban hierarchy that cuts across the traditional rich/poor, West/East, and
North/South divides in the world system. At the top of this new hierarchy are the "global cities"
that operate as command and control centers in a global urban network interwoven by
globalization. Because of a lack of data on networks of cities that would allow for an analysis of
relations among cities in the world economy, the contours of this network have only just begun
to be explored. In this paper, we take another step toward producing a comprehensive map of
the world city system and of its evolution across the "era of globalization." Our research focuses
on a key relation linking cities into a world system of cities: that between multinational
enterprises and their subsidiaries. Our data consist of information on the headquarter and branch
locations of the world's 500 largest multinational firms in 1981, 2000, and 2007. Using networkanalytic techniques, we address a central problematic of world city research: How has the global
restructuring of the past three decades altered the world city system?
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Globalization and the world

• system
city

Preliminary results from a
longituqinal data set
Arthur S. Alderson and Jason Beckfield

INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of globalization has renewed interest in thinking about the place
and role of cities in the international system . Recent literature proposes that the
fate of cities (and their residents) has become increasingly tied to their position
in international flows of investment and trade. Where traditional thinking on the
city (e.g. Hawley 1950; Duncan et al. 1960) treats processes of urbanization as regional or national phenomena, a new urban sociology argues for situating the city
in the larger context of the development of the world economy (Friedmann 1986;
Knox and Taylor 1995 ; Sassen 2001). Globalization is argued to be generating a
new geography of centrality and marginality that cuts across the old divides in the
world between the rich developed countries and the poor underdeveloped countries, and between East and West (Sassen 1994: 4). Jn particular, developments of
the past few decades are seen as producing a new global hierarchy of cities, at the
apex of which are located what have variously been referred to as ' world cities '
(Friedmann I 986) or 'global cities ' (Sassen 2001 ). Such cities are argued to be the
key nodes or command points that exercise power over other cities in a system of
cities and, thus, the world economy.
We address these arguments empirically by building on the strong affinity
between the literature on world cities and social network analysis. As conceptualized in the literature, the power of world cities is inherently relational : cities do
not have power in and of themselves, they have power to the extent that they function as command points and centers of planning and thus establish the framework
in which other cities operate in the world economy. Similarly, social network
analysts suggest that power is best viewed as a consequence of patterns of social relations that generate opportunities and constraints: some actors are favored
because they occupy positions that are more favorable than others (Granovetter
1973 ; Padgett and Ansell 1993 ; Guiffre 1999). Moreover, network analysts have
developed a set of tools that enable those interested in pursuing the world city hypothesis to assess the power and prestige of individual cities. ' With such methods,
one can address some of the fundamental hypotheses that animate research on the
world city system.~
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In earlier research (Alderson and Beckfield 2004), we used data on the headquarter and branch locations of the world's 500 largest multinational firms in 2000
to generate a relational data set in which ties are those between headquarter and
subsidiary cities. More recently, we have introduced a longitudinal component by
gathering the same data for 1981 (the earliest available). As assembled, this produces two matrices, each linking more than 3,000 cities around the globe. In this
chapter, we present the first results of this work. Using the techniques detailed below, we address a central problematic of world city research in this chapter: How
has the global restructuring of the past two decades altered the world city system?
In the course of addressing this question, we also address the more general question of the link between the global urban hierarchy and the world-system.

WORLD CITY HYPOTHESES AND GLOBALIZATION
As suggested above, we are guided in this research by three classic statements
of the world city hypothesis those of Stephen Hymer ( 1972), John Friedmann
( 1986), and Saskia Sassen ( 1991 ). As we review these arguments in detail elsewhere (see Alderson and Beckfield 2004), we briefly note here the broad similarities and differences in these statements as they speak to the evolution of the world
city system in the context of globalization. All three ;ee globalization as fundamentally altering the world city system and, thus, the geography of inequality.
However, they differ strongly on exactly how this is changing. Hymer implicitly
invokes the 'Matthew Effect, arguing that globalization will largely reproduce
existing patterns of inequality and dependency. While alteration of the global urban hierarchy is likely (e.g. the emergence of new centers of production in the
South and the simultaneous decline of old centers of production in the North),
Hymer predicted that the map of the world city system would match on_increasingly tightly to the map of the world-system - the 'core ' will grow increasingly
core, and the ' periphery ' wi11 grow increasingly peripheral. Friedman and Sassen
offer a rather different vision of the impact of globalization on the world city
system. They present the possibility of a new geography of centrality and marginality, one that cuts across long-standing North/South and East/West divides
in the world system. Friedmann ( 1995) characterizes the world city system as a
dynamic hierarchy with ranks and entrance criteria that are, in principle, open: To
the extent that cities can attract investment and capture more of the command and
control functions of the world economy their status in the urban hierarchy will
rise. While there is every expectation that cities such as New York, London, and
Tokyo will emerge as cities of the first rank in any empirical analysis, 'cities may
rise into the ranks of world cities, they may drop from the order, and they may
rise or fall in rank' (ibid.: 26). Sassen ( 1994) paints a similar picture: Areas in the
developed world once conceptualized as 'core ' are being peripheralized, while
areas once 'peripheral ' are joining the core of the world city system (e.g. the decline of Detroit and the rise of Sao Paulo). For both, then, globalization opens up
the possibility of substantial slippage between the map of the contemporary world
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city system and established maps of the world-system. The new urban hierarchy
generated by globalization cuts across the old North/South and East/West divides
in the world system.

DATA AND METHODS
To assess change in ·the structure of the world city system and to determine the
degree to which a new geography of centrality and marginality may have emerged
in recent years, we have assembled longitudinal data on a key relation linking cities into a world-system of cities: that between multinational enterprises and their
subsidiaries. Using sources such as Fortune magazine 's Global 500, we identify
the world 's 500 largest multinationals (in terms ofrevenue) in 1981 and 2000. We
then use the Directory of Corporate Affiliations (National Register 1981 , 2000) to
collect information on the headquarter and branch locations of each firm in both
periods."'

Power and prestige in the world city system
We assess the power of world cities in light of three measures of point centrality
(namely outdegree, closeness, and betweenness). To understand the differences
between these measures, it may be useful to consider the two networks illustrated
in Figure 2.1. Assume, for instance, that the relation illustrated in Figure 2 .1 involves the exchange of resources between cities. Examining the star network,
one would conclude that city A occupies a favorable structural position , while
cities B- G occupy the same, equally unfavorable position. ln the circle network,
by contrast, all cities appear equally advantaged or disadvantaged. Why is city A
advantaged in the star network? Freeman 's ( 1979) now classic treatment of centrality in social networks suggests three distinct reasons.

The Star

F

E

The Circle

G

B

F

C

D

E

D

Figure 2. I Graphs to illustrate centrality measures
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Outdegree centrality

City A in the star network is advantaged because it is more active than cities B- G.
As such, city A has more alternatives. If city B refuses an exchange with A, A can
rely on resources from C- G. B- G , by contrast, are less active. They are isolated
from direct involvement with others in the network and have no alternatives to
exchange with A. In this sense, city A is more powerful than cities B- G. In the
circle network, by contrast, all cities are equa11y active and thus equally advantaged or disadvantaged. With directional data, it is often important to distinguish
between outdegree (ties sent) and indegree (ties received). With a relation of the
sort explored in this chapter, the outdegree of each city is a fairly straightforward measure of power or influence: cities that send more ties are cities that have
captured more of the control functions of the world economy (i .e. display more
'world-cityness' than others).
Closeness centrality

City A in the star network is advantaged because it is closer to more cities than
cities B- G. City A is adjacent to all other cities while B- G are two steps from all
other cities (except A). Consequently, city A has greater power in the sense that
it is more independent than the others (or, alternatively, in the sense that it can
avoid being controlled by others). For resources to pass from city B to city E,
they must pass through A. Jn contrast, city A can directly communicate with B- G.
This gives city A in the star network a distinct structural advantage. Jn the circle
network all actors are equally close and are thus, again, equally advantaged or
disadvantaged.
Betweenness centrality

Finally, city A in the star network is advantaged because it stands between all
of the other pairs of actors. 1t thus has greater power in the sense that it brokers
all exchanges. If city B wishe to exchange resources with city E, it must do so
through city A. City A thus has the power to coordinate action and to withhold or
di tort information to its advantage. This mirrored by the fact that city A needs
no broker for exchanges with B- G in the star network, gives it a distinct structural
advantage. In the circle network, each city lies between each other pair of actors
and A- G are, again, equally advantaged or disadvantaged.
lndegree centrality

While the world city hypothesis emphasizes the power of world cities, it also
suggests that, in addition to being influential, world cities are prominent or prestigious - they are sought out by other cities, have ties directed to them, and are
chosen over others. Put differently, 'world-cityness' involves choices received in
addition to choices made. A simple and straightforward measure of a city's pres-
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tige is its indegree - the number of ties it receives. Cities that have high indegree
are prestigious in precisely the above sense.
Actor degree, closeness, and betweenness were calculated using the network
analysis program UCINET (Borgatti et al. 2002).

Changes in the structure of the world city system
Having established a· ranking of cities in terms of their power and prestige in 1981
and 2000, we tum to address three proximate questions regarding the impact of
global restructuring and the possible decoupling of the world city system from the
world-system: ·
How extensively has the structure of the world city system been altered across
the era of globalization?
Hymer ( 1972), Friedmann ( 1986), and Sassen (200 I) all share the expectation
that globalization is producing a novel global hierarchy of cities. To address thi
we calculate the Spearman rank-order correlatfon between each of our measures
of power and prestige in 1981 and 2000. This allows us, in a global fashion ,
to assess the degree to which the deck has been ' reshuffled ' over the last two
decades (i.e. the degree to which cities have exchanged ranks within the world
city system).
Have power and prestige in the world city system grown more concentrated
across the era of globalization?
Hymer ( I 972) and Sassen (2001) share the expectation that power will become
increasingly concentrated in the hands of multinationals located in an increasingly
small number of 'world ' or 'global ' cities as the world-economy develops. To
address this, we calculate and track the change from 1981 to 2000 in a standard
measure of inequality - the coefficient of variation - for each of our measures of
power and prestige.
Have cities decoupled from "traditional ' political geography in the course of
globalization?
Friedmann (1986) and Sassen (2001) argue that globalization is generating a
new geography of centrality and marginality that cuts across the old core/periphery and East/ West divides in the world-system . To address this claim, we match
each city to its country and assign it (1) to core, p eripheral, or semiperipheral
status on the basis of BoHen 's (1983) revision and update (BoHen and Appold
1993) of the scheme originally presented by Snyder and Kick ( 1979); and (2) to
Africa, Latin America, or Asia (with North American and Europe as the reference
group). We then estimate a series of regressions based on the conditional change
model:
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Y, = a + Bl(,+ B1 Y, 1 + c:,,

(2 .1)

where the dependent variable Y, is predicted from its lagged value Y, 1 and from a
vector of independent variables X measured at the same time point. A key feature
of this model is that it can be expressed in terms of ~y by subtracting r;_1 from
(2.l) to yield (Finkel 1995: 7):
(2 .2)
From this expression, it is clear that B 1 can be interpreted as the effect of X
on change in Y, controlling for the initial values of the dependent variable (thus
the name, conditional change model). The effect of the lagged dependent variable is simply the stability effect of Y, on Yin (2.1) minus J and has a variety
of possible substantive interpretations (Finkel 1995: 7- 11). With this model , we
are able to assess the extent to which the restructuring that the world city system
has undergone over the J981 - 2000 period cuts across region and the position of
nation-states in the interstate sy tern.
1

RESULTS

How hos the global restructuring of post two decodes
altered the world city system?
Of the senses of power discussed in the literature on world cities, degree centrality
is arguably the most prominent. World cities are variously defined as 'headquarter
cities ' (Hymer 1972), as ' basing points in the spatial organization and articulation
of production and markets ' (Friedmann 1986), and as 'concentrated command
points in the organization of the world economy ' (Sassen 2001 ). In this sense, outdegree is an unambiguous indicator of ' world cityness': Cities that send more ties
are cities that have captured more of the control functions of the world economy.
As one can note from ·1~1bk 2.1, the ranking of cities on outdegree in 1981 is only
moderately correlated with that ranking in 2000 (r = 0.672), indicating a measurable 'reshuffling' of the global urban hierarchy over the last two decades.
Outdegree centrality identifies as powerful or influential those cities that are
most active and visible (i.e. send the largest number of ties). Closeness centrality,
by contrast , identifies as powerful those cities with the shortest paths to others
in the network (quantified as the inverse average distance between a given city
and all others). By this criterion, the restructuring of the world city system over
the 1981 - 2000 period appears even more substantial, the correlation between the
rankings of cities on closeness in 1981 and in 2000 beingjusr0.570.
Betweenness centrality identifies as powerful those cities that lie on the paths
connecting other cities. Actors with high betweenness have greater power in the
sense that they serve as brokers and can control the flow of information through
the network. The correlation between the rankings of cities on betweenness in
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Table 2. 1 Speannan correlations (r) and coefficients of variation ( COV) for measures of
power and prestige in the world city system, 1981 vs . 2000
r Outdegree 1981 /Outdegree 2000

0.672

COVOutdegree 1981
COVOutdegree2000

10.981
13.018

r Closeness 1981 /Closeness 2000
CO V Closeness 1981
CO V Closeness 2000

0.570
0.105
0.095

r Betweenness 1981 /Betweenness 2000
COVBetweenness 1981
COV Betweenness 2000

0.646
9.555
12.672

r lndegree 1981 /lndegree 2000
CO VIndegree 1981
COV lndegree 2000

0.617
5.866
5.957

1981 and in 2000 is considerably less than perfect (r = 0.646), again indicating
substantial alteration in the global urban hierarchy.
A city 's indegree can be interpreted as an indicator of its prestige in the sense
that cities with high indegree have been chosen over others. Just as various versions of the world city hypothesis predict substantial change in the distribution
of power within the system in the context of globalization, they also suggest the
redistribution of prestige as firms find it increasingly important to establish ties
to those cities in whjch global control is produced and reproduced. The result
presented in Table 2.1 again lend support to the world city hypothesis. Far from
being stable, the ranking of cities in terms of prestige by 2000 was only moderately correlated with that ranking in 1981 (r = 0.617).
Viewed together, these results lend support to Hymer ( 1972), Friedmann ( 1986)
and Sassen 's (2001) view that globalization is producing a novel global urban
hierarchy. Given knowledge of the position of cities in the system 's distribution
of power and prestige in 1981 , one 's ability to predict their location in 2000 is
far from perfect. There is thus measurable 'slippage ' between the 1981 and 2000
maps of the world city system.
The world city hypothesis predicts more than just the emergence of a new
urban hierarchy. It also (especially Hymer and Sassen 's versions) describes that
hierarchy as one in which power is (increasingly) concentrated in the hands of
multinationals located in an (increasingly) small number of 'world ' or ' global '
cities. In other words, cities are not only expected to exchange positions within
the hierarchy in the context of global restructuring, but the global distribution
of power and prestige is predicted to grow increasingly unequal. We assess this
dimension of the world city hypothesis by tracking changes in the coefficients of
variation in each of our measures of power and prestige. The coefficient of variation (COY) - calculated as the standard deviation/mean - is a standard measure
of inequality. Smaller values indicate less relative dispersion . The COY is often
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used, for instance, by economists as a measure of 'a-convergence,' or of whether
the distribution of national income across economies is becoming more or less
equitable over time (e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995).
The results presented in Table 2. l are consistent with the world city hypothesis.
The distribution of outdegree and betweenness (i.e. of two of our three measures
of power) grew more unequal over the 1981 - 2000 period. The COY of outdegree
grew from 10.981 to 13.018 and the COY of betweenness grew from 9.555 to
l 2.672. Substantively, this means that the control functions of the world-economy
did indeed become more centralized (outdegree) while fewer cities 'mediate'
between others over time (betweenness). The COY of closeness on the other
hand, marginally declines from 0.105 to 0.095 . Substantively, this means that the
average city is no more distant from others in the system in 2000 than it was in
l 981. This should be interpreted in light of the findings for betweenness: With
fewer cities mediating between others any pair of cities should, ceter;s par;bus,
be closer. The results for our measure of prestige are also interesting. The COY of
indegree grows from 5.866 to 5.957. The distribution of prestige is thus growing
more unequal over time - a subset of cities received a larger proportion of all ties
sent in 2000 than was the case in 1981.

Has the world city system decoupled from the worldsystem?
Con istent with the world city hypothesis, the above analysis suggests that recent
decades have witnessed the emergence of a new urban hierarchy and that power
and prestige within this hierarchy have grown increasingly concentrated. What
are we to make of these facts? Smith and Timberlake (1995 : 8 l) have suggested
that in studying the tructure of the world city system ' we stand to learn a great
deal more about the nature of the world-system itself. ' Relations between cities,
they propose, undergird the structure of the world system and help to reproduce a
global economic order that exhibits a core/periphery structure at the level of the
interstate system. As such, we might expect change in the structure of the world
city system to lead change in the structure of the world system: Any revision of
the global hierarchy is likely to be manifest.first in the alteration of relations between cities. Thus, for instance, if the world-system is indeed in the midst of an
important shift in power from West to East (e.g. Arrighi 1994; Frank 1998), this
should be observable in change in the structure of the global urban hierarchy well
before it is revealed in change in the structure of trade between nations (Smith
,md White 1992).
The literature on world cities is rich with claims regarding the effects of the
most recent round of globalization on the world-system. Friedmann ( 1986) and
Sas en (200 I) argue that the restructuring that the world economy has undergone
in the past two to three decades has generated an urban hierarchy that cuts across
the traditional divides in the world-system. To the extent that this is true, we
would expect to observe substantial slippage between the map of the contemporary world city system drawn out above and the map of the world system. Hymer
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( 1972), in contrast, thought that globalization would largely reproduce pre-existing cross-national patterns of inequality and dependency. In his view, we should
expect the standing of cities in the world city system to match rather closely the
position of their nation-states in the world-system.
To explore the degree to which a new geography of centrality and marginality
may have emerged, we relate change in the power and prestige of individual cities
over the l 981 - 2000 period to the world-system position of the countries in which
they are located and to the world-region in which they are located. Jn all model
below, we also control for the population of each city. Interestingly, we find that
cities in the network that are located in non-core countries are, on average, ten
times larger than those located in core countries. As we show below, there is a
strong relationship between the population or raw demographic prominence of a
city and its power and prestige in the city system. Jt is therefore critical that we
control for population in testing for effects of world system .position; otherwise
any effect of world system position would likely be confounded by the large differences in average city size across world system positions.
The results for the measures of power and prestige are presented in Tables 2.2
and 2.3. For each measure, we present three models. In the first , we introduce
indicator variables for location in a semiperipheral or peripheral country (with
location in a core country as the reference category) and city population (natural
logarithm (In)). In the second, we introduce indicator variables coding for location in Africa, Latin America, or Asia (with location in North America or Europe
as the reference category). All of these variables are combined in a third model.
Jn all of the models in which it appears, population (In) has a significant positive effect on change in power or prestige over the 1981 - 2000 period. Outdegree
(In), closeness (In), betweenness (In), and indegree (In) grew significantly more
in larger cities than it did in smaller cities. The shifting position of cities in the
global _urban hierarchy is thus correlated with their raw demographic prominence
(Chase-Dunn and Manning 1999; see also Derudder 2003 ; Short 2004).
World-system position is explicitly ordered (Wallerstein 1974; Chase-Dunn
and Grimes 1995): the core region of the world economy is more powerful than the
semiperipheral region, and the semiperiphery is more powerful than the periphery. At the extreme, then, if Friedmann and Sassen are correct in their argument
that the contemporary urban hierarchy cuts across the traditional divides in the
world-system, the semiperiphery and periphery indicators should not significantly
predict change in power and prestige. Alternatively, if Hymer is correct in his
prediction that globalization would simply re-peripheralize the underdeveloped
world, change in power and prestige across the 1981 - 2000 period will be significantly ordered by world system position.
The results for outdegree, closeness, betweenness, and indegree are most consistent with the latter set of expectations. When change in power and prestige is
significantly related to semiperipheral and peripheral position, the relationship
is negative and the effects of world system position are ordered. The results of
Model I indicate that the average outdegree of cities located in semiperipheral
countries is roughly 9 percent lower than that of cities located in core countries (i.e.
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exp(- 0.090) - 1 = - 0.086), whereas the outdegree of cities located in peripheral
countries is 21 percent lower (i.e. exp(- 0.231)- I = - 0.206). Remembering that
the conditional change model can also be interpreted in terms of ~y (see equation
(2) above), the results of Model I mean, in addition, that the 'reshuffling' of cities
and the rise in inequality in the distribution of outdegree documented above was
biased in favor of cities located in core countries - controlling for initial levels of
outdegree, semiperipheral cities had 9 percent less outdegree relative to core cities
in 2000 than they did in J981 , while peripheral cities had 2 J percent less. Effects
of similar magnitude are found when indicator variables for region are introduced
into the regression (Model 3).
The results for closeness, betweenness, and indegree tell a similar story. Controlling for initial levels of the dependent variable and relative to the average city
located in a core country, the average city located in a semiperipheral country
was less close (Model 4), less between (Model 7), and less prestigious (Model
I 0) in 2000 than it was in J 98 J (significant at greater than the JO percent level
for closeness and betweenness). The average city located in a peripheral country
grew roughly 4 percent less close, 3 percent less between, and 12 percent less
prestigious. Taken together, the results presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 are more
consistent with Hymer 's view of globalization as reproducing existing cross-national patterns of inequality and dependency than with Friedmann 's and Sassen 's
visions of a world city system in the grips of novel forms of global restructuring.
Rather than cutting across the hierarchy of states in the interstate system, the
urban hierarchy appears to map onto it increasingly well.
What of the effects of region? Is there any evidence of significant global restructuring in these terms? 1f so, which statement of the world city hypothesis
might such evidence support? Interestingly, we find that the world region in which
cities are located is not significantly related to their outdegree (Models 2 and 3).
African, Latin American, and Asian cities did not experience a different rate of
change in outdegree than North American or European cities across the J 981 2000 period. We draw the same conclusions for betweenness from Models 8 and
9. So while the ' reshuffling' of cities and the rise in inequality in the distribution
of outdegree and betweenness was biased in favor of cities located in core countries, this occurred independent of any regional effects. The results for closeness
indicate that controlling for the initial level of the dependent variable and relative to North American and European cities, African, Latin American, and Asian
countries grew significantly more close over the 1981 - 2000 period (Model 5).
However, when population (ln) and world-system position are controlled (Model
6), the positive effects of Africa and Latin America are substantially attenuated
and no longer significant and Asian cities are found to have grown significantly
less clo e across the era of globalization. Finally, the results for indegree in Model
11 show that Latin American and Asian cities grew relative"ly more prestigious
over the time period under consideration. When the other controls are introduced,
however these coefficients are no longer significant and African cities are found
to have grown significantly less prestigious (Model 12). This effect is substantively large, with African cities, on average, having 28 percent less indegree in
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2000 than they had in 1981 , and this regional effect appears to account for the
negative effect of peripheral status on prestige in Model l 0.

CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we present the first results of a longitudinal analysis of data on
what we view as a key relation linking cities into a world system of cities: that
between multinationals and their subsidiaries. Our analysis of these data was
motivated by two general concerns. First, although the literature on world cities
is rich with claims regarding the effects of globalization on the structure of the
world-system, few have attempted to trace out exactly how the structure of the
world city system has changed over the course of the past two decades.-1 Second,
and related, although scholars such as Friedmann and Sassen suggest that the
world city system has decoupled from the world-system and that it has evolved in
such a way as to cut across the traditional divides in the world-system, no one has
systematically put such ideas to a test.
To these ends, we addressed three proximate questions. First, how extensively has the structure of the world city system been altered across the era of
globalization? Our analysis of the Spearman coqelations between each of our
measures of power and prestige in 1981 and 2000 suggests that the 'deck' has
been substantially ' reshuffled ' over the last two decades. Some cities have risen
in rank, others have fallen, and one 's ability to predict the position of cities in the
system's distribution of power and privilege in 2000 based on their standing in
1981 is modest. Second, have power and prestige in the world city system grown
more concentrated across the era of globalization? To address this, we tracked the
change from 1981 to 2000 in a standard measure of inequality - the coefficient
of variation - for each of our measures of power and prestige. The {esults show
that the distributions of two of our three measures of power (outdegree and betweenness) grew more unequal over time, while inequality in closeness declined
marginally. The distribution of indegree, our measure of prestige, grew marginally more unequal over time. Consistent with the world city hypothesis, then, we
find evidence that the distribution of power and prestige within the global urban
hierarchy has grown increasingly unequal. Finally, have cities been decoupled
from ' traditional' political geography in the course of globalization? Results of
a series of conditional change regressions estimated for each of our measures of
power and prestige support the position taken more than three decades ago by
Stephen Hymer (1972). While there is certainly less than a one-to-one matching
of cities onto nation-states in the world system, we find that the evolution of a
city 's power is shaped in a significant fashion by the world-system position of its
country. Moreover, these world-system effects are ordered in a fashion consistent
with the idea that cities located in core countries will, on average, grow to be more
powerful and prestigious than cities located in semiperipheral countries, which,
in tum, will be more powerful and prestigious than cities located in peripheral
countries. We find no evidence for the new geography of centrality and marginal-
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ity discussed by scholars such as Friedmann (1986) and Sassen (2001 ). Rather, we
find just the opposite - the reproduction of the 'old' geography in an even more
pronounced form. Our analysis of regional effects likewise reveals no evidence
for an urban hierarchy that cross-cuts regional divides in novel ways. We find, for
instance, no evidence of the rising Eastern hegemony described by Arrighi (1994)
or Frank (1998). When cities located in Asia are different from those in North
America or Europe in properly specified models, we find that it is only that they
have grown relatively less close across the 1981 - 2000 period. African cities grew
notably less prestigious - a finding that is consistent with many descriptions of the
'abandonment ' or ' neglect ' of Africa in the contemporary world economy.
In this chapter we have taken another step toward mapping the contemporary
world city system. While we believe that we have made some progress in this
regard , there are at least two promising directions for future research that would
firm up our preliminary results and serve to advance the longitudinal analysis of
the world city system. First, the results presented in this chapter pertain to the
entire world city system. Although we see no general pattern whereby the new
urban hierarchy cuts across North and South and East and West, this does not
speak to the possibility of a substantial reordering in the past few decades at the
very pinnacle of the urban hierarchy. In research under way, we are focusing our
anal~sis on the most powerful and prestigious cities, asking whether the above
findings hold for the class of headquarter/world/global cities that make up such a
small fraction of the cities analyzed in this chapter. Second, our data set could be
analyzed using the interlocking network model developed by Peter Taylor and the
Ga WC group (Taylor 2004). This would specify a three-layered network - a net
level (the world economy) a nodal level (cities), and a subnodal level of interlockers (the multinational enterprises (MNEs)) - that would unbundle the equation of 'city' with 'firm ' that the present analysis dictates (Taylor 2004). Methods
designed for the interlo_cking network model (Taylor 2005), could then be used to
validate our results for the entire system and for the subset of headquarter/world/
global cities.

NOTES
We use the generic 'world city hypothesis ' to refer to work following in the vein
of John Friedmann and Saskia Sassen (briefly reviewed below) who argue that developments in the world economy are generating a global urban hierarchy with a
distinctive, novel morphology. Although scholars in this tradition may vary appreciably on the particulars, they share the view that it is imperative to situate processes
of urbanization in the context of the development of the world economy, rather than
viewing them solely or even primarily as regional or national phenomena.
2 In the last decade there has been a flurry of work that, in clifferent ways, grounds
the network metaphor that has defined thinking on the world city system (see, for
instance, Smith and Timberlake J 995; Taylor et al. 2002; Taylor 2004; Derudder and
Taylor 2005 ; Derudder and Witlox 2005).
3 In the interests of space, we have kept the di cussion of data and methods to a minimum (see Alderson and Beckfield 2004 for details). Briefly, for each firm listed, we

U iCO RRECTED PROOFS ---

OT FOR DJSTRlBUTJO

1

r

Globalization and the world city system

35

coded the location of the firm 's headquarters and subsidiaries. We then constructed
directional, valued matrices for 1981 and 2000 from this list. In 2000, there are 3,692
unique cities in the list, 1,745 of which do not appear in the 1981 list. These cities
thus entered the system between 1981 and 2000 and necessarily had point centrality
(see below) of zero in 1981 . Owing to missing data, the total number of cities in the
regression analyses is reduced to 3,023.
4 See Smith and Timberlake (2002) and Shin and Timberlake (2000) for important exceptions.
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Abstract:
The notion of being 'Arab' in the contemporary Gulf is fraught in complexly different ways than
in other parts of the Mashriq. Arabness emerged relatively recently in the Gulf. It is traceable to
the late 1970s and 1980s (when events such as the Iranian Revolution had the unintended
consequence of 'Arabizing' and 'Islamicizing' Gulf regimes). This period (post-1970s) also
happens to be the global emergence of neoliberalism. I look at the notion of emergence in
relation to these two arenas: identity and neoliberalism, a connection not often explored by the
literature on either. Aihwa Ong (2007) invites scholars to trace the alignments of rationality and
logic at the 'edge of emergence.' Moreover, her suggestion that we increasingly focus on the
localized practices and discourses that constitute actually existing neo1ibera1ism is salutary: how
are localized discursive and symbolic materials taken up by actors such as states, corporations
(and combinations of the aforementioned), as well as non-institutional players in the project of
fashioning identity, piety, virtue, etc.? 'Arabness ' is both novel and - in the context of the
articulation between local Gulf capitalism and global neoliberalism - ' emergent. ' It is
complexly and actively deployed in the project of neoliberalization, productive on the level of
identity. Locals elites argue that cities such as Dubai are both a perfect examples of neoliberal
modernization and that this neoliberal identity is an elaboration of the city's authentic Arab
identity. One of the ironies here is the eventual erasure of any connections between Arabism and
the history of anti-colonial struggle represented by Nasserism and other Arabisms. This
neoliberalized Arabness is then taken up by Western elites (e.g., Thomas Friedman) to argue that
cities and polities such as Dubai and Doha represent a liberation of the Arabs from such
"unpalatable" ideologies as socialism and anticolonialism. This shift thus traces the broader
shifts in the political and cultural geographies, as well as geographies of cultural/symbolic
capital, in the contemporary Middle East.
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Flexible Citizenship in Dubai: Corporate Subjectivity and Ambivalences of
Arab Identity in the Emerging "City-Corporation"

On a pleasant December afternoon in 2004, I strolled the grounds of Dubai Internet City
(DIC), part of Dubai's media and information technology free zone (Tecom), after a lunch
meeting with one of my informants, Tecom employee Rana al-Mudarris.i The Internet City
building - also known as "the Mastercard building," owing to the corporate logo festooned
to it - was superficially a typical Dubai concoction: a modern steel and glass box clad in a
"traditional Arabian" fa~ade of false barajil (windtowers) and "oriental" arches. Yet in
other ways, the building's designers had striven for the exceptional: lush manicured lawns
marked by palm trees military in the rectilinear order of their landscaping, an artificial lake
overlooked by expensive restaurants and the stern mirrored-glass, corporate logoimprinted frontages of the DIC complex, the capital above the complex's main entrance
bearing the Orwellian slogan, "We See Hope Everywhere." All of this gave the impression
that one was no longer in Dubai but in some deracinated neoliberal utopia. As I walked
from the meeting through the lobby towards the exit, I passed three whiteboards on which
dozens of people had scrawled messages. I took a closer look and noted the red checkmark logo of Tecom's parent company, Dubai Holding corporation, on each board. Each
board also bore, in bold font, a question, respectively: "What does 'Realization' mean?'',
"Why is Determination important?", "Why is Imagination important?"

While a few responses did not exactly conform with the rules of the language game - one
person wrote that "realization" meant "to be a Muslim;" another confided that

Flexible Citizenship in Dubai, 3
"determination helps me wake up everyday;" a third noted dryly that the latter is simply "a
buzz word at times" - most of the several dozen responses were along the following lines:

"First step in creation"
"Journey towards enlightenment"
"I realized after coming to Dubai"
"Discover your potential"
"Brings out the best in me!!!"
"Makes you get 'there"'

:

"It separates doers from dreamers"
I

I,

I

"Imagination is what gives humans the ability to change their lives"
"Imagination is to free your mind of the impossible"

I do not know how spontaneous these mini-testimonies to the merits of imagination,
determination, and so on were. That they so closely paralleled official Dubai discourses
about the role of corporations and capital not only in providing basic welfare but in putting
in place the conditions for human self-actualization, and given that Tecom is a subdivision
of the Dubai ruler Muhammad Al Maktoum's sprawling holding corporation, I tend to think
that they were not entirely. Yet the connection that this piece of corporate debris
highlights between Tecom as a zone of "neoliberal exception" (Ong 2007) and the intimate
realms of personal identity is not entirely a top-down fabrication of corporate and state
officialdom.
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In this paper, I discuss the emergence over the last ten to fifteen years of neoliberal
governmentality in Dubai and its connection to the subjectivity of, and the negotiations of
identity by, the young professional citizens of the city-state who reached adulthood in the
1990s and who form the social basis of the emerging, corporate-dominated order of the
early twenty-first century. I describe how the principles of neoliberalism - for example, the
emancipation of capital from the oversight of the state, the commodification or
marketization of realms of life that were previously the prerogative of the state, the
apotheosis of the entrepreneur as a creative genius, the analogization of society as a
corporation - become localized. I analyze how this localization depends on the complex
interrelationship between powerful local institutions such as corporations and privileged
sectors of the state, hegemonic translations by local elites, and negotiations and
appropriations by local actors. Finally, I look at the fine-grained articulations of these
appropriations with locally situated social and gender identities and the ironies and
slippages that are generated in the socio-cultural process of neoliberalism's translations.

Although private capital, especially in the form of rentier capitalism, has always been the
dominant power in Dubai since its founding in the nineteenth-century, the 1990s
witnessed a new local theorization of the significance of privatization and a corollary
extrapolation of this theory to discourses of the city's exceptional character in the Middle
Eastern and especially Arab context. In the 1990s the model of the developmentalist, high
modernist state (Scott 1998) collapsed in much of the world, leading of necessity to a
reformulation of the relationship between the state and govern mentality in many parts of
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the global south or developing world (Ferguson 2005, Ferguson 2006, Ferguson and Gupta
2002, Harvey 2006, Herzfeld 2005, Ong 2000, Scott 2005). In the Arab countries this
period also saw the waning of the cultural and political weight of what Gulf Arabs call the
"northern" Arab countries (Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria) because of war,
economic collapse, or external occupation, and an elevation of the smaller Gulf countries to
an unprecedented regional weight.

The Gulf countries proceeded through the twentieth century by patching together systems
of modernist developmentalism, mineral extraction, and rentier capitalism. In Dubai, the
approach was slightly different. By late in the century, the state, at least, began talking
about the imminent end of the oil economy, which constituted less than ten percent of
Dubai's revenues in the year 2000 (as compared to about 55 percent in Abu Dhabi and 50
percent in Qatar, for example. See Economist 2002:27). As an alternative to the mineral
extraction-rentier state, there was an increasing emphasis on foreign private investment,
the real estate sector, and the development of free-trade zones. Begun relatively modestly
in the 1970s, free-trade zones had become immense in size and a common feature of the
Dubai landscape, both figuratively and literally, by the turn of the twenty-first century.

Aihwa Ong has remarked the waning of state-centered practices and discourses of
sovereignty in Southeast Asia, coining the term "graduated sovereignty" to describe how
some states in this region "have responded to global market forces with a particular mix of
governing practices and military repression" (Ong 2000:57). Graduated sovereignty is
characterized by flexibility: "there is discipline in the Foucauldian sense, there is labor
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discipline in the old sense; there are zones of corporatist power and zones of special
production" (Ong 200:72). Although the case of Dubai is in some ways different from most
of the cases Ong has studied - it is officially part of a larger state, the United Arab Emirates
(UAE), and depends for its defense (officially) on the UAE military and (actually) on the
American imperial presence in the Gulf - as a semi-independent polity with prerogatives
over much of its policy framework, especially as pertains to the economy, the Dubai state
has deployed such a mixed, flexible toolkit of governmentality. Free zones such as Tecom
often do not conform either to Dubai or to UAE state laws in areas such as employment and
visa requirements, labor market-nationalization policies, or media infrastructure and
censorship. Multi-national companies enjoy 100 percent ownership and profit repatriation
within the confines of the free-trade zones, as opposed to stringent profit- and ownershipsharing laws in "outside" economy.

What Ong would call the exceptional nature of this developing economic and political
framework significance has strong parallels in the intellectual and cultural spheres. The
significance attributed by Dubai locals to the new, more neoliberal approach, and how
these construals are shaped by and shape local social and cultural identities, is the main
focus here.

The flexible, neoliberal approach has been called "the city-corporation" model by one
influential Emirati theorist, Abdul-Khaleq Abdullah (Abdullah 2006). Although the phrase
itself is Abdullah's own, many if not most Dubayyans share his general thesis. No more so
than the young professionals discussed here, whom I call, following Ong (1999) and Wilson
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(2004) Dubai's "flexible citizens." Linguistically, culturally, and often physically mobile,
often socially marginal, the flexible citizens of Dubai see their city and themselves as a
genuinely progressive force in the Arab world. They are the local social formation that
bears the disproportionate burden for the localization of global discourses of
neoliberalism. They constitute a committed cadre of the city-corporation state and the
Dubai ruler, Sheikh Muhammad's, future vision for a polity in which capital is dominant.
There are objective reasons that they are among the most committed to the Sheikh's
project. Among other things, flexible citizens consist of disproportionate numbers of nonelites - individuals whose extraction is considered, locally, to be non-noble or "foreign" - as
well as women. For these groups, this generation, i.e., that of the city-corporation period,
is the first to have such a prominent public and responsible role in the fortunes of top
Dubai firms. Moreover, there is the socialization that these subjects undergo in the process
of working fo_r firms such as Maktoum. Following EP Thompson's classic work on the
processes of identity- and class-formation of the English proletariat (Thompson 1963), Ara
Wilson has noted the educative nature of work at the Thaksin Shinawatra firm among the
aspiring Bangkok middle-class (Wilson 2004:141). Work in the Maktoum and comparable
firms in Dubai is similarly educative, in the sense of shaping new social and class identities,
desires, and visions of the future among middle-class Dubayyans.

Yet in less obvious ways, there are factors - gender being most significant among them which make the relationship of the flexible citizens to the city-corporation model much
more complex and ambivalent. In this paper, I ask: in what ways is the city-corporation
idea more than simply a direct translation of neoliberal principles of free markets and the
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apotheosis of capital? How is this idea situated within Dubai contexts of social and gender
identity and linguistic practice? How does it frame local discourses about modernization
and progress? What are the ambivalences and tensions that arise when Dubayyans invoke
the city-corporation as an aspiration?

Founded in 1832, according to local legend, by an offshoot of the Bani Yas tribe of Abu
Dhabi, Dubai was until the 1970s a small and remote port in Britain's far-flung "informal
empire,, (Onley 2005a), home base for diverse groupings of merchants and so-called
smugglers. The period from the incorporation of Dubai (and other Gulf states) into the
Empire at different points in the nineteenth century, through independence in the early
1970s, to current times, is marked by various economic activities and policies: among them
are market protection and capital flight; smuggling and "crime"; transshipment; the
development of sprawling real estate and financial portfolios connecting the city to other
cities and states across Asia, Africa, and Europe; and the development of free-trade zones
(Davidson 2008, Field 1985, Herb 1999, Heard-Bey 1982, Marchal 2005).

Without exaggerating the significance of individuals in historical process, it is helpful to
acknowledge the imprint - in terms both of policy and the physical shape of the city - both
of the late ruler Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum ( d. 1990) and his son, the current ruler,
Muhammad. While the father focused on the formulation of policy (e.g., free-trade zones,
land tenure, private-public sector governance) and on modernization infrastructure
(Heard-Bey 1982), it is the son, along with his brothers and effective junior-partners
Maktoum (d. 2006) and Hamdan, who has guided Dubai to its current status as the
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aggressive, rapidly developing "Arabian Tiger" of mass-mediated representations. As has
often been noted, Muhammad calls himself the "CEO of Dubai." A larger than life figure to
ordinary Dubayyans, he has become for his subjects not only a model of wise leadership
but also a floating signifier to which are attached diverse aspirations, desires, and images of
what I will be describing as a localized, Dubayyan-Emirati modernity. In a historical
interpretation of Dubai's development, for example, the political scientist, Abdul-Khaleq
Abdullah, has written that "the leader of this Muhammedan Era (al-hiqba alMuhammadiyya) is a poet who possesses the intuition of clairvoyance and the ability to

peer into and see clearly the future" (Abdullah 2006:23).ii Not only Abdullah, but especially
Dubai's flexible citizens, analogize the city as a corporation, with Muhammad its visionary,
paternalistic chief executive.iii

It was under both Sheikhs Rashid and Muhammad that Dubai created a sprawling set of
parallel state and private sector institutions that have rendered the boundary between
state and private sector indistinct. This can be seen in the case of the Maktoum holding
corporation, Dubai's largest and most powerful company. Mike Davis is correct to observe
that in Dubai the state is nearly indistinguishable from private capital (Davis 2006:61).
Like the traditional family corporation (Field 1985), with its massive portfolio of diverse
interests - from banking to retail to real estate to travel, and on down the line, the
Maktoum firm has spun off various subsidiaries headed by bureaucrats who are,
simultaneously, CEOs of private corporations and government officials. Examples are the
holding corporation Dubai Holding, headed by Muhammad al-Gergawi, of which Tecom,
headed by Ahmad bin Bayyat, is itself a subsidiary; Muhammad al-Abbar's real estate
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behemoth EMAAR, specializing in resort and high-rise developments from Dubai to
Istanbul to Dakar and back; and Sultan Ahmad bin Sulaym's Nakheel, another real estate
firm, which specializes in themed retail and resort development. As bin Bayyat told me in
an interview, these corporations are, depending on the given context, both private firms
and government "initiatives." This capacity to shift between policy regimes is an example
of the exceptional nature of these entities. It is, however, the "exceptional" in a broader and
more symbolic sense that they inform contemporary Dubai social and political realities.

"A Country is Like a Company": The City-Corporation

Many supporters of Sheikh Muhammad's agenda often cite him and his firms as examples
of the modernity,.flexibility, and liberalism of the city-state. Abdul-Khaleq Abdullah has
been among those most active in the formulation and dissemination of such
representations. His essay, "Dubai: Rihlat madina 'arabiyya min al-mahalliyya ila 1'alamiyya" [Dubai: The Journey of an Arab City from Regionalism to Cosmopolitanism],
published soon after a large construction-worker demonstration in September 2005
(Abdullah 2006), not only celebrates Sheikh Muhammad and the writer's native city, it
theorizes the contemporary practice of graduated sovereignty as a model of development
the author calls "the city-corporation" (al-madina al-sharika). A uniquely elegant and
comprehensive summary of elite discourses, its author a prominent public intellectual,
consulted by local media whenever a broader, cool-headed perspective is needed to frame

Flexible Citizenship in Dubai, 11
current events, this is an exemplary document of the emerging neoliberal hegemony in
Dubai.

Abdullah transports the reader into a realm where states do not manipulate ideologies or
undertake hegemonic project~ in attempts to police their subject populations and optimize
their productive capacities. Rather, political and urban space becomes a commodity,
politics are transformed into marketing: "the state as brand and the city as brand, just as
with the branded commodity and the branded corporation, is a natural phenomenon, and
does not diminish the standing of cities, the dignity of states, or the depth of civilizations
and cultures" (Abdullah 2006:12).iv All states and cities seek to brand themselves, and this
should be regarded as part of the organic development of globalization:

There is no difference in the age of globalization between the commodity, the
state, merchandising (al-bida'a), the city, cultures, and services. All are
equivalent, and in the context of competition, the relationship between
becomes ever tighter ... for in order to remain in the vanguard (almust prioritize promotion and marketing ... because
essence, and the surface, in this day and age, is

them

muqaddima ), Dubai

appearance is as important as

as important as content itself. [Abdullah

2006:12-13].

Quoting a well-known conventional saying of the former Dubai ruler Sheikh Rashid bin
Said Al Maktoum, Abdullah asserts that "in Dubai there is one and only one priority, and
that is trade and nothing but trade, and the economy and nothing but the economy. Po1itics
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in Dubai are inconceivable" (Abdullah 2006:14).v Abdullah then coins the phrase "citycorporation" (al-madina al-sharika) to elaborate his notion state sovereignty:

Non-interference by the state in the economy is the law for all aspects of life in the
city-corporation (al-madina a/-sharika) ... a city which offers a pool
labor, 100 percent profit repatriation, non-interference in

of skilled, cheap

any way by the UAE state in

the operations of the free zones, especially when it comes to labor laws, as well as lack of
taxes and speed and ease of communications with other cities and capitals of trade and.
finance. [Abdullah

2006:15].

Abdullah's treatise is a sort o(charter document, supplying the justification for firms such
as the Maktoum arid its subsidiaries, but also the ideology for other (ostensibly private but
well-connected and politically powerful) family corporations, such as Majid Al Futtaim
(MAF), whose chiefs subscribe to, and whos~ employees are trained to internalize, the
city- corporation principles of commodification, labor exploitation, and the withering of
the state.

Muhammad, a management-level employee for MAF, was a stimulating interlocutor during
my fieldwork in Dubai. As well as being an informative guide to the city and its social
landscape, Muhammad would often provoke me to question (if not to jettison) the
politically progressive and universalist assumptions that I sometimes unwittingly brought
to my work. The side Muhammad took in one such argument was also spontaneous
expression in his piety to the city- corporation idea. Over lunch one day, Muhammad
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began praising Sheikh Muhammad, claiming that he is building a "dream" in Dubai (by
which he meant not only the Sheikh's own dream but also the realization of the aspirations
of his subjects). I asked whether there were not problems with such a dream, whether it
did not select out of the picture the labor that did the actual building of the "dream," that of
the foreign construction workers, for example, who have few to no rights in the UAE
(Human Rights Watch 2006).

Muhammad paused and there was an awkward silence, which I took to mean that I had
broken a taboo. "What was the First World War about?" he finally asked.

I paused, not knowing what he was driving at.

He went on: "You (Westerners) like to think of it as a fight for democracy and liberalism,
but is that really so? No, it was about the money, of course!" I protest incoherently and
stammer something about history being more complicated than that. He interrupts me:

A country is like a company, Ahmed. Show me a single society that doesn't

somebody. No one forces the Indians to come here, and, in any case,

exploit

they (are not

themselves particularly committed to Dubai). They send most of the money they make
back to India. No one tells them they can't do that.

But you don't mention how the

United States forced all those Chinese to come to the US to build their railroads. Or how
they kidnapped all those

slaves and shipped them to plantations in the South.

Flexible Citizenship in Dubai, 14
The "Dubai Model" and Ambivalences of Arabness

"I am big believer that reality is what you perceive it to be," Muhammad had said earlier in
the same conversation, summarizing his business philosophy. Business success is equal
parts acumen and seduction, maybe even more the latter than the former. If customers at
the MAF shopping mall that he managed did not get distracted by the image they are
presented, the business fails, he said. If there is no seductive dream-image to the
experience of Dubai, investors will not bother to invest. Above all, one should not blemish
the dream by bringing up mere facts. "We're fairly happy to leave the politics to the ruler
here. As long as we're free to do our business, we don't complain," he said. Or, as Abdullah
put it, "appearance is as important as essence."

On a superficial level Abdullah's theoretical and Muhammad's similar but relatively
untheoretical take on the city- corporation both seek to capture apd explain the putative
success story of Dubai. Reading such narratives in political and discursive contexts,
however, reveals ambivalences. Abdullah's assurance that Dubai's supposedly unique mix
of authoritarianism and deregulation is a model of contemporary capitalist development
sits awkwardly beside the city's political-economic situation in 2006, the year of his essay's
publication. This was to locals an inglorious year bookended by huge labor demonstrations
(in September 2005) and a scathing, highly publicized report by Human Rights Watch
(November 2006) exposing the UAE, and particularly the Dubai, construction sector as a
Dickensian archipelago of human rights abuses (Human Rights Watch 2006). When I went
to Dubai between December 2006 and January 2007, almost every Dubayyan I met had an
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opinion about the report: some simply denied its basis in fact, others conspiratorially
theorized that it was yet another attempt by the Americans to blacken the reputation of the
Arabs. Further evidence of locals' anxieties comes from discourse: during my fieldwork,
many Dubayyans spoke about their pride in their city and invoked the same notion of the
Dubai model that Abdullah discusses. "In ten years' time," a young Emirati woman told me,
"we've become Singapore." Far from demonstrating the argument for a Dubai model,
however, such discourses inadvertently revealed the anxieties exercising many
contemporary Dubayyans.

In a conversation with me, an Emirati academic and an otherwise an astute observer of the
Gulf and UAE political scene, made a telling comment. The Human Rights Watch report had
just been released a month prior to our meeting, and I asked him his opinion. "We must
take the report seriously," he said. "As the city grows, there are mistakes that are
inevitable. Second, with rapid growth, the change in (national labor laws) tends to lag
behind." One notes the disconnect between the theories that abound when locals are
relatively assured that details of Dubai's development are well-hidden (Abdullah's and
Muhammad's facile invocations of dreams and an almost frictionless world in which Dubai
elites can conjure cities out of sand) and the more sober, distanced tone when Dubayyans
cannot avoid the facts (the displacement of responsibility for labor laws and practices onto
anonymous, objective forces of "development" and the supposedly natural inertia of labor
laws which will assuredly change once elites know all the facts). The academic continued:
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The international legal environment is changing

all the time.

to keep up. Dubai is falling behind like any other country. But the
wrong to blame the (UAE) government. The government
inhuman treatment of labor. Those responsible are

Countries are

unable

report is absolutely

is not a participant in the

the Indian companies. They are

not abiding by the terms of the contracts they sign with workers.

"Indian companies?' I asked.

"Well, you, know, I meant 'global' companies." Then he assured me that "people here do
not shy away from criticism. This is not Saudi Arabia. But there is a limit to the peoples'
tolerance for criticism."

This individual is a serious scholar and not naive. The respect he accords the skepticism of
fellow scholars such as myself is perhaps reflected in his sudden shift from "Indian" to
"global" companies as the main players in the HRW scandal.vi But the comment reflects the
ways in which many Dubayyans attempt to defuse potentially explosive facts by
culturalizing or "nationalizing" them ("Indian companies," "this is not Saudi Arabia").

Folk theories of national characteristics and everyday ethnographic theorizing were salient
in many conversations I have had with Emiratis. They were also central to arguments
about the Dubai Model (mithal Dubai or qudwat Dubai), the exemplary modernity that
Dubai allegedly represents.

A conversation with an Emirati developer I had in late 2003

will highlight some of the main themes of such everyday ethnographic thinking and of its
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social contexts. The developer, whose projects include important and aesthetically
distinguished resorts and gated communities, started out by reflecting on the values that
guide his conceptualization of new projects. Much to my surprise, he said that he dislikes
the notion of "Islamic architecture": "I try to develop the desert. You cannot build Islamic
architecture in there. The rule in the desert is simplicity. Simple buildings. The desert is
about feelings of space ... Good design has to have spirit." When you have a great site, "you
don't have to build anything," because God gave you everything.

This feeling for simplicity, he said, is connected with the fact that "I am a Bedouin." "We
don't have a (house), we have a tent." While Europeans are partly responsible for imposing
their notions of "Islamic" and "authentic local" architecture on the Emiratis, the lion's share
of the blame for what he considers the generally execrable architecture in the UAE falls on
two groups in particular: the "Iranians" and the "Indians." The Iranians are responsible for
the ubiquitous wind-tower structure (barjeel) seen on many pre-independence buildings
and referenced in postmodern ones in the UAE. But such buildings are not Emirati, he says.
The original wind-tower houses were built by Iranians, "not by us." Worse are the
"Indians." Abu Dhabi, he said, is the worst example of the influence of Indians on Emirati
architecture. It is filled with so-called Islamic buildings, but they are artificial and
expensive. In Abu Dhabi, he said, you always see Indians designing arches, which are not
Islamic but Indian.

When this developer says that he .is a "Bedouin," he is referring to the main ethnic divide in
the UAE, that between Emiratis who consider themselves "pure" Arabs ( sometimes called
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bedu) and those who are of Iranian descent ('ajam or 'ayam). Dubai, the developer's home
city, is also implicitly referenced, since its population of Emirati natives is overwhelmingly
Iranian in extraction (approximately eight of ten Emiratis from Dubai are 'ayam ). A third
important group, from this developer's persepective, are the expatriates, who constitute a
majority of the UAE population and among whom South Asians number approximately half
(South Asians are often grouped under the catchall phrase "Indians," as seen in the
developer's case).

When the Gulf states started receiving greater numbers of immigrants as oil wealth
increased, they initiated cultural nationalist projects to assert or maintain what they saw as
their authentic Arab identity (Onley 2005b ). The story is complex, and is also connected
with the rise of Nasserism and other nationalisms of the left in the Arab world, ideologies
that were confrontational in relation to the Gulf monarchies and sought to paint the latter
as spear-carriers for British and American imperialism. The Gulf "national dress,"
consisting of "traditional" gowns and head-dress - the Emirati kandura and ghutra, the
Bahraini thawb, or the Saudi disdasha and shimagh, for example - each derive from Najdi,
i.e., "Bedouin," roots and are the most visible example of this "Arabization" of countries that
are, and to some extent have always been, multinational or even "anational" (Anscombe
2005, Onley 2005a). The Arab/Bedu-'Ayam distinction and the feeling of anxiety about a
potential flood of "Indians" remain unresolved legacies of the Gulf economic boom and
state-building projects.
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In 2003, the month of Ramadan fell during a period of extended fieldwork I was conducting
the UAE, and a locally-based anthropologist friend invited me to join him in attending some

maja/is, receptions, at the homes of some Dubai notables. At one such gathering, a fellow
majlis attendee, a doctor, had just returned from trip to Malaysia. My anthropologist friend
asked him about the business atmosphere there and the quality of Malaysian manufactured
goods. The doctor said that Malaysian goods were impressive and that the country was a
good place for business. He then gave the example of Japan a few decades ago. When
Japanese goods first arrived on the Dubai market they were considered cheap and lacked
prestige. Now, Japanese products are more expensive than American ones. We can expect
the same from Malaysia. The Asians have something, he added. My friend - an Arab
expatriate - replied that each people has its national character, "even we Arabs."

This comment inspired our host, an Emirati, to reminisce about his student days in
America. Back then, he hung out with the Arab students and they would take long coffee
brakes. They began by saying "OK, this will be a ten-minute coffee break. But, we being
Arabs, ten minutes always turned into an hour, and an hour into two hours." The Japanese
students were different. When they took a ten-minute break, they would take exactly ten
minutes and promptly return to work. There was a Japanese student who studied math.
He was getting straight A's, but he fell in love with a woman who was a music student. So
he switched his major to music, said our host, and he still got straight A's! The Indians
were similar, he went on. There was a computer room with these archaic computers. The
Indian students would sleep in this room! "We Arabs don't have that work ethic, that sense
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of team work." It's nothing to do with how intelligent we are. "But we're too
individualistic."

There was a Sudanese student that our host also knew in college. He used to spend all his
time taking his fellow Sudanese students to the airport, to the hospital, taking them around
and helping them arrange their affairs. "I told him one day, 'why do you do this, you are
wasting all of your time?' He said, 'but I am Sudanese.' I said 'so what! You have to let
them be responsible for themselves."'

At another majlis that we attended, we arrived and saw the host, a prominent local
intellectual and news junkie, clicking back and forth on his TV remote, between al-Jazeera,
BBC, CNN, al-Arabiyya, and other satellite networks. News was coming in of a terrorist
attack in Saudi Arabia. A couple of the guests made some comments about how the

lslamiyyin were a blight on the region. Someone critiqued the Saudi society for opening
itself to such currents, a comment that reminded me of a conversation with another
Emirati, who pilloried the Saudis for "distorting Islam." The host connected Saudi politics
to the project of American hegemony in the Middle East, and the topic switched to the war
in Iraq, then in the early months of the American invasion. The host lamented the lack of
preparedness of the Americans to undertake such an enterprise, and mentioned the
Kuwaitis in passing: "they've become too pro-American. They're even growing their beards
long and wrapping them around their shoulders like the Jews."
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Later, a guest told the gathering about his recent trip with a Dubai delegation to Djibouti
and Eritrea. "What are the people like?" asked one of the other guests. Djibouti has a lot of
Arab influences, responded the traveler. They are Arab, specifically Yemeni "min al-as/ wa
fi-1-taqaleed" (in their extraction and their habits). Eritrea is half Christian and half Muslim

but it feels very Arab. There are signs in Arabic. There is also a Somalian influence.
Another guest tells of how the Somalians are turning their old buildings into museums. A
fellow sitting next to the first guest dismisses this, saying the Somalians are more likely to
destroy such buildings than to turn them into museums. The host interjects with the
observation that while most states evolve out of tribes (min a/-qaba'il i/a-d-duwa/), Somalia
has gone in the reverse direction, from a state (dawla) to a bunch of tribes (qaba'i/).

Returning to the topic of Eritrea, the traveler tells us about how the Eritreans, impressed by
the "Dubai moder' of development (mithal Dubai), asked, half-jokingly, about the possibility
of Dubai invading Eritrea. He says that the Eritreans have tried all sorts of Arab
consultants on various matters, and that Dubai Municipality was the only one that was
efficient and modern. "A people with this kind of organization must be modern," he quotes
one of his interlocutors as saying.

There is an ambivalence in such everyday ethnological musings. On the one hand, there is a
pride in being Arab, sometimes, as in the case of the "Bedouin" developer, expressed as
disdain for foreigners from immediately neighboring countries (e.g., India and Iran),
sometimes, as in the case of the traveler and his host, as a gentle condescension to_w ards
more benighted peoples (such as Africans). But the feeling of being Arab is complicated by
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a sense that Arabs are afflicted with certain behavioral and attitudinal impediments to
being modern. In the latter reading, the Arab world is on the constant verge of chaos and
Arabs, if left to their own devices, would revert to backwardness or succumb to the
blandishments of American hegemony. There is one exception to this narrative. Dubai is a
mitha/, a model; it is different. It becomes the hope of the Arabs and the broader region, as

the story of the Eritreans wanting Dubai to invade them jokingly implies.

"We Think They're Abnormal!": The Ethos of the City-Corporation and Dubai
Exceptionalism

No organizations better represent Dubayyan "post-Arab" and neoliberal modernity than
the aforementioned Maktoum and MAF firms. To both their management and their
employees these organizations are the embodiment of the values sketched in theories such
as that of the city-corporation: they reflect neoliberalism both in the negative sense, the
alleged liberation of the market from state intervention and from "politics," and in the
positive and active sense, as a space of individual creativity and active creation of novel
identities and ways of being along the "alignments of market rationality, sovereignty, and
citizenship ... at the edge of emergence" (Ong 2007:3).

More truly "exceptional" in Ong's sense of the term are the Maktoum firms, which, being
both state and private corporations, are given more latitude to experiment in governmental
flexibility. Although I focus here on Tecom, my observations are generalizable to other
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Maktoum subsidiaries and to some extent - with reference to company ideology and
employee identity, for example - to MAF.

When I interviewed him, Ahmad bin Bayyat, the head of Tecom, told me that in Dubai,
people have "a completely different mindset" from their neighbors both in the UAE and the
region. "We are not laid-back and relaxed. There is a hunger here for new ideas and
different ways of thinking." Unlike in other parts of the Arab world, according to bin
Bayyat, the people of Dubai do not depend on the government to subsidize services. This in
turn reinforces the practices of the government, which has to have "a commercial mindset."

ABB: Dubai's fundamental uniqueness is its people. I don't mean just the natives, I mean
everybody ... If you look at the population demographics of Dubai, you see that local growth
in relation tq expatriate growth is negative. How do you address this? We can't reverse it.
We're not like a big Western·nation, where the majority are nationals and you can, for
example, put up barriers to immigration. If we did that, we would have an empty country.
So once we realized that (immigration and the status of locals as a minority) are facts of
life, we said, 'let's bring the smartest immigrants, not the richest.'

AK: Is (Tecom) a typical government office, or is it a corporation?

ABB: It is not a government office, it is a government initiative. We don't like the term
"government" here. (Tecom) was just an idea. Sheikh Muhammad wanted it to be
commercially viable. He did not want it to be subsidized by the government in any way.
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Therefore, it has nothing to do with the government. The government did not pay to set it
up. We had to sell the idea to financial markets and raise debt from banks.

AK: How has Emiratization (the nationalization of the labor market) affected Tecom?

ABB (smiling): When you look at the government sector, you see that twenty percent of (the

employees) have been employed through nationalization. Here, (we did not implement
Emiratization). We treated everyone the same, and thirty percent of our workforce is
Emirati. It is primarily a problem of branding. Once you bracket off (a certain part of the
population) you treat them as a number, not based on their merit ... Locals are not simply
numbers to us. A majority of the locals we hire are young, with two to three years'
experience as employees of (conventional) nationalization jobs. Here, you work from 8am
to 5pm, there you work from 8 to 2. So, they are serious, not frivolous. We only get the
serious ones. But the situation is different in most GCC countries (including the UAE).
They think that their way is normal. No, we are normal! We think they're being abnormal!

Three employees of Tecom, Tanya, an Iraqi expat, Marcus, an American expat, and Nadia,
an Emirati whose father was a diplomat and had lived abroad for many years, elaborated
on bin Bayyat's themes over lunch at the Tecom canteen one day, giving me a flavor of what
it is like, subjectively, to work for the "mother company." Tanya praised the caliber of her
co-workers: "People are so conscientious. They don't have to (work overtime) but they
want to. This is a continuously evolving place. Recruitment is by hand-picking. It's
selective. And every individual is unique." She added that she particularly valued the
emphasis on the "betterment of the individual" and the "sense of camaraderie."
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Nadia agreed: "The sense of community is part of the reason I decided to join Tecom."

T: I don't know, maybe I'm romanticizing things. But I definitely think that people care
about each other here.

Marcus: The purpose of (the enclave) is to promote interaction. It is to encourage
creativity ... A good question to ask is how has this community helps (workers) transcend
national boundaries. (He indicates Nadia). Among locals it's taboo for a woman to sit with
men, like we are doing now.

N: I lived abroad most of my life, so I don't see things that way. You can't avoid
socialization with men, with others. I don't think there's anything wrong with this, as long
as girls don't abuse it.

M: What this community is about is liberalism, liberalizing oneself. It teaches you the
necessity of cross-cultural interaction. You can't isolate yourself, you have to communicate.

Near the end of our conversation, Tanya compared Tecom to Huxley's Brave New World.
She did not seem to appreciate the irony of comparing the "mother company" to a future
world in which a technocratic elite cultivates an intellectual ruling class while keeping the
masses docile through a sophisticated apparatus of popular spectacle and chemical
manipulation. One must not, as MAF's Muhammad had implied, profane the dream image.
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Bin Bayyat reiterates many of the central concepts of the neoliberal city-corporation
theory: the superiority of the market social model over the statist-national model; the
notion of Dubai exceptionalism in its national and regional contexts; the assumption that
the free market is the panacea to all the ills afflicting Arabs with backwardness; that for
Tecom and organizations like it to pull the rest of Dubai and the UAE into the modern age,
these companies must first carve zones of gonvernmental exception from the larger state.
There is also the Tecom self-image that it is an organization that values individuality and
creativity, again unlike the surrounding national and regional contexts, where states
allegedly treat their people like numbers. This is connected to what is perhaps bin
Bayy__at's most interesting implication: that Dubai's uniqueness comes from its people,
defined as both locals and expatriates. Tecom's corporate ethos is therefore exceptional in
yet another sense: bin Bayyat is implicitly arguing that the Tecom zone of exception is
indissociably connected to a Dubai future beyond the Arab-'Ayami and EmiratiExpatriate distinctions, a future where merit, not ascriptive identity, is the criterion for
belonging in the community.

The three employees to whom I spoke reiterated many of these themes, and elaborated on
them in some ways. The values ofTecom, as the employees see them, are a care for the
individual, creativity, and a sense of community. Furthermore; Marcus is arguing that this
is a progressive mission or calling, with which companies such as Tecom are burdened for
the greater good and which must be inculcated in employees. The process of working for
Tecom is a process of enlightenment. This subjective sense of participating in a greater
calling, something that may be unpalatable to the masses outside the enclave (laboring as

Flexible Citizenship in Dubai, 27
they do with their merely local prejudices), as well as of being - as Nadia suggests temperamentally unique and therefore capable of being so educated, are traits shared by
Dubai's flexible citizens.

Dubai's Flexible Citizens

In their quest to accumulate capital and social prestige, according to Aihwa Ong, "flexible
citizens":

Emphasize, and are regulated by, practices favoring flexibility, mobility, and
repositioning in relation to markets, governments, and cultural regimes.
logics and practices are produced within particular structures of
family, gender, nationality, class mobility, and social power.

These

meaning about

[Ong 1999:6].

In Dubai, corporations such as Maktoum and MAF actively recruit individuals with
backgrounds that favor a "flexibility" in some of the ways that Ong and others have
described: an ability to negotiate Arabic and English linguistic milieus and Middle Eastern,
Western, (and often South Asian) cultural worlds (see also Wilson 2004:133- 162). In
turn, it is through working in and participating in the social worlds of companies such as
Maktoum and MAF that these Emiratis negotiate locally-prevailing structures of meaning,
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fashioning·identities that are both rooted in local social contexts but which these actors
perceive to be somehow exceptional or beyond those contexts.

Among these structures of meaning are age/generation, gender, and ethnicity. The
generation that came of age during the 1990s and were in their mid-twenties at the turn
the twenty-first century happened to enter the workforce at the same time that the
Maktoum, MAF, and similar firms began ambitious initiatives and projects, such as
Maktoum's Tecom, EMAAR, and Nakheel, and the large MAF retail outfits. These companies
became known for hiring and especially promoting disproportionate numbers of women
and ethnically mixed or naturalized (i.e., non-Arab, non-'Ayam) Emirati employees (as well
as expatriates, especially Sou"th Asians, a fascinating topic, alas, for another paper).

Dubai's flexible citizens are usually fluent in English, often as a result of their having done
higher education in America or Britain. Although travel is much easier for men - it is far
less common for Emirati families to allow their unmarried daughters to live and study
abroad - women are compensating for this by enrolling in various English-language higher
education institutions in Dubai and nearby Sharjah (if they haven't already enrolled in one
of the Dubai's prestigious English or American primary-high schools). Either way, young
professionals in Dubai now master at least two languages, Arabic and English, and often
Persian and Hindi/Urdu as well. Among the numerous moments I felt like an amateur
stumbling across the complex Dubai cultural landscape was one day at the Emirates
Towers building, headquarters of the Maktoum corporation, when I went up to a Dubai
local dressed in the national outfit, the kandura and ghutra. In the most perfect Arabic I
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could muster, and hoping to impress him that I, a non-local, had grappled with the local
language, I asked him for directions. He turned and, without flinching, in a perfect deadpan
Oxbridge English, conducted me where I needed to go.

I had made a habit of asking all of my interviewees, if they spoke both English and Arabic,
their preference for the language they wished the interview to be carried on. Several of the
responses were similar to that of Akram, a business development strategist at Tecom:
suggesting that they preferred English. Whether this was because they wanted to make me
feel more at ease or because they would normally prefer English was not always clear.
Akram simply non-verbally hinted that I should not be ridiculous, that of course he
preferred English, he was trained in Britain, after all. Talal, an employee in his midtwenties at the Executive Office, said that because of his schooling both at secondary level
in the UAE and at university both in the UK and the US, he was actually more comfortable
using English. Hiba, Talal's coeval and colleague in the office, said that although she was
educated only in Dubai, she too preferred English: "I think in English." She said, "(in
school) English was our first language. We took Arabic in a class called 'Religion and
Arabic'." (She also spoke aboutthe influence of the Western media, which has a strong
presence in Dubai).

Social factors are also significant in shaping the identity of flexible citizens. The case of
Maryam, who is in her mid-twenties and already working at management-level in
Maktoum's Executive Office, shows how ethnicity and gender complexly influence physical
mobility, and thus the ability to accumulate the symbolic capital (language, specialized
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training, etc.) that shapes flexible citizenship. Although her family is Emirati by nationality
and therefore considered muwatin ("national" or "local") - all-important in securing basic
rights of the UAE welfare state, such as free education abroad, healthcare, etc. - they are
also seen, informally, as "foreign" because both parents are from non-Emirati extraction.
That is, they fall into neither of the broad categories, Arab or 'Ayam. "My being half
'foreign' is sometimes used to excuse things. When I went abroad, people said 'She went
abroad because her mother is (from another country). They do things like that.' If I don't
stick to the traditional rules, they say, 'Oh, it doesn't matter, she's (foreign)."' (Maryam told
me later that her mother's foreignness is more salient when such conflicts arise because
the mother is a more recent immigrant to the UAE than the father).

As Maryam and several other woman professionals explained to me, the burdens of sum'a
(reputation) and proper behavior fall much more heavily on females from "pure" Arab and even to some, although a lesser, extent, "pure" 'Ayam - famili_es. Being from a
naturalized Emirati family, such as Maryam's, simply does not carry either the advantages
or the burdens of being "pure-blooded" or "noble." This is of supreme importance to
women because it means that those of non-traditional ethnic categories, such as Maryam,
may travel and study abroad independent of a mihrim (a male guardian). In Maryam's case,
the degrees that she earned at prestigious American universities enabled her to return the
UAE and take up, in her early twenties, a highly responsible position with Maktoum's
Executive Office.

Flexible Citizenship in Dubai, 31
Fuad, another mid-twenties Emirati of "foreign" extraction and a former employee of the
Executive Office, expounded on the connection between ethnicity and life chances and
implied that the order being implemented by Sheikh Muhammad heralds new things.
Growing up in Dubai, "I guess I sort inhabited this gap. I wasn't really an expat, but I wasn't
a typical muwatin either ... There isn't a category (i.e., Arab or 'Ayami) that I fit into. But
like an 'Ayami, I would be problematic in marriage issues."

"You mean, (Arabs) would have a problem if you wanted to marry their daughter?" I asked.

Yes. I wouldn't have pedigree ... The 'Ayam too, they're not considered to
pedigree either. There was a lot of discrimination against them by (the
but Sheikh Muhammad is trying got change that. He
to head Dubai Holding (a subsidiary
'Ayami) to hold that high and

have

'pure' Arabs),

nominated (Muhammad) Gergawi

of Maktoum). He was the first Iranian (i.e.,

prominent a position in the Dubai government.

Perhaps inferring a critical edge to my question, or to his reading of it, he paused
thoughtfully. Then he began again: "Everyone very easily challenges your attachment to
this place if you criticize it. In fact I am very attached to this place. It's where I grew up, it's
where all my best friends are from." Another pause. "Sometimes, you're pleasantly
surprised, though. The other night I was at the (Dubai) Jazz Festival, and they were
handing out condoms. Can you believe that? Here, in Dubai."

Ahmad, a professional in his mid-thirties, similarly connected the issue of sexuality to
Dubai's modernity in the "Muhammedan era." Although a "pure" 'Ayami, Ahmad is much
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closer in self-perception to Maryam and Fuad than to what he considers to be the
"traditional" majority of his compatriots. His perceived cultural flexibility he attributes to
his liberal father, who encouraged Ahmad and his brothers to be artistically and
intellectually creative and did not skimp on their education. A gifted artist, Ahmad left the
UAE after high school and traveled in the US, bouncing from coast to coast until he ended
up in the northeast, where he entered a prestigious graduate school. In one of our
conversations, he linked the experience of travel with personal growth, making a
distinction between Emiratis who had undergone this experience and their allegedly less
sophisticated compatriots, who had not. For Ahmad, this experience was akin to crossing
boundaries, both literally and mentally. One became seasoned, less governed by taboos,
perhaps even blase, in one's approach to everyday life. At a gathering that he and I
attended one evening, the hosts were playing the film Clockwork Orange. The scene where
the main character is forced to watch nude women caused a reaction in the audience, which
prompted Ahmad to reminisce in the following way. Some years prior, he and some frienqs
had organized a semi-public screening of the same film. Against Ahmad's resistance, the
fellow organizers cut out the nude scenes, fearing the police turning up. "But things are
changing in Dubai," he said. "Pretty soon, pictures of nude women will be no problem."

The ways in which Fµad and Ahmad linked sexual openness with modernity suggests that
the discourse of modernity in contemporary Dubai may be gendered in ways of which male
flexible citizens may be unaware. In her work on Bangkok middle-class flexible citizens,
Ara Wilson observes how the seemingly apolitical nature of consumer culture turned out to
be, in fact, a mode of the redeployment of the state's power through invisible controls of
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which middle class subjects were largely unconscious or about which they were sanguine
(Wilson 2004:141). Fuad and Ahmad both envision the city-corporation period in Dubai's
history as an advance in emancipation, an overcoming of tradition. Muhammad had
connected this theme to emancipation of business from politics. For Fuad and Ahmad, this
emancipation is more spiritual, an evolution of Dubai into a space less governed by taboos
and artificial social distinctions. For all three, politics somehow disappear. In the
discourses of female fl exile citizens, however, politics reenters through the door of gender.

My discussions over the span of a year with four female employees of MAF and Tecom
show that although Dubai as a political and cultural-identity space has been reconfigured
in the Muhammaedan era, this reconfiguration remains regulated by male patriarchy,
which, perhaps ironically, is in turn enabled by the city-corporation's increasing
governance by market fundamentalism. Fuad, Ahmad, and Muhammad's liberatory Dubai
becomes a much more ambiguous place in the renderings of Muna, Lara, Randa, and Rana,
who perceive complex connections between gender, generation, aspiration, identity, and
the city-corporation. Muna and Rana, incidentally, are both, like Maryam, Muhammad,
and Fuad, Emiratis of "foreign" extraction (Lara is an 'Ayami, while Randa is of Arab
background). Each had a more complex reading, for example, of the increasing sexual
openness of the past few years. Each, like Maryam had done, expressed a generally positive
attitude towards the changes characterizing contemporary Dubai. Furthermore, each
expressed relief that "modernity," as Muna, using the English, put it, was being guided by
what they considered to be wise men such as Sheikh Muhammad and Majid Al Futtaim.
Each found the companies they worked for to be progressive and supportive of women's
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advancement and, thus, strong evidence in support of the reasonableness of the citycorporation model. In any case, theorized Randa, there was no use complaining about
these changes, because they are part of tijara (trade), which is /i-sa/ih kul/-hadd (in the
interest of all Dubayyans ).

Nevertheless, they were also more likely than their male compatriots and coevals to
emphasize the importance of balancing the desire for the new with a respect for the
taqaleed (traditions), maintaining that openness to the modern or the foreign without
ihtiram (respect) for the past and the local was meaningless.

"We used to complain that Dubai was too small," Muna, whose is of Jordanian extraction,
said over coffee with Lara and me. "Everyone (knew) you. Now, you're more free and
anonymous. But it's no longer as cozy."

"They say, 'We want to open up to tourists,' but they never talk about the bad things that
tourists bring, the alcohol, the prostitution, and drugs," said Lara.

Muna: The divorce rate is increasing. Because of modernity. Before, a woman would know
her place in society. Now, the woman is more independent, she can work. But this is
causing the breakup of the family (tafakkuk a/-'a'i/a). The family is not as close as before.
The father is off on business trips, the woman says "why do I need my husband?"

Lara: Before, marriage was much better. There was no temptation (ighral Now, with
(things like phone number) "papering,"vii things have become easy for the men. Men used
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to stalk women when they saw them on the street walking. Now it's the men who are being
hunted. It's very easy for the men now.

M (to Lara): It's the same thing in Jordan. I think it's an Arab mentality. (To me) There is a
hush-hush mentality here. There are websites, for example, that are only available outside
the UAE, that advertise rates for prostitutes in Dubai. You can't access those sites here. It's
enough,ya'ni. Maft ihtiram Iii-din (there is no respect for religion). It is too open. We have

to have balance. There are als·o double standards. There is no democracy. I can't discuss
sensitive issues (like these) with locals, especially with the Arabs (i.e., Bedu). But it's a
general problem with the Arabs (i.e., people from the wider Arab world): everything is a
sensitive issue with us. There is lots of segregation. The man does his own thing. The
woman just spends money and is bored.

The ambiguities of flexible citizenship, and the complexities of its mediation by gender and
ethnic background, is most vivid in the case of Rana, a market analyst at Tecom. The
daughter of an Emirati father and a mother from a Levantine country, she too is considered
"foreign" by local definitions. Unlike Maryam, however, she was less inclined to attribute
emancipatory possibility to her otherness. There was a lot of discrimination, she tells, that
she felt in school from the "pure" muwatinun. For example, they would not accept
invitations to her home. Like Fuad, she raised the issue of how most of these muwatinun
would not permit their sons to marry her. In one of our conversations, Rana connected the
issue of marriage to her own sense of uniqueness in relation to _other Emiratis, who, she
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theorizes, marry because of family compulsion or the desire to conform to social norms
(implicitly, the Emiratis who abide by the ethnic purity rules):

R: I'm a very complicated person. My understanding of marriage is not like anybody's
understanding of marriage. Like any woman, I want to be a mother, but I want to be a
useful mother. I don't want to harm my kids and I don't want to raise kids who will have no
future. So, then the beginning should be right. I should get married when I'm ready for it
and I should get married to someone who is (of) the same mind, who understands where
I'm coming from, and who will not get married for the sake of getting married, who wants
to get married because he wants a life partner, somebody who will support him and back
him and be there whenever he is needed and the other way around. Kids are not the core
objective. Kids come out of a relation(ship). (If) the relation(ship) is there, then we can
think of bringing the fruit of the good relation(ship ). But if it's not good then why (bring
kids into it)? The kids will not be happy because the parents don't understand each other.
And even with my kids I would love to have a very open-minded kid, I would love to give
them their space. Different than this society. I want them to be themselves, I want them to
be very independent. But my mentality is very different.

AK: Independent of what?

R: To give them their free space, without any control of tradition, or people's perceptions.

AK: What do you mean "tradition" and "people's perceptions?"
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R: I don't know if you've noticed, but most people here restrict their kids from doing certain
things. Like, for example, a boy will grow in a way that "you shouldn't cry because you're a
man," and, for a girl, "you shouldn't go horse-riding, because this is a man's thing, you
shouldn't wear this color, ... " And you're really restricting your kids, you're not giving
them space to find out what are their tastes like. They should figure it out. This society
controls them in a way that they don't have enough space to try things and to have their
own lifestyles and tastes. They're either partially or fully directed by other people.

During various conversations, Rana and her co-workers, such as Tanya, emphasized Rana's
creativity. Tanya, for example, extolled Rana's mastery at preparing sushi, theorizing that
"maybe it has something to do with the creativity of the people who tend to work at
Tecom." At the time of my fieldwork, Rana had been for some years a serious textile artist
as well. Like Tanya, Rana also made the connection between uniqueness, creativity, and
the experience of working at Tecom.

When she was recruited to work at Tecom, what appealed to her was the sense of being
involved in something both different and vital in the context of her home city: "I liked the
idea of (working in) a free zone, where people will have 100% ownership, in so and so
industries, so and so areas, and it's going to shape the new economy of Dubai." She added
that Tecom was exciting because "it's new, a startup, and I'm very open to new ideas, I'm
very adventurous, and I don't mind trying a new job." But the stakes were more than
personal: "This is a country adventure, it's a Dubai adventure. So, if we get through life, if
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we are adventurous, and if the whole country is doing the same, let's try and ifwe fail, we
fail together, and if we win, we win together. "

AK: In what ways then would you say that (working at Tecom) is different from the
common, everyday experience?

R: See, the image that Dubai is trying to build is Dubai is different. Different in terms of
lifestyle, different.in terms of the number of nationalities that we have here, different in
terms of concept. How many media, technology, and education free zones do you have
around the world? So it's the uniqueness of it. That's why it's a trial, it's in the future.

"I think Sheikh Muhammad is trying to add more value to our social life," she added.

Be traditional, but be modern. I can manage to be both. I don't know how. A few
days ago, one of the ladies in my group, a muwatina, ... was

wondering how I could, for

example, walk into press conference, ask questions, where I become very forward, go take
pictures of people that I
wondering, why

don't know. Speak to anyone, help anybody. And she was

am I doing this, what is there in my personality that gives me the

power to be so natural. And actually it's nothing, it's just that I am very natural if I don't
harm anyone and it'll help me learn, whether it's in a modern way or a
traditional way. It'~ very simple, it's not complicated.
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AK: What is modern life?

R: What's modern life? For them, modern life would be, as I said, talking about my life
openly. It would be, like all of them are educated, none of them would stand in a press
conference and ask a question, they would just keep listening, even though they might have
tons of questions in mind, they come to me and they write me the question and they tell
me, "Please, say it, because we don't have the courage." Modern life for them would be me
traveling to the world summit, standing there, representing the company, talking to people
from a11 over the world. It would be, for them, me wearing this (colorful 'abaya [robe] as
opposed to the black 'abaya preferred by most Emirati women), not thinking of how people
would look at it.

Rana seems to be drawing on the main themes that were outlined by theorists and
technocrats, such as Abdullah and bin Bayyat. Dubai is exceptional; the ruler is wise and
forward-looking, acting in the interests of all Dubayyans and making it possible to balance
the "traditions" with "modernity"; like these elites and the company workers, she also
focuses on how a special class of people are drawn to companies like Tecom: they are true
individuals, they stand out from the herd, they are creative and committed to the
progressive vision of the Sheikh.

But there are complications. For Rana, in more reflective moments, certain nagging facts
complicate the story and perhaps bring the dream-image down to earth. In another
conversation, Rana admitted that sometimes "I feel like our cosmopolitanism has gone too
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far. Sometimes, you go to places, and you feel like you're the stranger." She gives the
example of a resort hotel popular with European tourists, where she had been shocked to
see the excesses of drunkenness and public sexuality. "I feel that, especially with the Dutch
and the British, (this cosmopolitanism) is a form of indirect occupation." Then, a striking
admission, in the context of neoliberal exception: she has noticed that the expats from
Europe get preferential treatment in the hiring practices of the Tecom "community
members." The government of Dubai is indirectly responsible, she says. The government
makes deals with corporations so that their own citizens, Europeans and North Americans,
get three times the salary for the same position as a muwatin would. "The expats feel as if
it's their right (to live and work) in Dubai." They behave as if they are the locals and we are
the foreigners, she says, her tone rising. One time, a Dutch friend really offended her when
he said, in passing and sarcastically, "We own like half of Dubai."

Fi.nally, echoing Muna's ironic critique of the "Arab mentality," Rana lays the blame on local
elites, those in charge of hiring at big companies. In other words - although of course she
does not mention anyone by name - the deputies of Sheikh Muhammad, in Tecom's case.
They are racist against locals too, she says. "You know," she adds with an acid tone, "the
locals with modern ideas. But you don't make too much of it because it could end up
offending investors and scaring them away. And Dubai is, first, about business."

Conclusion
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For intellectuals such Abdul-Khaleq Abdullah, technocratic elites such Ahmad Bin Bayyat,
and rising corporate managers such the MAF employee, Muhammad, the late Dubai ruler
Sheikh Rashid Al Maktoum's dictum that "in Dubai there is one and only one priority, and
that is trade and nothing but trade" (Abdullah 2006:14) is incontrovertible. From their
perspective, the economic and physical rise of the city over the past two decades supplies
unimpeachable evidence in support of the Sheikh's saying. These men see the citycorporation model of development as unchallengeable and transcendent. Women such as
Rana, Randa, and Muna, flexible citizens with much to gain from a similarly blind adherence
to the city-corporation order, are more critical and ironic than their male counterparts.
The ghost of Sheikh Rashid still haunts Dubai's contemporary subjects, a gray eminence
behind all that is visible. It is no accident that Randa and Rana, while in effect throwing
their hands up in submission to the marketization of Dubai, both ironically paraphrase the
old Sheikh's encomium to trade.

Such unguarded moments have an edge that is rarely seen among Emiratis in the feverish,
pro-growth atmosphere of today's Dubai. Elites such as the ruler and his deputies tend to
see criticisms of the city-corporation not simply as disagreements over the economy important as the economy is - but as affronts to the elites' political wisdom and honor.
Criticisms of the beautiful image of the city-corporation are also challenges to the view
that Dubai has somehow transcended its Arab context. This belief underpins the
ideological project of the city-corporation, a notion which is disseminated externally for
the consumption of foreign investors anxious about the politics of the region, and internally
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for the hegemonic persuasion of a rising social class of professionals, a cadre of those
committed to Sheikh Muhammad's political-economic agenda.

An irony of this situation is that gender appears to be the fault-line where such critiques
are express, if only indirectly. Most of the female flexible citizens to whom I spoke were as
positively disposed toward the neoliberal model as their male counterparts were. They
also applauded what they saw as the Sheikh's openness to and encouragement of women in
the corporate world. Most of these women favorably compared their own fortunes to those
of their mothers, aunts, or older sisters, who they alleged were prevented by patriarchal
traditions from fully realizing their ambitions. Yet these women were far more likely than
their male counterparts to raise doubts about the "openness" of city-corporation Dubai,
an openness usually connected to what they considered to be disagreeable manifestations
of sexuality. As is perhaps their wont, men were more sanguine about such new features
of the Dubai scene as op.en prostitution, semi-pornographic magazines peddled at
supermarkets, prophylactics being distributed in public, and women "stalking" men at
shopping malls (as Lara put it).

Such ironies are part of the concrete material of what anthropologists call "localization" or
"local appropriation" of global-scale ideas and cultural products. Neoliberal ideas about the
supremacy of the market encounter in their movements across the globe local conditions
that shape the particular forms they take in these given localities. In Dubai, it was the large
family corporations, such as the Maktoum and the MAF, that became the primary carriers
of the neoliberal creed, translating its principles through local symbolic conditions, such as
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prevailing anxieties about Arab identity and the developmental stagnation of the Middle
Eastern states. It was through this "friction" (Tsing 2005) between traveling ideas and the
local cultural landscape that new products were created. The city-corporation idea is
such a product. Moreover, its meaning is plural and shifting: an emancipation from
tradition and politics for some, it is simply a reconfiguration of traditional power for
others; evidence of the Dubai exception and model for some, for others the city-_
corporation idea is the old wine of the "Arab mentality" in the new bottle of corporate
trappings. Even for the same subjects, such as the female flexible citizens discussed here,
its meaning is plural and shifting, constituting, simultaneously, both a sign of progress from
patriarchy and evidence of this patriarchy's self-delusion. The story of the

.
neoliberalization of Dubai is ongoing, as evidenced by the city-state's seemingly frictionless
current rise into the stratosphere of global notoriety. To adapt a phrase from Aihwa Ong,
the daily localizations and frictions summarized here show how volatile indeed are the
ongoing alignments of rationality, labor, and life at the edge of emergence .
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i Although

it is a booming city manifesting many of the characteristic of rapid urbanization,

for its natives, who constitute a minority of the population (perhaps 15 percent out of a
total population of around 1.5 million), the city often feels like a much smaller community.
Many of my informants only spoke to me on condition of anonymity to avoid compatriots
recognizing them, a likely scenario in a community that is still closely bound by ties of
kinship and memories of the village life that characterized Dubai only a couple of

Flexible Citizenship in Dubai, 49

generations ago. I have given all my Emirati informants pseudonyms and changed other
aspects of their identity that may identify them.

ii

kama anna qa'id hathihi-1-hiqba sha'ir yamluk hadas al-tanabbu' wa istishraf al-mustaqbal

wa ru'yat al-afaq al-ba'id

iii

The parallels between the Dubai city- corporation and the local family corporation, as

described for example in Field 1985, are striking. Many of the qualities attributed to
Muhammad are the same as those of the figure of the family corporation chief: paternalism,
wisdom, vision, the corporation as a social and even moral calling.

iv

la tantaqis min makanat al-mudun wa heebat al-duwal wa 'araqat al-hadarat wa 1-

thaqafat.

v

vi

fa la majal Ii 1-siyasa fi Dubai.

In fact, labeling a company "Indian" or "global" would be meaningless in the UAE context,

where all companies must have local sponsors who are officially the owners of those
companies. The only companies that can be "foreign" or "global" in terms of ownership are
the ones in the free zones.
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vii

The practice where unmarried youths scribble their phone numbers on pieces of paper

and drop them near a person from whom they wish to receive a call. More recently
replaced by wireless technologies such as Blue Tooth.
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Abstract:
African cities have historically been beleaguered by economic mismanagement, poor resource
utilization and financial indiscipline. In order to prop up ]ocal development, and reverse these
governance challenges, there is a new drive to promote social accountability mechanisms. The
core goals of social accountability include promoting poverty reduction and effective and
sustainable development. Available evidence suggests that social accountability mechanisms can
contribute to improved governance, increased development, effectiveness through better service
delivery and empowerment (Malena, et al, 2004). One such form of social accountability is
participatory budgeting (PB). In the context of increasing market and political reforms in Africa,
there is an increasing interest in participatory budgeting (PB). It is a useful response to bad
management practices that result in poor decisions, poor or disinvestments, dwindhng resources
and decaying infrastructure. Further, it generates trust between citizens and public officials
thereby enabling cities to better handle demands from their communities. However the
performance of participatory budgeting in African cities is affected by funding, political
commitments, confidence of marginalized groups, poor communication and mobilization, multiethnicity and diver ity and polarized politics among others. This research discusses the
implementation of PB as a core element of social accountability in two African cities, namely
Harare (Zimbabwe) and Johannesburg (South Africa).
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Introduction

The African sub region has been characterised by moribund economies as a result of bad
governance manifesting through mismanagement, poor growth strategies, poor resource
utilisation and financial indiscipline both at local and national levels. This malice distorted the
markets, enriched a few individuals and promoted unfair channelling of public resources to
specific client groups thereby leading to neglect of the public good and ineffective provision of
public services.
Top-down development strategies and public policies of the independence era failed to
incorporate the preferences of the intended recipients, hence they were unsuccessful. The
conventional planning and administrative methods of the independence era failed because they
used rationalistic planning and management techniques to control development activities .This
led to inappropriate and harmful interventions being made because the intended beneficiaries did
not participate in the decision making process. Policies evolved from methods of analyses that
often ignored or discounted the political, institutional and social aspects of development. The end
result was therefore that the development objectives were not concisely defined and there was
lack of und~rstanding of local, social and cultural conditions. Further, the use of top-down
oversight mechanisms including civil service reform, internal and external auditors, ombudsman
and the creation of other independent bodies to perform an oversight function have not generated
sufficient levels of development.
Africa is pursuing political and market reforms with support from multi-lateral institutions to
reverse its economic woes. Key among these reforms has been the decentralisation process and
strengthening of local governance.
PB in Africa is occurring in the context of this decentralisation process and is among a
concoction of reforms being undertaken as part of wider national policy reforms aimed at
addressing the role and function of public services. Municipalities are taking over the
responsibilities of service provision in close collaboration with civil society and the private
sector. The overall objective of the exercise is to anchor, decisional powers in public hands
through citizen participation.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the importance of social accountability mechanisms that is
the "demand side" of good governance in sustaining development in African cities,. with
particular reference to the application of participatory budgeting in Harare and Johannesburg.
The paper does not seek to provide an exhaustive discussion of the whole realm of social

accountability mechanisms in promoting sustainable development and democracy but only
highlights the contribution of PB in this process. It is however cognisant of the fact that PB and
indeed the general realm of social accountability mechanisms is a consolidation of the
decentralisation process that has been going on in Africa.

Decentralisation
At independence African countries adopted principles that sought to promote a top-down
approach to development. This state centred model emphasized central control of resource
allocation, minimized the functions of the market and granted the state significant power to
intervene in private exchange as well as to own and control productive resources (Mbaku, 2003).
It was believed that centralisation would increase equity, make it easier to conduct macroeconomic policies and that it improved accountability. However, the centralised state has been
proved to be inefficient and in the case of Africa, failed to improve the lives of its people.
Studies have shown_that centralisation programs were a failure whether measured by their impact
on developmental activities or as programs. The centralised African state was typified by high
levels of authoritarian, personalistic, clientilistic, rent seeking, corrupt practices and an absence
of accountability (Olowu, 1990; Davison, 2001 ).
Consequently, the state turned to various forms of decentralisation to share responsibilities with
the periphery. The decentralisation process beginning in the 1980s was also premeditated by
structural adjustment reforms that were introduced with support from international financial
institutions. The reforms called for structural changes in fiscal and monetary policies as well as
good governance as means of breathing life into the continent' s ailing economies. The
liberalisation process also opened up the political space and saw a move from single party
domination to multi party participation. The African continent has since then seen a wave of
democracy and constitutional reforms that brought with it among other things, expectations for
people driven budgetary outcomes. Since then civil society organizations in Africa have
clamored for participation in development programming including in the budgetary process.
They have been lobbying for budgets that are more responsive to the needs of the people.
Decentralisation was advocated as a strategy for development in many different policy
environments and by governments, international agencies and academics. The call for good
governance found meaning in the context of decentralisation of authority so as to promote
transparency, accountability, effectiveness, efficiency and equity among other concerns.
Decentralisation reforms have varied depending on the emphasis put on each element of the
process, namely delegation, deconcentration, devolution and privatisation.
Delegation is the transfer of authority to semi- state structures. The central government sets the
objective of the delegated entities and transfers resources to them but the agents have a fair
degree of autonomy in performing their functions. In Africa, this has found form in the context
of semi-state owned enterprises. Deconcentration relates to the transfer of authority from central
government office at the national level to their field offices at the local level. In this arrangement,
staff and resources are transferred from headquarters to lower levels of administration.
Privatization is the transfer of responsibility for public functions to voluntary organizations or
private enterprises resulting in either the sale to private parties of a controlling stake in the share
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capital of a public enterprise or of a substantial part of its assets. The most common forms of
privatization are management contracts, leases, concessions, divestitures, joint ventures and asset
sales. The rationale here is to mobile resources and expertise not normally found within the
realm of the public enterprise.
Of interest to this research is devolution. It is concerned with transfer of public authority,
resources and personnel from the national government to the local level (Ndegwa, 2002). The
process is an advanced form of decentralisation that anchors the management of fiscal,
administrative and political resources at the local level. Devolution advances the core goals of
social accountability. It is characterised by the cultivation of functional association between the
public, private and civic society. It improves accountability and participation at the local level
resulting in improved service delivery. According to Saito (2008:2), it
" .. .strengthens democracy at the grass roots by providing opportunities for citizen
participation in local decision-making, ensuring accountability of local political leaders
and government officials, and promoting a system of checks and balances -among various
levels ofgovernment. "
It is within the realm of devolved entities that participatory governance has emerged as a key
focal area.
The art of citizen partjcipation, in its various forms constitutes social accountability mechanisms.
Social Accountability
Accountability is an obligation of office bearers or power holders to account for or take
responsibility for their actions. According to Sicker (2006:2), accountability is,
The obligation of power holders to account for or take responsibility for their actions in
both their conduct (by obeying the rules and not abuse their power) and their
performance (by serving the public interest in an efficient, effective, and fair manner)"
Accountability requires that officials act on criticisms or demands made of them, accept
responsibility for failure or incompetence and answer to the public about the use of their powers and
duties.
Social accountability is an approach towards building accountability that relies on CIVIC
engagements. This is a scenario where ordinary citizens and/or civil society organisations
participate directly or indirectly in exacting accountability. Hence, social accountability is
associated with paying __ particular attention to the demand side of governance that is,
strengthening mechanisms for citizen participation in holding the local leadership to account for
their actions and to be responsive to the needs of their constituents. Society is a powerful
potential force for strengthening government accountability (World Bank, 2003a: 1). As African
cities endeavour to reverse the governance challenges they are facing, there is hope and a new
drive in support of social accountability in decentralised governance
Interest and support related to social accountability initiatives in African cities derive from its
core goals of promoting poverty reduction and effective and sustainable development. There is a
broad range of actions that constitute social accountability mechanisms. Citizens, communities
and civil society organisations can use these to hold governing officials and elites accountable.
They include participatory budgeting, citizen participation in public policy making, public
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expenditure tracking, c1t1zen monitoring of public service delivery, citizen advisory boards,
lobbying and advocacy campaigns among others. Such citizen driven accountability measures
support and reinforce conventional mechanisms of accountability such as political checks and
balances, accounting and auditing systems, administrative rules and legal procedures.
Available evidence suggests that social accountability mechanisms can contribute to improved
governance and increased development effectiveness through better service delivery and
empowerment (C. Malena ,etal, 2004), see Figl.

Source: Sicker, 2006

Background to PB in African cities

·Africa is the most rapidly urbanising region in the world amid economic stagnation, poor
governance and fragile institutions. Cities face service delivery challenges emanating from the
absence of good governance, effective development and empowerment. In most African cities,
from Cape to Cairo and from Dakar to Mogadishu there is almost a universal inadequacy of
public service resources relative to need. Cities are faced with challenges of overcrowding; lack
of housing and growing slums; inadequate clean water supplies, an appalling drainage system
and a terrible waste management, to the extent that refuse is uncollected and piles of waste are
al1owed to rot in streets and vacant lots. In addition the urban road network has deteriorated and
is going unrepared. The cities are also failing to supply electricity, medicine, and transport
among other amenities. They are marked by pervasive poverty, high levels of inequality and
dilapidated infrastructure. The 1908s and 1990s became in common_parlance, a period of "urban
crisis" across the continent (Sten and Halfani, 2001 ).
The state of African cities is attributed to weak urban governance structures marked by poor
transparency, lack of accountability, rampant corruption (and at times extortion), inefficiency,
insecurity, clientalism, patronage and capture in an environment characterised by resource
scarcity. Accounting and reporting systems have also been atrocious. Audits _are not regularly
carried out and in those instances where they have been done, they have not been used as means
of engaging the communities in the decision making process. Municipal authorities tend to
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exclude civil society groups as they dislike public scrutiny of their revenue and expenditure. All
these resulted in a serious deterioration of services.
City governments misallocated resources, often spending on wrong goods and the wrong
clientele. On many occasions indifference, and collusion with vested interest groups led to non
responsiveness to the demand for services. Because of weak accountability and a lack of
transparency, financial resources, even when allocated, would not reach the intended destination
and service delivery was compromised.
Basing his comments on what was happening in Swaziland, Wunsch (1998), observed that
Swaziland's two main cities, Mbabane and Manzini's systems had a problem of poor utilisation
of revenue. They had a limited local tax base and faced resistance to raising rates on the existing
base. In addition, locally powerful individuals used their political connections to frustrate local
collection endeavours. In the area of budgeting and financial management the two cities did not
have any programmatic context to guide their activities. As a result there was no standard against
which to assess performance. Mbabane had serious problems in tracking its expenditures, with
accounts running several months late.
Due to the nature of the centralised state, African municipalities were used as transmission belts
for central decision-making, while often provi9ing convenient spaces for the powerful to dictate
at local level. In local councils, seniority and power took precedence over accountability.
Clientalism was implicitly accepted as a means of allocating scarce resources. This made it
difficult for constituencies to bring their Councillors to account. Citizens tend to lose trust with
the municipal leadership when such scenarios prevail. In some South African and Tanzanian
municipalities for example, there was a tendency by citizens to evade taxes at the local level
because they did not trust the authorities would use the raised revenue to provide expected
services (Fjeldstad, 2004; Fjeldstad, 2006 ). In Harare, the C~airperson of the Combined Harare
Residents Association(CHRA) and five thousand other residents boycotted paying rates for two
years over poor service delivery and the imposition of an unelected council. The boycott ended
after the election of a new council in 2008.
The cost of corruption to local development has also been immense. The Human Rights Watch
(2007:25), reported that corruption in Nigeria's local governments in the Rivers state region had
become,
"so pervasive and so debilitating that, with the exception ofpaying civil service salaries,
they have virtually ceased to perform any of the duties assigned to them".
Corruption in Nigerian cities and many ·other African cities is endemic, so much that it has
become a major hindrance to good governance.
In Burkina Faso, cases of embezzlement, bribe taking and other malpractices by elected
councillors and administrators are also prevalent. Titles to urban land were often distributed
unfairly to officials' wives, relatives and friends or to wealthy individuals wi11ing to pay hefty
bribes (Harsh, 200 l ).
A study carried out in Uganda, established that the bulk of the local school grants transferred
from central government to local schools were captured by local government officials and
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politicians (Rienikka and Svensson, 2004). Corruption distorts urban political, economic and
social life.
In addition, the poor were ignored by state organs responsible for programme development and
resource allocation activities in African cities. Mhlahlo (2007) argues that bureaucratic, complex
and non-transparent municipal administrative practices marginalised the poor and that the quality
of urban governance could mean the difference between cities characterised by prosperity and
inclusiveness, and cities characterised by decline and social exclusion. In this context, the World
Bank reports that, in the city of Maputo, Mozambique, two thirds of its population live on
unplanned settlements, without adequate water, sanitation or energy facilities.
Where decentralisation is limited, efficiency is compromised. Cities in Tanzania have a limited
level of discretion in implementing their responsibilities. They are constrained in responding to
local needs due to inflexible central government guidelines and conditionalities attached to
centralised financing of services (Boex and Martinez - Vazquez, 2003).
The development shortfalls of the African cities are also attributed to inadequate staffing. They
fail to attract and retain professional and technical staff. The staff situation is characterised by
relative inefficiency, high staff wastage and turnover. A good staff outlay complements
participatory budgeting.
The cities have also had inappropriate local government frameworks that are too centralised, too
prescriptive and control oriented thereby clouding their ability to make meaningful decisions,
including decisions to adjust rates and service charges.
The PB process is an endeavour to support the redirecting of development resources for the
public good with full participation by the potential recipients. It provides a method through
which the whole community can participate in the process of governance. At the same time it is
an effort to safeguard public resources from the vices of the past. PB theory postulates that a
truly democratic and transparent administration of resources is one of the most effective ways of
avoiding corruption and mishandling of funds. In addition, PB ensures that funds are directed
towards the most pressing needs of the majority of the population.

Participatory Budgeting

The city of Porto Alegre in Brazil pioneered the concept of PB that brought the population
directly into the formulation and execution of the City ' s budget. The City adopted PB in 1989,
upon the election of a new Mayor belonging to the Worker's Party. The party had campaigned
on a ticket of democratic participation. It believed that without the full participation of its
citizenry, a government is unable to fulfil its mandate as the people' s elected representative. PB
was part of wider reform efforts to overturn Brazil ' s history of patronage politics, social inequity
and corruption. Porto Alegre experimented with different mechanisms to overcome fiscal
constraints, redirect capital investments and services to the poor and provide citizens with a
direct role in decision making. PB expanded rapidly to other Brazilian cities, Latin America,
Europe and now there is an exponential rise of PB in Africa.
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A budget is a document that includes the ]ocal government's expenditure and revenue proposals,
reflecting its policy priorities and fiscal targets. The difference between PB and traditional
budgeting lies in that the latter is a preserve of municipal officials led by the Treasurer and
Director of Finance whilst the former involves citizens from the identification of needs and
priorities to implementation, monitoring and evaluation. PB is a co-managed process. It is a
mechanism through which state and non-state actors come together to allocate, spend and
account for public resources.
There is no agreed definition of PB though various definitions embrace the same features
required for a budgetary process to be classified as participatory. According to Wampler
(2007 :21 ), participatory budgeting is a decision-making process through which citizens
deliberate and negotiate over the distribution of public resources. As such it must also be viewed
as an interactive process between those who govern and the governed that result in the
prioritisation of the allocation of resources, spending, taxation and implementation in a given
locality. Communities work together with elected and unelected officials to develop policies and
budgets in order to meet the needs of those communities.
Schugurensky (2004) identifies PB with a democratic participation process that enables ordinary
citizens to deliberate and make collective decisions about budget all..ocations. These include
neighbourhood, zone or ward discussions and decisions about priorities regarding investments in
local infrastructure like sewage, schools, healthcare and housing. It a]so encompasses city wide
forums on city wide issues such as economic development, taxation and urban development
among other issues.
Marquaetti (2007: 1) defines PB as an innovation where,
"the citizens and civil society organisations have the right of participati11.g in the
elaboration of the fiscal policy of their municipalities, taking part on the definition of
how and where the resources will be obtained and how and where they will be employed
in their neighbourhood".
The intercourse between the public and the city makes the budget transparent and public. This
process is an essential element supporting participatory democracy and decentralised
governance. lt reduces clienta]ism, corruption and social exclusion.
The new trend in local government is characterised by an increasing demand by c1v1c
organisations and communities to have a say in identifying needs, setting priorities and
determining resource al1ocations. Enabling such participation in the budgetary process is
understood to generate significant trust between citizens and public officials. An increased role
of the citizens in the decision-making processes has the potential to improve the capacity of
cities to better handle demands from their communities. This enhances coordination,
transparency, accountability, priority setting, and expenditure a11ocation. During budget
preparation, civil society organisations (CSO) debate budget reports and policies. During
execution, CSO is an effective fighter against budget leakages because of corrupt practices,
embezzlement and squander, if controls are weak or non existent. At the accounting and auditing
stages, CSO may act as whist]eblowers and ensure a proper fol1ow up of audit reports (Jan
Isaksen eta], 2007).
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Participatory budgeting has also been referred to as an effective "School of Citizenship", because
it promotes civic engagement and social learning. Shah (2007) notes that participation is an
effective avenue to help citizens to familiarise themselves with their rights, express their views
and see these views affect policy and action.
City managers historically tended to present policy issues in a complex jargon not familiar to
citizens. Participation thus helps citizens learn the basic language and practices of urban
governance. In this case, civil society groups also play a vital role in offering advice to citizens
on how to understand what proposed policies mean for them. As citizens become familiar with
the art of governance, their ability to hold their municipal government to account increases and
this fosters better performance (Putman, 1993).
The participatory budgeting process increases efficiency in budget allocation. It brings the
decision of allocation of public resources closer to the citizens, thereby ensuring that allocation
of scarce resources reflect people's priorities. Citizens have a right to a say in the decisions that
affect their well being.
Further, it promotes political inclusion and greater social justice. Public budgets can often
reinforce social exclusion and poverty due to elite capture. As such the institutionalisation of PB
can re-direct public resources and can improve the opportunity structure and promote
empowerment of marginalised groups and poorest neighbourhoods. This is because limited
economic power is often accompanied by limited political power. Those community members
who lack financial resources may find it difficult to make their voices heard, and the poor are
often underrepresented in the political process. UN-HABITAT, notes that governance process is
a place where those who are traditionally marginalised break out of the cycle of exclusion. PB
rules also specify that those who need more should receive more. Because of this equity
principle, it plays a vital role in improving the living conditions of many people, especially in
poor neighbourhoods. Its institutional priorities focus on pro-poor policies such as preferential
pricing policies for housing, water and electricity.
PB improves transparency as it is a partnership between the municipality, civil society, business
and ordinary residents in the locale. The partnership minimises the chance of inflated budgets
and other dishonest practices. Transparency unlocks blurred boundaries of accountability and
makes actions by officials visible. It restricts corruption by opening up closed systems that are
ridden with ambiguity. Cities increasingly become financially sound and cost effective in their
management of revenue sources and expenditures. It creates mechanisms for citizens and
government to discuss budget constraints together, make trade-offs and optimise the use of
scarce public resources vis-a-vis urgent and strategic investments.
·

PB promotes democracy in public policy making. Its adoption in African cities coincides with
the rejuvenation of civil society institutions at the national and local levels in the continent's
democratisation wave. Civil society is seen as vital in consolidating democracy and shaping
public policy. Associations are schools of democracy (Hourtzager etal, 2007:03). They produce
civic and active citizens who are vital for the consolidation of democracy. Direct involvement of
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citizens in the budgetary process increases budget legitimacy and complements traditional forms
of representative democracy. This stems from its features that are a mix of direct democracy
combined with committees of representatives elected from amongst the participants.
The PB process is an important medium of accountability. Accountability enables the electorate
to hold their representatives and bureaucrats responsible for their conduct and performance in the
public realm. Historically, African local political leadership and bureaucracies have been rigid
and lacked responsiveness to citizen demands. For many years, African bureaucracies acted in
ways that assumed that citizens could not comprehend the intricacies associated with the
management of cities. PB is one mechanism that enables citizens to maintain a check on the
excesses of local bureaucracies. It is an avenue through which citizens interact with its local
leadership, learn about its operations and empowers the citizens, to engage them and demand
good governance and,
Good governance ensures political, social and economic priorities are based on
consensus in society and the voices of the poorest and the most vulnerable are heard in
decision-making over the allocation of development resources (Zimbabwe Human
Resources Development Report, 2000:8)
Accountability of local authorities and all service providers to their citizens is a fundamental
tenet of good governance in cities. Enhanced transparency and accountability helps reduce local
government inefficiencies, patronage and corruption which are common vices in African cities;.
Asegedew (2007), notes that with PB, corruption is minimised as citizens take care of and watch
carefully and make sure that the capital allocated for a project as well as the material purchased
for various purposes are properly placed. Giving citizens space to give voice to their priorities
helps municipalities to reduce scope for corruption, thereby enhancing credibility and mutual
trust.
PB provides additional sources of information not available through traditional political
institutions. Participation allows citizens to feel a sense of ownership and take keen interest in
the success of any proposed priorities to which they are part. Such sense of ownership is
achievable when there is fiscal decentralisation which reduces central control in favour of local
preferences that foster allocative efficiency. PB is thus more efficient and effective because
decisions are not made on the basis of what authorities think is good for the citizens but on the
basis of the latter's real needs and aspirations. It also limits the political use of state funds.
The PB process provides a forum for interaction within the local communities who otherwise
would be unlikely to meet. The nature of PB nurtures compassion and solidarity among groups,
reinforces social ties, and promotes the collective pursuit of the common good (Schugurensky,
2004). In this way, it contributes to the resolution of conflicts through a process of consensus
building achieved by open discussions on a wide spectrum of urban governance issues, including
evictions and security of tenure.
Zamboni (2007) contends that studies in Brazilian cities, inc1uding Port Alegre indicate that
other important achievements of PB include increases in the revenues from local taxes collection.
In the case of Porto Alegre, between 1989 and 1996 the number of households with access to
water services rose from 80% to 96%; the number of children in public schools doubled; and tax
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revenue increased by nearly 50% because greater transparency encouraged payment of taxes.
Effectively, PB increases the resource mobilisation capacity of cities.
Generally, PB results in positive political, social, economic and institutional achievements
wherever it has been successfully implemented around the world.

Participatory Budgeting versus Traditional Budgeting
The traditional form of budgeting is dominated by the city treasury and is to a larger extent, a
preserve of the city management (see Fig.2).

Traditional Budgeting Cycle

Participatory Budgeting Cycle

Planning

/

Budget
Formulation

Budget
Evaluation and
Auditing

PB Monitoring &
Evaluation Stage
(Community
supervision and
auditing)

Resource
Mobilization

Budget Tracking
and monitorine

PB Formulation
Stage (situational
analysis and
priority setting

Budget
Adoption and
execution

Source: Adapted}rom the Mumc1pal Development Programme 1ram mg Companion, 2008

The first step is a planning exercise. It is meant to establish the resource framework, objectives,
policies, strategies and expenditure priorities for the budget. This is followed by a second step,
where behind closed doors; the municipality puts together an annual budget plan (budget
formulation). The third step is the resource mobilization stage which revolves around the city
Treasurer estimating and collecting revenue from various taxes, transfers, user charges and other
sources. Budget Jines for departments are also guided by the revenue estimates from this
exercise. The fourth step is the budget adoption and execution stage. Execution is in the hands
of city authorities with treasury often exercising strong control over spending, reviewing
allocations to departments and approving major expenditures. Treasury tracks and monitors the
budget to detect consistencies as well as inconsistencies between resources allocated and
expenditure by the city ' s implementing departments.
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The final step involves budget evaluation and auditing where the actual expenditures of the
budget are accounted for and assessed for effectiveness by city authorities.
Contrary to the traditional forms of budgeting, participatory budgeting is a joint process between
the city and its citizens through all its stages. Its initial step mainly involves the distribution of
information, the initial discussion of policies and priorities by citizens in their localities, zones,
or wards and putting in place relevant participatory structures.
The initial step involves two meetings. In the first meeting the Mayor explains the purpose of
PB. His/Her presentation focuses on the PB program, objectives and operational details,
expected local impact as well as activities to be undertaken before, during and after
implementation, expected roles of council members and departmental heads and PB norms and
procedures. Departmental heads also accompany the Mayor and elaborate on local revenue
sources, unpaid taxes, and user charges in arrears. Furthermore, they provide information on
local investment needs, budget cyc1e and the entry points for citizen participation during the
cycle.
The second meeting is a situational and problem analysis meeting held to identify problems and
needs. At this stage, a scan of required development projects is also made.
The forum also provides citizens with opportunity to identify and vote representatives to the PB
council. Elected Councillors are expected to report back to the community on their progress.
The second step involves PB formulation and approval. Citizens and or their representatives (PB
Councillors) set priorities and decide on investment projects. The process involves prioritising
problems identified during the situational analysis meeting. The PB council may sit several times
to finalise the list of prioritised investments and projects. The outcome is a draft budget
submitted to a full Council by the Mayor.
The third step involves operationalizing the budget. Operationalization involves converting the
city ' s objectives into tangible outcomes using the resources allocated during formulation. All
activities are implemented with consultations between the municipality staff and the PB
Committee (consisting of members elected from PB counci11ors).
The fourth step involves monitoring and evaluation. PB Councillors and citizens monitor budget
implementation, and conduct onsite monitoring and evaluation of projects. Effective PB
evaluation process also entails perfonnance reports given by the municipality to citizens. These
include reports on project implementation status, problems encountered, and periodic
participatory site visits to inspect projects.
However there has not been a single model for PB. The participatory phases have tended to be
adapted to different environments based on the realities of the City such as local history, civic
culture, legislative provisions and administrative structure of national government.

Challenges to Participatory Budgeting
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PB processes can easi]y be captured by interest groups resulting in· the use of public resources to
advance the interests of powerful elites. This is more likely in African countries where the CSO
sector is at a nascent stage in some interest categories. Where a civil culture is not strong,
founders and Chief executives of some CSOs and NGOs may run one man organisations and
claim to represent the interests of certain groups whilst, their Boards may not even be functional.
Furthermore, CSOs and NGOs tend to be accountable to donors than to the communities they are
supposed to serve and support.
Shah (2007:2) also argues that the "tyranny of group dynamics" can allow manipu]ative
facilitators to preserve and protect the interests of the governing elites. Where citizens are not
informed in particular, the process can be used to perpetuate an illegitimate and unjust exercise
of power. This can further marginalise the marginalised. In many African cities, few citizens
tend to participate in budgeting processes. There is general apathy, lack ofknow]edge of the
participatory budgeting process and perceived partisanship in the process. Additionally, the only
resource the poor have is time. They therefore cannot afford to spend time in meetings since they
have to look for food to sustain them.
Matovu (2007), points out that multi-parties are an emerging political set-up and programs set
outside party structures are perceived negatively with suspicion by the government. He also
highlights that sometimes it is shear lack of political wil1 that presents a great constraint to
government for it to meaningfully engage itself in participatory budgeting.
Another constraint to PB is that the budgetary process is not enshrined in the law. In many
countries, existing statutes do not provide a guiding framework for the participatory process.
Most civic activities at the local government level are donor funded. As a result po1iticians view
such organizations with suspicion, with a feeling that they have a hidden po1itica1 agenda.
Those who do not fu11y appreciate the benefits of the challenging, expensive and time consuming
PB process and the involvement of the community, especially the bureaucrats and politicians
may also perceive CSO activities as troublemaking. Marginalized groups a]so Jack confidence to
make demands for services. All these factors negatively affect the process of Participatory
Budgeting.
The Case of Johannesburg

Johannesburg (COJ) has a population of approximately 3,8m (Statistics, SA, 2008). Its
uniqueness lies in that 42% of its population is below the age of 24. The city's popu]ation is also
growing largely as a result of migration from other parts of the country and African region. The
number of households is rapidly increasing, placing huge demands on the City's economic and
socia] infrastructure.
The COJ consists of two organizationa] streams, the political leadership and administrative
structure
The structure of the COJ mirrors the national and provincial government. lt is made up of a
legislative arm (the council), an executive arm (Mayor and Mayoral Committee) and an
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administrative arm. The Council has overall authority over municipal affairs. The politicians
express the needs and desires of the communities that they represent and from time to time, do
consult with such communities (Geyer, 2007). The Executive Mayor, takes overall strategic and
political responsibility for the City. His/her Committee functions as a City-level cabinet tasked
with executive decision-making. Various Council Committees consider and approve
departmental reports and policies. These reports and policies are forwarded to the Mayoral
Committee for consideration before being referred to Council for approval. The City also has
Mayoral sub-committees that support the integration of the work of Council across political
portfolios and departments.
The administrative structure is responsible for the day to day running of the City. It manages and
formulates policies and prqcedures, and co-ordinates various activities and is guided by the City
Manager and heads of departments.

PB in the City of Johannesburg
The participatory process is institutionalized through the country ' s constitution which recognizes
the framework of local governance. Section 52 of the 1996 constitution defines local government
as the custodian of democratic and accountable government for local communities. Local
Governments are required to provide democratic and accountable government, provide services
to communities in a sustainable manner; provide social and economic development; promote a
safe and healthy environment and encourage the involvement of the community and community
organizations in the matters of local government (Nyalunga, 2006).
Section 153 (1) of the constitution also outlines key duties of municipal governance as
structuring and managing its administration, and budgeting and planning processes to give
priority to the basic needs of the community and to promote the social and economic
development of the community. Municipalities are encouraged to involve communities and
community based organization in their planning and operations.
The COJ believes that the involvement of citizens in planning and service delivery actually
makes the delivery process relevant and appropriate to local conditions; closes the gap between
citizens and the municipality; and enhances the impact of the services delivered (COJ,
IDP:2008).

Legislative Framework
Legislative provisions are framed within the context of the South African Constitution ' s Chapter
, 7 on local government, the Local Government Act, Local Government Municipal Structures Act
(1998), the Municipal Systems Act (2000), Municipal Finance Management Act (2003) and the
Municipal Property Rates Act (2004)) all which ensure that participation is guaranteed, free , and
fair and trickles down to the household level.
The Municipal Finance Management Act (2003) provides the framework within which
municipalities draw up budgets, with specific_timelines for preparation and approval. It requires
that municipal entities submit their draft budgets to the parent municipality not later than 150
days before the start of the entity ' s financial year. Section 16 (2) of the Act compels the Mayor
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to table a draft annual budget at a Council meeting 90 days before the start of the budget ·year.
Section 24 of the Act, obliges the Municipal Council to approve the annual budget at ]east 30
days before the start of the budget year. Community participation is provided for in the Act as it
compels any municipal authority ' s accounting officer, to make public, the proposed budget and
all supporting documentation and invites the community to submit comments. The Municipal
Property Rates Act (2004) also promotes community participation in the budget process and the
determination of rates policies.
The Municipal Structures Act ( 1998) requires that municipalities set up ward committees to
support effective participation at the local level Together with the Municipal Systems Act
(2000), the two Acts provide for external consultations through both formal and informal means
including public meetings with residents, business, state departments and similar entities.
The Municipal Systems Act (2000) defines the municipality as consisting of the political
structures, the administration and the community. It also legislates Integrated Development Plans
(IDPs) for all municipal areas. The South African system of Integrated Development Planning is
a process by which municipalities prepare 5-year strategic plans that are reviewed annually in
consultation with communities and stakeholders. An Integrated Development Plan contains
short, medium and long-term objectives and strategies. It serves as the principal strategic
management instrument for municipalities. The COJ Mayor notes that "IDP represents the
immediate and intermediate stages of our journey" (COJ, Budget Speech, 2006). As such each
budgetary process is conducted in the context of the annual IDP.

Citizen Participation Mechanisms
The participatory budget process in the City is elaborate and is funded through the budget office.
According to the Municipal Finance Management Act (2003), the Mayor of a municipality is
responsible for coordinating the process of preparing the budget and for reviewing the
municipality ' s IDP and budget-related policies (Fatma Yusuf, 2004). As such, the Mayor
spearheads PB . Ordinary citizens, ratepayers associations, community based organizations,
NGOs, religious groups, youth and women 's formations , sports clubs, cultural groups,
universities, technicons, trade unions and organized business participate in this process. The
process has resulted in sustainable projects as strong comments come from the community,
private sector and NGOs. This has helped shape a robust planning process amenable to
sustainable projects. As the process is open to everyone it means that ownership is also enhanced
thereby ensuring sustainabi1ity.
The Mayors ' road shows are the strongest showing of the City ' s resolve to pursue PB. These are
intended to provide information and encourage participation. During these shows and other
public meetings, the Mayor is accompanied by heads of department whose responsibility is to
further explain budget procedures and the budget cycle; define entry points for citizen
participation during the budget cycle; provide detail about local revenue sources, unpaid taxes
and user charges arrears and provide information on investment needs and actual investments.
The Speaker of the COJ chairs Council's public participation and petitions committees, and
ensures that the public participates in city matters wherever possible, and provides support to
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Councilors. Each ward has a ward committee elected by the citizens. The purpose of the ward
committee is to provide a link between the city council and the community. The committee
works and supports the ward councilor (chairperson of the ward committee) and is trained on the
roles of local government, and rules for participation. PB training is provided by the council
upon need identification as well as by NGOs, and community based organizations (CBOs).
Many NGOs and CBOs provide training for free. The most prominent public interest
organization providing such training is the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA). Its
mission is to promote sustainable democracy based on active citizenship, democratic institutions,
and social justice.
In addition, over the past five years, the COJ carried out annual customer satisfaction surveys.
The surveys measure satisfaction in six broad c~tegories. These are the basic services (including
electricity, refuse co1lection, roads, sanitation, street lighting and water); community services
(including ambulance, bus service, public toilets, litter, street sweeping, traffic lights); public
safety and by-law enforcement services; billing, payments and enquiry services; communication
and interaction efficiency; and corruption.

Key Features of the COJ PB Process
Preparatory Phase
There are four main participatory phases in the COJ as depicted in Fig.3 below.

Fig. 3

COJ PB phases

Preparation
Monitoring/
i:;'v~ l11~tinn

Outreach
Implementation

15

The PB process begins with the first Mayoral Lekgotla (meeting) that sits before the budget is
drawn up. The Lekgotla evaluates the previous financial year's achievements and challenges.
The first Lekgotla is followed up by budget panel meetings at which budget proposals presented
by city departments and municipal entities are assessed. The objective of the panel meetings is to
ensure that the forwarded proposals are in line with the provisions of the developmental
objectives expressed in the City's Growth and Development Strategy (GOS) and to ensure that
the available resources are allocated in line with the City's priorities. The GOS is the city's longterm plan to ensure sustainable delivery of services; deal with social and economic development;
involve residents in local government and promote a safe and healthy environment. The budget
panel includes the City Manager, Chief Financial Officer and the Mayoral Committee member
for Finance and Economic Development (COJ, Budget Speech, 2006).

The panel's assessment report is presented at the second Lekgotla. A second Lekgotla is held to
assess the budgetary obligations of the next financial year. The two Lekgotlas enable planning to
be more focused and detailed. The draft budget allocations are made and issued to the various
departments and entities so that they revise their budget proposals in line with the budget
allocations. A consolidated draft budget is tabled for information and consultation rather than
approval. It is refined by taking into account the outcome of the public participation process in
the outreach phase.

Outreach Phase
Public participation is launched through an extensive communications campaign, designed to
disseminate information on the PB program and mobilize all stakeholders to participate in the
activities. These include notices in the local newspapers local radio stations, posters, leaflets
sent out with invoices and the electronic media. Public participation looks at the popular needs of
the people. It takes place mostly through ward committees, community meetings, mayoral visits
and the stakeholder summit. During participation the public can comment on the draft document
and raise their concerns.
All Councilors are responsible for conducting meetings in their wards both with their ward
committees and at public meetings. The City Mayor through the office of the Speaker ensures
that Councilors go to the people. The prime objective of these meetings is to review service
delivery performance in the past financial year; challenges faced and identify service priorities
for the ensuing year.
In addition to meetings at the ward level, pub1ic meetings chaired by members of the Mayoral
Committee and senior city officials are also held in each region. These meetings further explore
citizens' service delivery expectations. At a city level consultations are made with key
stakeholder groupings, N GOs, CB Os, labor and women's groups.
A synthesis of all the concerns and needs expressed in the outreach meetings is calibrated in the
draft budget and taken back to communities. A revised budget and all the requisite
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documentation is distributed in the wards and the regions and the community is walked through
each of them. The city explains how it intends to address concerns raised through service
delivery targets for the ensuing year and proposed capital projects. Communities are granted a
platform to critic the way the city has elected to address their needs. A public participation report
of the PB process is prepared and forwarded to the Mayoral Committee.

Execution Phase
After the Mayoral Committee meeting, the Mayor tables the report before a full Council for
approval. Upon endorsement by a full council meeting, the City shares the approved budget with
the provincial government. The new budget, tariffs and IDP are displayed in the City's website
and all people's centers and promulgated in the government gazette. Following the gazetting of
the budget, problem solving activities begin through respective departments and entities of the
city through out the financial year.

Monitoring and Evaluation Phase

~

A monitoring process occurs during implementation. The City's Management, Councilors and
Ward committees regularly schedule meetings to appraise themselves about the developments
within the prevailing budget. Evaluation is also part of the preparatory phase for the following
year's budgeting process.
Monitoring and evaluation includes petitions. Petition procedures were designed to dispel any
suspicions of political bias. A multi-party Petitions Management Committee is tasked by the
Mayor to consider complaints and give feedback to all petitioners within a reasonable time.
Other measures include feedback on community radio stations, views posted on the COJ website,
tips for the Mayor in the print press and customer satisfaction surveys.

Conclusion
The PB in COJ has been successful and worthwhile and has improved the city's accountability
profile. This can be attributed to a legislative environment that is receptive to participatory
development. The process is also characterized by political will and a well structured policy,
driven from the office of the Mayor. The Mayor has placed emphasis on the promotion of public
meetings and feedback mechanisms on demands and the process is we11 funded. The City
effectively utilizes municipal structures established for participatory budgeting.

The Case of Harare
Harare is Zimbabwe's largest city, with a population of approximately 2m. The city structure
consists of the administrative and political arms. The political structure is the supreme policy
making body in the municipal area. The administrative arm is responsible for providing technical
support and implementation to council activities.

Legislative Framework
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Local governance is not recognized in the country's constitution. The city is divided into wards
for the purpose of electing councilors and development planning. Municipal governance is
administered through the Urban Councils Act.
The City is run by a Council made up of representatives elected on a ward based system. They sit
to elect a ceremonial Mayor from among themselves. In terms of the 2008 amendment to the
Urban Councils Act, Councilors can elect a ceremonial Mayor from outside their ranks subject to
government approval through the Minister responsible for urban governance. The status of the
position of Mayor has changed on two occasions since Zimbabwe's independence in 1980. For
the period between 1980 and the late 1990s, the ceremonial Mayor was elected by a college of
fellow councilors. An executive Mayoral system was introduced between 1996 and 2007. An
executive Mayor was directly elected by the residents. The Ministry responsible for urban
governance has regulatory functions in relation to certain aspects of policy and management of
the City.

Citizen participation mechanisms
According to Mhlahlo (2007), urban councils are better placed than any other level of
government to understand people's needs and aspirations, are closest to the people and have
statutory powers and duties supportive of relevant local development. Through the Urban
Councils Act, Cities are required to consult their communities during the budgetary process. In
recent years, the City's citizens have taken a keen interest in the way the City is run. Residents
associations have been formed. Together with other bodies representing commerce and industry
they now demand to be consulted on the budget process.
The City of Harare recognized the PB process following a huge number of objections to the
budget that they got and the tension between council and residents that characterized the
beginning of every financial year. Citizens were not conscious of the rationale behind the new
budgets particularly in so far as it applied to various increases in user charges and rates, hence
their increased apprehension with City authorities.
Before the beginning of each financial year, Council is required by law to submit a certificate of
proof of consultation to the ministry responsible for urban governance together with the
proposed budget for the ministry's perusal and final approval ofrates. The certificate of proof of
consultation should also be accompanied by a detailed explanation from council on how it
responded to all objections that may have been raised during the consultation process. As such
the city is compelled by Jaw to consult the citizens, civil society and private sector and address
any objections that may arise.
However numerous factors have militated against the smooth running of the PB process in the
City. The Minister responsible for urban governance suspended the Executive Mayor elected on
the opposition Movement for Democratic Change ticket in April 2003. He later suspended 13
other Councilors from the same party. In terms of the legislative provisions, the Minister may
appoint a Commission to run a City's affairs for not more than six months. The city of Harare
was however run by a commission appointed by the Minister from 2003 to 2008.

18

As a result of the political environment obtaining during this period, it was difficult for the city
to provide for participatory budgeting. I ts political leadership became accountably to the
Minister rather than the citizens. The Budget had minimum if not insignificant citizen
participation (Chaeruka and Sigauke, 2007).
In its report on the 2004 Harare city budget, the Combined Harare Residents Association
(CHRA) argued that the budget did not reflect the aspirations of the city ' s residents. The
association pointed out that it was a result of an unacceptable process that did not seek
comprehensive input from the residents, and was the product of technocrats within the
municipality with minimal or no input from Councilors who rubberstamped it. In addition,
during the budget notice period, consideration of 2 500 objections raised on the budget were
summarized by the Acting City Treasurer instead of Councilors.
Significant complaints were also raised pertaining to the city ' s failure to consult in the 2005,
2006, and 2007 budgets. The residents demonstrated and defied council officials who attempted
to attend meetings to address the issues. On those occasions, the Chairperson of the Commission
avoided attending the potentially charged meetings. For the 2008 budget, the Commission made
cosmetic consultations after it had already started implementing the budget (Zimbabwe Gazette
Daily News, 12/12/007).
Between 2001 and 2006, the city also failed to produce audited accounts of its books. The Urban
Councils Act requires that the city produces such accounts annually and in a timeous manner.
Among other important functions, the audited statements inform the community as to how its
money had been spent.
Inappropriate implementation of the PB meant that service delivery continued to deteriorate.
This was exacerbated by a highly unstaple macro economic and hyper inflationary environment
obtaining during the period. A budget crafted to last twelve months would last no more than
three months, making consultation on supplementary budgetary funding difficult. The City
attempted to revive its fortunes by hiring a private consultant to craft its Tum Around Strategy
(TAS).
The consultant worked privately and independent of the community. The City introduced a
finished product for implementation. Today Harare faces perennial shortages of clean water,
disease outbreaks, drainage, sewage and waste management problems, overcrowding, poor road
maintenance and high employee attrition.

Key Features of the Harare PB process
Preparatory Phase
Key futures of the participatory process in Harare are depicted in Fig 4 below. They are of a
lesser complexity when compared to COJ. Indeed the PB process in Harare is al so less intensive.
Fig 4. PB phases in the City of Harare
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City technocrats led by the City Treasurer begi"n the budgetary process by collecting information,
reviewing previous budget performance and the status of projects implemented the previous
year. The input process is guided by Councilors who receive contribution from the citizens. Prior
to the beginning of the budgetary process, Councilors are duty bound to consult their Wards on
those developments and services they wish included in the succeeding year. Councilors bring
project proposals from their wards which are then incorporated into the budget proposals by the
city's administrative departments. However, Counselors ' input depends on the competence of the
councilor as the initial process depends on the individual exploits of the councilor and his or her
knowledge of her/his responsibilities as the top ranking politician in the ward. CSOs, including
the Urban Councils Association have occasionally conducted training for councilors, council
officials and the private sector. The training activities create community participation activities
including developing and enhancing counselor' s knowledge about the municipal budget
formulation, interpretation, review, implementation and management process.

Outreach Phase
Citizens at the ward level elect a Councilor to articulate their needs and expectations at council
level. Upon completion of the draft budget Council holds consultative meetings with the
community, CSOs and business sector, reflecting the essential provisions in the proposed budget.
Teams that are sent out to the community include ward councilors and council officials .. The
Counselor for a given ward is the team leader for the particular visit to his/her ward.
The draft budget is further revised in terms of the feedback that the City gets from the
community with consultation of the full Council. The drafted budget is advertised over a month
and in at least two issues of the national newspaper. During this period, residents, CSOs and the
business sector have the right to lodge objections to any provisions of the budget. The Council
addresses these objections either by providing satisfactory explanation, amending the draft
budget to cater for the objections or attending to any such matters raised as they pertain to the
budget.

Execution phase
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Once the objections period passes, council considers the objections and produces the final
budget. The final budget is sent to the Minister responsible for urban governance for approval of
new rates. Once approved all services provided for in the budget are made available to the
community, new rates, charges and fees are effected while new and projects at different phases
are also embarked on.
Monitoring and Evaluation Phase
Once implementation begins, council officials through the office of the Town Clerk make
periodic reports to Council. These periodic reports are cascaded to the various wards and other
stakeholders through Councilors and the office of the Mayor. However the monitoring process
for the City can still be improved by further strengthening community participation. There is no
deliberate effort to make evaluation a participatory exercise.

Conclusion
The PB process in Harare needs to be strengthened. Participation appears to be at the tail end of
the PB process and is piecemeal. Sections of the CSO community have argued that the process of
consultation, feedback and the principle of accountability are not there (CHRA, 2006). The
failure of the consultation process can also be linked to the various unscheduled changes in
political and administrative leadership that has been occurring in the last six years due to
excessive interference in the city's affairs by the state. The interventions usurped the powers of
the electorate and made existing participatory structures obsolete.
Comparative analysis of key success factors

Legislative Framework
Constitutionalising municipal governance is important for successful PB. The successful
implementation of PB in the COJ as compared to Harare is facilitated by unfettered autonomy of
governance at the municipal level and its recognition in the national constitution.
Constitutionalization minimizes interference from the national government and makes the
leadership more accountable to their communities.
A clear and unambiguous legislative framework promotes PB. The five pieces of legislation that
govern the COJ give it a logical framework within which to promote participatory governance
through established structures and raising municipal finance for planned projects and activities.
The legislation that gives too much power to the parent ministry as in the case of Harare tends to
stifle PB. The city of Harare operated without a substantive elected Mayor and or Council from
2003 to 2008 following their suspension by the responsible Minister. The absence of an elected
government also resulted in the City operating without substantive heads for departments such as
Housing, Treasury, Public Relations and the office of the Town Clerk. Such a situation impinges
on the effectiveness of the PB process.

Political Environment
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The Political Environment is critical in determining the sustainability of the entire process. The
success of the PB process in the COJ can largely be attributed to the political will of its Mayor as
well as other decision makers including the speaker, councilors and administration. The Mayor
politically legitimizes the process. As such its PB is always participatory and transparent. It is
better to avoid PB if transparency and accountability cannot be guaranteed. For example COJ's
2008/9 PB process was conducted under the theme, "Deepening Democracy, Enhancing Good
Governance and Building a Caring Society". Through the theme, its outcome was a lengthy
process of participation to ensure that it was a "people's budget". Even the development of its
IDP involved the community.
Harare has a participatory framework in place but this has been affected by a polarized political
environment. The Minister responsible for local government dismissed elected officials and
influenced the dismissal and or appointment of key heads of administration, potentially based on
political grounds. Consequently an appointed Commission was continuously renewed for the
period between 2003 and 2008. It did not come from the people. and therefore was not
accountable to them.
Harare's Tum Around Strategy (TAS), an equivalent of COJ's ]DP was developed by a private
consultant and implemented without involving the community. Whereas COJ has been able to
deal with the demands brought about by multi-party political leaderships which are becoming a
common feature as Africa democratizes, Harare has been affected by inter party conflict and
state interferences.

Clear and shared definition of the rules of the game
A clear and shared definition of the rules of the PB process is essential to prevent conflict
between council, CSOs, citizens and other stakeholders. The city with the stewardship of the
Mayor must visibly spell· out the PB stages and their respective timelines, rules for decision
making, composition of PB committee/council and rules for addressing disagreements. The
COJ's extensive interactive process has produced a shared vision between the City and its
residents.

Capacity building and Information dissemination
The PB process is best undertaken through scheduled public meetings by the council, training by
CSOs, use of posters, pamphlets, and electronic and print media. Wide information
dissemination must use all means available. This is evident in the COJ, hence the community
positively participates in the PB process. The City of Harare occasionally held meetings but
mainly in response to threats of court actions, demonstrations and refusal to pay for services by
the residents. The state has been at loggerheads with CSOs providing capacity building programs
in Zimbabwe. For example in March 2008 all activities of governance related CSOs were banned
until after the Presidential elections in June of the same year.
However all CSO groups providing capacity building training to local Councilors were again
banned for failing to follow the country's legal and administrative requirements (Herald,
5/11 /08). The responsible Minister argued that all such organizations must inform government as
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stipulated by the law and that Government had to approve the training syllabi, objectives of the
training and funding details.

Funding
PB is an expensive exercise. Funding for meetings and training citizens for full participation is
an important challenge for the cities. Once training has been provided and participation
embraced, there must be sufficient funding to implement all prioritized projects and activities.
Failure to provide such services may result in further self exclusion as citizens do not see the
value of spending their time in the participatory process. PB emphasizes participation in capital
expenditure. In receding economies like in the case of Harare where capital projects have ceased
and the city denied borrowing powers, the scope for PB becomes limited.

Vibrant citizenry and civil society
The general interest of civil society organizations and ordinary citizens to take part in the PB is a
necessary condition for PB. Participatory democracy promotes projects, sustainability. Citizens
feel a sense of ownership and commit themselves to their success. CSO participation in the COJ
is very significant. However, while PB attracted huge enthusiasm in the past years, the number of
citizens who are participating is decreasing (Matovu and Mumvuma, 20,97). The potential of
civil participation in the case of Harare has not been fully exploited.
Conclusion
The local government transformation and decentralization processes underway in African cities
seek to unlock the power of public participation in local development. Participatory budgeting is
one of the key strategies that the cities are adopting to sustain development. This process h~s
opened space for civil society empowerment, giving citizens opportunities to better participate in
decision- making processes and administration. Where it has been sufficiently implemented, PB
is increasing transparency, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in city activities. It is
reducing corruption, marginalization, poverty and bad governance. However, the cities still have
legislative, political and economic factors militating against the successful implementation of the
PB process.
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Abstract:
On February 4, 1986 thousands of workers lives changed in ways they could only begin to
imagine, for on that day United Technologies Corporation ordered the closure of the 76-year old
American Bosch manufacturing plant in Springfield, Massachusetts, capping a nearly 32-year
history of job loss and work relocation from the sprawling factory. For over 150 years
Springfield stood at the center of a prosperous two hundred-mile industrial corridor along the
Connecticut River between Bridgeport, Connecticut, and Springfield, Vermont, populated with
hundreds of machine tool and metalworking plants and thousands of workers. This paper offers
an historical account of t~e profound economic collapse of the Connecticut River Val1ey region
of the United States and places the Bosch shutdown in the context of the wider region's
deindustrialization, for the closure marked the watershed for large-firm metalworking and
metalworking unions up and down the Connecticut River Valley. The region went from being
one of the world's leading exporters of machine tools to sharp economic decline that placed one
of the region's leading cities, Springfield, Massachusetts, on the verge of bankruptcy in 2005.
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It was there that the sleight of hand lawyers proved that the demands lacked all validity for the
simple reason that the company did not have, never had had, and never would have any workers
in its service because they were all hired on a temporary and occasional basis .... and by a
decision of the court it was established and set down in solemn decree that the workers did not
exist.
- Gabriel Garcia-Marquez, One Hundred Years of Solitude
Abstract
For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the Connecticut River val1ey's machine tool
and metalworking firms and highly skilled workers constituted an innovative manufacturing
region. Here, machine tools were made which a11owed the precision engineering of interchangeable parts. Nevertheless, in the 1960s the U.S. machine tool and precision metalworking
industry entered a 'death spiral' and by the mid-l 970s the country was the world's largest
importer of machine tools. A study of the degeneration of the Connecticut River valley
productive system reveals the role played by many of the forces that typify globalization.

A. From Beehive to City of Homes
In the 1980s a dramatic wave of Jay-offs and plant closings among the Connecticut River
Valley's largest machine-tool and metalworking manufacturers led to rapid industrial decline and
massive dislocation for thousands of the region's best paid workers. The people who did the
work and the trade unions that represented them became extinct. Compounding the situation,
there were nearly two decades of hapless efforts by various local and state governments to
overcome employment loss and build some sort of sustainable economy. Springfield,

Massachusetts, the hardest hit city, fell into serious disrepair. Corrupt officials exacerbated the
problem and caused residents, already cynical about their government, to become even more
disenchanted with city leaders. Its once-powerful agglomeration of skills and innovative firms
depleted, Springfield staggered, nearly bankrupt, into the new century_ I
Even New England's vaunted education and training system, which once satisfied
employers' skills demands, couldn't turn the tide of economic failure. In an earlier era firms
sought out the Connecticut River Valley for its abundance of "high skills and scientific workers."
Firms settled in the Connecticut Ri~er Valley because:
.... areas like New England have a large number of firms which change their
products and production processes frequently. Change means restructuring,
learning new methods, testing, and experimenting. While a company which
produces a large volume of output using a well-defined and unchanging
production process looks to site its plants in low cost areas with little regard for
distance from headquarters, companies which are changing and developing
usually must keep a close watch on production. The combination of first, the
need for specialized skills and, second, the changing nature of a firm ' s need for
resources helps keep industrial agglomerations together.2

Springfield and the valley ' s deindustriahzation story opens a window on how globalization and
agglomeration gone bad affected hundreds of industrial cities. When firm managers stopped
investing in their skill base and searched for cheaper ski1ls outside the region and the nation, the
region ' s "innovation agglomeration" atrophied.

1 Robert Forrant and Erin Flynn , "Seizing Agglomeration 's Potential : the Greater-Springfi eld Massachusetts
Metalworking Sector in Transition, 1986-1996," Regional Studies 32 (I 998): 209-23,
2 John S. Hekman , "The Future of High Technology Industry in New England : A Case Study of Computers," New

England Economic Review (January/February 1980): 5-17, 6-7 ; John S. Hekman and John S. Strong, "The Evolution
of New England Industry," N ew England Economic Review (March/April 1981 ): 35-46,36.
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Recent historical studies of the textile, machinery, metalworking, and plastics industries
reveal that a systematic learning process among enterprises and institutions strengthens skills and
builds a regional economy's capacity for innovation. Prosperous "learning regions" depended on
workers applying their intelligence at work. This facilitated the life-long learning required for
successful knowledge-intensive production.3 This proposition held true in greater Springfield
for nearly two centuries as new machine tools and knowledge sharing advantaged firms. Skilled
workers exchanged their expertise; the idea was to "accept the best and use it to the shop's
betterment. " 4 In the early 1950s the President' Council of Economic Advisers warned President
Truman that New England firms were turning away from their historical strengths: skill
development, technological innovation, and the diffusion of new production methods. 5 By 1968
even the historically important Springfield Armory succumbed in the wake of defense spending
cuts and in response Springfield's Chamber of Commerce changed the city's nickname from the
"Industrial Beehive" to the "City of Homes".6

3 Richard Florida, "Toward the Learning Region ," Futures (J 995): 527-36. For historical studies on the importance
of skill and collaboration see Cristiano Antonelli and Roberto Marchionatti, 'Technological and Organisational
Change in a Process of lndustrial Rejuvenation: The Case of the Italian Cotton Textile Industry ," Cambridge
Journal of Economics 22 ( 1998): 1-18; Axel Wieandt, ,..Innovation and the Creation, Development and Destruction
of Markets in the World Machine Tool Industry," Small Business Economics 6 (1994): 421-37; Vittorio Capecchi,
"ln Search of Flexibility: The Bologna Metalworking Jndustry, 1900-1992," in Charles Sabe] & Jonathan Zeitlin,
Eds. World ofPossibilities: Flexibility and Mass Production in Western industrialization (New York: Cambridge
University Press, l 997): 381-418; Philip Scranton, Endless Novelty: Specialty Production and American
industrialization, 1865 -1925 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997). For empirical studies ofpresentday regional industrial cluster and how firms and regions develop skills competencies see the special issue of
Regional Studies, "Regional Networking, ColJective Leaming and Innovation in High Technology SMEs in
Europe," 33 (1999); Andrew Herod, "From a Geography of Labor to a Labor Geography: Labor's Spatial Fix and
the Geography of Capitalism," Antipode 29 ( J 997): 1-3 J.
4

Quote from the superintendent of the Osborn Manufacturing Company in Patrick Malone, "Little kinks and
devices at the Springfield Armory, 1892-1918," Journal of the Society for industrial Archeology 14 ( 1988): 59-76,
64.
5 Merrit Roe Smith , Harpers Ferry Armory and the New Technology: The Challenge of Change (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press 1977), l 04-5.
6 For a more detailed look at skiJJs see Michael Best and Robert Forrant, "Community-based Careers and Economic
Virtue: Arming, Disarming, and Rearming the Springfield, Western Massachusetts Metalworking Region ," in
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The scale of decline is evidenced in Table 1, which lists the major layoffs and closings in
Hampden County between 1982 and 1990.
Table 1. Layoffs and Closings in Springfield-Area Metalworking, 1982-1990

Company

Status

No. of Jobs
Eliminated

American Bosch
Chapman Valve
Columbia Bicycle
Kidder Stacy
Northeast Wire
Oxford Precision
Package Machinery
Plainville Casting
Portage Casting
Rafferty Steel
Rexnord Roller Chain
Springfield Foundry
Van Nonnan
Van Valkenberg Plating
Wico Prestolite
Atlas Copco
Easco Hand Tool
Storms Drop Forge

Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Layoffs
Layoffs
Layoffs

1,500
250
250
90
35
60
400
65
60
50
200
75
275
40
250
565
2,000
125

J

-

_,,-(

Years in
City

Closure
Dates

2/86
6/86
6/88
9/89
1990
9/86
9/88
4/87
8/86
11/85
6/89
4/86
10/83
7/86
3/82
1980s
1980s
1980s

~.

80
100+
80+
100+
22
40
100+
65
36
40
JOO+
JOO+
90
100+
80
70+
75+
60+

Peak Emp.
since 1960

1800
2700
1000
325
125
120
950
75
100
675
285
1200
135
675
1000
2200
250

The search for the 1:1ext cheap place to get things made supplanted the valley's golden age of
skill; metal fatigue had set in. 7
In 1982 organized labor demanded that the Massachusetts legislature adopt plant- closing
legislation aimed at stopping the exit of jobs. Governor Michael Dukakis established a 38member Commission on the Future of Mature Industries made up of leaders from business,
Michael B. Arthur and Denise M. Rousseau , Eds., The Boundaryless Career: A New Employment Principle for a
New Organizational Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996): 314-30.
7 Robert Forrant, Plant Closing and Major Layoffs in Springfield, Massachusetts (Springfield, MA: Machine Action
Project, J 986); Robert Forrant and Erin Flynn, "Seizing Agglomeration's Potential ," Regional Studies, 32 (1998):
209-21; David Lampe, The Massachusetts Miracle: High Technology and Economic Revitalization (Cambridge,
MA : MIT Press, J988). Lynn E. Browne and Steven Sass, "The Transition From a Mill-Based to a KnowledgeBased Economy: New England, J940-2000," in Peter Temin, Ed., Engines of Enterprise: An Economic History of
New England (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000): 201-49; Susan Rosegrant and David R. Lampe,
Route 128: Lessons from Boston 's High-Tech Community (New York: Basic Books, 1992); Michael Best and Robert
Forrant, "Creating Industrial Capacity: Pentagon-Jed vs. Production-led Industrial Policies," in Jonathan Michie and
John Grieve Smith, Eds. , Creating Industrial Capacity: Toward Full Employment (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1996): 225-54.
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labor, government, and academia and charged it with developing "an industrial policy to move
the state toward a truly balanced economy .... in terms of its industrial mix and in its distribution
of benefits to the Commonwealth's regions and citizens."8 Three issues overshadowed the
Commission's work: the types of extra assistance, if any, workers caught in closings should
receive; the proper economic development role for state government in distressed regions; and
whether firms should be required to give their employees and the state prenotification of layoffs
and closings. While the Commission deliberated, 200 more firms closed and 18,000 additional
workers lost their jobs.9 .In the end, the Commission produced weak, voluntary notification
language that encouraged employers to give workers 90 days notice of shutdowns. A new
Industrial Services Program (ISP) worked with unions and firms to avert closings, provide
retraining if a closing occurred, and help specific communities affected by a large number of
closures. 1O

B. American Bosch and Springfield: Intertwined Histories of Prosperity and Decline
In December 2004 a fire destroyed the former American Bosch plant. The morning after the fire,
managers at Danaher Tool (formerly Moore Drop Forge and EASCO Hand Tool), one of
Bosch ' s North End neighbors and one of the few remaining metalworking firms in Springfield,
announced its closing. Anxious to see the factory ' s ruins, and anticipating that several ex-Bosch
workers would be too, I drove to the fire scene. At the destroyed building, it felt like I was
8 Judith Leff, " United Technologies and the Closing of the American Bosch," Harvard Business School Case Study,
May 1986 6.
9 J. Leff, "United Technologies and the Closing of the American Bosch," 6.
IO J. Leff " United Technologies and the Closing of the American Bosch," 6; Governor' s Commission on the Future
of Mature Industries, Final Report (Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1984).
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attending a friend's wake. Still standing was the once white, now soot-stained front wall of the
original factory building with the year 1911 , signifying when the factory opened in the city, still
visible. Around me stood nearly I 00 former Bosch workers, each person eager to exchange
stories about the old days. Memories flooded back as I walked down Main Street to the far
comer of the building and peered through the rubble into the area of the factory where I had
worked. I thought about workmates who showed up early every day, started their coffee pots
and argued about the relative merits of the Boston Red Sox and the New York Yankees or the
Boston Bruins and the New York Rangers (hockey mattered then). People sold donuts an9
newspapers to raise money for their children 's college tuition or a local charity. Small-time
gamblers sold betting tickets on the weekly football games
The fire finalized the' historical disconnect between several generations of relative
working-class prosperity and the new, harsh reality represented by Springfield ' s dysfunctional
urban center, its decaying neighborhood housing stock, and its slim hopes for an economic
turnaround after years of neglect and irresponsible governance. At numerous intervals over 200
years, working people flocked to Springfield for the well- paying jobs they could find there; in
2004 young people voted with their feet and moved on if they could.
Just a few months before the fire, the Massachusetts legislature and Governor Mitt
Romney took the unusual step of creating a Finance Control Board- chaired by the
Commonwealth ' s Department of Revenue Commissioner Alan LeBovidge-

" to initiate and

implement extraordinary remedies to achieve a long-term solution" to the city ' s money mess.
By the time of the December fire, the Control Board had tightened its hold over the city ' s
spending decisions. For the Control Board, the way forward came at the expense of teachers,

6

school cafeteria workers, firefighters, policemen, and other city workers. Springfield needed to
structurally adjust, it needed to shrink its level of public services and focus on spending curbs. 11
In his history of Massachusetts industry Orra Stone called Springfield "a beehive of
diversified production." A 1941 Work Projects Administration study pointed out that
Springfield's products have been for the most part the essentials of other
industries, the machines, the tools, and units that tum the wheels of industry the
world over. Because of this inter-relationship and the diversification of her
industries, Springfield has suffered less from economic upheaval than singleindustry cities of New England.12

In the 1950s andl 960s Springfield's and most of the region's metalworkers enjoyed
relatively good wages, and the city's downtown and ethnically-defined neighborhoods benefited.
However, the wave of industrial closings and the loss of nearly 11,000 manufacturing jobs
provoked the near collapse of many of the city's leading financial institutions. Because of the
consolidation of manufacturing and financial services, Springfield's leading capitalists "lost
ownership and control over capital," and one after another downtown's local banks and
department stores closed and the buildings stood empty, monuments to a failed economy.
Compounding things, several overly ambitious, and in retrospect, ill-conceived riverfront
development projects failed to materialize. Elected officials and local and regional economic
development organizations and agencies spent years covering over the decline while searching

for some new scheme that could breathe life into the city and region. IJ:arvard University
Business School guru Michael Porter and creative economy maven Richard Florida offered their

l l Alan LeBovidge, Letter from the Chairperson of the Springfield Finance Control Board to Eric Criss,. Secretary,
Executive Office of Administration and Finance, September 1, 2004.
12 Writers' Program of the Works Progress Administration, Springfield, Massachusetts (Springfield : City of
Springfield, 1941) 57.
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high-priced services to the city, but to no avaiI. 13 The result, in 2004 Springfield, the Bay
State's third-largest city, had a staggering $40M budget deficit; deindustrialization's chickens
had come to the empty downtown to roost! Wishful thinking, mismanagement, corruption, a
soaring crime rate, and the failure of the region's extensive network of colleges and universities
to contribute much time to strategizing over a solution to economic decline had turned even the
most profound Springfield optimists into doomsayers.
Once installed, the Control Board focused on the symptoms of distress, never once
addressing the historical relationships between the disappearance of well-paying work and
Springfield's plight. No one in a responsible position discussed how the loss of half of greaterSpringfield's manufacturing plants between 1950 and 1987 accompanied by the loss of 43% of
Hampden County's industrial employment between 1980 and 2000 affected city finances. There
can be Jittle doubt that the cumulative impact of the closings and layoffs breached the historical
continuity of the valley as a world leader in precision metalworking. And it was equally obvious
that new high-wage replacement work had not materialized. Yet, from 2004 to 2007, rather than
focus at least some of their attention on job creation and economic development. the Finance
Control Board's turnaround strategy was predicated on "the containment of personnel costs." 14
Failing to focus on growing Springfield out of its budget mess, recovery remained unreachable
and city services and the quality of life in its neighborhoods deteriorated. In April 2007 the
Executive Director of the Control Board admitted as much when he reported that the city "faces
a $3.2 million budget deficit for the fiscal year starting July 1 and deficits for the following three
fiscal years" if it tries to pay back the original Joan by 2009 as the enabling legislation required.

13 Bjorn Claeson, The System Feeds on Us: An Ethnography ofPoor People And Elites in a New England City. PhD
dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, J 996, 48.
14 Boston Globe Editorial, l 7 June, 2005 , 22.
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The deficit required further cuts in city services and/or a series of new tax and revenue-raising
measures. 15

C. Jobs Mattered
There were at least six good reasons why members of the Finance Control Board, local and state
economic development officials, and political leaders needed to make connections between
employment loss and plant closings and Springfield's fiscal situation. First, blue-collar knowhow had been a critical source of the city's and the state's competitive advantage and the basis
for many business innovations that brought in wealth from outside the region. _Second, we11-paid
industrial workers paid local and state taxes that helped to fund schools and fueled growth in the
retail, real estate, and entertainment sectors. Third, workers' secure employment had allowed
them to send their daughters and sons to college and helped to reproduce the state's vaunted skill
base. Fourth, a statewide infrastructure of hundreds of small and medium-sized metalworking,
plastics, and precision manufacturing firms received lucrative subcontracts from companies
outside the region. Fifth, the wages in services lagged we11 behind manufacturing wages. And
sixth, median household income in western Massachusetts' industrial cities in 2007 dropped well
below the state average of $50,502. The numbers: Greenfield, $33, 11 0; Holyoke, $30,441;
North Adams, $27,601; Pittsfield, $35,655; Springfield, $30,417.
Springfield's wage figure helps us to understand its present financial condition.
Simply put, deindustrialization meant impoverishment for thousands of people. In his
ethnographic study of Springfield's poverty-stricken neighborhoods, Bjorn Claeson found that
between 1960 and 1990 the number of people employed in manufacturing in Springfield
declined from approximately 23,000 to 12,000. He concluded that

15 Dan Ring, "Springfield needs more time to repay loans," The Republican, 5 April , 2007.
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The wholesale and retail industry employed roughly the same number of people in
Springfield in 1990 as in 1960 (13,563 versus 13,230). The service industry labor
market, by contrast, grew during the same period of time; the total number of
services in the city increased from 7,659 to 17,524. But, the service and retail jobs
that increasingly dominate the labor market pay an average of $7,000 and $17,000
respectively less per year than the average manufacturing job, even accounting for
wage reductions in ma.nufacturing. Many people who formerly would have
enjoyed stable industrial jobs and comfortable wage lead an existence even more
insecure, having been pushed into the city's dangerous informal service
economy. 16

Figure I reveals what happened to Massachusetts's manufacturing and services
employment from 1997 to 2004, while Figure 2 does the same for Connectic..ut. Stagnation and
Joss are obvious.
Figure I. Massachusetts Manufacturing and Services Employment 1997-2004
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Figure 2. Connecticut Manufacturing and Services Employment 1997-2004

16 Bjorn Claeson, The System Feeds on Us, 49.
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The same story holds true for Hampden County (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Hampden County Manufacturing and Services Employment
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As the employment crisis in manufacturing worsened, Springfield's leaders wrongly
assumed that Massachusetts' boom in electronics, finance , and biotechnology would right the
ship. But, as Figure 3 shows, by late 2001 Hampden County's employment stagnated. Even
though the Bay State added almost 500,000 service-sector jobs over the 1980s and 1990s, the
majority of the well-paying ones were inside the Route 495 beltway, far closer to Boston than to
Springfield. According to the Boston Globe' s Charles Stein, "The new economy never made it
11

this far outside the Massachusetts Turnpike." Stein summarized, "A lot of middle-class people
left for better economic opportunities, while the number of poor people grew steadily over the
past two decades. This shift helped make Springfield one of the poorest cities in
Massachusetts."17 Springfield's unemployment rate of 8.5% was a lot higher in several of its
Hispanic and African American neighborhoods. The public-health infrastructure got smaller.
School nurses were fired. Fourteen thousand streetlights were turned off for almost two years.
Jobs in the police department and schools were cut. Fire stations closed on a rotating basis. 18
To reiterate, the vaunted service economy produced far too few well-paying, fu11-time
jobs. ln Massachusetts, the gap between average manufacturing and services wages did not close
appreciably between 1997 and 2003. For the country, "Industries ranked in the bottom fifth for
wages and salaries have added 477,000 jobs since January 2004, while industries in the top fifth
for wages had no increases at all.. .. " 19 ln 2003, three of the largest occupations adding jobs in
Massachusetts - cashiers, food preparation and serving workers, and waiters and waitressespaid average wages below $10 an hour. ln the same year, nine of the fifteen largest occupations
in the Bay State reported average wages of less than $15 an hour. "Given the high cost of living
in Massachusetts this proliferation of low-wage jobs is a major public policy challenge ... ." 20 In
Hampden County, manufacturing employment fell from 34,301 jobs in 1998 to 28,000 in 2004,
while service jobs increased from 86,500 to nearly 96,000. Over that period service sector wages

17 Charles Stein, "Almost a Ward of the State," Boston Globe, J8 June, 2004, C 1.
18 Robert Forrant and Shaun Barry, "Winners and Losers: High-Tech Employment Deals an Uneven Hand,"
Massachusetts B enchmarks, 4, (3), 2001 : 12-16; Mark Brenner, "The Economy: A Growing Divide with Uneven
Prospects," in Tom Juravich, Ed., The Future of Work in Massachusetts (Amherst: University of Massachusetts
Press, 2007): 1 1-32.
19 Edmund Andrews, "It 's Not Just the Jobs Lost, But the Pay in the New Ones," NYT, 9 August 9, 2004, C 1;
Charles Stein, "Wages Don ' t Figure in Rebound ," BG, May 5, 2004, 1. Inflation adjusted average manufacturing
wages in the Commonwealth were $1 ,120 in 1997 and $1 ,116 in 2003 ; services wages averaged $747 in 1997 and
$876 in 2003.
20 M. Brenner, "The Economy," 2007 .

12

barely registered an increase over $650 a we·ek, while the remaining manufacturing jobs
averaged $850.
Commenting on August 2004 national employment data New York Times business
reporter Louis Uchitelle noted that layoffs are "more frequent now in good times and bad, than
they were in similar cycles a decade ago." Across the country, the almost 60% of laid off
workers who found a new job earned less money, compared with about 50% of workers who
went through the same experience in the early 1990s. In other words, both the number of new
jobs and the wages of jobs continues to moderate, so that even when employment growth
occurred, the wealth base eroded.
This is what transpired in Springfield. Thus, absent sharp tax increases or an infusion of
new revenues from the state or federal government to make up fur lost taxes and local spending
by workers, essential services- education, youth programs, police and fire protection- suffer,
and jobs that depend on disposable income, like restaurants, disappear. Michael Yates confirms
these trends: "For a nation as rich as the United States, there are a very large number oflowpaying jobs. One of the most interesting data sets in the SWA is that for the fraction of jobs which
pay an hourly wage rate insufficient to support a family of four at the poverty level of income
with full-time, year-round work." One-quarter of all jobs pay at or below poverty wages; for
Blacks, the figure is 30.4% and for Hispanic workers 39.8%. For Black women the figure is
21

33.9% and for Hispanic women, 45 .8%.

D. "A comatose patient on life support": The Finance Control Board Takes Charge
This brings us back to Springfield, Massachusetts. Several Springfield business associations,
including Future Springfield, the Springfield Taxpayers Association, and Springfield Central,

2l Louis Uchitelle, "Layoff Rates at 8. 7%, Highest Since 80 ' s," NYT 2 August, 2004, C2 ; Michael Yates, "A
Statistical Portrait of the U.S. Workin g Class," Monthly Review, 56, (1 I), 2005 : 12-31 .
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Inc. attempted to lead a business revival of sorts in the 1980s. So-called public-private
partnerships were going to save the day. But these partnerships could not stop the decline of the
city' s central commercial and financial corridor along Main Street between the Springfield

Republican 's newspaper offices and city hall and the civic center. Two of the city's leading
retailers, Forbes and Wallace along with Steigers, vacated their multistory department stores in
1976 and 1994 respectively, no match for the large indoor malls that sprang up along Interstate
Route 91.
For years, Springfield' s recovery rested on its $110 mil1ion riverfront development
project, anchored by the new Naismith Memorial Basketba11 Hall of Fame, and the renovation of
its downtown civic center. "Entertainment complexes, riverboat gambling, interactive museums,
crafts and arts centers, and riverboat rides" were proposed to supplement activities at the Hall of
Fame. In other words, tourism dollars were to spark a revival of sorts. However, the Basketbal1
Hal1 of Fame never generated the visits that consultants predicted, nor is there any evidence that
we11-paying jobs materialized along the riverfront. Among its difficulties, the riverfront is cut off
from the city ' s commercial downtown by a six-lane raised highway and railroad tracks. By the
early 1990s nearly one-quarter of downtown office buildings were vacant. "The Society of
Industrial and Office realtors ranked Greater Springfield as the area with the sixth- highest office
vacancy rate in the country."22
The co1lapse persisted through a lengthy period of economic expansion elsewhere in the
state. For Springfield, according to Robert Nakosteen, a professor of economics and statistics at
the Isenberg Schoo] of Management at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, this created a
significant structural problem whereby the city could not "depend on its own tax base. All the

2 2 Bjorn Claeson, The System Feeds on Us, 304- 05 ; Marla Goldberg, "Attendance dips, hope rises at Hall ," Sunday
Republican, 17 April , 2005 , 1; B. J. Roche, .. Under Control?" Common Wealth, Summer 2005 : 50-60.
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wealth just moved out of the city." William Ward, head of the Hampden County Regional
Employment Board, noted that as the well-paying work disappeared, the replacement wages for
workers fortunate enough to find new jobs lagged well behind their previous pay and benefits.

23

Yet, the city's financial problems were not taken seriously, even in the mid-l 990s, when it
received a $21 million state loan and sold its municipally owned hospital to a private company to
cover budget shortfalls.
Fifteen years later the Control Board focused on bringing costs in line with projected city
revenues, cutting back on essential services and reducing personnel costs. For the Control
Board, "Some combination of increases in economic productivity, reduction in wages and
benefits, and work rule changes must be accomplished if the city is to have annual balanced
budgets." In September 2004 Chairman LeBovidge summarized the situation this way: " It.. is
clear that an integral part of the recovery plan for the city of Springfield must include work rule
changes, benefits restructuring and take-home pay reductions for municipal workers." In 2004

The Republican called the city "a financial basket case."

24

.

As the crisis worsened, Republican

reporter Dan Ring wrote, "Although Springfield is the third-largest city in the Commonwealth
out of 351 municipalities it has the lowest bond rating, the fourth-lowest income per capita, the
25

second-lowest property values and the highest nonresidential property tax rate in the state."
City officials negotiated a relief package with the Romney administration and the
legislature. The governor offered approximately $51 million in intere~t-free Joans to cover the
shortfall in the $437 mil1ion FY 2004 budget, so Jong as the city agreed to let a state-appointed
23 Robert Nakosteen quoted in Adam Gorlick , "Springfield Bailout Bill Stalls Due to Union Concerns," Associated
press, 4 June, 2004; Interview with William Ward , March 25 , 2005.
24 Scott Greenberger, "'State Eying Municipal Bailout: Springfield Facing $20M Budget Deficit," BG, 29 May,
2004, Bl; LeBovidge Jetter to Kriss, 1 September, 2004; Boston Herald, "Better Rail Service Would Help get W.
Mas Economy on Track ' 26 June 2004, 18.
25 Dan Ring, "Finneran Downplays Bankruptcy," The Republican, 16 June, 2004, 1.
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control board make future spending decisions. Attached to the proposal was the suspension of
26

collective bargaining for the city's unions.

Ken Donnelly, secretary treasurer of the

Professional Firefighters of Massachusetts, accused the governor of "trying to break the unions.
I haven't seen anything this bad in 32 years." Timothy Col1ins, president of the Springfield
Education Association, said that the control board plan represented "the lowest day of my life
when you have a mayor and a governor stripping us of our collective bargaining rights. It's
almost un-American. Shame on the governor and shame on the mayor." Ken Poole, who
represented Public Works employees, noted that his union had 364 members in 1999 and in mid2004 just 208 members.
Ultimately, the city received a $52 million interest-free loan to be paid back by 2012. The
$52 million figure matched what the city was owed in delinquent property taxes. With the loan
came the Finance Control Board (FCB) to take over fiscal management of the city through the
summer of 2007. The Board ' s term was extended to 2009 in mid-2007 when it became apparent
that Springfield would not be able to pay the loan back by 2012 as was required in the enabling
27

legislation.

And, despite the arguments from union leaders that job cuts and wage freezes

would negatively impact the provision of essential protective and educational services and cause
more residents to leave the city, the Board instituted a wage freeze. Teachers ' previously
negotiated pay increases were held back, causing the exodus of nearly 250 teachers during the

2 6 Trudy Tynan, '"With State Aid Promised, Springfield Now Faces the Hard Part," The Assod ated Press, J6 July,
2004 ; Peter DeMarco and Tyrone Richardson, Bumpy Road is Seen for Springfield," BG, 6 June, 2004, B3.

27 Peter Goonan , "Current Tax Collection Bodes Well ," The Repubican, 3 September, 2004, 1.
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28
2004-2005 academic year.

By early 2005 Springfield was referred to as "a city under siege."

In one of its first public statements, the Board informed residents that

No solution to the city's fiscal crisis can be achieved without a substantial
reduction of personnel costs and expenses. It is clear that an integral part of the
recovery plan for the city of Springfield must include work rule changes, benefits
restructuring and take-home pay reductions for municipal employees.

30

Eric Kriss, one of Governor Mitt Romney's chief financial advisors, described the Board
as "a tool to help the city recover financially" and contended that a turnaround could occur only
with the good will and effort of municipal employees. But, with 20% of the city's workforce cut
between 2002 and 2004, and the private sector job base continuing to shrink, it was difficult to
imagine why city workers would go along with the FCB 's plans. Observers also found it
difficult to see where any badly needed economic stimulus would come from. This prompted

The Republican to remind its readers: "While we agree that work rule and benefit changes need
to be made regarding city employees, we vigorously oppose the reduction of their wages and
think it would be unconscionable to do so." For good measure, the newspaper's editorial added
"The Control Board should be working for a surgical plan to restore the city's finances, not a
31

hatchet job that leaves the city as nothing more than a comatose patient on life support."

E. Where To: Four Years of Finance Control Board (Mis)Governance and Counting?

28 Quotes in Adam Gorlick, Springfield Bailout Bill StalJs Due to Union Concerns, The Associated Press, 4 June,
2004.
29 Roselyn Tantraphol , "Springfield: A City Under Siege," Hartford Courant J 7 April , 2005 , 1.
30 P. Goonan, 2004, 1.
31 The Republican, "Finance Control Board too Quick on the Draw," 3 September, 2004, 16.
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For most of the last two centuries the Connecticut River Valley, with Springfield as its leading
city, related to the rest of the country and the world as a stellar manufacturing center, its
metalworkers and machinery builders fueling the nation's industrial revolution. In historical
succession, industries including textiles, paper, shoes, rifles and handguns, industrial machinery,
aircraft engines, and computers generated spectacular wealth and advanced workers' living
standards. Metalworking growth stemmed from three related factors: continual innovations in
product design and development stimul~ted by the Springfield Armory; a nucleus of locallyowned, collaborative, machine-tool builders and precision metalworking firms whose expertise
provided the region with the first-mover benefits of any technological breakthroughs; and the
base of skilled workers performing the precision machining required to tum out world-class
products.

,, , ,

The catalyst for the direction of economic development of the Connecticut River valley
was the establishment of the Springfield Armory. A central objective of the Armory was the
development of precision engineering and its use in gun production. Its willingness to diffuse
technical knowledge to its contractors spread best practice and its ability to attract and train
skilled mechanics laid the foundation of a highly skilled workforce. In turn, this served as a
repository of knowledge, the means of incorporating new technical information and the source of
highly innovative new business start-ups. Burgeoning expertise in machine tool technology laid
the foundation for a capital goods sector that interacted with emerging industries creating a
diverse manufacturing base. Both benefited from learning processes within networks of machine
builders, small specialist engineering shops, education and training institutions and final goods
producers.
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But, after the Second World War, Springfield and the region were caught up in the
accelerated pace of globalization, and the ski11 base was no longer a sufficient magnet to preserve
and grow well-paying work. Once locally owned firms changed hands, their assets were
globalized, and the region's ability to shape and reshape its economic future slipped away.
Springfield scrambled to save what jobs they could, offering corporations financial inducement
to stay or move in. Springfield and nearby Hartford, Connecticut, even engaged in a ludicrous
'border war' , each city's mayor offering inducements to firms to move employment
~pproximately 30 miles north or south along Route 91. While politicans fiddled, the skill base
cultivated up and down the Connecticut River Valley for over a century disappeared. East
Hartford and Springfield- once home to major industries- suffered years of falling living
standards and sharp population losses.
For much of the twentieth century a strong shop-floor skill base, combined with
innovative and forward-looking employers, provided the region with a competitive advantage for
close to 150 years. The productive system reached its zenith during the Second World War.
Symptoms of decline were evident by the early 1950s as the rate of adoption of new technology
and the rate of new product development slowed, as skill became a lower priority for firms, as
work was relocated to the South and overseas, and as firms turned to short-run financial gain
rather than long-run modernization. Increasing competitive failure and the growing inter-regional
and international relocation of production to low wage areas resulted in progressive plant
closures and mass layoffs which undermined the Valley's position as ·a world leader in precision
metal working.
The river valley's former industrial cities suffer economical1y in 2008 due to the failure
to develop a new "Armory", a new ·catalyst for sustainable prosperity. No amount of belt
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tightening, no long-term freeze on teachers' wages, no too high-priced employment of all-star
academic guru's, no fanciful notions that tourist attractions will grow a plentiful supply of wellpaying jobs can arrest the horrible slump. Cooperation among the region's trade association,
trade unions, educational institutions, and supportive state and federal agencies was essential for
meaningful job creation to occur.
But, as work disappeared, the moment slipped away and thereafter only infrequent lip service
was paid to organizing a valley-wide campaign against runaway shops and lost jobs. This left
the "artificial spatial divides between the workplace and the broader community" in tact and
strengthened the more unified corporate America, intent on limiting labor's role in economic
decision-making. 32
By discounting skill and worker input, managers, and their numerous enablers in local,
state, and national finance and government, discarded the utilization of the very knowledge base
essential for their success. The managers of the region ' s machine-too] and metalworking firms,
with Ahab-like determination, searched high and low for workers that they could pay less money
to and for technology substitutes for labor. Their failure to recognize and accept workers interest
in honest participation contributed to the calcification of labor relations, helped cause lagging
productivity growth, and resulted in the devastation of manufacturing cities like East Hartford,
Connecticut; Springfield, Massachusetts; and Springfield, Vermont.
Just as managers resisted workers' efforts to democratize their workplaces and engage in
shopfloor decision-making, so to did Springfield's Finance Control Board strip residents ' voice
from helping to rebuild their city. Months into the Control Board's rule, unions representing
teachers, police, and firefighters fought through the courts to get their legally-negotiated pay

32 Andrew Herod, Labor Geographies: Workers and the Landscapes of Capitalism (New York : The Guilford Press,
2001 ), 268 .
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increases restored. A 23-yearold forklift operator expressed the feelings of many residents: "Just
get it over with. To know your city is going broke- it's time to move out of here. There's no
opportunity here. " 33 Labor leaders believed that Governor Romney was more interested in
imposing conservative fiscal measures and pohcies on the city to bolster his national political
stature, than in solving Springfield's problems. Cost-cutting ideas inc1uded charging fees for
trash removal, dosing libraries, selling the municipal golf course, and transferring city
employees to the state employees' health care plan. Tim Collins, president of the Springfield
Education Association, and _an outspoken critic of the Control Board, charged,

These political leaders have starved this city into this situation, so they could put
forward their Draconian agenda. And the leadership of the Legislature is letting
the city fail because they want to give Romney a black eye as he runs for
president. 34

ln July 2007, after three years of the Control Board's existence, and after the Democrat,
Deva] Patrick, was elected governor and put several new members on the Board, for the first
time the Board talked openly about how it might stimulate economic development. Calls were
made for the colleges and universities to lend their expertise to the monumental task of finding
several new "engines of prosperity" for the valley, ones that might match the skills and
innovation that had previously prope11ed the regional economy forward. But, near the end on
2008 very little has been accomplished on this front.
To conclude, one interesting question is from which direction did the challenge of
globalization come? The much larger history of the Connecticut River Valley productive system

33 Quoted in Stephanie Ebbert, "Springfield Edges Toward Fiscal Abyss," ·B G, 17 January, 2006.
34 Collins quoted in S. Ebbert, "Springfield Edges Toward Fiscal Abyss," BG, 17 January, 2006.
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shows that in its generative phase its machine tool industry posed a global challenge rooted in its
production and innovative capabilities, which came directly from its success in world markets
and indirectly from its transformative effect on American manufacturing. In its degenerative
phase the productive system faced a global challenge from Japanese competition based on
production and innovation principles that had been the key to its early success. But it also faced a
challenge from the globalizing activities of U.S. corporations. These used world markets to
outsource production, and as the demands of shareholders mobilized on a global scale, focussed
their managers attention on short-term gain based on downsizing, deskilling, plant closures,
cutbacks in research and development, and the neglect of investment in physical and human
capital.
~

In the end, the challenge of globalization and how it impacts our older industrial cities
depends on the rules of game. The issue here is that there is a direct conflict between the logic of
the market as idealized by corporate liberalism and incorporated in Anglo/American capitalism
and the logic of production as revealed by hi~torical studies of industrial districts like the one in
the Connecticut River Va11ey. The former has concentrated power in corporate hands, which are
guided by stock market pressure to prioritize the short-term distribution interests of shareholders,
whilst the latter requires the diffusion of responsibility to a11 stakeholders and a concentration on
the longer term to a11ow this empowerment to bear fruit. Whether the challenge of globalization
is constructive or destructive wil1 depend on which of these routes is fo1lowed, although the
present directional signs in Springfield, Massachusetts are not encouraging.
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This paper concerns two contiguous New England metro areas separated by a state
boundary. The Hartford metro area is on the Connecticut side and the Springfield metro area
adjoins on the Massachusetts side. The eponymous central cities of the metro areas are
located about 25 miles apart. In 2000 the Springfield metro had a population of 592,000; the
Hartford metro area had about twice the population, ranking 51 in size among all U.S. metro
areas. These metro areas have received relatively scant scholarly attention compared with
much larger metro areas. They are, however, areas that have had significant Puerto Rican
population growth and a particularly high proportion of Puerto Ricans among the area
Hispanics. This makes Hartford and Springfield valuable for studying the distinctive impact of
Puerto Rican presence.
The first section of this paper shows how the two metro areas reflect the broader
patterns of population change in the Puerto Rican population of the United States. Puerto
Ricans were heavily concentrated in the major cities of the Springfield and Hartford metro areas,
but Hispanic presence is shown to have to have had distinct political significance in the city of
Hartford. The pattern of population dispersion within these metro areas is then considered,
especially the stark difference between non-Hispanic white (hereafter referred to as "white")
population change and change among His~anics. The relationship Hispanic/white residential
segregation and Puerto Rican predominance among Hispanics is the focus of the last part of the
paper, and the connection is demonstrated using a broad spectrum U.S. metro areas.
PUERTO RICANS IN THE U.S. POPULATION
According to the 2000 census , only 10 percent of Hispanics in mainland metropolitan
areas (all references hereafter are to the mainland population) were Puerto Rican, and Puerto
Ricans comprised just 1.5 percent of all metro area residents. Puerto Rican concentration
particularly in the Northeast, however, has made their influence far greater than these numbers
suggest. In 1950 there were 226,000 Puerto Ricans on the mainland; 81 percent resided in
New York. By 1980 there were over 2 million Puerto Ricans in the U.S. and a majority lived
outside the New York metro area. The number Puerto Ricans in New York peaked in 1990 and
then fell for the first time in the following decade. By 2000 the total Puerto Rican population
reached 3.4 million , with 840,000 residing in the New York metro area (Cruz 1998: 4; Baker
2002: 45; Maciso, Jr. 1968; Guzman 2001; Rodriguez n.d.: 9). Since 1980 Puerto Ricans have
shifted away from older areas of settlement to small cities, and locations in Massachusetts and
Connecticut have been important destinations (Whalen 2005: 39; Acosta-Belen and Santiago
2006: 86-89).
In 2000 there were only three metro areas other than New York with over 100,000
Puerto Ricans: Philadelphia (171,000), Chicago (159,859) and Orlando (146,530). Puerto
Ricans in large cities , however, tend to be a relatively small proportion of the metro Hispanics.
Just one of every three Hispanics in the New York metro area was Puerto Rican in 2000. The
Puerto Ricans share of the Hispanic population exceeded that of New York in 47 metro areas.
Springfield, Massachusetts was at the top of this list with 83 percent Puerto Rican among
Hispanics. The nearly 65 thousand Puerto Ricans in the Springfield metro area comprised
10.4% of the total population (compared to 9.0% for New York), a figure above all but one other

metro areas. 1 In 2000 the Puerto Rican population of the Hartford metro area was 83,000,
comprising nearly three-quarters of the metro area Hispanics. Among metro areas with a
sizable Puerto Rican population, Hartford had the second highest proportion Puerto Rican
among Hispanics. 2
DEMOGRAPHIC AND POLITICAL UNIQUENESS OF THE CITY OF HARTFORD
The Hartford and Springfield metro areas also stand out because of the level of Puerto
Rican presence in the largest cities. In 2000 over 80% of Hispanics in the city of Hartford were
Puerto Rican; Puerto Ricans were nearly one-third of city population. In 2001 Hartford elected
Eddie Perez as its first Hispanic Mayor and the first mayor of a state capital. Perez was born in
Corozal, Puerto Rico and came to Hartford at age 12 in 1969.3
This mayoral change culminated a long period of Puerto Rican political mobilization, but
it also had a significant demographic underpinning (Cruz 1998: 174-5). The city of Hartford
experienced explosive Hispanic population growth combined with an especially sharp exodus of
non-Hispanic whites. In Hartford the shift toward minority predominance came early. By 1970
the Hartford school system was 45 percent black. The city elected the first black mayor in New
England, Thirman L. Milner, in 1981 (Grant and Grant 1986: 78). In 1980 61,000 whites
comprised 44 percent of the Hartford population. There were 45,000 blacks, greatly
outnumbering the 28,000 Hispanics. Ten years later both blacks and Hispanics outnumbered
whites. There were still more blacks than Hispanics, but the gap narrowed to only about 6000.
During the 1990s the number of Hispanics continued to grow, while there was a net decline of
both whites and blacks. During the 1990s the decline in percentage white in Hartford was
higher than in any other central city in the 102 largest metropolitan areas of the country (Frey
2003: 167). The result was that by 2000 there was a complete reversal of the 1980 group
hierarchy, leaving the city with 21.6 thousand whites, 46 thousand blacks and 49 thousand
Hispanics. As the city shrank in size (down from 136,392 to 121,578 between 1990 and 2000),
Hispanics gained a clear plurality. Conditions were particularly propitious for Puerto Ricans to
take political leadership of the city.
In his analysis of the Puerto Ricans involvement in Hartford city politics, Jose Cruz
(1998: 5) notes that "[d]e~graphic concentration facilitated ethnic political mobilization,
promoting the development of leaders and organizational efforts and acting as a counterweight
to the forces of poverty and marginality." Also important was the fact that Hartford was a
medium-sized city, which afforded "easy access to city hall, proximity to elected officials, an
accessible media, and small electoral districts that allow direct contact with large numbers of
voters even when financial resources are scarce." Puerto Rican influence could be far greater
than in cities like Chicago and New York, where Puerto Ricans were found in much greater
numbers (Cruz 1998: 159). Even in Hartford, however, Cruz (2006: 243) notes that just 15
percent of municipal officials were Hispanic, very much lower than 41 percent share of the
population.
Demographic conditions that appear to be of key significance to the political
empowerment of Hispanics in Hartford have yet to occur elsewhere in the Springfield and
Hartford metro areas. While Hispanics had high representation in the population of other cities,
1

In 2000 12.6% of the total population of Vineland-Millville-Bridgeton , New Jersey was Puerto Rican, but
this was a metro area with only 18,520 Puerto Ricans.
2
In 2000, the metro areas just below Springfield in the percentage Puerto Rican among Hispanics were
Jamestown, New York (77.0%), Waterbury, Connecticut (75.0%) and Hartford, Connecticut (73.1%). In
both Jamestown and Waterbury, however, the number of Puerto Ricans was relatively small , 4.542 and
19,687, respectively.
3
Downloaded on September 2, 2008 from http://www.hartford .gov/government/mayor/biography.asp.
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nowhere else did they reach a plurality of the population nor were whites reduced much below a
majority of the total population.
The city of Springfield showed a clear contrast to Hartford. With a total population of
157,000 in 1990, Springfield was very close in size to Hartford, but Springfield at this time was
still nearly two-thirds white. In the decade that followed Springfield population loss was
relatively small, down 5000 compared with an 18,000 drop in Hartford. The white exodus and
Hispanic growth still left whites nearly a majority of the population. Hispanics came to
outnumber African Americans, but Hispanics were only 27 percent of total - much lower than in
Hartford.
In the Springfield metro area the second largest number of Hispanics was in Holyoke; in
the Hartford metro area New Britain contained the second largest number of Hispanics. The
situations here, however, were more like Springfield than Hartford.
In 2000 Holyoke had a population 40,000, of whom 36 percent were Puerto Rican and
an additional 5 percent were other Hispanics. This gave Holyoke the highest percentage Puerto
Ri~an of any city in mainland United States. (Hartford, with 33 percent Puerto Rican in 2000
ranked second .4 } Whites , however, greatly outnumbered Hispanics. With only 3 percent
African Americans, Holyoke was 54 percent white in 2000.
New Britain experienced a surge in Puerto Ricans, their number rising from 10.3
thousand in 1990 to 15.7 thousand in 2000. New Britain was drawing more Hispanics, and
especially Puerto Ricans , than the city of Hartford. Between 1990 and 2000 there were 5,400
more Hispanics in Hartford, but only 28 percent of this increase was Puerto Rican as compared
to 78 percent in New Britain. 5 By 2000, however, whites in New Britain still comprised 59
percent of the population , African Americas were 11 percent and Hispanics were just over 27
percent (up from 16 percent in 1990).
HISPANIC AND WHITE DISPERSION ACROSS THE METRO AREA
White exit from Hartford may have created greater political opportunities for Puerto
Ricans, but this empowerment, at least up through the 1990s, was of limited value in coping
with economic decline (see Cruz 1998: 208-214). Among all U.S. citi"es with population over
100,000 in 2000, Hartford was second only to Brownsville, Texas in the percentage b~low
poverty. A variety of studies comparing the central cities of US metro areas show Hartford
consistently at or just above the very bottom on indices of economic well being in 1990 and in
2000 (Vey 2007 p. 71 ; Wright and Montiel 2007; Lewis Mumford Center 2008).
Hartford population decline was extreme. In 1950 the city population peaked at 177,000;
fifty years later this was down to 122,000. Between 1990 and 2000 the population had declined
by 13 percent - the largest percentage decline among the 195 U.S. cities with populations of
100,000 or more in 1990. The median change in these cities was an increase of 8. 7 percent
(Glaeser and Shapiro 2003: 18-19). The city of Springfield also lost population, although it was
down only 3.1 percent.
As Hartford declined, its suburbs grew. As was the case throughout the nation, whites
heading to suburbia were increasingly joined by Hispanics and African Americans (Guzman
2001: Wiese 2004; Suro and Singer 2002). In 1990 55 percent of metro area Hispanics resided
in the city of Hartford ; by 2000 this fell to 43 percent. Although somewhat more concentrated in
New Britain (which grew from 15.4 percent to 16.9 percent of metro area Hispanics), Hispanics
were dispersing widely across the metro region. The Springfield metro area showed a very
4
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Downloaded on September 4, 2008 from http ://www.epodunk .com/ancestry/Puerto-Rican .html.

Hispanics in Springfield grew by almost 15,000, with again 78 percent of that attributable to Puerto
Ricans.

similar pattern. 6 In both metro areas between 1990 and 2000 Hispanics comprised a larger
share of the population in nearly every town and city, paralleling the broader dispersion of
Puerto Ricans across the nation: "Between 1970 and 2000 Puerto Ricans gravitated to the
South, moved within the Northeast, maintained their presence in the Midwest, and were found in
every state of the union. Migration which used to be primarily aimed at New York City, now
flows directly to other parts of the country" (Acosta-Belen and Santiago, 2006: 86-87).
Whites were also geographic mobile, but in a way that often reestablished rather than
mitigated residential separation from Hispanics. Indeed, in the Springfield and Hartford metro
areas the two groups were moving in diametrically opposite directions. Change in the number
of Hispanics by town or city between 1990 and 2000 had an almost perfect negative correlation
with the change in the number of whites (-.89 for Hartford; -.98 for Springfield). For Hispanics
between 1990 and 2000, the larger the size of the city or town, the higher was their population
growth. During the same period whites showed the greatest numeric increase in areas with low
population, consistent with a pattern suburban sprawl.
Table 1 provides some greater detail regarding the location of population change. For
each metro area separately, the table shows all the towns or cities with a loss of 1,000 or more
whites between 1990 and 2000. The median population size of municipalities in 1990 was
12,054 in the Springfield metro area and 11,312 in the Hartford metro area. Column one shows
that, with the exception of Winchester, all these towns were well above the median. White
population decline was greatest in the city of Hartford and the city of Springfield; larger towns
clearly tended to have the largest white loss. Columns 3 and 4 show consistent and
appreciable growth in the number of Hispanics (and also African Americans, with the exception
of Hartford). These areas of high white population decline accounted for 85 percent of the
Hispanic population increase in the Hartford metro area and 90 percent of Hispanic increase in
the Springfield metro area. Given the geography of poverty and minority population
concentration, the result was that whites moved toward areas of greater ethnic and economic
homogeneity. Hispanic growth tended to be greatest in areas with a prior large Hispanic
presence. 7
What explains the difference in group movement? One factor was surely ability to afford
to live in desirable suburban areas. Housing is just one of the costs that a poor family must
consider. Subsidies provided under the federal Section 8 Rental Voucher Program have
increased suburban residency of the poor, but Edward Goetz (2003: 8) notes that "such a
voucher does not put a bus line in front of the building, relocate the community college or
affordable day care nearby, and bring along the family's network of friends and relatives for
emotional and material support." Differences .in locational choices are shaped by substantial
group differences in socio-economic achievement.
Residents of the Hartford metro area were wealthier than those in Springfield, but this
wealth does not appear to have appreciably mitigated group differences (see Table 2). There
were stark difference between Hispanics and whites, with African Americans in an intermediate
6

The percentage of metro area Hispanics in the city of Springfield, however, increased from 53 in 1990
to 57 in 2000.
7
For Hispanics, the correlation of the increase in the group in each town or city from 1990 to 2000 with
the size of the group in 1990 was .68 in Hartford and .95 in Springfield. For whites the comparable
figures were -.63 and -.88.
The change among Hispanics is consistent with national trends. Based on a study of 331
metropolitan areas of United States, Logan (2003 : 253) concludes: A The persistence of residential
segregation for minority groups means that newly suburban group members tended to move into the
same array of neighborhoods in which co-ethnics were already living in 1990. Given the rapid growth of
each group, this implies that suburban racial and ethnic enclaves may have emerged or grown
substantially in many metro areas, especially in those areas in which the group is well represented .@
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position. Compared to whites, Hispanics earned only 47 percent of the income of whites in the
Hartford metro area and 43 percent in the Springfield area. There was even greater contrast in
the figures for those below twice the federal poverty level 8 and the proportion of children being
raised in female-headed households. Only about a quarter of Hispanics owned their homes as
compared with three-quarters of whites - a factor that contributed to Hispanics being far more
likely than whites to change residence within the past five years. Added to these socioeconomic differences was the fact that the groups differed markedly in their age structure. With
a median age of about 40, whites were far less likely to have young children at home than were
Hispanics, whose median age was in the low twenties.
It is significant to note that Puerto Ricans differed somewhat more from whites than did
Hispanics as a whole (who, of course, were predominantly Puerto Rican). In other words,
Puerto Ricans taken separately were somewhat poorer, more likely to have female-headed
households, less likely to own homes and had a lower median age. As is shown by data for the
nation , Puerto Ricans were in a particularly disadvantaged economic position relative to other
major groups of Hispanic origin other than Dominicans (Ramirez 2004 ).
CENSUS TRACT RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION
Change in ethnic composition of cities or towns is important because of the way in which
schools and other community resources are heavily based on these boundaries. It is common ,
however, to measure the degree of residential segregation by census tract, each of which had in
the 2000 an average of 4,200 residents. The index of dissimilarity is a widely used measure of
residential segregation. In comparing two groups, the index can be interpreted as the
percentage of one group that would have to move to a different census tract in order to achieve
compete integration, that is, for the group to have equal representation in all census tracts.
Comparing all metropolitan areas at the census tract level, Logan, Stults and Farley
(2004: 6) find that the white/black residential segregation was much higher than Hispanic/white
segregation. Though the difference has lessened since 1980, in 2000 the white/black index of
dissimilarity (65.2) was still considerably above the Hispanic/white index (51.6). 9 In the Hartford
metro area in 2000, however, Hispanic/white segregation was at the same level as segregation
of whites from blacks, and in the Springfield metro area the black/white segregation was
substantially lower than Hispanic/white segregation.
Why did the Hartford and Springfield metro areas differ from the overall national trend?
Was this connected to Puerto Rican predominance among the Hispanics? The connection
seemed plausible if Puerto Rican predominance was associated with an especially large gap in
the income of Hispanics relative to whites, and income in turn shaped residential options or
choices . There is evidence that segregation of Hispanics from whites is highest in Northeast, a
region where Puerto Ricans are especially impoverished (Baker 2002; Jargowsky and Yang
2006; Santiago and Galster 1995; Tienda 1989).
Alternatively, racial discrimination may play a more direct role. Massey and Denton
(1993: 151) report that Puerto Ricans are more segregated from whites than other Hispanic
groups and attribute this to "the fact that many [Puerto Ricans] are of African origin. Although
white Puerto Ricans achieve rates of spatial assimilation that are comparable with those found
among other ethnic groups, those of African or racially mixed origins experience markedly lower
ability to convert socioeconomic attainments into contact with whites ." Loveman and Muniz
(2007: 935) see a significant connection between the growth of the population in Puerto Rico
8

Given the high cost of living in the urban areas of the Northeast, below twice the poverty level seems a
more appropriate standard of economic hardship.
9
The figures represent "the national averages for levels of minority-white segregation ... , weighted by the
number of minority-group members in the metropolitan area, for metropolitan areas with more than 2,500
minority-group members ... (Logan , Stults and Farley, 2004: 6-7).

categorizing themselves as white and the racial discrimination that Puerto Ricans have faced on
the mainland, where there was an "inescapable centrality of racial status."
Assuming a "white identity" in the United States may be more difficult when Puerto
Ricans predominate in the population. Based on a study of 48 metro areas in 1980, Santiago
and Galster (1995: 384) conclude: AWhile the presence of non-Puerto Rican Latinos apparently
reduced Puerto Rican/Anglo segregation, the presence of Blacks had the opposite effect.
Perhaps the presence of other Latinos mitigated Anglo prejudice towards Puerto Ricans and
increased the potential for integration. Anglo hostility may have been deflected from Puerto
Ricans as they are able to blend into the larger Latino community. @
Wilson and Traub (2006: 125) argue that, while there are circumstances in which
minority status has benefits, Hispanics often prefer to identify themselves as immigrant something that may be less accessible to Puerto Ricans. In answering census questions about
race , Hispanics "resisted both whit~ and nonwhite racial classifications, instead labeling
themselves 'other. "' Foreign-born Hispanics find value in stressing their status as immigrants as
a means "to tap into the American melting-pot ideal and ethos of upward mobility based on
ambition, self-discipline, and hard work ." Robert Smith (2006 : 34) finds that first-generation
Mexicans in New York "lament and fear the social distress that Puerto Ricans as a group are
thought to experience. In imagining a different future for their own children , Mexicans use the
readily available American tool, the immigrant analogy, to posit a racialized difference between
themselves and Puerto Ricans. " Mexican youth distance themselves from what they view as
the denigrated status of Puerto Ricans and African Americans in New York through practices
("transnational life") which emphasize their affinity with the community in Mexico from which
their families originated (Ibid.: 163-4; see also Wilson and Traub 2006: 210, note 13).
Looking at a broader set of metro areas makes it possible to test the association
between Puerto Rican presence and white/Hispanic residential segregation and to view the
Hartford and Springfield metro areas in perspective. Table 3 shows all metro areas in which at
least 40 percent of the Hispanics were Puerto Rican in the year 2000. The range was from 41 to
72 percent Puerto Rican . These, then , were metros where Puerto Rican influence was likely to
vary from strong to moderate. This threshold was somewhat arbitrary but metro areas with a
much lower percentage Puerto Ricans were surely likely to have a greater array of confounding
influences other than the degree of Puerto Rican presence. Table 3 is sorted by the
white/Hispanic index of dissimilarity (column1 ). Hartford and Springfield were clearly toward the
top, ranking 3 and 4.
As hypothesized, the percentage Puerto Rican among Hispanics (column 4) was highly
correlated with Hispanic/white segregation (r = .73). There was no relationship between
black/white segregation and Hispanic/white segregation (r = .095), but there were cases of
lower black/white segregation only in the top half of this list. These data also show that lower
income of Hispanics compared to whites (column 5) was associated with higher segregation of
whites from Hispanics (r = -.74). A larger share Puerto Rican was associated with lower income
relative to whites (r = -.58). Applying multiple regression makes clear, however, that the "Puerto
Rican effect" on residential segregation cannot be explained by the lower income associated
with Puerto Rican presence. Using the Hispanic/white segregation as the dependent variable,
the beta coefficients in the regression equation were -.469 for the Hispanic/white income ratio
and .460 for the percent Puerto Rican among Hispanics, both significant at the .01 level. 10
Finally, Table 3 suggests that regional factors may be important. All four of the Florida
metro areas ranked 30 or more in their index of white/Hispanic dissimilarity. Florida has had
recent surge of Puerto Ricans , many middle class and professional (Whalen 2005: 40). By

10

The r square was .67. Multicollinearity is not a problem here, as shown by the tolerance statistic of
.659.
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contrast, nine of 16 metro areas with the highest segregation of Hispanics from whites were
located in Connecticut or Massachusetts.
CONCLUSION
Comparing metro areas with moderate to strong Puerto Rican representation among
Hispanics supports the conclusion that that low income of Hispanics and high percentage
Puerto Rican both contribute to segregation in the Springfield and Hartford areas. The multiple
regression coefficients show a significant "Puerto Rican effect" on residential segregation of
Hispanics from whites, even when controlling for the lower income of Hispanics relative to
whites associated with a higher percentage Puerto Rican among Hispanics.
The impact of Puerto Ricans is surely changing. One factor is that Puerto Ricans are a
shrinking proportion of the Hispanic population. Even in the 41 metro areas with high Puerto
Rican presence, between 1990 and 2000 the number of Puerto Ricans grew by 58 percent,
while the number from other groups of Hispanic origin increased by 90 percent. In these metro
areas Puerto Rican were 60 percent of Hispanics in 2000, down four points since 1990.
More important, perhaps, are changes in the meaning of immigrant status. Douglas
Massey (2008) makes a compelling case that immigration policy over the past two decades has
had a detrimental impact on Hispanics . The situation has worsened considerably as a result of
the response to the September 11 , 2001 attack: "The arrival of growing numbers of darkskinned immigrants over the past several decades has triggered a new round of racial formation
in the United States. Latinos, in particular, have increasingly been framed as a racialized 'other'
whose presence threatens the culture , values, living standards-indeed, the very existence-of
the United States. In keeping with this framing of social reality, discrimination against Latinos
has risen to equal or exceed that directed against African Americans (Charles 2003), with
discriminatory treatment being triggered by foreign accent appearance, and skin color rather
than class" (Ibid. : 102). Recent more vigorous enforcement efforts against immigrants have
profoundly affected Hispanics. The 2007 National Survey of Latinos showed that 33 percent
expressed the view that the situation of Latinos had worsened over the past year; this rose to 50
percent in the 2008 survey (Lopez and Minushkin 2008).
Spatial population dispersion across and within metro areas may increase exposure to
hostility. In the Hartford and Springfield metro areas, Hispanic representation grew in nearly all
suburbs, but the towns or cities with the greatest Hispanic increase were locations where whites
were most prone to leave. This difference in group residential movement may reflect the
discrepancy in economic resources of whites and Hispanics, but Massey's research suggests
that there may also be growing intolerance. Research on residential segregation in all metro
areas over the period from 1980 to 2000 revealed "a movement of the Hispanic population
toward areas of lower segregation and increasing segregation in those areas" (Logan, Stults
and Farley 2006: 11 ).
How will Puerto Ricans fair with these changes? Their declining representation among
Hispanics may lessen the extent to which they are viewed as racially separate from other
Hispanics. The shift from minority status to an immigrant identity, however, may no longer be
an advantage. Indeed, Puerto Ricans may perceive increased value rn distancing themselves
from Mexicans. Gina Perez (2004: 175) underscores the perils long associated with this kind of
divisiveness. Puerto Ricans' claim that their citizenship entitles them to preferential treatment
can "contribute to a discourse of illegality that further marginalizes Mexican immigrants and
erects barriers of exclusion that prevent Puerto Ricans from seeing their shared location as
mejicanos and Mexican Americans in Chicago's racialized political economy."
A worsening of the economic or political situation for Hispanics in general is unlikely to
bode well for Puerto Ricans, but it may result in a reduced connection between Puerto Rican
presence among Hispanics and the level of residential segregation of Hispanics from whites.
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Table 1
Towns or Cities Losing 1,000 or More Whites in the Hartford and Springfield Metro Areas,
1990-2000
Total Pop. Poeulation change, 1990-2000
1990
White
Black
His12anic
Hartford
New Britain
East Hartford
Windsor
Manchester
Bristol
Vernon
Bloomfield
Enfield
Windham
West Hartford
Middletown
Mansfield
Winchester
Newington
Sum of above

139,739
75,491
50,452
27,817
51,618
60,640
29,841
19,483
45,532
22,039
60,110
42,762
21,103
11,524
29,208
687,359

Remainder of MSA

470,226

Springfield
Holyoke
Chicopee
Amherst
West Springfield
Northampton
Sum of above
Remainder of MSA

156983
43704
56632
35228
27537
29289
349,373
238,511

Hartford Metro Area
-20,937
5,123
-14,322
6,854
-12,527
4,546
-3,707
452
-3,680
2,350
-3,615
1,514
-3,227
405
-2,987
128
-2,875
652
-2,851
2,815
-2,492
2,099
-2,352
874
-1,575
320
195
-1,306
-1,259
467
-79,712
28,794

Percentage white
1990 2000 Change

-4, 140
2,320
5,622
3,230
2,896
627
635
2,884
1,440
545
1,903
1,043
414
89
252
19,760

30.5
74 .7
83.4
77.2
92.0
94.4
93.6
54 .3
94.0
81.0
91.8
83 .7
87.9
97.8
95.0
74.9

17.8
58.8
59.6
62.9
80.1
89 .3
88.1
38 .8
88.3
65.6
82.9
77.5
81 .9
93.4
90.3
65.1

-12.7
-15.9
-23.8
-14.3
-12.0
-5.1
-5.6
-15.5
-5.7
-15.4
-8.9
-6.2
-6 .0
-4.4
-4.6
-9.8

3,932

96.1

93.3

-2.8

Springfield Metro Area
-25,578
14,815
3,322
-7,011
42
2,912
-5,715
2,740
342
-2,359
490
469
791
-1,349
285
-1,260
317
201
-43,272
22,065
4,661

63.6
65.3
93 .9
82 .6
94 .5
91 .1
75.4

2,518

96 .6

48 .8
54.0
86.9
76.7
88.4
87.8
65.1
94.4

-14.8
-11.3
-7.1
-5.9
-6.1
-3.4
-10.3
-2.2

28,010

8,938

4,921

1,149

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 1990 and 2000 censuses.

------

--

--

..... --

Page 13 of 15

Table 2

Measures of Racial/Ethnic Differences the Hartford and Springfield Metro
Areas, 2000

Median
household
income
Total population
White
Hispanic
Puerto Ricans
African American

$
$
$
$
$

52,188
56,963
27,050
24,454
35,103

Total population
White
Hispanic
Puerto Ricans
African American

$
$
$
$
$

40,740
44,727
19,238
18,022
29,075

% owning
a home

%in
same
house
asin
1995***

Median
age

Hartford Metro Area
19.7
22.0
12.9
11 .9
54 .5
51 .7
57.0
59.1
38.4
52 .0

70.2
79.1
26.2
22.2
43.7

58.3
63 .035.2
35.3
47 .3

37.4
40.2
24.4
23.7
30 .1

Springfield Metro Area
29 .1
28.5
21 .0
16.8
67.8
57.5
70.3
60.0
46.3
55.0

65.5
74.5
23.3
21 .1
43.6

57.0
62.0
35.1
34 .8
47.8

35.8
39.2
22.1
21 .9
27 .9

% below % of children
in femaletwice
poverty
headed
households**
level*

*Among those for whom income known, the percentage in households with less that twice the official poverty level.
**Percentage of children under 18 living with a female householder, no husband present.
*** Percentage of the population age 5 and older living in the same house as in 1995.

Source: U.S. Census 2000, STF4

Table 3

Metro Areas With 40 Percent Puerto Rican Among Hispanics in 2000
Index of Dissimilarit;t

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Metroeolitan area
Reading , PA
Bridgeport, CT
Hartford, CT
Springfield, MA
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton , PA
Lancaster, PA
Waterbury, CT
Lowell, MA-NH
Philadelphia, PA-NJ
Worcester, MA-CT
New Haven-Meriden , CT
York , PA
Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria, OH
Brockton, MA
Buffalo-Niagara Falls , NY
New Bedford, MA
Ha rrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle , PA
Trenton , NJ
Rochester, NY
Utica-Rome, NY
Atlantic-Cape May, NJ
Jamestown, NY
Erie, PA
Vineland-Millville-Bridgeton , NJ
Youngstown-Warren, OH
New London-Norwich , CT-RI
Syracuse, NY
Wilmington-Newark , DE-MD
Elmira, NY
Daytona Beach , FL
Fitchburg-Leominster, MA
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY
Orlando, FL
Glens Falls, NY
Newburgh, NY-PA
Monmouth-Ocean , NJ
Binghamton, NY
Dutchess County, NY
Dover, DE
Ocala , FL
Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bal, FL

I

I

White/
Hispanic

White/
black

Differ ence

% Puerto
Rican
among
Hispanics

72
67
64
63
62
62
61
61
60
60
60
58
58
58
56
56
55
54
54
54
53
53
49
49
49
48
46
45
44
43
43
41
41
40
40
38
37
33
32
32
25

61
53
64
49
74
64
77
77
57
38
55
51
64
34
63
71
65
53
58
47
49
63
47
69
54
51
51
57
72
59
66
64
69
64
64

-11
-13
0
-14
11
2
16
· 17
-3
-21
-5
-7
6
-24
7
15
10
-1
4
-7
-4
11
-2
20
6
3
5
12
29
15
23
23
29
24
24
6
24
20
22
35
48

61%
67%
73%
83%
66%
72%
75%
61%
62%
64%
65%
61%
62%
56%
68%
68%
62%
41%
67%
63%
49%
77%
58%
67%
55%
59%
52%
42%
52%
46%
66%
56%
52%
49%
49%
40%
47%
46%
45%
45%
41%

44
61
54
54
67
73

Hispanic/
Wh ite
Income
Ratio*

Number of
Hispanics

Number of
Puerto
Ricans

0.51
0.59
0.47
0.43
0.60
0.59
0.52
0.46
0.52
0.48
0.55
0.66
0.66
0.57
0.52
0.39
0.55
0.64
0.53
0.55
0.73
0.58
0.58
0.69
0.73
0.71
0.56
0.66
0.69
0.87
0.61
0.60
0.74
0.69
0.86
0.81
0.50
0.82
0.74
0.87
0.89

36,357
56,914
113,540
74,277
50,607
26,742
26,245
17,242
258,606
36,248
53,331
11 ,296
74,862
9,524
33,967
10,395
19,557
33,898
47,559
8,125
34 ,107
5,901
6,126
27,823
10,74~
13,770
15,112
27,599
1,609
31 ,648
11 ,838
23,798
271 ,627
1,895
42,053
63 ,813
4 ,495
18,060
4 ,069
15,616
21,970

22,038
38,307
82,992
61,310
33,528
19,341
19,687
10,508
160,076
23,349
34,509
6,874
46,117
5,311
22,956
7,021
12,199
13,865
32,078
5,152
16,640
4,542
3,538
18,520
5,938
8,155
7,912
11 ,566
843
14,577
7,820
13,306
139,898
920
20,507
25,797
2,109
8,239
1,837
6,997
9,111

*Median household income in 1999.
Source: Lewis Mumford Center: http://mumford.albany.edu/census/data .html, downloaded Sept. 20, 2008.
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Abstract:
The Detroit, MI (USA) and Windsor, ON (Canada) binational metropolitan area once held the
greatest concentration of automotive and related industries in the world. Through this activity the
region experienced explosive population and employment growth during much of the twentieth
century. In recent decades, however, the high costs of this growth has become apparent:
deconcentration leading to urban decline, intermunicipal competition, and large areas of fixed
and obsolete infrastructure. Global shifts have also reduced the attractiveness of the region for
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the physical strategies used to create and design these facilities and offer an initial assessment of
their success in achieving the competitive goals that they have been intended for. In conclusion, I
also review some smaller-scale projects that I argue offer compelling, but so far low-visibility
and spatially marginal alternatives to corporate-dominated, heavily subsidized
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Introduction

Over the past twenty years the topics of globalization and the global city have come to 1
dominate the intellectual dialogue on international planning and development. Related issues
like poverty, neocolonialism, sustainability, and even 'development' itself have all been
subsumed into a term whose totalizing implications are matched by the breadth of its
utilization in recent researches, the best-known of which are so highly visible and widely cited
as to hardly require specific identification.
The debate over global city status, or 'globality', with its implications not only of the
inevitability and implied desirability of global city membership, or at least of participation in the
growing network of global cities, has neglected numerous aspects of urbanization in the
transnational context. The implications of this neglect are as meaningful as the aspects
themselves have been unheralded. Chief among these are very real concerns with the
desirability, or meaning, of globality; whether or not the attainment of global city status can or
should be seen as equivalent to a city's attainment of normative goods like democracy or .
sustainability. There is substantial and growing cautionary evidence to show that urban
globality does not guarantee urban virtue, at least as it pertains to universally considered values
like democracy and human rights. The absence of fundamental human values from many global
cities could be interpreted as calling into question the very meaning of globality, or at least of
demanding that the definition be broadened to encompass human as well as economic values.
Reinforcing the presumed desirability of globality is its seemingly teleological aspect. The
progression toward membership in the club of global cities is viewed as an inevitable,
irreversible progression in a manner not dissimilar to that espoused by the advocates of
modernity-driven 'development' from the 1960s through the 1980s (Rist 1997). The inevitability
of the progression to global city status is not only ironic considering the particularity and
privilege accorded to owners of that status, which of course mitigates against any substantial
broadening of membership, but is deeply married to the seeming inevitability of the
progression of globalization itself- an economic, social, and physical interconnectedness that is
sweeping the world.
This paper is written to critique this dominant perspective by illustrating the means by which a
particular transnational metropolitan area, that of Detroit-Windsor (USA-Canada), is operating
in a manner precisely opposite to the dominant teleological trajectory projected by the
advocates of globalization. Detroit-Windsor is a swiftly deg/obalizing region- a binational
metropolitan area whose global dominance has been shrinking for the past several decades.
Once a leader in global automobile manufacturing and the home, as of 1955, of three of the
largest five corporations in the world (Fortune 2008), Detroit-Windsor has in the succeeding five
decades undergone a shocking deindustrialization that has devastated the economy and
landscape of much of the region. Even more profound is the region's transformation from a
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global leader, if not a global city•, to what can only be d·escribed as an increasingly marginal role
on the world economic stage. In spite of its location straddling two of the world's largest and
wealthiest economies (USA and Canada), Detroit-Windsor stands as a signal example of
deglobalization, or localization, in a world that seems to be obsessed with the opposite
transformation. The global past of Detroit-Windsor is over; what lies ahead will almost certainly
be a local future.
While the deindustrialization of Detroit-Windsor has been well documented (Sugrue 1996,
Thomas 1997) the planning-level responses to it, carried out substantially at the municipal
scale, have rarely been placed into the macroeconomic context that they have ultimately
sought to correct. Urban, regional, and state officials in both Michigan and Ontario, faced with
large-scale economic shifts whose origin and remedy lies far beyond local control, have sought,
through a combination of subsidy and incentives to private developers, to revitalize the
economic, social, and physical landscape of the region through the construction of large-scale
urban developments. The purpose of these megaprojects is as much to revise and rehabilitate
the deteriorating image and physical fabric of the city-region as it is to regenerate an economy
whose industrial basis is unrecoverable in a postindustrial, service-based transnational society.
The megaprojects constructed on both sides of the border have a common basis in
consumption rather than production. In each development, gambling, entertainment, and
leisure are variously presented as 'answers' to an economic crisis whose origins lie in declining
wealth, not in its creation. The employment created by the megaprojects is marketed as a
substitute for that formerly provided by industrialization, yet the economic foundation of this
new economy is dependent on capturing consumption and capital from the very regional
residents who have endured the difficult decline of recent decades. For all intents and purposes
the new mega project economy is a parasitic one, feeding on the embers of the industrial .
economy by capturing fragments of the accumulated capital generated over decades through
industrial production and in possession of the region's residents. The megaproject strategy
attempts to capture this capital through local consumption rather than permitting it to be
reinvested or dissipated in other regions of the USA/Canada or even farther afield. Yet the
majority of the profits generated by this new parasitic growth are simply reaccumulated
outside the region by the mammoth corporations and wealthy individuals in control of the
megadevelopments, many of whom are located in Nevada.
A declining industry in a declining region

In recent decades the relative decline in the dominance of the "Big Three" American-owned
automobile corporations (General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler) has been both progressive and
relentless. Hampered by competition from agile, efficient competitors in Japan and by their
own patent inability to respond with innovations of their own, the Big Three have seen their
dominance of the North American auto market shrink from a historic high of 87 percent in 1970

The term as defined by Sassen [2001] and others is predicated on modern postindustrial, finance -based
economies and thus is not entirely applicable to the former industrial economies.
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to 71 percent in 2000. Since 2000, their decline has been even swifter, with the Big Three's
North American market share dropping to 45 percent by 2007 and their worldwide market
share dropping from 32 percent to only 21 percent (Center for Automotive Research 2008a).
This dramatic decline has of course had devastating consequences for automobile-sector
employment, much of which has historically been centered in Michigan in the USA and in
western Ontario in Canada. In the United States alone, Big Three employment shrank from
430,000 in 2000 to only 241,000 by 2007. This number is forecast to decrease further to
203,000 by 2016. At the same time, the dramatic rise in automobile ownership and production
of Big Three automobiles outside North America (including Mexico) has led to the Big Three's
employment abroad rising from 85,000 in 2000 to 113,000 in 2007. This number, too, is
forecast to increase further to 152,000 by 2016 (Center for Automotive Research 2008c).
Despite the transfer of much of their production abroad in a desperate attempt to maintain
profitability through much lower labor costs, the Big Three's losses in market share and steadily
increasing costs in North America (100% increases for materials and much higher than that for
employee benefits since 2000) have led to steadily increasing losses for the companies. None of
the Big Three have been profitable since 2000; their cumulative losses, by 2007, totaled over
$85 billion (Center for Automotive Research 2008b). It does not take sophisticated economic
analysis to see that this rate of loss cannot be maintained; no company can lose money forever,
and North America, and the Detroit-Windsor region, therefore needs to face the very real
possibility that one or more of the Big Three will cease to exist within the next several years,
barring survival through ownership by or even merger with another company. This desperate
strategy is one that Chrysler already pursued from 1998 to 2007 when it was owned by the
German manufacturer Daimler AG. Since 2007 Chrysler has again existed as an independent
company.
With much automobile production and employment historically centered in Michigan and
western Ontario, the worldwide decline of the Big Three has been even more traumatic at the
local level. In Michigan alone, automobile-related employment has dropped nearly 50 percent
in eight years from 316,000 in 1999 to 174,000 in 2007 (this figure includes related supplier
industries outside of the Big Three themselves.) The Windsor, Ontario area, with a much
smaller employment base to begin with, has lost almost 18,000 jobs during approximately the
same period (Gomes 2008). Ironically, the transfer of Canadian automobile production to
elsewhere in Ontario, versus the transfer of US automobile production outside of Michigan to
other states, led to Ontario surpassing Michigan in vehicle production as of 2004, when both
the state and the province produced 2.6M cars. Yet this figure in turn represents a relative
decline from 1999, when Ontario produced 2.9M cars and Michigan 3.1M. Accompanying this
decline in production has been a flurry of plant closings. In Michigan alone, 18 plants have been
closed or announced for closure from 2005 to 2011. Ontario, on the other hand, has lost only
two plants (Center for Automotive Research 2008b).
The Detroit-Windsor metropolitan area remains heavily dependent on automobile
manufacturing, but the industry's precipitous decline has caused significant economic distress.
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With ten percent of its workforce directly dependent on the Big Three, Windsor is now (2008)
the Canadian city with the highest level of unemployment in the country. In 2007 the region
had 9.9 percent unemployment, with experts calculating that the effective rate, including those
who were no longer seeking work, closer to 14 percent (Center for Automotive Research
2008c). Detroit, similarly dependent on automobile-related employment, suffered as of August
2008 from the second-highest unemployment rate for large municipalities in the United States:
8.8 percent versus a national level of 6.1 percent (Bureau of Labor Statistics).
In the face of such a tremendous shrinkage of the automobile economy, any traditional
economic development measures that might be considered- particularly the recruitment,
retention, or reopening of automobile-related manufacturing facilities- attains a sort of
poignant futility. Many of the closed plants are sure never to reopen: like the older facilities of
the early- and mid-twentieth century located within the city limits of Detroit and abandoned
from the 1950s to the 1970s, they will eventually become the white elephants of their locality,
with demolition and reuse by any available commercial activity an increasingly attractive option
compared to continued deterioration of the closed facility (Ryan and Campo 2007).
Nevertheless, some limited reopenings are being considered; Ford is currently pondering the
return of some 300 jobs to its shuttered Essex plant outside of Windsor. This is fewer jobs than
were lost (900) when the facility closed in 2005, but in the face of a dying market the facility's
potential smaller-scale continuance, achievable only with a public subsidy of $SOM, is being
hailed by Canadian politicians as an economic development success (Vander Doelen 2008).
Industrial retention or reopenings possess symbolic value, but they will almost certainly
recapture only a small fraction of the jobs lost in recent years at a much lower average salary. In
the face of this debilitating reality, other developments are also being pursued by regional and
local leaders across the region to not only create jobs but to demonstrate the continued vitality
and vibrancy of the area. These developments therefore have both economic and symbolic
value. The largest and most significant of these developments are located at the historic
centers of the region- downtown Windsor and downtown Detroit- and they are based in leisure
and tourism, an economy of consumption rather than production and one that is shaping the
economic development measures of cities across North America and around the globe (Judd
2002). Chief among these are sporting facilities, casinos, and hotels.
Local Initiatives: revitalization through exploitation

The construction of the new leisure facilities that dot the Detroit-Windsor region has been
undertaken in the spirit of competition. This competition, however, is somewhat different in
geographical scale and ambition than the automobile industry. Whereas the Big Three are
locked in a global competition to produce innovative products at the lowest cost, Detroit and
Windsor, unable to compete globally or even nationally as leisure destinations, compete with
their regional peer cities, with each other, and with their own suburbs. Like dozens of other
metropolitan areas across North America, they are increasingly locked into a race with
themselves to capture more leisure dollars than the other side of the border.
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The two major fora of the new leisure-based economy of Detroit-Windsor are professional
sports and gambling. Professional sport is uniquely the province of the Detroit metropolitan
area, as Windsor is far too small to hope to capture either a franchise or a stadium. But
competition is fierce in metropolitan Detroit for the stadiums that host the four different
professional teams (hockey, basketball, American football, and baseball) allotted to Detroit by
the respective professional sports organizations. Since 1970 each team has moved at least once
(football twice) to a new facility, with an enormous price tag attached each time, much of
which has been borne by the public. Gambling operates under a somewhat different dynamic
which will be explained shortly, but its public cost is also high.
Stadiums: Ford Field and Comerica Park

While space does not permit a detailed exposition of the development of all of Detroit's recent
sports facilities, Comerica Park {baseball) and Ford Field (American football) merit discussion
because of their great cost ($300 and $500 million respectively) and their highly central location
(at the northern edge of Detroit's downtown). (Crain's Detroit Business 2002) The construction
of these stadiums, replacing two perfectly functioning facilities, one of which was baseball's
oldest remaining professional ballpark, involved substantial public expense: $280 million
dollars, paid for in large part by visitors to Wayne County via a 1 percent tax on hotel and motel
rooms and a two percent tax on car rentals (Crain's Detroit Business 1996a, 1996b). The
arguments made for the stadiums mirrored those made for professional stadiums across the
country: the teams and their owners wanted to increase revenue, while their host
municipalities wanted to increase tourist traffic, spin-off spending, and jobs. Because of its
particularly deteriorated downtown, Detroit also saw the stadiums as urban activators, as they
were located near to existing theaters, restaurants, and hotels. The already existing stadiums,
Tiger Stadium in West Detroit and the Pontiac Silverdome in suburban Pontiac, were
abandoned and left to rot; as of 2008 their futures are still up in the air.
By taxing visitors to construct professional stadiums for private corporations Detroit perceived
itself to be successfully competing with other metropolitan areas elsewhere in North America,
most of whom were also in the process of constructing new football or baseball stadiums
during the 1990s. The substantial economic evidence showing that the returns on such facilities
would be limited was not the issue. What was at stake was regional pride, together with a fear
of being perceived as inferior to other city-regions with new stadiums of their own. The
greatest risk, of course, was the possibility of losing one or more professional teams to another
city; such a nightmare scenario was experienced by cities like Montreal, St. Louis, and Cleveland
as their teams sought greener pastures, and greater revenues, elsewhere. Detroit had avoided
this fate. "The tigers might have left the region to play elsewhere if they hadn't gotten the new
stadium, [a consultant] said. But they hadn't, and the city is richer for it," crowed Crain's Detroit
Business {2000c), a tireless booster of the new stadiums.
Economically, the sports facility race could be argued to be a zero-sum game for the DetroitWindsor area. There was no real net gain of activity, since the teams already existed. Multiplier
effects from the new development doubtless existed, but the increase in restaurants and
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entertainment facilities near the stadiums could only be a paltry contributor against the
massive public investment required to construct the facilities. Nevertheless, local boosters were
tireless, insisting that Comerica Park "symbolized that downtown's rebound was real, and it
bolstered the perception ... that downtown was a place favorable for investing money." (Crain's
Detroit Business 2000a) The economic impact of Comerica Field, estimated as $6.2 B over 20
years, had to be argued against both the impact lost through the closing of Tiger Stadium, and
the loss from investing such funds elsewhere- both impossible to quantify. But the real benefit
of the stadiums was not economic, nor could their true cost or benefit actually be calculated.
Both cost and impact projections were something of a smokescreen for the psychological
benefit that a badly declining area felt that it needed to remain confident and competitive with
other metropolitan areas in North America.
Casinos

Casinos constituted the other major high-visibility economic development constructed in
Detroit-Windsor during the 1990s and 2000s. Like the professional stadiums, the casinos, four
in all, were conceived in a spirit both of regional and local competition. Ultimately, Detroit and
Windsor's casinos competed with each other to capture the leisure dollars of Detroit's wealthy
suburban areas.
The first casino in Detroit-Windsor opened in 1995 along the Windsor waterfront. Originally
titled the Windsor Grand Casino, with 700,000 square feet of space and a 200-room hotel, the
casino immediately drew thousands of visitors per day, mostly from the Detroit side of the river
th
(Crain's Detroit Business 1998). Prior to the September 11 , 2001, attacks, passage between
Detroit and Windsor was quite easy, with only oral confirmation of identity generally proving
sufficient to gain entry either to the USA or to Canada. The success of the Windsor grand
demonstrated that the casino market of the region was strong and worth exploiting.
The solo success of the Windsor casino was not long in attracting envy, and competition, from
the American side of the river. By 2000 not one, but three competing casinos had opened, all of
which were located in the city of Detroit. The obvious aim, with the casinos located near
downtown along the junction of interstate highways, was to capture auto traffic from the
suburbs that might otherwise be heading over the border to spend money in Windsor. At the
same time, passage to and from Canada became more difficult, as US officials tightened entry
regulations by requiring both birth and identity documentation, as well as conducting more
extensive questioning and even random searches of vehicles. Faced with long delays at the
border and the perception of a difficult crossing, many Americans simply stopped crossing the
Windsor border, a trend that of course worked to the advantage of the Detroit casinos.
The casinos worked their gambling magic. By late 2000, the two open Detroit casinos and the
Windsor casino were each generating over a million dollars in revenue daily. "The market is
much more robust -than I had thought," said a casino analyst, who concluded that the four
casinos could eventually generate up to $1.6 billion annually, with up to $200 million of those
revenues being returned to local, state, and provincial governments in taxes. Detroit and
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Windsor were indeed competing on a regional level: "We have buses coming in daily from as
far away as Cleveland," noted one casino operator. But analysts were skeptical, doubting the
competitiveness of such a "cold" region: "This [Detroit-Windsor] isn't a destination market, it's
a local market." (Crain's Detroit Business 2000b)

Conclusions
This short paper can only begin to point out the complexity, challenges, and ultimate futility of
attempting to arrest a global-scale decline with local-level initiatives. Amidst the ebb and flow
of global capital and global goods, the Detroit-Windsor transnational metropolitan area is
fading out of the global picture. Global consumers its citizens may still be, but the region's
global contribution is dropping steadily as its Big Three automotive industries lose market share
and shed employment and profitability. In what can only be described as a deglobalizing region,
the economic, social, and physical consequences_are clearly painful to behold.
Public policy can do little to alter this bitter economic calculus. When Federal subsidies are
required to return a fraction of jobs lost only in 2005, as is the case with Windsor's Essex Ford
plant, the ultimate futility of industrial job retention or regeneration becomes clear. The longterm manufacturing trend is inexorable, and little forward progress is possible, particularly
when the decline is steep and rapid, as it has been since 2000.
The only viable alternative for the automotive industry seems to be the new leisure economy of
recreation and consumption. But in this field, Detroit-Windsor cannot compete on a global or
even on a national scale: there are better-equipped and longer-running competitors in better
locations, and the fundementals of that equation are unalterable. Even with a hundred casinos,
Detroit is unlikely to be able to compete with Atlantic City or Las Vegas. The new leisure
economy has provided new jobs, buildings, and construction activity to boost the spirits of local
leaders and citizens, but the cost has undoubtedly been high. Lost amidst the gleeful revenue
projections of the four casinos is the dispiriting fact that a great amount of this "revenue" is
simply the acquired savings of local residents. The Detroit-Windsor region is essentially taxing
itself at a great discount, with the majority of the revenues generated going to the casino
corporations rather than to the government. Only in the most desperate economic
circumstances would such a self-predatory strategy make sense. It is a sobering reminder of the
lack of other options available to this deindustrializing, deglobalizing region that each casino
has expanded from its original footprint in recent years in a further effort at local competition.
How far the tides of globalization will ultimately retreat in Detroit-Windsor, and what economic
wreckage manufacturing will leave behind as it fades away still remains to be seen.
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